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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis argues that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved 
through power relations between the government and news media in Australia. Informed by 
Foucault’s theorisations of discourse, power and governmentality within a broader cultural 
studies approach, this thesis explores how governmental attempts to stabilise meaning over 
time have been both contested and confirmed within various Australian newspapers. 
 
The analysis will firstly illustrate that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has been 
perpetuated by Australian government attempts to establish terrorism as the primary source 
of insecurity and legislation and war as its appropriate response. I suggest that governmental 
authorities situate themes of terrorism, war and legislation within what I term 
‘epistemological frameworks’, namely ‘otherness’, ‘legitimation’ and ‘exceptionalism’, to 
confirm and perpetuate this particular understanding of insecurity. 
 
By then working through a series of case studies I will argue that ongoing contestation of 
both these themes and frameworks leads to continual shifts in the meaning of insecurity. To 
make this argument, a textual analysis will be undertaken of both newspaper reportage and 
material produced by the government such as advertising campaigns and press releases. This 
analysis will allow me to trace the complex discursive interactions between government and 
media, and illustrate their negotiations of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity over 
time. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the thesis 
 
There is no doubt the events of September 11, 2001 have already evolved into contemporary 
folklore. The tale of a defining moment in modern history begins with the now iconic 
imagery of the burning twin towers, and the heroic characters embodied by emergency 
services personnel. This tale was meant to end with an age-old triumph of good over evil. 
But as with most tales, the story has changed with the telling. Much of this characterisation is 
based on the widespread media coverage of the event. Not many historical events have had 
the same extent of immediate, worldwide, multimedia distribution of imagery and 
commentary. It was only three minutes after the first aeroplane hit the World Trade Centre 
that CNN broke into an advertisement to report the crash, having already fixed cameras on 
the crash site (Anchors and Reporters, 2006). When the second flight crashed into the World 
Trade Centre less than twenty minutes later, several major media organisations were already 
reporting on the first plane crash (Combs, 2002: 250). Millions of not just national, but 
global viewers saw the second impact live on their television or computer screens.   
 
The mediatised events of September 11 have contributed to the creation of a particular 
discourse reflecting on the insecurity that now seemed to ‘lurk’ within the Western world. 
Much westen media anlysis of the event positioned September 11, 2001, as the ‘beginning’ of 
a new age of insecurity. It was the creation of a pivotal faultline in the way the western world 
understood itself (See Mather, 2001: 54; Chafets, 2001: 65; Rodricks, 2001: 4; Fulcher, 2001: 
15). This was highlighted in headlines across global, Westernised media from The Times of 
London’s prediction that it was “The day that changed the modern world”, to Le Parisien’s 
grim suggestion of its implication: “The world is afraid” (See Ludlow, 2001: 2). 
 
The monstrous symbolism of the terrorist attack, the dramatic aesthetic of its mode of 
destruction and more importantly, the ubiquitous possibility of its reoccurrence also created 
a voracious governmental response. This response was reflected in speeches that espoused 
the impossibility of ever ‘going back’ to the pre-September 11 obliviousness of the threat 
lurking in every unattended bag, every lone photographer, and especially, every Muslim 
convert. A discursive change to incorporate insecurity into everyday life has been implicated 
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in a diverse range of governmental actions, from the beginning of military engagment with 
Afghanistan and Iraq, to the imprisonment of an Australian citizen overseas without charge. 
 
It is both media and government communication about ‘Post-September 11 insecurity’ that 
has contributed to an expansively accepted discourse in much of the western world. Much 
academic work, especially in political studies and international relations fields, has instead 
focussed on either defining sources of insecurity, or emphasising the kinds of responses 
available through military or legislative action. For example, as part of the Global Terrorism 
Research Centre, David Wright Neville has focussed on defining changes in political violence 
and the challenges these pose for police and intelligence services. Despite their importance, I 
believe that these kinds of analyses often highlight material forms of securitisation as a 
necessary pre-requisite of the post-September 11 context. My dissatisfaction with this 
response has contributed to the development of this thesis, which suggests that forms of 
discursive contestation are central to public understanding the post-September 11 era. This is 
explored primarily through the discursive interactions between Australian newspaper media 
and governmental authorities.  
 
Thesis argument and research questions: 
 
This main argument of this thesis is that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has 
continually evolved through power relations between the Australian government and news 
media. In forwarding this argument, the thesis will illustrate that governmental authorities 
have represented sources of post-September 11 insecurity through terrorism, as well as their 
own policy-based responses through legislative and military actions. These representations 
will be shown to exist within a dynamic of interaction with media reportage, which has also 
forwarded its own particular understanding of terrorism, legislation and war. Utilising three 
case studies, the research in this thesis will show that both institutions interact through 
power relations that forward either ‘contestation’ of discourse, or forms of ‘confirmation’ 
that legitimate dominant understandings of the post-September 11 context. It is the complex 
negotiation that occur through these discursive interactions that have contributed to the 
continual evolution of the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity. 
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One of the major aims of this study is to forward an analysis of the post-September 11 era 
that takes into consideration the complex cultural interactions that contribute to its meaning. 
I wish to forward these continually changing representations of post-September 11 insecurity 
as fundamental to the way politicised actions like war or legislation are enacted. The rationale 
for this study is to forward an alternative to more dominant political analyses of post-
September 11 insecurity that present political actions as the contributing factor to 
understanding of insecurity. With these aims in mind, the primary research questions 
framing this thesis are: 
 
a) How has Australian governmental discourse in the media represented the sources of, 
and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity? 
b) How have these governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity been 
either confirmed or contested in Australian newspaper reportage? 
c) What effects has media negotiation of governmental discourse had to understandings 
of the sources of and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity in the public 
sphere? 
 
To investigate these research questions I will firstly illustrate how governmental discourses 
have attempted to create the conditions for a politically expedient representation of post-
September 11 insecurity. To do this the thesis will discuss the ways in which themes of 
terrorism, legislation and war have been represented according to particular frameworks of 
meaning. Secondly, the thesis will explore the representation and negotiation of these 
meanings through interaction between news media and governmental authorities. This will 
occur through case studies used to illustrate how both media and governmental authorities 
perpetuate representations of events and actions to dominate understanding of post-
September 11 insecurity. These case studies will employ a textual analysis of Australian 
newspaper articles and governmental communications to illustrate the use of particular 
epistemological frameworks by governmental authorities, and their negotiation within 
Australian newspaper reportage. 
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The theoretical aspect of the research will focus on three ‘epistemological frameworks’ 
through which governmental discourse has ascribed particular meanings to themes of 
terrorism, legislation and war. While these epistemological frameworks will be delineated 
further in the next chapter, I have illustrated that governmental discourse has situated 
terrorism within an epistemological framework of ‘Otherness’, anti-terror legislation has 
been situated within a framework of ‘legitimation’, and war has been situated within a 
framework of ‘exceptionalism’. The thesis takes these more abstract epistemological 
frameworks as the starting point for its analysis of the ways in which a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity has taken on particular meanings. This epistemological framing will 
be analysed within understandings of the heterogenous interactions that enable this framing 
to be negotiated and change.  
 
I have defined these epistemological frameworks along a similar theoretical framework as 
Michel Foucault’s conception of the episteme. Epistemological frameworks maintain a ‘way 
of knowing’ by continually referring to a particular meaning underlying a discourse. They 
operate on a more abstract level, constantly referring meaning to previous knowledge the 
audience already has about a particular discourse. This occurs because they refer the 
audience to broad, contextual meanings that are constantly perpetuated within culture, such 
as ‘nationhood’ or ‘Australianness’. This epistemological framing assists particular cultural 
actors to control discourses in ways that are beneficial or conducive to the maintenance of 
their power in the public sphere. If, for example, governmental authorities continually 
dominate a particular understanding of post-September 11 insecurity, they can also suggest 
that their actions are most pertinent in response. The continuous repetition or referral to this 
framing becomes similar to notions of ‘common sense’ because it is a constant referent that 
does not have to be spoken to be understood as rational, or ‘true’. Thus, maintaining a 
particular epistemological framing of discursive themes also suggests a particular relation to 
power.  
 
Methodology of thesis: 
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Extending from the theoretical chapters, the primary thesis argument will be explored 
through research constructed around the specific case studies.  I have chosen to utilise case 
studies because I will be more readily able to draw out discrete discursive themes about the 
sources of, and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity from a condensed case study. 
Rather than attempting to discuss discursive themes from the myriad of historical events that 
occurred within the time period from 2001, the case studies examine a particular event that 
illustrates what I believe is a typical Australian governmental representation of post-
September 11 insecurity. These case studies will illustrate the negotiation of a discourse of 
post-September 11 insecurity through themes of terrorism, legislation and war.  
 
The broader methodological approach prioritises the discursive interactions that allow both 
government and media to produce, maintain and contest various representations of post-
September 11 insecurity over time. I have chosen to posit this approach within an 
exploration of how governmental discourse has framed themes of terrorism, legislation and 
war according to particular epistemological frameworks.  These frameworks are shown to be 
part of governmental attempts to maintain a hegemonic representation of the sources of, 
and responses to, post-September 11 insecurity. The case studies will examine these 
frameworks within broader cultural interactions, specifically the power relations between 
media and government that serve to negotiate particular representations of meaning. 
 
The methodological approach utilises textual analysis of materials gathered primarily through 
reportage in Australian mainstream metropolitan newspapers, and secondly through 
Australian governmental communications initiatives. This refers to the practical method of 
collecting materials and identifying the ways in which recurrent discursive themes of 
terrorism, legislation and war were represented in the language of governmental 
communication and media reportage. The texts, as representative of the discourses, are 
explored within an understanding of the complex and inter-connected relations between 
cultural actors that serve to contest, confirm or mediate these representations of meaning at 
the time of utterance in the public sphere. I have therefore defined text as the 
documentation of historical, material and cultural context. I have utilised textual analysis as 
the primary method of research because it allows the connotative interpretation of the 
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newspaper and governmental texts. Texts cannot be separated from the social, political and 
economic practices that create the circumstances (and conditions) of their production and 
consumption. This suggests that understanding of texts differs from discourse because they 
are a systematised and localised organisation of discourse. I have also defined representation 
as providing a link between language, text and context to create meaning. This definition is 
used to highlight the thesis’ understanding of the interdependence of phenomena and 
language (Lewis, 2005: 6).  
 
The textual analysis focuses on the way language facilitates representation of terrorism, 
legislation and war. This analysis will survey the language used in headlines, the content of 
news articles, as well as the language conveyed in the materials of governmental 
communications initiatives. This focus on language will be to explore either the strategic use 
of epistemological framing within governmental discursive themes or the negotiation of the 
representation of these themes within media reportage. This will be completed by identifying 
patterns in the use of language to represent the discursive themes. Thus the textual analysis 
will identify the strategic use of language, such as the repetition of emotive words or 
phrasing, the connotations of language towards particular epistemological frames of 
meaning, language critical of other cultural actors, or language used to claim ‘fact’ or ‘truth’.  
 
Similarly to Foucault’s archaeological method, the textual analysis will explore what set of 
circumstances and relations allowed those particular statements to appear, pointing out their 
instability and possibilities for transformation. Exploring how a particular representation is 
‘suggested and suggesting’ through these relations implies a general set of questions. In the 
thesis these questions ask: 
o what is the social or cultural context of the particular representation; 
o where and who the representation comes from;  
o what are the motivations for making the particular choice of representation, and: 
o what are the possible effects of using this representation, for both the audience, and 
the various interests of those involved (See Fairclough, 2003).  
The analysis will illustrate structures of occurrence and re-occurrence of elements within 
discourse, and will illustrate certain relationships between institutions and use of language. 
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This allows the research to elucidate how certain representations are maintained or 
appropriated according to how a particular discourse is agreed upon or contested (Burton, 
1979:16). These particular questions are utilised in the analysis of textual representations in 
the case studies, especially when analysing why one representation was selected over another. 
This relates to the broader thesis argument by illustrating the way representations of post-
September 11 insecurity evolve is contingent on power relations between institutions and 
their discourses (See Fairclough, 2003:56).  
 
I will focus on several aspects of the power relations between media and government to 
negotiate discourse: firstly, the critical examination of governmental discourse within news 
reportage, secondly, agreement upon governmental representations of insecurity within 
media reportage, and lastly, the role that engagement with media criticism and other cultural 
actors might have in contributing to any change in governmental discourse. This aspect of 
the textual analysis focuses on both the competitive and the consensual relations that occur 
between government and media and can affect meaning making. This reflects the primary 
thesis argument because it suggests that different cultural actors have battled to represent a 
dominant meaning through strategic uses of language. It also suggests that negotiation 
through their politicised relations allows the representation of insecurity to change.  
 
Samples used for textual analysis: 
 
The media texts analysed will be comprised mostly of mainstream metropolitan newspaper 
reportage on governmental discourse. This choice is justified by the fact that these 
newspapers are the most numerous, widely distributed and read print media. This suggests 
that because a majority of media consumers are accessing these media, this reportage might 
be influential in setting or maintaining a mainstream news agenda.  As a print-format media, 
newspaper reportage is also most easily accessible and reproducible for the purposes of this 
project. The newspapers referred to in the textual analysis within the case studies will be 
comprised of one national newspaper The Australian, two major newspapers in Melbourne, 
The Age and The Herald Sun and two major newspapers in Sydney, The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The Daily Telegraph. I chose these newspapers because they are the major daily 
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newspapers read in the most densely populated cities in Australia.  I chose media 
organisations that closely matched governmental communications in terms of resources 
available to disseminate information. The newspapers selected are the most widely 
disseminated in Australia, which suggests they would have a larger audience reach and 
potential discursive influence in framing a news agenda. This would enable the analysis to 
suggest more convincingly that these media are able to effectively contest governmental 
discourse in a way that might influence governmental authorities to change their 
representations, or indeed, for an evolution of the meaning of a discourse of post-September 
11 insecurity to occur. 
 
The sample of articles chosen for analysis from the five newspapers is organised through use 
of the Factiva database. Factiva is a database system that provides free-text and limit-based 
search and organisation of full text news from major newspapers and internationally. The 
sample of articles for each case study will be chosen according to a limit-search conducted 
on the period for which the case study was deemed to be a ‘news event’. I judged a news 
event as the time period for which the case study topic received five or more articles per day 
within a Factiva limit-search. The date-limit is set at every year after 2001 until 2008, and the 
word-limit is the name of the case study, for example, ‘Abu Ghraib’, or ‘Anti-terror 
law/legislation’. The limit-search then allows the database to show the number of articles 
that appeared over one year, which is used to build the sample of articles for analysis.  The 
search is then narrowed to only include news reports and opinion editorial in the sample. 
Some case studies have used multiple samples, such as the David Hicks case study, which 
fluctuated in media popularity from the year 2001 to 2008. The obvious exception to this 
sample was the Abu Ghraib case study, which utilises US media in its analysis. The 
justification for the use of US-based media reportage was to provide the context for the 
Australian governmental representation of the mostly-American response to Abu Ghraib. In 
choosing US-based media, the sample is much narrower, and chosen only according to 
whether a particular article about an American governmental response had been referred to 
in Australian media, or by Australian governmental authorities. This sample was also 
organised utilising a Factiva limit-based search. 
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The materials used to complete the textual analysis of the governmental discourse include: 
press releases, advertising initiatives and website material specific to the content of the case 
study. These materials were collected through use of limit searches on what I deemed key 
governmental websites, particularly, the Prime Minister’s Media database, as well as the 
websites of other governmental authorities, the Australian Parliamentary Library and the 
websites for specific governmental campaigns, such as the Be Alert, Not Alarmed campaign. 
The limit searches were conducted in the same way as conducted on Factiva. A date-limit 
search of one year was conducted on governmental media databases with the text-limit being 
the name of the case study. The materials were limited to press releases, speeches and 
interviews, so the sample contained materials mostly likely seen by the mainstream media. 
The voices of governmental authorities as heard in interviews, ‘door-stop’ commentary, 
speeches and various other public communication will also be utilised to suggest the ways in 
which these strategic representations have occurred within broader relations of power. 
Furthermore, quotations from governmental authorities within media reportage itself will 
therefore be considered within broader analysis of the ways governmental discourse has 
been negotiated or confirmed by other cultural actors. These materials will be utilised to 
suggest how governmental authorities have strategically represented certain discursive 
themes within particular epistemological frameworks of meaning.  
 
Theoretical context of the thesis 
 
In prioritising discourses about insecurity to analyse representations of the post-September 
11 context, I have utilised the work of particular political and cultural theorists. In this 
section I will consider previous analysis of the post-September 11 context. I have not 
considered this a formal literature review, as I have critically examined particular texts at 
pertinent points of discussion throughout the thesis. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile at this 
point to discuss major theorists and debates that I have both contested and utilised to 
formulate my thesis. 
 
While the focus of my thesis prioritises a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, it is a 
framework of maintaining security that has long been the subject of political studies analysis. 
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Insecurity has often been represented as the residual effect of political relationships or 
actions. For example, the United Kingdom’s Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political 
Violence maintains research into the determinants, manifestations and consequences of 
terrorism with one of their major aims being to “contribute to the enhancement of human 
security” (CSTPV, 2007). Much of this work is dedicated to evaluation of risk and the 
psychology of terrorism and terrorists. What this suggests is that actions such as terrorism or 
the material actions of government have an effect on how insecure citizens are. Insecurity 
thus becomes an implied concept used to propel notions of national security, rather than the 
cultural frameworks that perpetuate these understandings. 
 
This kind of analysis has contributed to understanding of terrorism as ‘embodied risk’, and is 
often used to assess government regulation or prohibition. The compounding of both more 
abstract and embodied risk has led to theorisation of risk as non-specific, invisible and 
uncontrollable threat ‘embodied’ through specific political actions. The term ‘risk’ has been 
more widely theorised than insecurity, especially by Ulrich Beck (2002) and Anthony 
Giddens (1990). Beck has theorised the existence of a ‘risk society’, where physical risks are 
created within capitalist social systems by institutions that are meant to manage and control 
“risky activity” (Beck, 1992: 21). Terrorism forms part of a ‘risk society’ because globalised 
modernity has created unnatural, human-made uncertainties and hazards beyond any 
national or cultural boundaries (Beck, 2002: 41). Beck has attempted to include discussion of 
the media in his analysis of ‘risk’, suggesting that “the mass media and the scientific and legal 
professions in charge of defining risks become key social and political positions” in 
confirming the existence of risk. Simon Cottle (1999: 18) has criticised this simplification of 
the mass media’s role because it ignores the inter-relationship between relevant institutions 
and how their different endeavours mutually inform discursive practises.  
 
Taking Beck’s analysis as a starting point, Paul James and John Handmer (2007: 120) have 
argued that a fundamental shift in the communication of risk has emerged, particularly in the 
context of the war on terror. They (2007: 120) suggest that theorisations of a risk society 
“become part of a tendency to take risk as an all-embracing category”. Therefore little 
attention is given to the different formations of risk. By naming a particular kind of society 
in terms of risk, Handmer and James argue that Beck becomes caught in an “epochal style 
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argument” (Handmer et al, 2007: 122). Instead, prior emphasis on risk assessment is being 
replaced in the September 11 age with the manipulation of culturally-based understanding of 
security. Handmer and James (2007: 120) illustrate that Western governments are now 
focussing on “the novelty and radical emergence of terrorism-as-risk, in part ignoring history 
and concentrating on the symptoms to maintain a continuing sense of danger”. 
 
Handmer and James’ analysis forms part of an important body of work that has more 
recently focussed on how threat is utilised by governmental authorities to legitimise their 
security actions. Most pertinent to this study is Anthony Burke’s In Fear of Security (2001) and 
Beyond Security: Ethics and Violence (2007). These texts have suggested the politics of fear 
implicated in governmental ‘security’ projects. Burke has used a Foucauldian methodological 
approach to suggest that the ‘epistemic realism’ that has traditionally framed security studies 
analyses has not provided a historically specific approach to understandings of security, nor 
an account of the relations between discourse and power (Burke, 2001: xxxi). Following 
Burke’s approach, Matthew McDonald suggests in Constructing Insecurity (2005) that security 
should be viewed as a fluid, social construction (2005: 298). McDonald suggests that 
security’s meaning does not have a fixed meaning across time and space and that “definition 
is necessarily wedded to specific discourse” (2005: 299). 
 
Similarly to Burke and McDonald, I have utilised a discursive approach to conceptualising 
security. Burke and McDonald have emphasised the actions of government in their analysis. 
My approach differs in that it positions a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity as 
constituted through the complex discursive interactions between media and government. 
This has allowed me to argue that power relations between the two institutions have 
contributed to evolutions in the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This distinguishes 
my thesis from analyses of media and government that situate the two institutions as 
separate negative forces waging ideological war against helpless citizens. Many analyses of 
the media in the post-September 11 context have positioned their representations as purely 
reflective of hegemonic meaning. Even more liberal analyses such as Brigitte Nacos’ Mass 
Mediated Terrorism (2002) suggest that the media are removed from processes of meaning 
making. Nacos (2002: 5) argues that:  
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As long as the terrorists offer visuals and sound bites, drama, threats and human 
interest tales, the news media will report—and actually over report—on their actions 
at the expense of other and more important news.  
 
Nacos suggests that media attention towards terrorism fulfils a propaganda purpose because 
over-reportage of terrorism—and the associated overreaction by audiences—make relatively 
small political groups seem much more powerful than their militaristic or economic reality. 
While Nacos’ work on the capacity of the media messages to influence public perception is 
important, it neglects to situate that influence within a dynamic of relations that allows media 
representations to evolve.  As Lewis (2005: 5) argues:  
 
The emphasis on the media’s productive capacity and institutional status has tended 
to rarefy the various industries, technologies, techniques and professional personnel 
and isolate them from their political and cultural context of consumption and 
meaning making. 
 
Noam Chomsky has been particularly critical of mass media systems tending to comply with 
powerful interests of social elites. He (2002: 14) argues that the media and government are 
complicit in a ‘propaganda model’.  Both media and government “work on the assumption 
that only a small elite can understand the common interests” and these belief systems are 
used to manufacture the consent of citizenry to governmental control (Chomsky, 2002: 14). 
Stemming from this model, many studies of media and government representation have 
suggested they are complicit in ‘duping’ the public into dominant social understandings. 
 
In the post-September 11 context, Karim Karim has taken a similar approach by suggesting 
that media and government communication have created continually negative media 
references to Islam. This has led to the creation of a general impression that the religion 
promotes extremism and that a practising Muslim anywhere in the world can only be 
represented as an “Islamic terrorist” (Karim, 2002: ix). This argument has been made in an 
attempt to circumvent the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis forwarded by political scientist 
Samuel Huntington, who suggested that cultural difference would be the cause of much 
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future conflict.  He controversially suggested that the West must be accommodating if 
possible to other cultures, but confrontational if necessary to secure its superiority on the 
world stage (Huntington, 1997: 47). 
 
Karim and Tariq Ali have instead suggested that the power of institutions such as media and 
government stem from negative representations of the ‘enemy’. The citizenry accepts these 
representations because “a people strongly committed to the ideal of peace but 
simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe that the fault for any such 
disruption of their ideal lies with Others” (Karim, 2002: 56). These arguments have been 
sourced from post-colonial theorist Edward Said’s conception of Orientalism. In his seminal 
texts Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993), Said suggested that the negative 
representation of minorities as ‘Other’ continued after decolonisation, and is still very much 
a part of the contemporary world. Said’s texts explore how Western literary and media 
representations have manufactured the Middle East and Islam as ‘Other’. Said argues that 
simplistic binary oppositions between the ‘superior West’ and the ‘inferior Orient’ have often 
been applied as a “discourse of knowledge” within literary and administrative texts, used to 
“prove the truth” of the Orient’s inferiority in a post-colonial era (Said, 1978: 35). 
 
Said’s work has informed the work of some scholars who have analysed the representation 
of Muslims by both media and government in the post-September 11 context. Scholars in 
Australia like Scott Poynting, Howard Brasted and Fethi Mansouri have been especially 
influential in extending Edward Said’s conceptions of Orientalism in the post-September 11 
age. This has been taken up especially by journalism scholar Peter Manning, who has argued 
that “dog-whistle journalism” has illustrated how reporting on terrorism, refugees and ethnic 
crime encourages governmental allusions to ‘the Middle eastern menace’ (See Manning, 
2004). For both Manning and Scott Poynting, the media and the government appear 
complicit in the representation of Muslims and Middle Eastern asylum seekers as a threat to 
the nation. The heady mix of post-September 11 insecurity, Middle Eastern asylum seekers 
and a new cultural focus on securitisation was seen to emanate through “a powerful formula 
from populist columnists and opportunist politicians, equating terrorism, ethnic crime gangs, 
Islam, misogynist violent crime, Muslim ethnic-religious leaders, Middle Eastern asylum 
seekers and other folk-devils” (Poynting and Noble, 2003: 47). The sense of complicity 
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between media and government in conceptions of dog-whistle politics belies the complexity 
of disseminating particular meaning to audiences. Utilising this conception of representation, 
governments, the media and the audience all harmonise in producing and understanding the 
same representation of meaning.  
 
Like much of the criticism levelled at representations of ‘Otherness’, analysis of Muslims in 
the post-September 11 context has often simply illustrated how government or media has 
presented a dominant discourse without forwarding possibilities for change. This conception 
positions media and audience as purely reflective of governmental action because it assumes 
the successful dissemination and reception of a political dog whistle. Within this conception 
government, media and audience harmonise in producing and understanding the same 
representation of meaning. This is problematic because it suggests that every ‘dog whistle’ is 
successfully disseminated. If the public, which was unaware of the ideological undertones of 
a political message, but supported it nonetheless, there is never an escape from a particular 
representation of meaning.  
 
The suggestion here is to move away from an understanding of a monolithic media injecting 
ideas into the unthinking masses, or the idea that government and media work either 
together or separately to instil the same hegemonic meanings into culture. Instead my thesis 
will show that power relations between governmental authorities and the media have 
contributed to continual evolutions in the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. While 
certain groups may have greater political, organisational or economic resources to present 
their discourses more forcefully, representations are constantly evolving because they 
become subject to discursive interaction between different cultural actors. All discourses are 
contested, subjective and reproduced according to the complex cultural interactions of 
cultural actors within certain historical and political contexts.  
 
One of the major contributions of this thesis to cultural research will be to map the 
development of post-September 11 insecurity as a discourse by highlighting the changes that 
occur through interactions between cultural actors. It highlights relationships of power with 
a view to providing a space for change—and even the total annihilation—of the dominance 
of particular discourses. This is a unique contribution to the cultural studies field in which 
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this thesis positions itself. The thesis actually illustrates the complex discursive interactions 
that occur between cultural actors, mapping their effects on a particular discourse over time. 
This thesis also works broadly to illustrate the representation of post-September 11 
insecurity within complex relationships between different cultural actors in the public sphere. 
This differs from the analyses that I have forwarded in this section, because it illustrates the 
complexity of meaning-making processes, rather than attempting to ‘pin down’ the multitude 
of representations about the post-September 11 age to one dominant meaning or institution. 
To do otherwise would allow ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ to become a discursive 
monolith, devoid of opportunity for negotiation by other cultural actors. Instead this thesis 
is concerned with the manifestation of discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war 
relating to post-September 11 insecurity, and tracing their evolution once they are exposed 
to the negotiations of cultural actors within the public sphere.  
 
Historical Context of the thesis:  
 
In tracing the development of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, we must also 
consider the relationship between governmental discourse and media reportage within 
particular historical and cultural contexts. I will now turn to an exploration of the broader 
historical and political events associated with a post-September 11 era of terrorism and war 
to illustrate the context through which this thesis has been structured. This will also position 
the choices I have made for the thesis’ case studies within a particular historical context. This 
is important because it illustrates the inter-relations between physical action and their 
representation through discourse.  
 
Before September 11, 2001, ‘terrorism’ was often understood in the western world as being 
perpetrated in third world countries by groups with singular political aims such as the PLO 
(Palestine Liberation Organisation), or otherwise aberrational individuals like Theodore 
Kaczynski (the Unabomber).  The events of September 11 were a surprise in many ways—
this was the first ‘enemy’ attack on American soil since 1941, it occurred within a time of 
declared international peace, and was perpetrated by a group who had not yet registered in 
the international media as a major threat (See Lewis, 2005). The symbolism of the attack also 
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reverberated around the globe. Within an accepted worldwide discourse of the United States 
as an economic superpower with unprecedented military capabilities and diplomatic power, 
the events of September 11 could be seen as an attack not only on a nation but also on an 
accepted consensus of knowledge. Previous discourse failed to describe this historical and 
discursive rupture and thus, political pundits, the media and governments alike pronounced 
the events an “historical turning point” (See Chomsky, 2001) and even, the “beginning of a 
new era” (See Bush, 2001).  
 
The subsequent relation of these events to a discourse of ‘Post-September 11 insecurity’ has 
inspired a level of global political action that associates terrorism with the very worst 
national fears, even in nations where terrorism was not previously an ongoing political 
consideration. This context of threat has had differing implications on the political and 
cultural life of particular western nations, as well as their international relations. The 
discourse of ‘post–September 11 insecurity’ has also been adapted and utilised by different 
nations to refer to their own particular nationalistic fears. For example, in Australia, 
historical fears associated with uncontrolled immigration have been re-conceptualised in the 
post-September 11 age to suggest that ‘illegal’ and refugee migration might exacerbate the 
potential for terrorist cells to be initiated in Australia. Thus ‘Post-September 11 insecurity’ 
has worked as a legitimating discourse because it complements existing political discourses 
concerning national fears, but in ways that suggest ‘new threats’ with the need for ‘new 
responses’.  
 
In placing these representations within an historical context, we must address US defined the 
events of September 11. While Australia is the focus of this thesis, the US government’s 
responses to insecurity provide the historical and political context through which Australia 
addressed its own military and legislative responses. In the US, the post-September 11 threat 
was not represented through the acts of an elite group of mostly Saudi Arabian attackers. 
Instead, US President George W. Bush declared that the attacks were an ‘act of war’, not 
from another nation, but from another ideology (See George W Bush’s, 2001). Lipset (1997: 
vii) suggests that this discourse referred to an existing political view that the US had sole 
responsibility for defending ‘freedom’ as part of their republican heritage. The attacks on 
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September 11 were defined by the political assertion that a specific group was refusing to 
acknowledge, or communally participate in, America’s—and thus ‘worldwide’—democratic 
principles (See Agamben, 2005).  
 
A discourse constructed around protection of worldwide democratic freedom framed initial 
US response to the September 11 attacks. This occurred firstly through the national 
introduction of the Patriot Act (the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) in 2001  
(Preserving Life and Liberty, 2007). The act increased the power of law enforcement 
agencies to access and investigate citzens’ personal communication, and medical and 
financial records. It also increased the power of officials to detain and deport non-
citizensand immigrants who were suspected of terrorism-related acts (Preserving Life and 
Liberty, 2007).  
 
On an international scale, the response to the September 11 attacks was almost immediately 
militaristic, with US Congress authorising the use of ‘all necessary military force’ against the 
perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, their sponsors and those who protected them in a 
global ‘war on terror’ (Combs, 2002: 250) [1]. Bush also gained international support for a 
military strike against Afghanistan from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, China and Russia 
(Combs, 2002: 250). The officially-stated purpose of the Afghan invasion was to target al 
Qaeda members, and to punish the Taliban government in Afghanistan for providing 
support to al Qaeda (9/11 Commission Report, 2004) [2]. Less than one month after the 
September 11 attacks, on October 7, 2001, the ‘Enduring Freedom’ camapign began.  US 
and British forces attacked thirty Taliban military targets in Afghanistan including airfields 
and troop concentrations facing the Northern Alliance [3].  Australia, along with Canada, 
France and Germany sent military support.  
 
Attacking Taliban and al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan would not be the end of the ‘war 
on terror’. As this thesis will show, a discursive theme of war framed governmental 
communication about responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Though Vice President 
Dick Cheney had previously stated no evidence had been found linking Iraq to Osama bin 
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Laden or al Qaeda, two days after the Afghan campaign began, the United Nations 
Ambassador for the US, John Negroponte, presented a letter to his Iraqi counterpart, 
Mohammed Douri. It warned that if Iraq aided the Taliban, used weapons of mass 
destruction or suppressed opposition groups, “there will be a military strike against you and 
you will be defeated” (Combs et al, 2002: 298). Iraq’s then deputy Prime Minister, Tariq 
Aziz, told London’s Daily Telegraph he expected the US and Britain to use the ‘war on terror’ 
as an excuse to attack Iraq (Attack on Iraq, 2001).  He also predicted that such an attack 
would break up America’s international coalition (Attack on Iraq, 2001). Aziz would be 
proven correct less than a year later, when a tenuous link between ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ and Osama bin Laden would play into an increasingly strong US governmental 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
On September 10, 2002, in a speech seemingly timed for maximum dramatic effect, 
President George W. Bush presented ‘secret intelligence’ findings to the UN General 
Assembly. He alleged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass 
destruction and had to be disarmed “by any means necessary” (President’s remarks, 2002).  
In response, Iraq allowed UN weapons inspectors back into the country in 2002 (Timeline, 
2002). Nonetheless, the US government continued to allege  Iraq’s ability to make weapons 
of mass destruction, as well as nuclear weapons (Top Bush officials, 2002). Finally, President 
Bush also claimed Saddam Hussein had personal and diplomatic links to al Qaeda, and that 
these “long-standing ties” were standing in the way of creating a “free society” in Iraq (Bush 
stands, 2004). These efforts to secure UN support for an invasion of Iraq in the form of an 
international sanction did not succeed. Nations that had previously supported the US in its 
strike against Afghanistan, such as France, Russia and Germany, publicly distanced 
themselves from the impending conflict in Iraq (Germany rules out, 2003).  
 
There was resounding international condemnation of the possibility of a strike. Worldwide 
protests about the Iraq war simultaneously held in 2003 were the biggest display of anti-war 
sentiment since the Vietnam War. A rally of three million people in Rome on February 15, 
2003, was listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the largest anti-war rally ever (Largest anti-
war, 2006). Despite the protests, the US formed a ‘Coaliton of the Willing’ with 30 
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signatories, including Australia. Unlike the attack on Afghanistan, many Western nations did 
not support the Iraq invasion. The US received military and diplomatic support from the 
United Kingdom, Australia and to a lesser extent, Italy and Japan. On March 20, 2003, the 
US began military operations in Iraq, attacking Baghdad as part of ‘Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’ [4].  It took less than two months for Baghdad to fall. On May 1, 2003, President 
Bush declared “mission accomplished” (Bush, 2003). American coalition forces captured 
President Hussein without resistance in 2003, in a cellar in his hometown in Tikrit and he 
was subsequently tried and found guilty of a series of war crimes in relation to the deaths of 
148 Sh’ites. (Saddam Hussein, 2003). Hussien was hanged on December 30, 2006. 
 
In the aftermath of the initial US military operations, a Coaliton Provisional Authority (CPA) 
was appointed and granted limited powers to form an interim government. This terminated 
the Ba’ath party’s—and Saddam Hussein’s—governmental power (Combs, 2002, 55). In 
2005, Iraq held its first elections and the Iraqi interim government was replaced [5]. Despite 
the relative ease with which Hussein was forced from government, US military operations 
continue in Iraq because of continuing civil and political unrest. Insurgent groups have 
maintained anti-US attacks (as well as Sunni and Shi’ite tensions) around Mosul, Tikrit and 
Fallujah using ambush tactics, suicide bombings and explosives to target coalition forces and 
checkpoints. The number of Iraqi civilians killed during the military campaign cannot be 
confirmed and estimates range from the 30,000 that the US military confirm to 100,000 
quoted in a Lancet report (United States DoD, 2007; Burnham et al, 2003). At the time of 
writing, the US Department of Defence had confirmed that almost 4000 US military 
personnel have been killed in combat (United States DoD, 2007).  
 
While Australian governmental discourse about post-September 11 insecurity has had a 
slightly different resonance to that of the US, it is nonetheless discursively grouped within 
globalised understandings of the post-September 11 age. Australia’s involvement in the 
Coalition of the Willing has not focussed primarily on military operations, though Australia 
has committed over 1500 troops to combat zones in Afghanistan and Iraq (Department of 
Defence, 2007). Instead, the Australian government has defined its own nationalistic 
discourses, which have acted in tandem with globalised understanding of the events of 
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September 11, 2001. To this end Australian political action and legislation has revolved 
around thwarting the potential of terrorists to mount an attack on Australian soil.  
 
The ‘Bali bombing’ of October 12, 2002, was seen as ‘Australia’s September 11’ because 88 
of the 202 casualties were Australian (Churchman, 2003). The relative closeness of the two 
attacks seemed to solidify the power of the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity in 
Australia. The Bali bombings seemed to be the catalyst for a number of legislative changes 
on home soil. Prime Minister John Howard argued that the Australian government and 
citizens would have to adjust to meet this “new and unpredictable threat” (Federal Liberal 
Party, 2006). Greater importance was therefore placed on developing the counter-terrorist 
capabilities of Australia and regional neighbours in the areas of border control, law 
enforcement, transport security, intelligence, finance regulation and emergency management 
(Federal Liberal Party, 2006). An increase in defence funding totalling $27 billion was 
promised over a decade as the biggest and most specific long-term funding commitment to 
defence in 20 years (Federal Liberal Party, 2006). Over $3 billion in additional funding was 
also committed to intelligence agencies to give them greater jurisdiction in the anti-terror 
laws to detain and prosecute potential or suspected terrorists (Federal Liberal Party, 2006).  
 
This framework of legislative action was also incorporated into justification of Australia’s 
military responses to a new ‘terrorist threat’. Three more high profile terrorist attacks 
solidified this global terrorist threat to Australia. A second attack in Bali occurred on 
October 1, 2005, after a series of explosions at two popular tourist sites in south Bali (Bali 
terror attack, 2006). Four Australians died in the bombings, and 19 were injured (Bali terror 
attacks, 2006). Europeans and tourists were also targeted in 2004, when a series of 
coordinated bombings struck the commuter train system in Madrid, Spain. The bombings 
were timed to occur three days before Spain's general elections, killing 191 people and 
wounding over 2000. An official investigation concluded that the attacks were directed by an 
al Qaeda ‘inspired’ terrorist cell, suggesting that the threat of terrorism was now being used 
by other political groups (Nash, 2006). 
It was the ‘London bombings’ that widened the discursive frame of reference for the 
‘terrorist other’. On July 7, four young men—three of them Britons of Pakistani origin who 
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grew up in northern English suburbs—exploded four bombs in separate underground train 
systems and buses (London attacks, 2006). Fifty-six people were killed in the attacks, and 
700 people were injured, including one Australian. The apparent suicide bombing  was 
considered by the British media to the largest organised terrorist act in the United Kingdom 
since Lockerbie (London attacks, 2006) [7].  
 
In much subsequent media commentary, this attack was seen as the consequence of another 
new threat in the Post-September 11 age, where even citizens could be seen to be working 
against the interests of their nation. These ‘others in our own backyard’ were seen as an 
extension of the threat posed by Muslim extremists internationally, and lent credibility to the 
clash of civilisations thesis that suggested that ethinic and religious difference would cause 
ideologically-based warfare (See Huntington, 1997). A later study of 373 captured jihadists 
who planned terrorist acts in Europe and North America showed a quarter were Western 
European nationals (Button, 2005). The study also found that these potential terrorists had 
two traits in common: they were second generation migrants and male (Button, 2005). While 
some suggested that tensions were simmering because large numbers of unemployed and 
alienated groups of immigrants were finding ways to root their anger in extremism, others 
suggested the way to combat the issue was to create a stronger and more enforceable sense 
of national identity. This Australian governmental perspective became prominent within 
suggestions of the need to continue a military presence in Iraq to ‘assist’ them to overcome 
the sectarian violence that fuelled terrorism. This military support has not wavered at the 
time of writing. 
 
Structure of the thesis: 
 
This section will provide an overview of the contents of the thesis. After this introductory 
section, Part Two of the thesis will provide a definition of insecurity in the post-September 
11 historical context. In Part Two, I will refer to the ways Australian governmental 
authorities have represented insecurity’s meaning, as well as the negotiation of that discourse 
within media reportage. My definition of insecurity will stress that meaning is not achieved 
through domination by specific institutions, but is realised through a diffusion of different 
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discursive interactions (Fairclough, 2003: 17).  Within this section, Chapter Three “Defining 
the terms: Government, media and post-September 11 insecurity” argues that the definition of 
insecurity is subjective, politicised and contested by various cultural actors. This is because 
insecurity is defined through the heterogenous discursive interactions between cultural actors 
attempting to forward a hegemonic representation of its meaning. I will explore this 
definition of insecurity by discussing the ways in which power relations between media and 
government contribute to changes within the language that represents its meaning. Chapter 
Four, Defining the use: Government, media and the Be Alert, Not Alarmed campaign”, will provide a 
case study to illustrate the discursive interactions that contribute to evolutions in discourse. 
The case study explores the representation of Australia’s national security hotline by 
newspaper media and governmental authorities to illustrate the power relations that have 
negotiated the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
In suggesting the ‘meaning’ of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, this thesis 
explores both the represented sources of, and responses to insecurity. Part Three of the 
thesis explores the way sources of insecurity have been represented by governmental 
authorities. Part Three of the thesis takes from both US and Australian governmental 
political actions to discuss representations of terrorism as the source of post-September 11 
insecurity in Australia. Within this section, chapter five: “Representations of the ‘terrorist other as a 
source of insecurity” describes the epistemological framework of otherness that situates 
understanding of terrorism as a source of insecurity.  Otherness suggests a sense of 
opposition to unified Australian values and beliefs. This situates the threat that terrorists (as 
embodied ‘others’) pose to the unity of the nation. It continually refers the audience to 
understandings of nationhood and its protection against those who do not immediately fit 
within its description. The ‘other’ is everything that ‘we’ are not and in this way, 
governments can go on to justify the various responses needed to deal with this threat to the 
nation. Therefore this discussion of otherness should be seen as connected to subsequent 
analysis of governmental actions in response to insecurity.  
 
This epistemological framework is illustrated via a case study in Chapter Six: “Rat in the ranks: 
A case study of David Hicks as the terrorist other”. This chapter provides empirical evidence of the 
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maintenance and contestation of frameworks of ‘otherness’ in the representation of David 
Hicks and his imprisonment in Guantanamo Bay. This chapter argues that David Hicks was 
presented within Australian governmental discourse within a framework of the post-
September 11 terrorist ‘other’. Within this framework, Hicks’ ‘unAustralian’ actions as a 
‘terrorist’ were justification for his imprisonment without access to the traditional rights 
afforded an Australian citizen overseas.  
 
The Australian governmental legislative responses to insecurity are discussed in Part Four of 
the thesis to illustrate that the ‘war on terror’ is also conducted through the language of the 
law. Within this section, Chapter Seven: “Legitimation in the legislative war on terror” argues that 
the themes of legislation have been situated within an epistemological framework of 
legitimation.  Legitimation suggests the meaning of particular legislative responses as 
‘essential’ and ‘logical’ claims to certain action, which are offered by governmental 
authorities as a way to justify their actions in regard to the war on terror. This links to the 
previous chapter where use of the discursive theme of otherness begins the processes of 
legitimating governmental actions in response to insecurity. The case study in Chapter Eight, 
“Legitimation and the Australian anti-terror laws”, focuses on the introduction of the Australian 
anti-terror laws and the discursive interactions between media and government in 
negotiating understanding of the need for the legislation as a response to post-September 11 
insecurity.  
 
The representation of Australian military responses to post-September 11 insecurity is 
discussed in Part Five of the thesis. Specifically, this section is seen as an extension of the 
discussion of legislative responses to insecurity. Where legitimation as a discursive theme 
refers to the actions of those responding to insecurity, epistemological frameworks of 
exceptionalism refer to the government, or nation that acts in response to insecurity. Chapter 
Nine, “Exceptionalism in the physical war on terror” provides the conceptual outline of 
exceptionalism as the epistemological framework situating understanding of military war. 
This chapter argues that exceptionalism positions one nation’s governmental responses as 
having the political and cultural superiority to justify their responses to insecurity. The moral 
superiority implied by this framework is utilised to exempt the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ 
from critical judgement of their actions and especially, to see any damaging consequences of 
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those actions as ‘aberrational’. This supports the broader thesis argument that a discourse of 
September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between news media and 
governmental authorities. It does this by illustrating that a nation’s justification of violence in 
the name of a moral or ideological ideal is centred on power relations that exert certain 
understandings of responses to insecurity.  
 
This argument is supported by Chapter 10, “A case study: the use of exceptionalism in the response to 
Abu Ghraib”, which illustrates discursive themes of exceptionalism in Australian 
governmental response to photographs of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Where 
the chapter on legitimation discusses the actions of the Australian government in responding 
to insecurity, this section is used to show governmental defence of the consequences of a 
‘war on terror’. This chapter concludes the research in the thesis by illustrating that 
governmental representation of their exceptional moral right to use violent action was 
contested by media reportage about Abu Ghraib. The media’s contestation effectively 
challenged the moralistic underpinning for the beginning of the Iraq war. This supports the 
broader argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved 
through power relations between the Australian government and news media. This is 
because the media and governmental authorities engaged in discursive battles over the 
representation of Abu Ghraib. The power relations between media and government will 
illustrate the evolving nature of a discourse that is contested, subjective and incomplete. 
Having now introduced the primary arguments engaged within this thesis, the next chapter 
will discuss the theoretical and methodological approach taken to exploring these arguments 
and their theoretical frameworks.  
 
Endnotes: 
 
1. The Senate approved the resolution unanimously; and the House of 
Representatives vote was 420-1. Congresswoman Barbara Lee for California was 
the only person to vote against the resolution. She later maintained staunch 
opposition to the Iraq war (Barbara Lee, 2006). 
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2. The Taliban government initially demanded evidence of Osama bin Laden's 
involvement in the September 11 attacks. As US military action became imminent, 
the Taliban offered to extradite bin Laden to a neutral nation. In response, 
President Bush stated that his demand for bin Laden was not open to discussion 
(Combs, 2002: 245). 
 
3. The Northern Alliance is the name for the organisation that united various Afghan 
groups to fight the Taliban. In late 2001, with extensive econmic and military 
assistance from the US, the Northern Alliance took most of Afghanistan from the 
Taliban (Karon, 2001).  
 
4. The US military operation in Iraq began without United Nations approval (Lynch, 
2004: A18). The Bush administration argued that the invasion had ‘implicit 
approval’ of the Security Council and was therefore not in violation of the UN 
Charter (Lynch, 2004: A18). 
 
5. In mid-2004, an interim government of Iraq assumed the full responsibility and 
authority of the state. Though Iyad Allawi was Iraq's first post-Hussein prime 
minister, his government was not allowed to make new laws without the approval 
of the US-led CPA (Anderson, 2005). 
 
6. Regulation of national borders was also considered a key priority for the Australian 
Government in an environment of terrorist threats. Garran (2001) suggests that the 
Howard government had always strongly affirmed that it was the sovereign right of 
the state to decide who should enter Australia, but this was the first time 
immigration issues had been so specifically deemed a priority of the anti-terror 
response.  A discursive shift had occurred in Australian political response to terror, 
which specifically linked historic fears of ethnic or religious ‘invasion’ to the post-
September 11 terrorist threat. This discursive positioning was underlined in the 
2001 Tampa crisis, where the Australian government refused to let a Norwegian 
tanker that had rescued asylum seekers dock in Australian territorial waters (See 
Wilkinson & Marr, 2004). This decision was largely legitimated through discourses 
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of a terrorist threat lurking within the character of the asylum seeker as an ‘illegal 
immigrant’. 
 
7. 270 people were killed in an attack on the Pan Am flight 103 at Lockerbie (London 
attacks, 2006). 
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Chapter Two 
 Theoretical Review of thesis 
 
 
Building on the introduction, this chapter will now discuss the theoretical approach taken to 
explore the thesis’ primary argument. I will explain how the theoretical framework will 
situate understandings of discourse and power in regard to the relationship between 
newspaper media and governmental authority. The theoretical approach focuses on Michel 
Foucault’s conceptions of discourse and power, as well as governmentality.  The research 
will be accomplished through the analysis of three epistemological frameworks through 
which governmental discourse is able to ascribe particular meaning to themes of terrorism, 
legislation and war. The thesis will illustrate that terrorism, as the main source of post-
September 11 insecurity in Australia, has been situated within an epistemological framework 
of ‘otherness’. Similarly, anti-terror legislation has been situated within an epistemological 
framework of ‘legitimation’ and war has been situated within an epistemological framework 
of ‘exceptionalism’. These frameworks manifest as part of governmental attempts to create 
the conditions for a stable and politically expedient representation of the meaning of post-
September 11 insecurity. 
 
The thesis takes these epistemological frameworks as a starting point for its analysis of the 
ways a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has been maintained and negotiated. These 
frameworks are drawn from cultural discourse and exist within interactions with other 
cultural actors. These epistemological frameworks are not forwarded to suggest that meaning 
becomes rigid in its signification, or dominated by one particular institution. Instead, the 
notion of an epistemological framework suggests the actions of institutions that attempt to 
assert themselves over the dynamic, mutable and changeable elements of culture and its 
representation in discourse. For example, while institutions like government attempt to 
dominate particular representations of meaning for the benefit of increasing their cultural or 
political power, these meanings are perpetually in a state of flux because of their relation to 
other discourses. 
 
I have situated understanding of language as the facilitator of the representations I have 
described above. In doing so, have distinguished between discourse and language. I have 
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defined a discourse as the politicised manifestation of the various strategies and effects of 
relationships between cultural actors involved in meaning making in the public sphere. 
Language is utilised within relations of power to make up the compound of discourse. In 
this respect language is seen as the fabric of discourse, used to construct the meanings within 
discourse. Similarly to Lewis (2005: 3) I argue that language must be seen as co-extensive to 
the “phenomenal, material and corporeal aspects of human experience”. While we may 
experience phenomena as physical or material ‘sensation’, we cannot ‘know’ or represent 
these experiences meaningfully without language (Lewis, 2005: 3). Thus language is not 
merely the articulation of the phenomenal, but also forms the stimulus and conditions that 
determine physical response (Lewis, 2005: 3). For example, an event of ‘terrorism’ will have 
immediate physical effects, but these effects are represented as ‘terrorism’ by the discourses 
that have driven the meaning of the action. 
 
The representation of meaning through language and its mediation is a constant problematic 
of post-structuralist analysis. The gaps and dissenting forms of meaning are highlighted as 
the precarious nature of representation. For example, Jacques Derrida (1974) maintains there 
is no ‘origin’ in language that is constructed out of ‘truth’. This suggests there is no fixed 
representation in language. Instead, language is an constantly evolving mass of imprecise 
details, constantly seeking, but never achieving a fixed or stable meaning (See Derrida, 1974).  
As Lewis (2001: 165) illustrates, the subject of language is not “a deeply rooted or 
unchangeable aspect of meaning but dynamic, mutable, open and formed through various 
relationships”.  While Derrida’s argument is helpful insofar as it exposes the instability of 
meaning, I would argue that his work does not assist the thesis in discussing the relations of 
power that underpin much of the mediation of meaning in culture. Derrida’s deconstructive 
method is a strategy of exposing the processes of language. It was not Derrida’s purpose to 
utilise language to provide a ‘real-world’ solution to the political issue of how ideology 
functions in culture.  
Nonetheless, the conception of epistemological frameworks has been influenced by a broad 
post-structuralist theoretical approach. A post-structuralist approach prioritises discourse as 
the means through which knowledge and understanding are constructed. This theorisation 
suggests “we can imagine only what we can symbolise, speak of only what we have language 
for, speak only in the ways our rules of discourse allow us to” (Lye, 1997). Understanding of 
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discourse is thus seen as the most important aspect of understanding knowledge and action 
in the material world. This prioritisation does not deny the existence of the material world 
outside text or discourse (See Laclau et al, 1985). As Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108) argue: 
 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense 
that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity 
as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the 
wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is 
not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion 
that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of 
emergence. 
 
What Laclau and Mouffe challenge is the ‘closure’ of a structuralist model of discourse, 
which they suggest implies that every social action repeats a system of meanings and 
practices. This means that there is no possibility of constructing new points of meaning. 
While this thesis illustrates that cultural actors attempt to impose particular meanings 
through epistemological fraeworks, these are continually re-negotiated through interaction 
with other cultural actors. We can thus imagine epistemological frameworks to appear like 
scaffolding; their utilisation by governmental authorities constructs a foundation through 
which politically expedient meaning can be asserted. But like scaffolding, there is a necessary 
impermanence to these foundations. They are assertions over unstable cultural meaning that 
are unstable and that cultural actors often seek to re-build—or completely demolish. 
 
The post-structuralist approach has sparked methodological concern with its seeming 
relegation of political engagement highlights constant latitudes of meaning (Eagleton, 
2003:160). Terry Eagleton has been especially vocal in his criticism of post-structuralism, 
arguing that as a theory of ‘reference’ in language, a post-structuralist approach often does 
not extend political possibility for change (Eagleton, 2003:3). He suggests this is due to the 
tendency of post-structuralist theorists not to forward any criticism of the institutions 
involved in meaning making practices, or the potentiality of change. In responding to this 
criticism, I forward Said’s methodological focus on the political potential of discourse. In 
texts like Orientalism Said suggested the ways meaning making could lead to transformations 
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in political action. This thesis will not adhere specifically to Said’s methodology as it 
forwards aspects of Foucault’s archaeological method that I have already problematised in 
the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, this approach is suggested as a response to criticism of 
post-structuralism’s lack of engagement with political action. Said’s approach suggests there 
are normative methods of engaging political action against centralisations of power. All 
political actions are rooted in the discursive because they affect different understandings of 
political and social life. To this end, all political actions, as manifestations of power, are 
problematic and unstable because they are framed by discursive understandings. I refer to 
this understanding to argue that while centralisations of power may exist within institutions, 
and they may impose themselves on specific discourses conducive to their political power, 
there is always the potential for change both towards and away from centralisations of 
power. 
 
While this may appear as an intellectual ‘bet both ways’, in fact this conceptualisation was 
quite deliberate. I wish to illustrate that the manifestation of institutional power is quite 
heterogeneous and problematic, especially when it conflicts with alternate discourses in the 
public sphere. Secondly, this suggestion is extended to illustrate that discourses themselves 
are never stable or unproblematic. They must always be considered in relation to their 
strategic deployment in various relations of power. As a result, political action cannot be 
detached from the social, economic and cultural contexts through which it operates.   
 
Meaning making involves a complex interaction of social and individual practices and modes 
of thinking through power relations (Lewis, 2001: pg. 8). As I have already suggested, the 
dominant representation of what something means is the result of the interaction between 
many cultural actors. Thus, representation forms the imagination of reality through 
discourse. The media, for example, has brought different cultural representations together in 
greater proliferation and dissemination, stimulating ever-increasing possibilities for new 
meanings.  Within the relationship between government and media, the events of dissent 
and complicity between the two institutions in representing ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ 
illustrate how dominant cultural understandings are created and destabilised.  The power 
relations between the two have contributed to the availability of different understandings of 
post-September 11 insecurity.  
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It is this framework of understanding meaning, coupled with utilisation of work from the 
post-structuralist phase of Michel Foucault’s career that has provided the tools to define the 
use of epistemological frameworks in this thesis. Within this phase Foucault (1972: 17) 
suggested that creating the conditions for political and intellectual liberation was a process of 
exposing instabilities in the totalising discourses that attempt to inscribe history and power. 
Foucault begins The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) with criticism of the discursive unity of 
meaning as the “natural way things are” (Foucault, 1972: 3).  He argued that we often fail to 
notice the way in which we constitute speech. The arbitrary language practices we use to 
construct knowledge become ‘common sense’ and unquestioned. Without being conscious 
of this process, we group distinguishable objects or topics into ‘unities’ of discourse. 
Studying these discursive formations and the reason for their apparent unity as ‘knowledge’ 
is the subject of the archaeological method. The unity of discourse on a particular topic 
would be:  
 
The interplay of rules that define the transformation of these objects, their non-
 identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal discontinuity that
 suspends their permanence (Foucault, 1972: 33).  
 
For example, we constitute the object of ‘security’ by a set of rules that allow us to say what 
it constitutes within an interplay of rules that defines its absence. The archaeological method 
would examine this knowledge of security at a certain time by investigating discontinuities in 
the discourse, suggesting what was available to be spoken about as ‘knowledge’ of security.  
 
Utilising the archaeological method, Foucault(1970: xxi) continues his focus on ‘how’ 
questions: 
 
 An enquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became
 possible; within what space of order knowledge is constituted…such an enterprise is
 not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of the word, as an ‘archaeology’. 
 
Foucault (1972: 33) argued that systems of thought and knowledge called the episteme are 
governed by rules that allow particular discourses to be spoken at one time but not at 
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another. These rules act beyond grammar and logic, even beneath the consciousness of 
individual subjects. Knowledge within a particular episteme is based on a set of fundamental 
assumptions that are so fundamental to its constitution as to be invisible to people operating 
within it. This knowledge is defined by a system of conceptual possibilities that determines 
the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period. 
 
Foucault (1972: 138) suggested each historical period (or epoch) had its own episteme, which 
delimits the totality of experience, knowledge and power to be ‘known’ in that period. 
Therefore, the episteme represents the conditions of the possibility of discourse within a 
particular historical context. As Foucault suggested, the episteme is not a form of knowledge 
in itself, but must be seen as: 
 
… the total set of relations that unite at a given period, the discursive practices that
 give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, possibly formalized systems…it is a
 group of relations that can be discovered, for a given period…when one analyses
 them at the level of discursive regularities (1972: 250). 
 
The ‘rules’ of the formation of a discourse are therefore to be found within analysis of 
discourse itself.  By focussing on the specificity of statements within particular discourse and 
finding differences, separations and dispersions within them, Foucault hoped to provide a 
discursive map of what was able to be regarded as ‘true’ for any historical context.   
 
Similarly to Foucault’s conception of the episteme, I describe my conception of 
epistemological frameworks as constituting ‘ways of knowing’. These frameworks are utilised 
to refer to a particular representation of meaning. Analysis of epistemological frameworks 
therefore focuses on discursive practices used to construct representations of meaning 
within discourse as ‘self-evident’. This process suggests that discourses pose a question of 
power from the very moment of their existence. Discourse is “an asset that is, by nature, the 
object of a struggle, a political struggle” (Foucault, 1972: 120). The specificity of the 
statements within a discourse relate to the power relations between cultural actors who fight 
over the constitution of its meaning. The conception of epistemological frameworks reflects 
these power relations because it suggests that the process of asserting a discourse is 
conducive to an understanding of governmental authority in the public sphere. 
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The thesis’ approach differs from the archaeological method in that epistemological 
frameworks are conceived as part of discursive interactions that serve to negotiate what 
Foucault seemingly suggests as rigid discursive formations. The archaeological method has 
been criticised for its restriction to the comparison of the discursive formations of different 
periods. Foucault was aware of archaeology’s inability to account for the way in which one 
episteme shifted to another through history, or how two epistemes overlapped in meaning. 
McNay (1994), Rabinow (1991) and Burchell (1991) have also suggested that Foucault’s 
‘archaeological phase’ lacks discussion of diffuse manifestations of power and their effects 
on discourse over time. While the broader approach of this thesis reflects a Foucauldian 
concern with discourse and power, these concerns are approached critically. To illustrate 
this, I will now turn to a discussion of the theoretical foundations for my approach to 
discourse and power. This discussion will show how I have also utilised the genealogical 
phases of Foucault’s work to inform the methodology for the research project contained in 
this thesis. 
 
Theoretical approach to discourse 
 
The definition of epistemological frameworks suggests a specific approach to notions of 
discourse and power that needs to be further elucidated. I will firstly turn to discussion of 
my theoretical and methodological approach to discourse. This will be subsequently 
discussed in relation to theoretical approaches to power. In doing so I will illustrate the 
theoretical framework that has allowed the thesis to argue that discourses of post-September 
11 insecurity have continually evolved through power relations between the media and 
governmental authorities.  
 
This thesis defines discourse as the compound of language and power.  Discourse is the 
politicised manifestation of the various strategies and effects of relationships between 
cultural actors involved in meaning making in the public sphere.  This definition also 
suggests a particular approach to ideas of power, language and relationships between cultural 
actors, which I will conceptualise further along this chapter. This definition of discourse has 
been initially conceived through the use of Michel Foucault’s theorisation of 
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knowledge/power compounds in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). Admittedly, Foucault 
conceptualises his model of discourse through a complex series of terms: discursive 
formations, discursive practices, the archive and archaeology. The function of these terms is 
to focus on the singularity of his description—to make it clear as to what discourse is not, as 
much as what it is. Discourse itself is a highly ambiguous and mobile term and even Foucault 
admits to using it in a variety of different ways: “treating it sometimes as the general domain 
of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a 
regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements” (Foucault, 1972: 80). I 
will utilise my definition of discourse to suggest a regulated practice encompassed within 
power relations that account for a particular group of statements.  
 
As I have already suggested, the archaeological method investigates the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge, of institutions and of practices. Foucault attempted to uncover 
common rules of formation underlying a seemingly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses 
that describe a “history of resemblance, sameness and identity” (Foucault, 2004: 67).  The 
term archaeology thus denotes a domain of research into the ways in which: 
 
… different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also 
institutions, commercial practices and police activities—all refer to an implicit 
knowledge special to this society (Foucault, 2004: 67).  
 
This aspect of archaeology relates to the thesis because it suggests the ways that specific 
cultural actors can continually refer the audience to a particular meaning without having to 
actually suggest this mode of understanding.  Similarly, this thesis will suggest ‘rules’ of 
formation occur through the governmental assertion over particular discourses according to 
epistemological frameworks. Following the archaeological method, I suggest that these 
meanings are made up of ideas of sameness and identity. This is because these frameworks 
often refer to constructions of nationhood and national identity that are seemingly 
threatened by post-September 11 insecurity. This threat is then linked to the justification of 
governmental authority to respond on behalf of the nation.  
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In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), as well as The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An 
Introduction (1981) and Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault outlines his argument that power 
and knowledge are inextricably linked to each other through discourse. Foucault conceived 
of knowledge as systems of thought embedded within social relations. Knowledge is not a 
form of pure speculation; it is both a product of power relations and also instrumental in 
sustaining those relations. Thus knowledge is not fact, nor a form of disinterested 
speculation, but a product of power relations, because there is a vested interest in 
maintaining particular systems of thought.  
 
For Foucault, the development and reformulation of power was a constant philosophical 
pre-occupation. His initial work attempted to distance itself from Marxist conceptions of 
power created through institutionalised forms such as state apparatuses and class relations 
(Foucault, 1980: 52). Thus, Foucault’s initial theorisation of power in earlier texts like 
Madness and Civilisation (1967) was constructed through examination of how seemingly 
‘humane’ institutions and social practices like prison systems or medicine ostensibly created 
limits on personal freedom. In this work Foucault explores—somewhat problematically—
phenomenologically ‘pure’ experiences that undermine what he saw as an impartial 
rationality being thrust on individuals under medical care (Lewis, 2002:170). This negative 
conception of power was subsequently reformulated by Foucault to account for what he 
later saw as the conflictual, unstable and empowering elements inherent in power relations 
(Foucault, 1980: 138). This led to one of Foucault’s important contributions to cultural 
theory, suggesting that power underlies all social relations from the institutional to the 
personal and exists as a fundamentally enabling force.  
 
This conceptualisation of power meant that his methodological approach also shifted to 
suggest that in order to understand power, it must be analysed in its most diverse and 
specific manifestations of everyday relations, or ‘microphysics’ (See Foucault, 1972). He 
suggested that to understand discourse, we must understand power in its most diverse and 
specific manifestations. According to Foucault, nothing in culture exists that is not mediated 
by the meaning making processes embedded in discourse and its associations with power. 
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Therefore power exists at the everyday level in the practices and exchanges between various 
cultural actors: 
 
It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very 
reason we must conceive of discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose 
tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise we must not 
conceive of a world divided between accepted discourse and excluded 
discourse…but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that come into play in various 
strategies (Foucault, 1981: 100).  
 
Similarly to Foucault’s approach, this thesis suggests that there are multifarious and 
continually evolving understandings of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity related 
to the complex power relations between media and government. Foucault’s understanding of 
discourse and power as self-reflexive is therefore important because it gives a theoretical 
platform for this thesis to suggest that discourse is open to change, and the ways in which 
these possibilities for change could occur through discursive interactions. This allows the 
thesis to suggest that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually changed 
according to power relations between cultural actors such as the media and governmental 
authorities.  
 
Theoretical approach to power  
 
The theoretical approach to discourse that I have just outlined also suggests an important 
link between discourse and power. I will now turn the discussion to notions of power and its 
manifestation through discursive interactions between the media and governmental 
authorities. While the approach to discourse in this thesis is assisted by Foucault’s 
archaeological method, it is problematic when dealing with the underlying issue of power. 
The archaeological phase has been criticised for its failure to tease out the issues of power 
(See Said: 1986). Specifically, Edward Said argued that despite his initial enthusiasm for the 
power/knowledge reflexivity, ultimately Foucault’s conception of power was pessimistic 
because it does not suggest any forces of effective resistance (Said, 1986: 151). This was 
because a microphysics of power eliminated more classical Marxist ideas about ruling classes 
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and dominant interests and by extension, the elision of marginal oppositional and eccentric 
groups (Said, 1986: 153).  
 
This translates into the paradox that Foucault’s imagination of power was by his 
analysis of power to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorisation to let it go 
on more or less unchecked (Said, 1986: 152). 
 
Said suggests that Foucault emphasises the productivity of power, its “provocative 
inventiveness and generative ingenuity” in order to suggest how “discourses get things done, 
accomplish real tasks and gather authority” (1986: 152). Thus, any utopian imagination of 
the end of power is not prioritised and therefore does not suggest the importance of counter 
discursive attempts (Said, 1986: 153). This is problematic for the conception of power 
relations in this thesis because it suggests a lack of differentiation in his theory of power, 
which results in a reductionist understanding of power as a form of social control. 
 
Using Said’s criticisms as a platform, I have identified specific problems with the 
archaeological method, which has led to an adjustment in the way this thesis relates its 
approach to discourse with modes of power. Firstly, McNay’s (1994: 49) suggestion of the 
implicit ‘social embeddedness’ of discourse in the archaeological method is not conducive to 
the approach this thesis takes to power. It is problematic because this thesis suggests that the 
various complexities in power relations between government and media create possibilities 
for continual evolutions in discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. This cannot occur 
within an archaeological method that strives to suggest an a priori set of rules for the 
emergence of discourse. This is conducive to the conception of epistemological frameworks 
as a strategy for maintaining hegemonic discourse. Foucault’s suggestion of conditions for 
the emergence of discourse can result in a somewhat monolithic view of power because it 
cannot discuss the ways in which differing accounts of discourse might emerge. While the 
framework of this thesis suggests that centres of power exist through institutions like 
government or media, the manifestations of this power are still seen as quite diffuse. 
Following these criticisms, the approach to power relations within the thesis will be 
conceptualised along Foucault’s genealogical method.  
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Foucault also believed that the weakness of his archaeological method was its failure to 
incorporate a more detailed theory of power into the analysis of discourse (Foucault in 
McNay, 1994: 85). This gave rise to the ‘genealogical method’: the method of analysis that 
traces the uneven and haphazard processes of dispersion and accumulation that are 
constitutive of the event. Foucault (1980: 98) argued that far from being “teleologically 
governed”, the historical processes that give rise to the emergence of events are in fact 
discontinuous, divergent and governed by chance. In the genealogical method, the history of 
an event is no longer interpreted in terms of a greater meaning but understood as a conflict 
between different cultural powers, a state of permanent warfare:   
 
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at the 
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to 
domination (Foucault, 1971: 151). 
 
Deriving from the idea that history is a process of struggle between different centres of 
power is Foucault’s notion that power relations permeate all levels of social existence 
(Foucault in McNay: 1994: 102).  
 
The idea of the ubiquity of power relations was a radical re-conception of Foucault’s 
theorisation of power. Foucault suggested that most theories of power tend to regard it as a 
repressive force used by the political elite to maintain social hierarchies. He then replaced 
this with a concept of power as an essentially positive force that engenders a multiplicity of 
relations rather than simply domination. 
 
Power should be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never 
in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power (1980: 98). 
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Thus the distribution of power is constantly open to modification. This suggests that the 
discursive formations that transmit and produce power relations are potentially reversible. A 
particular understanding of discourse may thus be hegemonic at one time, but the 
negotiating influence of power relations between institutions affects changes in discourse 
that ultimately effects presentation of its meaning.  
 
This emphasis on the specificity of different types of power relations leads to a 
corresponding stress on the complexity of their inter-relations. Foucault stresses that social 
control is not always achieved though a monotonous logic of domination (such as military 
force) but is often realised indirectly through a convergence of different social practices with 
various institutions and organisations able to exercise power (Foucault, 1980: 125). Thus, a 
relation of power is distinct from the imposition of violence because it is an action that has 
an inter-related effect on the actions of others:  
 
What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act 
immediately and directly on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon 
an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future 
(Foucault, 1980: 76). 
 
In this sense, Foucault’s conception of power becomes much more inclusive of both social 
context and the freedom of individuals and alternate actors to influence the way discourse is 
understood and acted upon. Foucault (1980: 92) describes the interplay of power and 
“freedom to resist” as a process of “permanent provocation”. A power relation only occurs 
where there is the potentiality for resistance. Therefore a power relation must be defined 
through a cultural actors’ potential to influence the actions of the other and to present 
resistance to their influence (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 127).  
 
The genealogical method is much more conducive to the primary argument of the thesis 
because it allows for a conception of power relations between cultural actors that suggests 
the ways non-political elites may contribute to processes of meaning making. While the 
genealogical method refers to the practices of negotiating power, Foucault’s notions of 
governmentality are used to suggest the discursive strategies utilised to maintain power. In a 
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series of lectures at the College de France beginning in 1977 and ending before his death in 
1984, Foucault developed the concept of governmentality. Though he did not publish a text 
on governmentality before his death, his lectures and some essays have been published 
within other texts. I have used aspects of governmentality to conceptualise the strengths and 
weaknesses of governmental representations of discourse within the public sphere. 
 
In governmentality, Foucault traced the emergence of two developments in Western political 
thought: the administration of governance through ‘security’ or ‘police’ and the maintenance 
of governmental rationality through an ‘art of government’. Using Machiavelli’s studies of 
sovereignty, Foucault suggested that the link between the prince, his subjects and his 
territory was vulnerable because it was based only on a “synthetic” acceptance of his rule. 
Foucault (in Burchell, 1991: 87) concluded that the Prince’s ‘art’ of securing his power was 
to:  
 
… reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality, but with this last understood 
not to mean the objective ensemble of its subject and territory, but rather the 
Prince’s relation with what he owns. 
 
This was to suggest the acceptance of governmental rationality as the protection of the state. 
The acceptance of this rationality creates a political status quo as a method of continuing 
governmental power. 
 
Foucault contrasted the example of the Prince to the modern government of the state, 
where power relations affected successful government of the individual within vast 
populations. Foucault’s conception of governmentality distinguishes more clearly between 
types of power such as violence, domination and the relations of power between people. 
Within the practices of governmentality, power is illustrated as both a ‘subjectivising’ and 
‘objectivising’ force. While power is able to repress individuals, it also inherently constitutes 
the conditions of their freedom. Using this conception of power as a platform, 
governmentality was the name given by Foucault to the practices of governmental 
authorities to maintain and perpetuate discourses to assert dominance over citizens. This 
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occurred through strategic management processes that suggest governmental authority as 
essential for the well-being of the citizenry.  
 
Foucault was interested in the connections made between a discourse of governmental 
authority and the management practices that ensure this power is perpetuated. He argued 
that governmental authority was perpetuated through continuities between the different 
forms of power that compose government: an upward continuity in that the person who 
governs the state must first learn to govern themselves correctly, and a downward continuity 
that comes from when the state is well run, allowing the head of the family to look after his 
family and behave correctly. Foucault further related this continuum to governmental 
notions of security, which meant that governments exercised forms of surveillance and 
control over citizens “as attentive to that of the head of a family over his household and his 
goods” (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 90). This manifests through governmental strategies that 
suggest that the happiness of citizen necessarily results in an intensification of regulatory 
controls over citizens: “to develop these elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a 
way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state” (Foucault, 1980: 
89). Security therefore is seen as a distinct principle of political method and practice, 
designed to continually refer to a specific rationality of governmental power (Gordon in 
Burchell, 1991: 20). Self-government is connected discursively with morality and related to 
the material effects of the management of the economy and ruling the state. 
 
Implicit in this suggestion of regulatory control is that a discourse of authority will inevitably 
lead to slippages in the power relations between government and citizenry. This is because 
governmental control is not about territory or subjects, but rather, a diffuse power exercised 
over a complex of citizens and their relation to ‘things’. Foucault defines these ‘things’ as 
comprising a citizen’s links with wealth, resources, and means of subsistence, customs, and 
historical and current events. These continuities also suggest a differentiation in the types of 
power exercised by cultural actors and the ways in which insecurity over a citizen’s relations 
to ‘things’ could be used as a discursive means of perpetuating governmental regulation.   
 
Using Foucault’s notion of the upward and downward continuity of power, the thesis will 
illustrate how the epistemological frames situating discursive themes of terrorism, legislation 
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and war present the importance of the citizen’s acceptance of governmental political action. 
This occurs through governmental strategies suggesting that the effective management of the 
state is maintained through the citizen’s various involvements in the discursive construct of 
the nation. It implies that any deviation from governmental actions might lead to the 
dissipation of the nation’s unity and strength. This governmental authority suggests ‘the 
nation’ as a ‘hard truth’ and homogenous entity, rather than a fluid and diffuse discursive 
construct.  For example, while governmental responses present their actions as integral to 
the maintenance of the nation’s security, these actions are suggested as part of the citizen’s 
imperative to support the responses, maintain the habits and obey the legislation that 
maintains a representation of a unified Australia. By doing this, the citizen is able to fully 
engage in and participate in ‘being’ Australian.  
 
Using conceptions of governmentality as a platform, the thesis will also illustrate 
governmental representations of insecurity have had multifarious effects within specific 
power relations. Specifically, once these representations are subjected to the negotiations of 
media discourse they become contested and subjective, allowing the possibility of change in 
the processes of meaning making. This relates to Foucault’s notions of the inherent ‘danger’ 
of governmental attempts to ‘manage’ the state, because it suggests that power relations 
between different cultural actors are not immovable. Rather, governmental authority is 
dependent on the acceptance of a particular manifestation of power. When these relations of 
power become contested by other discursive representations, governmental authority over 
particular discourses becomes subject to change. 
 
While I often use governmentality in this thesis to illustrate the way governments present 
their political actions, I acknowledge Foucault’s use of the term was much broader, talking 
about the ‘art’ of governing, rather than simply government itself. As I have suggested, in 
Foucault’s initial discussion of governmentality, he does not refer to governments 
specifically, but a sovereign’s relation to his principality. He relates this back to 
contemporary government by suggesting that many of the ‘troubling’ aspects of 
governmentality and its power plays are seen in modern government. I refer to 
governmentality as the theoretical underpinning for the techniques of governmental 
authority. Governmental authority refers to the systems put in place to maintain and 
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perpetuate this ‘logic’, while government is differentiated as the practical body. Nonetheless, 
I have also illustrated techniques of governmentality in the practices of newspapers’ attempts 
to forward notions of their cultural power in the public sphere. As I will show, both 
government and media forward discursive strategies conducive to their authority as part of a 
political status quo. Similarly to governmental discursive strategies, media discourse is 
subject to the negotiation of other cultural actors. Given the focus of the primary argument, 
the discursive strategies of the media to perpetuate their authority is acknowledged more 
within the contestations of governmental discourse. 
 
What is most useful about governmentality is that it suggests that institutional or centralised 
modes of power can exist, but the manifestation of this power when introduced into the 
public sphere is diffuse. The conception of these diffuse manifestations of power are utilised 
within this thesis as a framework to discuss the ways in which other cultural actors can 
represent alternative discourses about post-September 11 insecurity. This is an important 
aspect of this thesis’ approach to discourse because the power relations initiated through the 
interaction of governmental discourse and media reportage are used to suggest the ways that 
the meaning of post September 11 insecurity has evolved. The relationship between 
government and media illustrates the often tentative, unfinished and messy nature of their 
interactions leads to the heterogeneity and ambivalence of discourse (Fairclough, 2003:60). 
This mediated textual heterogeneity will be seen in the thesis as evidence of the evolving 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
Theoretical approach to power relations between media and government 
 
This thesis’ approach to discourse and power necessitates some introductory discussion of 
how discourse is affected by the relationship between media and government. I will now 
turn to a discussion of how discursive interactions between media and government are 
explored in this thesis according to relations of power. This relationship is conceptualised as 
revolving around complex discursive processes of both contestation and confirmation of 
each others’ discourses. The effects of their power relations occur according to the various 
strengths and weaknesses of the institution. For example, while the media are stifled by their 
inherent organisational and economic structure to report on the actions of political elites, 
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they are equally able to contest governmental discourse in their use of language and news 
value. Conversely, the discourses of political elites are restricted by their need for positive 
media reportage and the appearance of unified and strong decision making. Nonetheless, 
they often maintain the lion’s share of reportage and resources to support their political 
actions. The specificities of this relationship will be further elucidated in chapter four, but 
my overall approach will be to suggest the various levels of complexity within a relationship 
of power between media and government. I will utilise a Foucauldian theoretical approach to 
suggest the diffuse manifestations of everyday power relations between the two institutions.  
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis’ conception of the specific role of the media is 
significantly influenced by Colin Mercer’s cultural policy understanding of newspapers and 
nationhood. Mercer’s analysis of the media’s role in political and cultural life focuses on 
newspapers using particular governmental practices to assert discourses about nationhood, 
as well as confirming the citizen’s place within the nation. He thus defines newspapers as a 
‘mannering technology’ in terms of providing the “rituals, daily practices, techniques, 
institutions, manners and customs which enable the nation to be thinkable, inhabitable and 
thereby governable” (Mercer, 1992: 27).  
 
Mercer suggests the media is vital because it provides audiences with a sense of “community 
in anonymity” with a clocked daily existence, and a sense of the chronology of an 
‘immemorial past’, which are both necessary in order for nations to be imagined (Mercer, 
1992: 36). The newspaper is thus reliant on the discursive, from techniques of reportage and 
presentation, to the techniques and practices of reading. These techniques provide 
representations of—and to—groups, communities and nations (Mercer, 1992: 36). 
 
People, their manners, customs, moral qualities and environment: the newspaper is 
the only printed cultural form which is able to collect, notate, tabulate and physically 
format these heterogeneous factors and simultaneously offer politico-moral 
commentary on them in a way that does not cause any problems of internal 
coherence, disunity of form, and so on (Mercer, 1992: 36). 
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Mercer suggests that the conditions for the emergence of the newspaper form are deeply 
entrenched in the political-cultural environment, including the economic, political, and 
industrial circumstances within which the newspaper is produced. He thus argues for a 
greater sense of the political within cultural studies, rather than a focus on ‘textualisation’ or 
the functionality of media messages.  
 
The process that Mercer employs to expose the ‘political within the cultural’ is to analyse the 
ways in which institutions assert the rationality of their authority. The newspaper does this, 
Mercer suggests, through its presentation as “daily, banal, prosaic but with a texture that 
offers it as definitely circumscribed and peculiar; that is, as national” (Mercer, 1992: 26). In 
the same way, Michael Bilig suggests in his text Banal Nationalism (1995) that public 
authorities engage in practices to establish ideas of nationhood through the continual 
reminding of national symbols (Bilig, 1995:8). He suggests that this reminding is so 
established, familiar and continual, that it is not consciously registered as a political practice 
(Bilig, 1995:8). Consequently, Bilig (1995:8) situates national identity within the embodied 
habits of social life, especially being situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally 
through processes of understanding and using language. To have a national identity is to 
possess ways of ‘talking’ about nationhood (Bilig, 1995:8). 
 
This constant referral to previous meaning within epistemological frameworks is also based 
on conceptions of nationhood and national identity, as Bilig and Mercer suggest. This occurs 
because governmental authorities suggest nationhood through particular social and political 
structures with a foundation in state authority. Similarly, newspapers ‘confirm’ this 
discourse—and their power within it—through the discursive construction of the nation in 
their pages. Our particular construction of the nation is perpetuated through discourses that 
establish its political and social status quo. 
 
Both Mercer and Bilig acknowledge Benedict Anderson’s text, Imagined Communities: Reflections 
on the origin and spread of nationalism (1991). Anderson’s seminal text suggested the nation was 
defined as an ‘imagined’ political community.  He suggests nations are imagined because 
while the members of the nation will never know most of their fellow members, national 
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discourses allow an understanding of their unity (Anderson, 1991: 6). Using this conceptual 
model, Anderson delineates the role of the newspaper more clearly than Bilig, arguing that 
the newspaper reader, observing that their own newspaper is being consumed by other 
citizens, is continually reassured that this imagined community is visibly rooted in everyday 
life and thus, continually shared (Anderson, 1991: 36).  
 
The thesis uses these conceptualisations to suggest that a newspaper’s cultural significance 
comes from presenting popular, mainstream representations of cultural understanding, 
communicated as the ‘most widely held views of Australians’ (McQuail, 1987: 195). 
Extending this, McQuail (1987: 196) argues that media reportage often favours a consensus 
view of social and cultural issues. Newspapers often attribute particular attitudes and values 
to their readership in the hope of continuing an economic loyalty from their readers, rather 
than a genuine cultural understanding of wider viewpoints in the public sphere. It is in the 
newspaper’s best interests to suggest a consensus viewpoint of its readership, as it engages a 
sense of community that is economically beneficial and boosts its power as a cultural actor in 
the public sphere. Thus news is a practice and is implicated in processes of meaning making. 
Far from neutrally reflecting ‘reality’, newspapers intervene in the social and cultural 
construction of the meanings that make up this reality (Hartley, 1982: 15). Using the most 
mainstream newspapers would thus also allow the thesis to make claims about how the 
viewpoints contained within these mediums are suggested by these organisations as a 
consensus opinion.  
 
It is this need for consensus that creates the overwhelmingly Westernised, middle-class 
attitudes and experiences that are so often reflected in newspapers (McQuail, 1987: 196). 
McQuail argues (1987: 205) that over time, the presentation of certain representations of 
events, people and issues as ‘news’ creates a consensus knowledge that reporters and viewers 
recognise immediately as ‘newsworthiness’. Newsworthiness suggests a hierarchy of events 
and their meanings, with a general bias towards events with proximity to ‘home’. Similarly to 
the epistemological framing of discursive themes within governmental discourse, media 
reportage can refer to some people, events and issues and immediately suggest particular 
newsworthiness or importance. The news that is selected for reportage must go through a 
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process of transformation of an event, person or issue into the language and representation 
that the newspaper wishes to perpetuate. As Hall (1976) suggests: 
 
The media do not simply and transparently report events which are ‘naturally’ 
newsworthy in themselves. ‘News’ is the end-product of a complex process which 
begins with the systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a 
socially constructed set of categories. 
 
This categorisation of news-worthiness is therefore a politicised process, engendered by the 
newspaper’s understanding of its best economic and cultural interests, but also affected by 
the relations it has established with other cultural actors. 
 
As a result of this process, only a limited range of individuals are deemed ‘newsworthy’. 
They appear within reportage regularly as ‘experts’ or as a result of their social or cultural 
importance. Conversely, newspapers give disproportionate coverage to those groups which 
do not have the resources to increase their visibility and cultural power within the public 
sphere.  Some minority groups and issues are often simply ignored within newspaper 
reportage, or otherwise seen as a threat to the consensus viewpoint that the media 
encourages.  It is often those actors with more resources for publicising discourse, namely 
governmental or elite political actors that are prioritised in media reportage. In particular, the 
actions of political elites are often used to frame the events deemed newsworthy by the 
media. These voices are often presented as the ‘voice of authority’, and even if being critical 
of these political actors, the reportage of their discourse automatically signals their 
prominence or authority within the structure of ‘newsworthiness’.  
 
Nonetheless, this thesis will illustrate that newspaper reportage of governmental discourse is 
not always necessarily confirming of their specific representations of meaning. Contestation 
of governmental discourse occurs despite the implication of media reportage in the 
construction of nationalistic ‘consensus’ viewpoints. It is not always in the media’s best 
interest to confirm governmental discourse, especially when presenting an alternate 
discourse may encourage their own cultural authority in the public sphere. Conceptions of 
governmentality suggest the instability of discursive techniques that governmental authorities 
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utilise to assert dominance over particular representations. Furthermore, this thesis 
conceptualises these power relations as a matter of exchange, open to challenge and 
mutability. Therefore the methodological approach in this thesis relates more broadly to 
power relations between media and government, which this thesis has defined through 
discursive practices of contestation.  
 
The approach I have taken to conceptualising media and government reflects the 
simultaneously dependent and competitive nature of their relationship. As I suggested in the 
introduction, this approach reflects the strength and weaknesses of each institution in 
representing hegemonic discourses in the public sphere. Utilising notions of governmentality 
adds to this definition of these power relations by prioritising discursive interactions that 
both affect and are affecting of processes of meaning making. This reflects the rationale of 
the thesis, which was to provide an analysis of the post-September 11 context that reflected 
the complex, cultural interactions that constitute its meaning. 
 
Using this methodological and theoretical framework, the next two chapters begin the 
exploration of the relations between media and government to represent a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. Chapter Three will utilise the discussion of the relation between 
discourse and power in this chapter to provide my discussion of post-September 11 
insecurity as a political discourse. Extending this, chapter four will explore the role that the 
agonistic power relations between media and government have in negotiating the 
representation of the sources and responses to insecurity. These two chapters will thus utilise 
the theoretical and methodological approach presented in this chapter to explore the main 
thesis argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power 
relations between media and government. 
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PART TWO 
 
WHAT IS INSECURITY? 
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Chapter Three 
Defining post-September 11 insecurity 
 
A discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has become a major conceptual paradigm for a 
wide array of political, economic and cultural understandings. Most significantly, this 
discourse has allowed the perpetuation of notions of securitisation, with prioritisation given 
to ‘new’ legal, economic and political methods of responding to ‘new insecurities’. This 
manifestation of insecurity can be seen in various contexts, from new tensions in 
international relations and legislation seeking to increase policing of potential terrorist 
threats, through to doubled check-in times at airports. At a time when the threat of terrorism 
was defined by the invisibility and ubiquity of potential enemies, it was ‘our’ insecurity about 
‘them’ that drove the security measures understood as a necessary protection.  
 
This chapter will begin the analysis of a discourse of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’, by 
providing a definition of insecurity I will use throughout the thesis. In this chapter, I will 
illustrate that a discourse of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ is politicised, subjective and 
constantly evolving. This is because insecurity is defined through the heterogenous 
discursive interactions between cultural actors attempting to forward a hegemonic 
representation of its meaning. I will explore this definition of insecurity by discussing the 
ways in which power relations between media and government contribute to changes within 
the language that represents its meaning. This provides a framework for the subsequent 
chapters to discuss more thoroughly the themes of terrorism, legislation and war.  
 
This chapter will proceed firstly by contrasting the discursive approach to insecurity taken 
within this thesis with the more dominant security studies response to the post-September 
11 context. Security studies and its broader field of International Relations often forward 
discourses that prioritise the ways in which political, militaristic and economic actions affect 
the physical security of states. I will illustrate that discourses within security studies do not 
prioritise insecurity as a cultural framework for understanding the actions contributing to 
security. I will thus contest the dominance of security studies as a mode of understanding the 
post-September 11 context because I do not believe it seriously considers the discursive 
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frameworks that underpin material action. This will enable me to compare a security studies 
discourse to this thesis’ focus on insecurity as a cultural construction affected by the 
discursive practices of various cultural actors over time. 
 
This contestation will allow me to move to my own definition of post-September 11 
insecurity. Insecurity will be defined as a discursive concept used to describe the parameters 
of actions that would create security. This situates insecurity within the practices of language, 
where insecurity and security work within a dichotomous signification of meaning. I suggest 
that security measures such as a ‘war on terror’ are framed by understanding of insecurity, 
because the communication of danger enhances understanding of the need for the actions of 
institutions that respond to represented threats. This is important because it highlights this 
thesis’ focus on the discursive practices that have served to both construct and contest 
representations of post-September 11 insecurity along themes of terrorism, legislation and 
war. This definition of insecurity will stress that meaning is not achieved through domination 
by specific institutions, but is realised through diffuse discursive practices and interactions 
(Fairclough, 2003: 17). This will also allow the chapter to begin to illustrate the aspects of 
intersection between governmental discourse and media reportage in negotiating the 
representation of insecurity.  
 
This will bring the discussion to how these interactions occur in the public sphere. As this 
thesis is concerned primarily with the discursive interactions between media and government 
to negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity, it is important to theorise the role 
and the constitution of the ‘space’ in which these interactions take place. This is especially 
because definition of the public sphere will show how it can be possible for meaning making 
practices to occur and change according to different historical and cultural contingencies. In 
order to show how these discursive practices might occur, this section defines the public 
sphere to emphasise its fluid and dynamic nature and the complexity of the power relations 
inherent within it. I initially forward Jurgen Habermas’ conception of the public sphere as 
the most comprehensive definition of its role in maintaining discourse. I will extend on his 
theorisation by emphasising this thesis’ focus on the heterogenous power relations in the 
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public sphere that contribute to evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity.  
 
Dominant paradigms in the study of security  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that both media and government 
representations of the post-September 11 context have become part of a broadly accepted 
discourse in the western world. This particular discourse centres on understanding of 
terrorism as a source of insecurity, and legislation and war as its legitimate response. While 
this thesis prioritises the discursive practices that strive to secure the meaning of these 
themes, much previous academic work has focussed on the analysis of material forms of 
securitisation as the primary mode of understanding the post-September 11 context. I refer 
to securitisation as a discursive practice that attempts to construct particular understandings 
of the definition of threats to security, as well as their effective responses (Wæver, 1995). 
The practice of securitisation also allows the identification of particular material and cultural 
changes that would need to occur in order to maintain security.  
 
This thesis participates in debates about security in the post-September 11 period by 
exploring the discourses that have made the predominance of securitisation agendas 
possible. It differs from this analysis, because it contests the hegemony of a securitisation 
perspective by forwarding a cultural analysis of discursive understandings of insecurity. In 
contesting the hegemony of these securitisation agendas, I firstly need to forward these 
dominant perspectives in contrast to the position I have taken in this thesis. In this section, I 
will therefore present the Security Studies theorisations of the post-September 11 context for 
critical analysis. To do this, I wish to present Security Studies as a discourse that prioritises 
material effects and actions in regard to politicised events. This will allow me to contest the 
security studies perspective that deals with an assumed material reality of securitisation 
agendas, such as military, legislative or economic action. These ‘physical realities’ are 
consequences of politicised discursive constructions that are not prioritised within Security 
Studies analysis, illustrating a gap in security studies discourses where focus on the 
negotiation of the meaning is more useful. 
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As I have previously suggested, the post-September 11 age has been predominantly defined 
through notions of material forms of securitisation perpetuated within the security studies 
field. This has occurred because security studies discourses prioritise the military, policy and 
economic responses to terrorism often communicated by governmental authorities. Security 
studies within the International Relations (IR) field have therefore maintained a predominant 
discourse regarding the effects of terrorism on individuals and states, particularly in US 
governmental discourse. The post-September 11 context has been understood within 
discourses about the political and strategic drivers of local and international security policy, 
and the use of defence, foreign policy, economic strategy and intelligence to contribute to 
‘homeland security’ (See Australian National Security, 2007). This framework is especially 
evident in governmental communication of policy responses to terrorist threats. For 
example, methods of ‘securitisation’ defined aspects of Western governmental assessment of 
the 2004 South East Asian tsunamis in terms of the potential to create ‘a breeding ground 
for Islamic Radicalism’ (Allard, 2005). Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested 
that a failure to re-build South-East Asia could result in disaster victims turning to extremism 
(Allard, 2005). Powell’s comment implies that even assistance in the face of a major 
environmental disaster is conditional of the state’s complete and permanent vigilance of 
post-September 11 threats. Furthermore, in representing this disaster, Powell prioritises 
economic strategy and trans-national relations as integral to maintaining the security of the 
region. 
 
Security Studies is typically derivative of International Relations theory that integrates 
material and political analyses with studies of international security issues. Discourses within 
International Relations dealing with security often emphasise causes of conflict, military 
technology, bureaucratic politics and economic issues (MIT Security studies, 2007). Initially, 
the academic study of security was dominated by realist logic, which suggested that states are 
primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security. This 
approach assumes that states are principal actors in the international system, and each state 
prioritises its own national interests regarding security and survival (See Kolodziej, 2005). 
International relations are determined by states’ comparative level of power, and derived 
from the military and economic resources that each state has amassed.  
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International Relations began as a theoretical discipline through debate beginning with E.H 
Carr’s text, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939) and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations 
(1948). Although political relationships between nations had been written about for 
centuries, its study was only recognised as a discipline relatively recently through 
establishment in universities in the United Kingdom after the First World War. Public 
reaction to the First World War meant that the first scholars in the field were mostly 
preoccupied with identifying the causes of the war and subsequently, how changes in the old 
political order could prevent its recurrence (See Waltz, 1979). Out of these initial questions, 
scholars debated how a new, internationalised political order could be created through a 
system of global collective security including an international system of laws. This view was 
shared by many liberal internationalists, later called ‘utopians’ or ‘idealists’ by critics. Critical 
reaction to this liberal internationalism dominated the discipline’s early years. The realist 
criticism forwarded by Carr and Morgenthau led to the first defining debate of international 
studies’ philosophical structure (See Cox, 2000). 
 
Both Carr (1967 ed) and Morgenthau (1978 ed) criticised what they saw as a liberal political 
misunderstanding of international relations. They suggested that the ‘idealist’ effort to 
reform the international system by promoting collective security through law would always 
fail because it ignored relentless state struggles for power (Carr in Cox, 2000: 45). The 
prioritisation of a state’s imperative to pursue power within their national interest is referred 
to as political realism. Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) work in the 1970s was highly influential to 
defining a structure of realism. Waltz (1979: 74) suggested that a political balance between 
hierarchy and anarchy in international structure emerges from the interaction of states. 
Statesmanship therefore involves mitigating and managing, but not eliminating conflict. 
Realists seek a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one. This particular 
model of international studies thus moved from focussing on how to change the world for 
the better, to what could and could not be achieved within a world constituted by competing 
states.  
 
Classical realism dominated the field for at least 50 years, and despite major challenges, 
remains highly influential especially within western governmental discourses. While 
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contemporary International Relations analysis has continued the debate between realist and 
liberal perspectives, other forms of analysis have extended the traditional limitations of 
international studies inquiry. Marxists, for example, have criticised liberal human rights as 
bourgeois freedoms that fail to address the class-based exploitation within capitalist relations 
of production. Feminist and constructivist critical theory have all had a major influence on 
international relations, as has the analysis of contemporary issues of globalisation, 
development of third-world nations and terrorism.   
 
Neo-realism emerged in the 1970s and posed a challenge to classical realism because it 
shunned the use of concepts such as human behaviour to explain international politics. Neo-
realism prioritises analysis of structural constraints (such as military or economic power) on 
states within an international order. Neo-realism also criticises liberal and Marxist 
approaches, which it suggests exaggerate the ability of global economic and social processes 
to change the basic structure of international politics (Cox, 2000: 14). Instead, the 
development of international law is prioritised, along with the institutionalisation of forms of 
international ‘co-operation under anarchy’ (Waltz, 1979: 37). It has also provided analysis of 
global trade, suggesting that free trade could promote material property and conditions for 
lasting peace (Pugel, 2003: v).  
 
Alongside this confluence of analytical approaches in the 1970s, Security Studies emerged as 
a prioritised mode of understanding state action within International Relations. Security 
policy and the role of government in preventing threats to the state (or causing threats 
through their responses) were already well-established issues in political and international 
studies (Goodman, 2004).  Similarly to the broad persective of international relations, 
security studies discourses focus on global issues among states within analysis of tangible 
policy or political outcomes. As I suggested earlier, Security Studies discourses have 
continually prioritised a political realist approach, emphasising strategic, material action 
within international relations to ensure security. Security Studies theorists, such as Walt 
(1991) have shared an interest in how issues of political and economic governance affect the 
security of states. If basic understanding of the state is constituted by a political community 
occupying a definite territory, an organised system of government and recognised 
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sovereignty, then traditional Security Studies discourse suggests that much of the 
government’s power comes from its physical ability to protect this basic constitution 
(McDonald, 2005: 297). Security Studies was thus initially informed by debates over central 
policy problems and addressed phenomena that could be controlled by State leaders. As a 
result, relationships prioritised within security studies discourses are those manipulable by 
policy or military power. 
 
The politically realist approach of security studies has also been criticised as amoral by liberal 
security studies theorists, who often focus on humanitarian issues within international 
relations (See Kolodziej, 2005). This led to the development of Human Security as a mode 
of analysis. Human Security has extended traditional security debates into what had 
traditionally been classed as ‘humanitarian’ issues. Seven key areas of analysis grew out of 
human security: the economic, health, food, environmental, political, community and 
personal effects on humans of international politics. To this end, recent security studies has 
been especially relevant and important in areas such as human rights, political and economic 
policy, personal security from crime, justice, refugee movements and displacement, and food 
security (Institute for Security Studies, 2007). These issues posed a challenge to traditional 
understandings of security because they moved emphasis away from the states, to groups 
and individuals.  
 
While Human Security has largely developed through state policy and international 
institutions such as the United Nations, Critical Security Studies has also challenged 
traditional conceptions of security studies.  Critical Security Studies challenges the primacy of 
the state, attempting to re-conceptualise security as an emancipatory process rather than a 
process of enforcement and prevention. Theorists such as Ken Booth (2008) have attempted 
to reformulate security in more positive ways by suggesting security as the elimination of 
unjust social relations and more broadly, the understanding of international relations as 
incorporating ‘multiple securities’ from ecological destruction, poverty and structural 
violence. This extends a security studies analysis based around the identification of abstract 
threats to the integrity of states, their interests or core values (Burke, 2007: 6-7). 
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Taking these fields of research into consideration, International Relations has thus developed 
discourses that draw on diverse fields such as economics, history, law, sociology and cultural 
studies. It also analyses a much broader range of issues, from ecological sustainability, 
nuclear proliferation, economic development, organised crime, human security and human 
rights, This has led to what I identify as the predominance of security studies discourse—
especially within governmental communication—as an assumed reality, rather than a 
politicised and contestable discourse about particular events and individuals. This is because 
governmental, corporate and institutional authorities prioritise material responses and effects 
as the mode of understanding political events. This mode of understanding is conducive to 
the cultural, militaristic an economic power of those who have a vested interest in material 
responses to political events. 
 
Security Studies thus continues to be a dominant mode of addressing the post-September 11 
context because the realist conceptions of its discourses often define power through its 
physical manifestations in political, economic or militaristic actions of a sovereign state. For 
example, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the US, a security studies 
framework of analytical response would incorporate policy-driven questions such as: 
 
What kind of threat do we face? What is the appropriate response to that threat? In 
other words, what are the appropriate ways to think about dealing with a threat from 
a non-state actor with no fixed location or permanently defined territorial assets? 
(Diebert et al, 2002).  
 
Response to threat is therefore seen as the sole responsibility of governmental authorities 
whose actions are entrusted to the protection and maintenance of a particular construction 
of the nation. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, governmental authorities 
posed their responses according to both the policy-driven questions of securitisation, as well 
as their role in the constitution of the state. I would suggest that this method of defining 
security illustrates that a secure nation-state, as a defined territory and ‘way of life’ is an 
enshrined entity. As a discursive construction it is particularly static in the way its various 
significations are understood and disseminated. In this ‘top down’ approach to meaning 
making, governmental policy is often suggested as a response to insecurity, and thus 
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governmental authorities also define the factors contributing to this response.  Though this 
seems the most politically beneficial way for governmental authorities to suggest an 
understanding of the post-September 11 period, it does not allow meaning to be contested, 
or to evolve over time. 
 
The discourses perpetuated within Security Studies analysis therefore denies or 
underestimates the role that the perpetuation of particular discourses have on the actions in 
the material world. In regard to the post-September 11 context, much Security Studies 
analysis has not taken into consideration the ways in which discourses about insecurity have 
contributed to particular ‘security’ actions. Insecurity remains hidden or assumed within 
Security Studies discourses because they are not concerned with the politicised meanings that 
construct understanding of how insecurity and security. Therefore, within particular realist 
conceptions of security studies, insecurity has not been contextualised as a product of 
culturally constituted meaning. I argue that the concept of insecurity needs to be defined 
through cultural processes of meaning making. Understanding of both sources of insecurity 
and their security responses are not established facts, but politicised discourses used by 
cultural actors to maintain hegemony over the representation of meaning. This perspective is 
important because it recognises that establishing particular discursive understandings of 
insecurity contributes to the legitimation of governmental actions. Further, it allows for the 
possibility of discursive contestations that negotiate the representation of post-September 11 
insecurity. 
 
The dominant security studies discourses therefore differ from the perspective taken in this 
thesis, which takes as its foundation the representations of meaning that drive the particular 
actions analysed by international relations theorists. I wish to situate understanding of 
security as a contestable discourse, rather than an assumed material reality. This approach 
prioritises understanding of security to show how it has become so firmly entrenched within 
the processes of understanding responses to post-September 11 insecurity, especially by the 
Australian government. This is important because it illustrates that contested understandings 
of sources of insecurity have effects on what is considered an appropriate response to 
maintain security. My concern is to highlight a gap in Security Studies discourses that assume 
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the dominance of material effects of security, rather than its politicised and continually 
evolving construction.  
 
Instead I argue, that the supposedly dominant understandings perpetrated by governmental 
authorities about insecurity have actually been subject to negotiation by other cultural actors. 
This is a broadly post-structuralist perspective, suggesting security exists through a “complex 
deployment of metaphor, knowledge and rhetoric with social, administrative, economic and 
geopolitical power” (Burke, 2001: 34). This emphasises security as having no inherent 
‘reality’. Instead, a process of interactions between different cultural actors contributes to 
understanding of both insecurity and security in the public sphere. This illustrates that 
understanding of security is a fluid process of cultural construction, based on notions of 
what constitutes insecurity.  Therefore this chapter will now move away from the static 
assumptions of the predominance of the state in defining political discourse and action. 
Instead governmental discourse is prioritised within discussion of discursive struggles over 
the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. In this thesis, interaction with media reportage 
will illustrate the complex ‘battles’ that contribute to the constantly evolving meaning of 
post-September 11 insecurity. I will now turn to a fuller explanation of my definition of 
post-September 11 insecurity utilising the approach I have outlined here. 
 
What is a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity? 
 
In this section, I will suggest that both security and insecurity exist within a network of 
discursive practises that construct and negotiate understanding of meaning. These range 
from our most private thoughts to larger apparatuses such as the practices of governmental 
power (Burke, 2001: xxxiv). Relating to this process, I will define insecurity as a subjective 
and contested discursive concept used to describe the parameters of actions that would 
create security. Insecurity and its responses through security only ‘exist’ through discourse 
because their meaning lies within competing discourses, which have sought to imagine it, 
defend against it and achieve its dissolution through the maintenance of security (Lewis, 
2004).  
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This situates insecurity within the practices of language, where insecurity and security work 
within a dichotomous signification of meaning. To illustrate these practices I will utilise 
Derrida’s understanding of binary opposition in language. This will enable me to show that 
dominant understanding of security measures such as a ‘war on terror’ are framed by 
understanding of insecurity, because the communication of danger enhances understanding 
of the need for the actions of institutions that respond to represented threats. These 
processes have led to the production of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ as a politicised 
discourse used by cultural actors to maintain hegemony over the representation of meaning 
and thus, prioritise their actions. Maintaining hegemony over discourse provides the 
justification of one institution’s cultural authority to act. Thus hegemony over the 
representation of sources of insecurity necessarily justifies the authority of political responses 
that maintain security. This definition of post-September 11 insecurity will stress that 
meaning is not achieved through domination by specific institutions, but is realised through 
diffuse discursive practices and interactions.  
 
I have suggested that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is made up of 
representation of the sources of insecurity through terrorism, and its response through 
legislation and war. This discourse has been used as the referent for a mode of 
understanding the post-September 11 era within a particular historical, political and cultural 
context. Thus, when I refer to a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, I mean to 
suggest the discursive practices associated with maintaining these themes as the dominant 
understanding of sources of insecurity and their responses as ‘security measures’. In 
Foucault’s terms, the conditions for the emergence of a discourse are deeply connected to 
the political, cultural and historical context in which it manifests. For example, the 
emergence of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity brings together the event of the 
terror attacks as the historical context, and more abstract cultural and political 
representations of insecurity and security as a mode of understanding this context (Handmer 
et al, 2007: 120). 
 
This process is evident in governmental communication of the ‘new and radically different’ 
emergence of terrorism as a global threat. Governmental authorities represent the insecurity 
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wrought by terrorism to maintain a continuing sense of danger that justifies their legislative 
and military responses within a ‘war on terror’.  This fits within an overall discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity, which provides a framework for understanding particular political 
and cultural representations within an historical context. This needs to be acknowledged 
especially given that notions of insecurity, terrorism and war have also become increasingly 
referential in events that do not traditionally constitute ‘terror’, such as refugee migration 
(Burke, 2001: 32). This illustrates therefore, the ways in which ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ 
is tied to a network of discursive practices that both produce and negotiate meaning within 
particular contexts. The inherent dynamism of the way post-September 11 insecurity can be 
utilised as a discourse refers to the different ways a discourse can emerge and evolve over 
time. This also refers to the primary argument of this thesis, because it suggests that 
particular interactions between cultural actors to represent meaning contribute to the 
evolution of discourses over time. The exchange, maintenance and negotiation of 
representations about post-September 11 insecurity between cultural actors contributes to 
differing understandings of the discourse in the public sphere, which changes its meaning 
over time. 
 
While it is the focus of this thesis, I would not suggest that ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ 
has been situated as an overt discourse within governmental communication about post-
September 11 threats. Instead, it is the framing discourse for understanding the September 
11 context, used to justify the various legislative and militaristic actions associated with 
maintaining security. I would suggest that political pundits within the media have spoken 
confidently of concepts of ‘maintaining security’, while governments have sought 
legitimation for ‘security measures’ in public discourse (See Ruddock, 2005; Burke, 2001; 
Shapiro, 1990). Discourses of insecurity are instead expressed as the catalyst or implication 
underlying a political response. Similarly to the way epistemological frameworks situate the 
meaning of discursive themes, insecurity is the underlying discursive referent and 
justification for political action in response to threats defined by the events of September 11, 
2001. Security measures such as the ‘war on terror’ are framed by insecurity in the sense that 
the possibility of danger enhances the need for methods and institutions that respond not 
only to terrorist attacks, but also to the possibility of attack.  
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This suggests that governmental discourse has referred to notions of insecurity as the 
justification of security measures. This is because discourses of insecurity create a much 
more immediate sense of the need for political action, minimising the time for counter-
discursive argument to take effect. Nonetheless, while governmental authorities attempt to 
manage the representation of insecurity, it is a concept that is abstract and uncontrollable. 
Within the discursive practices utilised by governmental authorities, insecurity has both 
positive and negative effects because it is necessarily abstract. On one hand, an overt 
reference to insecurity is not conducive to notions of governmental control over protection 
of the nation. A discourse of ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ cannot be overtly acknowledged 
within governmental discourse because it undermines authority to respond. On the other 
hand, elements of insecurity’s more abstract qualities and the fear that it produces can be 
utilised as a framework to legitimise governmental actions. 
 
Governmental authorities therefore carefully manage frameworks for communicating the 
sources of, and responses to, insecurity. Nonetheless, the abstraction and dynamism of 
insecurity’s meaning creates ‘slippages’ in the way it is represented in the public sphere. 
These slippages in meaning are created because as a discourse, insecurity has a changeable 
character. It has an abstract yet ubiquitous nature that quietly undermines the confident 
dissemination of security, reminding the state of exactly what it is that makes the very notion 
of security unstable.  
 
The inclusion of security is important in defining insecurity because it indicates that the 
terms operate through a dichotomous signification, whereby the terms implicate each other 
in meaning. The two terms implicate each other in their individual signification and are thus 
linked by their binary opposition. The insecurity/security dichotomy works on a principle of 
dualism, which suggests that one cannot be understood without the other. The two concepts 
are always defined in absence of, or antithesis to the other. Within the dichotomous 
understanding of insecurity/security, the fact of their existence is made up of both the 
physical experience of their absence and presence within an individual’s life, but also the 
imagined experience of what their absence and presence should ‘feel’ like. For example, 
installing locks on a front door attends to the physical experience of security. The locks’ 
absence would contribute to the presence of ‘feelings’ of insecurity.  
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Both insecurity and security can be articulated materially (as the physical response to 
insecurity like policy) and through the subject (as the personal and collective understanding 
of what defines them).  Furthermore, the dichotomy can be seen as both a physical 
experience of behaviours and actions that create security in response to insecurity, or 
alternatively, as the subjective personal experience of insecurity’s ‘affect’; the experience of 
‘feeling’ insecure. Generally, insecurity is described as a ‘feeling’ of fear, apprehension or 
anxiety—this notion highlights the subjective contingency of insecurity. Insecurity is not a 
tangible ‘thing’, but an experience that shapes and influences understanding and therefore, 
behaviour. For example, women express this sense of insecurity when opting not to walk 
alone after dark. While there is no tangible danger that confronts them in doing so, their 
behaviour is modified by their association with a cultural ‘knowledge’ of the predominance 
of attacks on women at night. 
 
In suggesting the system of opposition that insecurity/security engages, this chapter has 
been influenced by Jacques Derrida’s method of ‘deconstruction’. Deconstruction was a 
reaction against the structuralist notion that texts held stable meanings that could be ordered 
through the use of linguistics. Deconstruction instead uses linguistics to argue that that 
language is much less stable (Lucy, 1995: 59). A typical deconstructive reading focuses on 
binary oppositions within a text, firstly to show how those oppositions are structured 
hierarchically. Deconstruction then overturns that hierarchy to displace and re-assert both 
terms within a non-hierarchical relationship of difference. Within this theorisation, Derrida 
suggests that Western language is built upon binary poles defined by one’s domination over 
the other. It is a ‘presence’ which is facilitated by its opposite’s ‘absence’ (in Lewis, 2001: 
166).   
 
The binary opposition is related to the structuralist suggestion of the human tendency to 
think in terms of opposition. With this categorisation, terms and concepts tend to be 
associated with a positive or negative. Derrida suggests these oppositions are not only 
dichotomies, but also “hierarchies in miniature” (Derrida in Lucy, 1995: 62). The binary 
opposition is one of the key structural ideas which deconstruction rejects. Although Derrida 
acknowledges the human tendency to think in terms of opposites, he argued that these 
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oppositions were arbitrary and inherently unstable. The structures themselves begin to 
overlap, clash and ultimately, dismantle themselves from within the text. This is because 
these structures are only arbitrary notions constructed and de-constructed over time. This is 
important because it allows this chapter to show that although a ‘dominant’ discourse of 
insecurity is seen to exist, its meaning is unstable, allowing negotiation from other cultural 
actors. 
 
The binary division between security and insecurity suggests that each exists in opposition to 
the other; security is conceived of being everything that insecurity is not.  As Derrida 
explains (1974: 47), this is not an opposition of equal partners: “the first term is classically 
conceived as original, authentic, and superior, while the second is thought of as secondary, 
derivative, or even parasitic”. For example, the terms ‘light’ and ‘dark’ have been conceived 
through a binary division that situates ‘light’ as having a superior connotation to ‘dark’.  This 
opposition has been utilised in Catholic literature to suggest positive connotations of 
religious faith as those who have ‘seen the light’ against non-believers who remain in the 
‘dark’. Similarly, insecurity is described in a series of negative terms that serve to buttress the 
legitimacy of actions designed to create security. Derrida suggests that this understanding 
comes from within a language system that allows for the predominance of one binary over 
another.  
 
This use of binary opposites defers meaning, highlighting the contingency of ‘context’ for its 
representation in language. Context provides language with the historical and political 
framework to create meaning. For example, the events of September 11, 2001, provided the 
initial context of terrorism that contributed to the manifestation of governmental discourses 
of post-September 11 insecurity.  This is seen in the US government’s justification of 
military action in Iraq as a result of insecurity about weapons of mass destruction in the 
post-September 11 age, despite the nation not being involved in any actual attacks on the 
US.  
 
This utilisation of context does not placate the abstract nature of insecurity as a concept. 
Derrida’s suggestions of absence and presence are illustrated through insecurity’s implied 
irony as a concept. It is seen as ubiquitous yet undefined, existing and yet not containing 
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physicality. Instead, insecurity deploys abstract understandings of possibility and prevention 
as an important part of its meaning. This should be viewed differently from concepts of 
‘risk’. Confirmation of physical threat as the result of engaging in certain behaviour is 
generally referred to as ‘risk’. Notions of risk are outlined by Ulrich Beck (1992) in his text 
Risk Society: Towards a new modernity. He suggests that processes of modernisation have created 
self-endangerment through uncontrollable environmental, social and political risks. Beck 
considers risk to be tied to these physical or material events of destruction, such as 
environmental degradation or war. Therefore, risk differs from insecurity because its 
definition is fixed in the physical probabilities of an incident occurring. Insecurity works 
more as a subjective experience tied to the social, cultural and political understandings tied to 
representation of meaning in the public sphere. 
 
In contrast to risk, the experience of insecurity is therefore much more subjective. Insecurity 
can often stem from the more abstract and ambiguous communication of the possibility of 
future events that may contribute to physical risk. Subsequently, the encouragement of 
preventative action in the form of security is often propelled by those abstract possibilities. 
For example, the ‘anti-terror laws’ recently introduced by the Australian government give 
federal police greater power to detain, interrogate and follow individuals on the basis of 
‘suspicion of terrorist possibility’ (Hot reception, 2005). While there were no ‘physical’ 
experiences of terrorism in Australia to justify the preventative laws, the context of previous 
events of terrorism overseas has allowed governmental authorities to suggest the possibility 
of attack in Australia (Shiel, 2005). 
 
Understanding of security combines a complex deployment of metaphor, knowledge and 
rhetoric with systems of social, administrative, economic and geopolitical power (Burke, 
2001: xxxiii). On the other hand, insecurity is a powerful concept that propels the parameters 
of these physical and imagined experiences.  Insecurity thus relies on the premise of past and 
future events to exist, just as the dissemination of responses to these events allows its 
cultural and political strength. Both insecurity and security are imbued with the burdens of 
the events and responses of the past, present and future, as well as the cultural actors and 
relations of power that create those meanings. Thus the meanings of insecurity/security can 
be analysed in their discrete historical and political contexts, but not as timeless universals 
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(Burke, 2001: xxxiv). This sense of ‘context’ suggests that security can suddenly be 
understood in ways that were previously atypical (Lewis, 2001: 42). These abstracted forms 
of understanding insecurity/security are possible through processes of representation. 
Processes of representation allow particular meanings are constituted as the ‘truth’ of a 
particular individual, event or context. To this end, I now wish to discuss the ways in which 
particular representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity have 
contributed to the situation of its meaning. 
 
Representation of discursive themes: terrorism, legislation and war 
 
The meaning of insecurity is understood within the historical context of the post-September 
11 period, and is reliant on the evolving representations generated through culture to supply 
understanding. In this section I will highlight this thesis’ focus on the discursive practices 
that have served to construct representations of post-September 11 insecurity along themes 
of terrorism, legislation and war.  I refer to representation as the relationship between a 
particular context and meaning. As Lewis (2005: 7) illustrates, representation is evident in the 
politicised process of binding the symbolic (meaning) to action or events in the material 
world. It is the process of representation that suggests the link between the phenomenal and 
the symbolic as meaning or ‘truth’.  
 
Discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war manifest as part of governmental 
attempts to create the conditions for a stable and politically expedient representation of the 
meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This occurs through the situation of these themes 
within particular epistemological frameworks of meaning. These frameworks provide 
understanding of these themes as sources and responses to insecurity within a larger 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  A suggested in chapter three, epistemological 
frameworks provide a particular representation of meaning, which can then be applied and 
referred to by cultural actors. This ensures their dominance over meaning, and thus their 
authority within the public sphere. Therefore, epistemological frameworks are inherently 
subjective and politicised. They are utilised to refer audiences to meanings that are most 
beneficial for the maintenance of a cultural or political status quo. 
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Discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war reflect the overt governmental 
communication about the sources of, and responses to insecurity.  The epistemological 
frameworks act as the more abstract platform of meaning that define these themes and 
encourage material actions. Therefore these epistemological frameworks situate the differing 
meanings that contribute to a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  The theoretical 
foundation for epistemological frameworks suggests that through the negotiation of these 
representations, the audience makes sense of meaning. This is not a passive activity, but a 
politicised and active process (See Ang, 1996). This is important as it illustrates that meaning 
making processes are subject to negotiation both at the level of production and at the 
moment of reception. This is what leads to the fluidity of governmental discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. 
 
As the representation of the source of post-September 11 insecurity, the ‘meaning’ of 
terrorism must be situated within the discursive battles between differing cultural actors. 
This is because its meaning is often dependent on historically contingent and contested 
understandings of the symbolic representation of the phenomenological. There is no doubt 
the “symbolic amplitude” (Lewis, 2005: 21) of terrorism is immense despite the minimal risk 
posed by politically motivated violence in Australia. For instance, more Australians died 
from skin cancer in the past year in Sydney alone than have ever been killed through political 
violence (Skin Cancer, 2006).  These examples are not given to compare death rates, but 
simply to illustrate the amount of public attention given to acts of terror. Though the 
physical risk of dying from cancer is much more real to Australians, the political and cultural 
signification attributed to terrorism—as well as its reference to broader cultural fears—has 
allowed its prominence as a major source of insecurity. This suggests the ongoing intensity 
and politicisation of the representation of terror as a source of insecurity.  
 
Understanding of terrorism must be shown through the ways in which various cultural 
actors represent meaning through discourse. Terrorism has been presented within Australian 
governmental discourse as a random act of mass violence meant to instil fear into the 
populace as a method of propaganda. In a White Paper describing the terrorist threat to 
Australia, Prime Minister John Howard (Protecting Australia, 2004: v) suggested that it was: 
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… [a] new and unpredictable threat. It does not respect borders and the rights of 
people to live peaceful lives and go about their business. Terrorists do not abide by 
rules or engage in regular forms of combat. Instead they use whatever means are 
available to them to achieve their political and ideological objectives.  
 
As the source of post-September 11 insecurity, terrorism was situated by governmental 
authorities as an “extreme and militant distortion of Islamic doctrine that opposes the values 
of the West and modernity” (Protecting Australia, 2004: vii). 
 
The governmental definition of terrorism suggests that ‘Others’ use violence illegitimately. In 
comparison to governmental authorities working for the development and protection of the 
nation, terrorist ‘others’ use violence only to illustrate an ideological belief. Therefore, 
terrorists are presented as individualistic ‘others’ whose illegitimate actions threaten the unity 
of the nation and its identity. Though the description of the use of Otherness as an 
epistemological framework of meaning will be elucidated further in chapter five, we can 
relate this description to the broader discussion of discursive struggles over meaning. The 
representation of terrorism as the work of ‘Others’ who threaten the nation is presented 
within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity as part of maintaining governmental 
hegemony over cultural processes of meaning making. 
 
To this end, Karim Karim (2002) has argued that international struggles over power are the 
most pertinent contributors to both the definition and manifestation of terrorism. Karim 
(2002: 3) argues that the application of the ideological label of terrorism is simply a state 
process to garner political power. He suggests this is evident in the copious examples of 
western powers engaging in military partnerships even with those Muslim-majority countries 
that they subsequently identify as terrorist states (Karim, 2002: 1). For example, Saddam 
Hussein’s government was dropped from the US state department’s list of terrorist regimes 
in the 1980s when it was at war with Iran (Karim, 2002: 7). This perspective changed in the 
mid-1990s, when US administration found that Hussein was considered a destabilizing 
influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Therefore, in later 
discourses the US government suggested that Saddam Hussein was a dictator who used 
weapons of mass destruction to aid Islamic terrorist groups. Similarly, Karim argues that 
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dominant political discourses have created an overall picture of Islam as “a source of 
planetary instability: the Islamic peril disrupts national order at the very time that 
globalisation is bringing humanity together” (Karim, 2002: 1).  
 
Recent commentary has moved away from these preoccupations with statist control on 
cultural life, focussed instead on placing the concept of terrorism firmly in the realm of the 
discursive. Indeed, it has been argued that terrorist attacks are ‘communication acts’, serving 
to broaden the discourse on the United States’ role in the Middle East (See Silberstein, 
2002). Terrorism is discursive because this act of political violence is perpetrated in order to 
communicate a certain message in a way that ensures publicity (Silberstein, 2002: 5). Brigitte 
Nacos has also suggested the media are important in defining terrorism because they are the 
main ‘target’ of political violence. Rather than indiscriminate violence, communication and 
publicity of ideological messages are the central aims of terrorist acts. She suggests that 
notions of terrorism are deeply embedded in the processes of mediatisation of political 
discourses: 
 
Political violence for the sake of publicity succeeds even when the terrorists stage 
rather modest acts of terrorism. As long as the terrorists offer visuals and sound 
bites, drama, threats and human interest tales, the news media will report—and 
actually over report—on their actions at the expense of other and more important 
news (Nacos, 2002: 5).  
 
Nacos’ emphasis on the media suggests the link between the material and discursive in the 
understanding of terrorism. This is important because it suggests that the representation of 
terrorism in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has consequences not only for the 
understanding of meaning, but subsequent actions taken in response to accepted meaning.  
 
This thesis shows this representation of the war on terror as part of discursive strategies to 
ensure the authority of governmental actions within the public sphere. I now wish to draw 
attention to the discursive strategies that have situated legislative and military action as 
appropriate responses to post-September 11 insecurity. A discourse of post-September 11 
 87 
 
insecurity has also implied responses that privilege governmental action and power to act. As 
Paul James (James et al, 2005: 237) argues, the war on terror is a “war as concept”, with no 
visible enemy, no borders and no foreseeable end. The discursive war on terror is 
represented as a globally continuous state of war where the ‘enemy’, like the insecurity it 
perpetuates, is an abstract entity that must be imagined and represented through politicised 
discourses.  This ‘enemy’ no longer follows the sovereign law of the nation state, nor 
controls any defined territory. This differs from traditional representations of war as a 
conflict between sovereign states in which certain rules apply in terms of the treatment of 
prisoners, and the prohibition of weapons and certain techniques of warfare (James et al, 
2005: 217).  
 
Therefore, the ‘war on terror’ is symptomatic of the abstract nature of discourses of 
insecurity. The war is being fought against a concept that is understood only through highly 
politicised and contingent forms of discursive representation (Lewis, 2005: 35). This has 
nonetheless had material effects, with Australian governmental authorities having pledged 
their support for the US-led military war on terror, implementing military force in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as part of the Coalition of the Willing. The military war on terror is defined in 
the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism as “both a battle of arms and a battle of 
ideas” (National Strategy, 2006). This representation suggests that while military force is 
necessary to combat terrorism, the overall goal is to “promote freedom and human dignity 
as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule” (National 
Strategy, 2006). To do this, the war on terror also uses “diplomatic, financial, intelligence and 
law enforcement activities to protect the homeland and…disrupt terrorist operations” 
(National Strategy, 2006). Thus, the war on terror is represented as a trans-national 
operation, with outward moves to forcibly remove terrorist groups and enforce democratic 
rule, and inward action to increase legislative measures to curb security risks.    
 
While bringing freedom and democracy through military force may seem paradoxical, it has 
nonetheless been represented as justification for war through the notions of legitimation and 
exceptionalism that justify both governmental actions and authority.  This allows the 
 88 
 
Coalition of the Willing to legitimate their actions as the acceptable moral response to 
terrorism. As Zizek (2004) argues: 
 
The US dominated global force…does not perceive itself as one of the warring sides, 
but as a mediating agent of peace and global order, crushing rebellion and, 
simultaneously, providing humanitarian aid to the ‘local population’.  
 
This justification of governmental action has also perpetuated governmental authority to act, 
especially in responding to insecurity with military force. This discursive theme of war was 
situated within an epistemological framework of exceptionalism. This particular framing of 
war creates understanding of the legitimate violence of governmental authorities in 
responding to insecurity, and the illegitimate violence of ‘Others’. This violence is always 
seen within ideas of nationhood, and thus contrasted to those using violence illegitimately 
against the state, whether terrorists, or anti-war protesters. Thus, the link between violence 
and nationhood can be said to allow governmental authorities to assert their interests in the 
public sphere.  
 
As well as military responses to post-September 11 insecurity, governmental authorities have 
forwarded the need for particular legislative actions. This legislation has been articulated 
especially through the Australian anti-terror laws, which have served to limit the rights of 
those suspected of planning terrorist attacks in Australia. Conversely, the laws have extended 
the rights of state and Federal authorities to use surveillance, enforced interviews and secrecy 
to find these potential terrorists ‘before they strike’. In introducing legislation as a discursive 
theme within the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation situate the need for governmental action in an age of post-September 11 
insecurity. Despite the archaic nature of the laws, legitimation situated the meaning of anti-
terror legislation as the only response available to protect a vulnerable nation’s “security, its 
people, its borders, its interests and its values” (Howard, 2003). Legitimation therefore 
perpetuates not only the war on terror as the most legitimate response to insecurity, but also 
the authority of governmental authorities.  
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Nonetheless, the implementation of both militaristic and legislative responses by 
governmental authorities does, to some degree, require public consent. Gaining consent 
remains problematic for governmental authorities because the war on terror is represented 
according to particular ideological frameworks that are available for contestation in the 
public sphere. Thus the war on terror itself is available for contestation because it is based 
on discursive arguments for the representation of meaning. Foucault’s notion of discourse 
encapsulates the broader thesis conception of the politicised, subjective and contingent 
nature of discourses presented in the public sphere. Within these practices of discursive 
formation, cultural actors—especially within institutions such as government and media—
seek to stabilise the primacy of their discourses as durable ‘meanings’. He described this use 
as a claim to power, where the discourse provides access to strategies of regulation of what 
can and cannot be thought of as meaning:  
 
Institutions suggest that you have nothing to fear from discourse. They say ‘we’re 
here to show you that discourse is within the established order of things, that we’ve 
waited a long time for it’s arrival, that a place has been set aside for it—a place which 
both honours and disarms it; and if it should happen to have a certain power, then it 
is we, and we alone, who give it power (Foucault, 1972: 216).  
 
This description can be seen similarly in governmental processes of maintaining discourses 
of insecurity as a ‘natural’ consequence of terrorism, creating the political conditions 
conducive to the justification of legal and military responses.  
 
The representation of fixed contexts in fact belies the evolving processes of power that 
create meaning. To maintain the credibility of meaning within a discourse, cultural actors 
must manage its representation, actively producing discursive responses to meanings that are 
incompatible with its own (Shapiro, 1990: 334). In this thesis, these practices are illustrated 
through the manifestation of discursive themes that serve to create the conditions for 
acceptance of governmental action. While this comprises a specific illustration of a discursive 
strategy, processes to negotiate ‘meaning’ are “everyday, immediate and unavoidable” (Lewis, 
2005: 110). Discourse therefore, can be viewed as an asset within power relations that 
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subjugate some forms of meanings over others (Shapiro, 1990: 331). In this thesis, 
governmental discourse and its mediation within newspapers illustrate the inevitability of 
‘battles’ over meaning. When ‘public’ opinion is included in this interplay, and other groups 
within culture also fighting for their voices to be heard within the mainstream representation 
of events, the inherent complexity of meaning making in culture is exposed. I would now 
like to turn the discussion to a much more sustained explanation of the space in which this 
public interplay of representations is able to take place: the public sphere. 
 
Discursive interactions in the public sphere: a definition 
 
In each of the previous sections, I have prioritised the negotiation of meaning by news 
media and governmental authority as contributing to the evolution of discourses about post-
September 11 insecurity. I wish to present the various contestations and confirmation of 
meaning as occurring within interactions between various cultural actors. To do this, I also 
need to theorise the ‘space’ where these heterogenous interactions take place. This needs to 
be a public space where various cultural actors interact, as well as providing a dynamic 
environment that allows for battles to occur over the representation of meaning, and for 
these meanings to change over time. I have conceptualised this space along notions of the 
public sphere. It does not exist within a physical space, but rather through the social, cultural 
and political spaces of discursive interaction where often contradictory and contested 
representations of meaning battle for dominance within the cultural imaginary. To show how 
these discursive practices might occur, this section defines the public sphere to emphasise its 
fluid and dynamic nature and the complexity of the power relations inherent within it. I will 
initially forward Jurgen Habermas’ conception of the public sphere as the most 
comprehensive definition of its role in maintaining discourse. I will extend on his 
theorisation by emphasising this thesis’ focus on the heterogenous power relations in the 
public sphere that contribute to evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity.  
 
Jurgen Habermas has forwarded the most comprehensive account of the structure of the 
public sphere.  In his ‘model of society’ in The Theory of Communicative Action (1984), 
Habermas defined the public sphere as “a discursive arena that is home to citizen debate, 
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deliberation, agreement and action” (Habermas, 1984: 397). Importantly, Habermas 
prioritised the notion of consensus formed around communication between subjects. In 
attempting to formulate the pre-conditions for ‘meaningful discourse’ in the public sphere, 
Habermas suggested that ‘reality’ is collectively constituted through communicative action 
that agrees on the conditions of ‘rationality’ (Habermas, 1984: 397). 
 
Within this conception of the public sphere, claims of truth and validity are challenged, but 
must conclude in agreement to produce a consensual, rationalised truth. In a utopian model, 
this consensus provides the ‘ideal speech situation’ for citizens’ political liberation. Habermas 
argues that the ideal speech situation is universal. It is made possible by human activity that 
inevitably seeks to represent itself and its culture in language. Though the socio-cultural 
context is shaped by historical determinants, Habermas argues that the dynamics of 
development will always be impelled towards an ideal speech situation and the ultimate 
rationality of language.  
 
This approach to communicative rationality was shaped through Habermas’ dissatisfaction 
with post-structuralism and its supposed inability to reconcile individual and collective 
interests. Habermas argues that the inevitable human need is to construct community and in 
order to do this effectively, they must rely on consensus and rationality to resolve issues. The 
alternative, according to Habermas, is the selective use of force or coercion, with the goal of 
keeping these underlying conflicts latent. The consequential ‘official’ consensus is reached 
once those conflicts are repressed. In cases where social integration is achieved in this 
manner, the consensus is ideological.  
 
Such forcefully integrated action systems are, of course, in need of an ideological 
justification to conceal the asymmetrical distribution of chances for legitimate 
satisfaction of needs. Communication between participants is then systematically 
distorted or blocked (Habermas, 1975: 27).  
 
Habermas seems to be prescriptive in his notion of the public sphere. He argues that the 
entrenched coercive efforts of the political sphere can be countered with a consensus in the 
cultural sphere as to what constitutes rationality. Indeed, Habermas’ work as a theorist is 
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characterised by his insistence that philosophy provide public utility through “a reinvigorated 
public sphere in which political debate can spur an even greater form of democratic will 
formation” (Bronner, 2002: 213). 
 
 The advantage of Habermas’ conception of communicative action over traditional critical 
theory is that it highlights some progressive possibilities for citizens to increase their 
autonomy in political decision-making processes through discourse.  Nonetheless, as a 
Marxist, Habermas insists on placing the public sphere within a structuralist framework of 
political action and especially, within a stringent impetus towards consensus. This enforces a 
hierarchy within the public sphere, where communication is seen as a tool of human life, but 
politics is inherent to human life. This seems to imbue his theory with a sense that 
communication is part of a structural process of society, rather than constitutive of human 
life itself. While this thesis’ argument suggests that heterogenous discursive practices are 
constitutive of the meanings that drive action in the physical world, Habermas suggests that 
only consensus over meaning can drive action. This limits communicative practice to only 
being ‘meaningful’ when it stems from unified political action in the physical world.  This 
would suggest that Habermas’ theory of the public sphere becomes limited when subjected 
to the contingencies of social, historical and cultural life because of his reliance on 
consensus. 
 
A unified rational and consensual public sphere is hard to sustain given differences between 
different cultural actors. Notions of the public sphere must be contained in a framework that 
allows for the transgressive qualities of cultural processes. A conception of the public sphere 
must be broad enough to include the individual practices of cultural actors, but also the 
contingent and interconnected nature of their relations with each other [2]. Apart from this, 
the public sphere must allow for the production of each cultural actor to be affected by their 
relations with others. Taking into account these criticisms of Habermas’ conception of the 
public sphere, this thesis forwards a more dynamic understanding of the public sphere. I 
wish to reject notions of a separation between political, social or cultural spheres and suggest 
that a public sphere needs to include these multiple frames of reference to account for the 
heterogeneity of the cultural understandings within it. This conception of the public sphere 
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is meant to emphasise fluidity of understandings that come through the public sphere. 
Rather than describing a monolithic unity of understanding, the public sphere should 
describe participation through the “development of distinct groups organised around affinity 
and interest” (Gitlin, 1998: 173). The model is also meant to be dynamic, accounting for 
interaction between discourses suggested as both national and global, and produced by both 
mainstream and minority cultural actors.  
 
Given the thesis contention that power relations between cultural actors are contingent and 
interlinked, the location of these relations must also reflect this complexity. Mouffe (1999: 
757) has argued that an agonistic plurality of power relations takes into account the 
multiplicity of voices that the public sphere must encompass. Definition of the public sphere 
must reflect the complexities of power relations inherent within it. Instead of threatening 
democracy, a plurality of oppositional discourses is crucial to illustrate notions of political 
mobilisation and participation (Cammaerts, 2007: 73). This perspective suggests that 
democratic potential is ensured by the effective mobilisation of agonistic relations between 
cultural actors. 
 
The importance of this definition of the public sphere is that it allows an equal footing for 
cultural actors to contest dominant discourses. In particular, the media’s role in the public 
sphere has been a particular site of contention between theorists. While most theorists 
acknowledge the importance of the media in meaning making processes in the public sphere, 
the focus has been on the ‘information-carrying’ potential of reportage. Others have 
focussed their conception of media power on their supposed tendency to communicate the 
interests of dominant cultural actors. Most popularly, Marxist scholar Noam Chomsky has 
suggested that the media ‘manufactures consent’ of the status quo in the public sphere, 
rather than providing criticism of dominant political structures (See Chomsky et al, 2002). 
This thesis attempts to steer away from the focus on media as purely reflective institutions, 
and instead explore the media’s situation within particular politicised practices of meaning 
making. The media is thus implicated in the dynamic of maintenance and contestation of 
meanings within particular contexts and against other cultural actors. 
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Following this framework, the public sphere will be defined as the location of the various 
practices of meaning making between cultural actors that define a particular culture. Culture 
is central to understanding the way discourses of post-September 11 insecurity have gained 
legitimacy in the public sphere. Lewis (2005: 10) argues that culture is open and dynamic, 
equally able to provide the resources for social harmony, disharmony and change.  This 
definition is opposed to closed concepts of the public sphere that rely on consensus between 
actors or the integration of social groups (See Habermas, 1974).  
 
This particular understanding of the public sphere also relates back to the definition of 
insecurity I have provided within discussion in the previous sections of this chapter. This is 
because the dynamic constitution of the public sphere would allow for notions of insecurity 
to evolve according to the particular historical and cultural contingencies presented by 
discourses within the public sphere. In the previous section, I suggested that both security 
and insecurity existed within a network of discursive practices that produce and negotiate 
understanding of meaning. This conception of insecurity allows for the representation of its 
meaning to evolve according to the various negotiations of its meaning that occur in the 
public sphere. Discourses associated with post-September 11 insecurity are therefore 
significantly connected to the public sphere, because the discursive interactions that occur 
within this space contribute to evolutions in its meaning. The discursive interactions that 
occur within a culture at a particular time are played out within the public sphere between 
actors who have a vested interest in the representation of meaning. How these discursive 
interactions are played out in the public sphere has consequences for the way the meaning of 
‘post-September 11 insecurity’ is understood. 
 
These discursive interactions are played out between particular cultural actors within the 
public sphere. Cultural actors within the public sphere are those institutions, groups or 
individuals who are engaged with cultural processes of meaning making, whether these are 
through production, dissemination or response. These cultural actors are not only 
represented by governmental figures, but also the media, actors within citizenry represented 
by community and social groups, and the private, individual inhabitants of the particular 
nation. This tripartite consensus between government, media and public (Best et al, 2003: 4) 
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implies many alternative forms of reality and being—and thus an endless conflict that 
Foucault suggests makes up the interaction of individual discourses into a symbolic ‘social 
order’ of representation (Burke, 2001: xxi). Every group has a certain amount of power in 
creating the representation of a dominant cultural understanding. This ‘understanding’ is 
crucial in mediating how it is that certain events come to be seen in a certain way and certain 
responses become legitimised. Thus, all groups in culture have a stake in suggesting how 
certain events are represented.  
 
Nonetheless, this notion of the public sphere will still impose structures on the ways in 
which institutionalised cultural actors—such as government and media—can interact in the 
public sphere. Institutions are constrained by political and economic factors specific to their 
constitution as a cultural actor. Both government and media have specific political and 
economic structures that allow them to represent meaning in certain ways, but are 
simultaneously constrained by these organisational structures. Despite these constraints on 
cultural actors, the evolution of meaning often occurs in uncontrolled ways. Therefore the 
public sphere cannot place structural boundaries on either meaning making processes or the 
ways in which individuals understand meaning. The incorporation of certain events into 
understanding is not a singular event, but an ongoing battle for signification, contingent on 
evolving and pluralistic power relations.  
 
Representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity have evolved according 
to discursive processes of confirmation and contestation forwarded by cultural actors within 
the public sphere. This relates to the primary argument of this thesis because it suggests that 
power relations between media and government have contributed to the continual evolution 
of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. It does this by prioritising the discursive 
practices between cultural actors in the public sphere as dynamic and heterogenous, allowing 
the representations of meaning that come out of these interactions to be open to negotiation 
and change. Defining insecurity in this sense suggests that its meaning can be subjective, 
contested and reproduced according to the cultural specifications of the time. Therefore, the 
Security Studies state-dominated management of insecurity does not correspond with the 
complex model of interactions between cultural institutions that negotiate meaning.  
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This chapter has argued that post-September 11 insecurity is a politicised discourse used to 
maintain cultural authority in the public sphere. This was situated in contrast to Security 
Studies analyses, which I suggested prioritised the political, militaristic and economic actions 
that affect the material security of the state. The discursive frameworks positioning insecurity 
as the foundation of material action are not seriously considered within this perspective 
despite their importance in shaping subsequent understanding and action with the post-
September 11 age. Instead, this chapter has illustrated that the discursive practices of 
particular cultural actors within the public sphere are conducive to the representation of the 
meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. The next chapter will provide a framework 
through which these processes of discursive interaction can be conceptualised. A case study 
of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ advertising campaign will illustrate the ways in which 
discursive interaction in the public sphere has provided confirmation and contestation of the 
various representation of post-September 11 insecurity. These processes will further 
elucidate the primary argument of this thesis because they will show that power relations 
between the news media and governmental authorities have contributed to the evolution of 
discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
Endnotes: 
 
1. More recent conceptions of the public sphere have attempted to take into account 
the various contestations that cultural actors pose to political hegemony. These have 
resulted in extensions being made to Habermas’ account of the public sphere by 
interlocking multiple networks and spaces. For example, a normative model 
presented by Bart Cammaerts (2007) composed a complex interplay of competing 
and fragmented public spheres, some attempting to break into the mainstream public 
sphere, which is controlled largely by the market and the state. The model is also 
meant to be dynamic, accounting for interaction between different trans-nationalised 
public spheres and furthermore, the marginal anti-public spheres which go against 
the mainstream hegemony of the public sphere (Cammaerts, 2007: 84). This model 
was sourced from Todd Gitlin’s (1998) mapping of public ‘sphericules’, which 
interact and compete with a dominant public sphere. Gitlin attempted to integrate 
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structuralist conceptions of political and cultural structures and post-structuralist 
conceptions of difference and contestation against hegemonic discourse. His 
conception of public sphericules is used to oppose notions of a monolithic public 
sphere in favour of multiple public spheres that invite participation through the 
“development of distinct groups organized around affinity and interest” (Gitlin, 
1998: 173). Despite the need for inclusion of difference within conceptions of the 
public sphere, the notion of fragmented public sphericules has been criticised (See 
Cammaerts, 2007). Gitlin himself concluded that the differentiation and 
fragmentation of the public sphere would potentially lead to the downgrading of 
democratic potential. Instead of fluidity, public sphericules seem to promote a kind 
of rigid individualism that could simply promote a monolithic public sphere 
(Coopman, 2003). 
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Chapter Four 
Defining power relations between government and media: the Be Alert, 
Not Alarmed campaign 
 
It is a sad fact that since the terrorist attacks on September 11…we live in a more dangerous world. 
Prime Minister John Howard, introduction to National Security Information booklet. 
 
As John Howard’s comment suggests, the post-September 11 context has perpetuated an 
understanding of pervasive insecurity within contemporary Australian life. Within this 
apparently “more dangerous” world, Australian governmental authorities suggested that 
citizens could actually utilise post-September 11 insecurity to locate potential terrorists. This 
seemed to be the intention framing the Australian government’s ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ 
campaign; a $15 million advertising and communications initiative to inform a seemingly 
insecure nation about how to report potential terrorist activities to governmental authorities 
(National Security, 2004). The campaign narrative’s arm wrestle between a citizen’s rational 
‘alert’ actions and ‘alarmed’ reflex actions reflects the paradoxical representation of post-
September 11 insecurity discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
I wish to continue the analysis initiated in the previous chapter about the ways in which 
power relations between media and government contribute to a discourse of post-September 
11 insecurity. While I alluded to this relationship in discussing the ways post-September 11 
insecurity has been defined, this chapter will now further elucidate the specific discursive 
practices of both media and government within their interactions to negotiate the meaning 
of insecurity. To do this I will separate the two institutions, theorising their role in the public 
sphere, and the various abilities and constraints of their discursive practices to represent the 
meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. This will enable me to suggest that each institution 
has a vested interest in maintaining hegemonic meaning of insecurity because it validates 
their cultural power, and allows them to dictate future actions within the context of their 
dominant discourse. The conceptual framework for this relationship will then be illustrated 
through media and government practises to represent the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. 
In doing so, I will argue that representations of post-September 11 insecurity have been 
generated and negotiated through discursive interactions between governmental authorities 
and the media. In this respect, the case study is approached differently to the case studies 
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employed by the remainder of the thesis. It is not used to illustrate an argument about a 
specific representation within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Rather this case 
study provides empirical evidence of the theoretical framework illustrating the interaction 
between media and government to negotiate representations within a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity.   
 
Power relations between governmental authorities and media 
 
In the previous chapter I began to define insecurity through the discursive interactions 
between news media and governmental authorities to form hegemonic meaning. I argued 
that many different cultural actors attempt to maintain a hegemonic representation of 
insecurity to contribute to their power in the public sphere. I would now like to shift the 
focus from defining insecurity to conceptualising the relationship between the Australian 
government and news media. This thesis argues that power relations between news media 
and governmental authorities have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of 
post-September 11 insecurity. Therefore we must conceptualise power relations between the 
two institutions as dynamic and heterogenous in order to contribute to continual changes in 
discourse over time.   
 
I will utilise Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality to define this aspect of power 
relations between media and government. While I have previously drawn on the 
archaeological method to theorise the use of discourse, Foucault’s theorisation of 
governmentality is more conducive to conceptualisation of power relations between media 
and government. This is because governmentality assumes that the distribution of power is 
constantly open to modification and the discursive formations that transmit and produce 
power relations are potentially reversible. A particular understanding of discourse may thus 
be hegemonic at one time, but power relations between institutions ultimately effect the 
presentation of its meaning. This emphasis on the specificity of different types of power 
relations leads to a corresponding stress on the complexity of their inter-relations. This 
theorisation will be utilised to illustrate the relations between news media and governmental 
authorities as capable of contributing to discursive changes. 
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In theorising governmentality, Foucault (in Burchell, 1991) reconceptualised power to 
underlie all social relations as a fundamentally enabling force.  Each individual has the 
potential to influence the discourse and actions of the other and to present resistance to this 
influence. A relation of power is constituted between subjects or groups because they are 
capable of actions of confirmation and contestation of the other’s influence. Therefore 
power does not operate in a uni-directional fashion but rather, as an agonistic struggle that 
takes place between free individuals (McNay, 1994: 4). In this way, power constrains 
individuals but it also constitutes the conditions for the possibility of their freedom. As 
McNay (1994: 124) suggests:  
 
The notion of freedom is crucial to understanding the concept of government 
insofar as it refers not only to the process of social regulation, but also to a process 
in which free individuals attempt to govern others by influencing their actions.  
 
The absence of freedom to resist or act otherwise implies a state of absolute domination or 
physical constraint, which negates the influence that complex interrelations between cultural 
actors have on social life.  
 
Foucault’s conception of power in governmentality is important because it suggests that 
while centralisations of power exist, each cultural actor has the potential to negotiate other 
discourses. In attempting to dominate the representation of post-September 11 insecurity, 
governmental authorities recognise the damaging potential that alternate representations 
have to the authority of their actions. Lewis (2005: 44) argues: 
 
While citizens may fear the capacity of elites to access and deploy textual resources, 
the elites in turn are afraid of people’s intrinsic creativity and capacity for resistance, 
indifference or rejection of authority and privilege. 
 
Institutions forward representations that operate at a distance from everyday audiences and 
their discursive-phenomenal experiences (Lewis, 2005: 14). This distance allows the public’s 
own understanding of events to intermingle with the influences of other cultural actors.  It is 
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this complex interaction that has the potential to create evolutions in meaning because 
individuals are actively engaged with deciding the outcome of processes of meaning making. 
These changes in the representation of meaning often cannot be controlled by the 
institutions involved because no single institution has total control over how meaning is 
understood.  
 
While many cultural actors have arguably remained ambivalent, contradictory or even 
unresponsive to hegemonic representations of post-September 11 insecurity, this is not to 
suggest that these representations are monolithic or insusceptible to evolution in meaning.  
There is space within the public sphere for a dynamic interchange of meaning, the creation 
of new meanings and the evolution of traditional representations within interactions between 
cultural actors. These interactions allow the thesis to argue that discursive negotiations 
contribute to changes in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
Dominant representation of meaning is not simply the domain of governmental actors, but 
can come from a profusion of groups or individuals. Similarly, Foucault argued it was 
necessary to avoid “the limited field of juridical sovereignty and state institutions” and 
instead to conduct an “ascending analysis” of power:  
 
The target of [his] analysis wasn’t institutions, theories or ideology, but practices—
with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these [discourses] acceptable at a 
given moment: the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just 
governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic 
circumstances, but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, 
strategy, self-evidence and reason (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 75).  
 
Foucault is suggesting here that in an endlessly contested political domain, there are still 
ways to map the practices of certain institutions in their representation of meaning (Foucault 
in Burchell, 1991: 75). Conceptualising the relationship between dominant institutions is one 
way of mapping these practices within a broader domain of cultural interaction. In this 
thesis, the practices of Australian governmental authorities and newspaper media are 
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analysed within power relations that have confirmed and contested understandings of post-
September 11 insecurity.  
 
This thesis is framed by the understanding that both governmental discourse and media 
reportage are critically implicated in maintaining and negotiating the meaning of post-
September 11 insecurity. The relationship between the two institutions is defined through 
their discursive interactions. Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality will assist in tracing 
these interactions through confirmation and contestation of each others’ discourses. It will 
illustrate both the direct and indirect affects on their cultural influence in the public sphere. 
It is thus a simultaneously competitive and dependent relationship because both institutions 
are reliant on each for cultural power. This cultural power is sometimes gained through 
competitive relations with each other. They are dependant on each other to continually re-
affirm a political and cultural status quo that underlines the dominance of the two 
institutions in the public sphere. They are competitive because each institution has a vested 
interest in increasing their influence in the public sphere. This definition of their relationship 
will also illustrate that both institutions act according to particular strengths and weaknesses 
that affect their interactions. I would now like to turn to discussion of these particular 
strengths and weaknesses, beginning with the specific discursive practices of Australian 
governmental authorities. 
 
Practices of Australian governmental authorities 
 
In conceptualising the power relations between Australian governmental authorities and 
newspaper media, this section will elucidate the various strategies that have been used to 
either contest or confirm representations of post-September 11 insecurity. This is important 
because it illustrates that in representing the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity, each 
institution works according to a very specific role and structure. Thus, the way each 
institution has produced, maintained and negotiated particular representations of war and 
terror is unique. This will allow me to discuss the ways in which the specific practices of each 
institution have contributed to the power relations that distinguish their interaction to 
negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity.  
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In this section I will focus on the role, constitution and practices of Australian governmental 
authorities. The role and structure of government has been forged over hundreds of years of 
post-Enlightenment sovereignty and nationalism. From Machiavellian principles to John 
Howard’s public announcements on YouTube (See Labor calls, 2007), the methods of 
ensuring governmental power in the public sphere over time have been as numerous as they 
have been varied. This section will utilise Foucault’s conception of governmentality to define 
the methods of governmental discursive practice and strategy. Thus, when I refer to 
governmentality, I am suggesting the strategic discursive practices aiming to shape, guide or 
affect the conduct of individuals and nations (Burchell, 1991: 2). This differs from references 
to government as the governing body of persons within a system of rule of the state.  
Governmental authorities are the individuals or organisations within this governing body 
that direct, manage or control this system of governance.  
 
Foucault was interested in defining governmentality as a series of regulatory strategies that 
are heterogeneous and indirect, working to influence structures of understanding according 
to the best interests of government (McNay, 1994: 118). The maintenance of governmental 
authority is practiced through activities and strategies that confirm specific roles for 
government and citizen. Specific practices create ‘individualising’ and ‘totalising’ 
understanding of these roles within the nation. That is, a two-way continuity is maintained 
between the individual citizen’s behaviour and the well-being of the nation(McNay, 1994: 
118). An upward continuity is maintained when the person who governs the state must first 
learn how to govern themselves correctly. A downward continuity is maintained when the 
state is well run, citizens look after their families, and individuals in general, behave 
‘correctly’ (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 195). This continuity is illustrated in conceptions of 
the senior politician as a ‘statesman’ whose political actions are the model for the good 
government of the individual. Concurrently, the individual through their ‘good behaviour’, 
such as obeying laws and gaining employment, contributes also to the well-being of the state.  
 
Taking from these individualising and totalising practices, governmental authorities suggest 
that only their effective management and regulation protects the nation. These practices are 
reflected in governmental utilisation of epistemological frameworks that refer back to 
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particular cultural discourses. As I have previously suggested through epistemological 
frameworks, governmental authorities are able to draw from particular cultural discourses 
such as the ‘nation’ to reinforce a sense of their authority. This process is not just limited to 
governmental practice. Most cultural actors are part of this process, each referring to various 
representations of cultural discourses to benefit their own construction of hegemonic 
meaning. This process is confirmed or re-constructed according to a specific context and 
need. For example, governmental discursive practice continually constructs representations 
of national beliefs and the roles that different cultural actors play in their constitution to 
enforce a particular political status quo. These frameworks confirm or re-construct notions 
of national belief, as well as the need for governmental action and authority to protect the 
nation.  
 
Through this effective governmental management of the nation’s health, well-being (in 
regard to wealth and standard of living) and security against threat, Foucault suggested that 
government claimed a kind of ‘pastoral power’ (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 121). This 
pastoral power is situated through mechanisms of security presented by governmental 
authority. Security addresses itself distinctively to ‘the ensemble of a population’ and relates 
political security (that of the authority of government) to social security (that of the ensured 
well-being of the population). Thus, security is a specific political method of expanding 
sovereignty—distinct from practices of law, sovereignty and discipline—but capable of 
combination with these practices within diverse governmental configurations (Burchell, 
1991: 35). Foucault suggested that these mechanisms of security were becoming increasingly 
powerful forms of government through their dynamic method of justifying the increase of 
governmental power over increasingly minute aspects of individual citizens’ lives. 
 
These mechanisms of security nonetheless betray the paradoxical nature of modern 
governmental discursive practices. While governmental strategies seek to suggest the 
happiness of citizens in protecting the conditions and quality of their lives, the achievement 
of such ends results in an intensification of regulatory controls over citizens. It is the tension 
between governmental power and citizens’ freedoms that create schisms in representations 
of governmental authority for the ‘good of the nation’. The processes through which 
individuals are ‘regulated’ or controlled also provide the basis from which resistance to 
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governmental authority can be articulated. Governmental discourse must be seen to apply 
authority in ways that contribute to the strength of the nation, rather than for the acquisition 
of more cultural power. If audiences begin to understand meaning in ways that differ from 
what is being suggested by government, or in ways that suggest the manipulation of power, 
scepticism or resistance may occur. Given that audiences are actively engaged in constructing 
meaning, there is always a possibility of their resistance or scepticism to governmental 
representation. As I have already suggested, this tension of governmental interests creates 
gaps in discourse where other representations can be presented as alternatives to dominant 
discourse.  
 
These tensions occur within the simultaneously competitive and dependent relations of 
power between government and media. Coupled with alternate representations in the media, 
the power of the public backlash can often spur the most concentrated governmental 
communications response. Indeed the fear of being caught ‘off the script’ has inspired a 
degree of co-ordination between government agencies, the Prime Minister’s office and party 
organisations to the extent that government communication often mimics permanent 
‘campaigning’. Errington and van Onselen (2005) argue that:  
 
By co-ordinating the activities of government agencies and party activities through 
the political offices of the executive, governments can award themselves extensive 
resource advantages over the opposition, through government advertising and public 
relations strategies. 
 
Governmental authorities are able to call on a host of resources to continually link their 
policies to electorate interest. These include media advisors employed at all levels of 
government (including the offices of backbenchers), public service media units, and co-
ordinating agencies. External agencies including Public Relations consultants, advertising 
agencies, media monitoring firms and polling companies are also employed by incumbent 
governments (Errington & van Onselen, 2005a). Modern campaign methods such as focus 
groups, qualitative polling, voter databases and strategic use of Senate resources are also now 
being used to direct governmental discourse. For example, governmental advertising, postal 
and office entitlements of members of parliament are also used to research the concerns of 
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the electorate (Errington & van Onselen, 2005). These enable governmental authorities to 
‘check’ the impact and response to their communications. 
 
Co-operation between the party executive and organisation of state resources allows paid 
advertising to complement the daily discursive strategies of the federal government 
(Errington & van Onselen , 2005). As former senator Noel Crichton-Brown suggests: 
 
For penetration and effectiveness, paid advertising must complement earned media. 
The leader’s message of the day should be reinforced by the television commercials 
of the night (cited in Errington & van Onselen, 2005a). 
 
To do this, government communication strategies have tended to combine advertising and 
public relations methods to achieve maximum communicative success. Ian Ward (2003: 25) 
has also discussed this approach to communications strategy as the introduction of the ‘PR 
state’. Ward suggests (2003: 27) that parties acting within the ‘PR state’ purposefully blur the 
distinction between public information and party propaganda to ensure the political 
expedience of governmental actions. This process was illustrated during the 2004 federal 
election campaign, where millions of dollars in ‘information’ advertising about Medicare 
public health insurance was co-ordinated to sell federal government policies (See Grant, 
2004). As well as television advertising, Prime Minister Howard left pre-recorded messages 
on thousands of household telephones declaring his support for Medicare reform (Schubert, 
2004).  
 
While these strategies might have influential results, we can also suggest that this 
‘professionalisation’ might impinge on the relationship between political parties and 
citizenry.  With governing parties relying much more heavily on publicly funded resources 
for communication of their policies, this might create increasing scepticism of governmental 
communication. Indeed, former head of the British Government Information Service, 
Bernard Ingram, suggested that the public has now come to expect to be ‘conned’ by 
government communications, to the detriment of the operation and influence of politics (in 
Errington et al, 2005). As Foucault suggests, while increasing resources and capacity for 
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communication would suggest seemingly intense governmental power, in fact governmental 
discourse is often in danger of intense moments of public contestation (in Burchell, 1991: 
93). This relates to the broader thesis argument because it illustrates that the power relations 
between cultural actors contribute to changes within discourse. We can suggest that the 
mobilisation of particular discursive strategies is an attempt to shield governmental discourse 
from contestation by other cultural actors within specific power relations.  
 
In mobilising particular discursive strategies, governmental authorities attempt to assert their 
dominance over the representation of meaning. The Foucauldian analysis that I have 
forwarded suggests that this process is continually in a state of flux. While governmental 
authorities have many resources to assert their influence, there are inevitable tensions that 
occur when their representations interact with other cultural actors. To illustrate the strategic 
governmental attempts to mobilise discourse about post-September 11 insecurity, we will 
now turn to discussion of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ advertising campaign. In the initial 
stages of the campaign, governmental communication can be seen to assert a particular 
hegemonic understanding of the sources and responses to post-September 11 insecurity.  
This discussion will provide a platform for subsequent discussion of the negotiation of these 
representations within the practices of mainstream newspaper reportage. As I will argue later 
in the chapter, the strategic representations presented by governmental authorities were 
contested through the interaction with the media.   
 
Governmental discursive strategy in the “Be Alert, Not Alarmed” campaign 
 
Taking the conceptual platform I have just outlined, I will now turn to an illustration of 
governmental discursive practices within the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ advertising campaign. 
This will illustrate the conceptual paradigm I have just outlined by showing the strategic use 
of representation used by governmental authorities to represent sources of post-September 
11 insecurity. Maintaining hegemony over discourses about post-September 11 insecurity is a 
governmental strategy utilised to justify the various legislative and militaristic actions 
associated with maintaining security. These strategies contribute to the power relations 
between media and government that this thesis argues negotiates the meaning of post-
September 11 insecurity.  
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As one of the initial governmental responses to the September 11 attacks in the US, the 
Australian National Security Hotline was introduced so that ordinary Australians could 
report suspicious terrorist related activity. The 24-hour hotline acts as a single contact point 
for Australians to report security issues to police, security or military-trained personnel, who 
pass the relevant information to state or Commonwealth agencies for assessment and 
response (National Security website, 2004).  Its launch was advertised with special 
‘information kits’ sent to every Australian home. They contained a fridge magnet with the 
National Security Hotline phone numbers, a 20-page booklet about Australia’s emergency 
procedures and how individuals could increase public safety, and an open letter to 
Australians from the Prime Minister. In the initial promotions campaign for the hotline—
one of the only advertising campaigns that the Prime Minister directly supervised—the 
catchcry urged Australians to ‘be alert but not alarmed’. In a seemingly paradoxical reference 
to maintaining security, Australians were asked to use suspicion to stop the threat of 
terrorism from disrupting the maintenance of Australia’s free and open society.  
 
As discussed in the last chapter, insecurity is not a physical manifestation of danger but is 
culturally produced.  It ‘exists’ as such only through discourse and thus its meaning lies in 
the practices of language. In this way, insecurity can constantly be imagined and implied to 
be true through discourse—and thus be influential to public understanding. Governmental 
communication about insecurity has sought to draw from these cultural discourses in order 
to assert their hegemony over the representation of its meaning. In initiating the ‘Be Alert, 
Not Alarmed campaign’, governmental authorities utilised particular discursive practices to 
suggest the need for their actions to protect the nation from terrorism. 
 
One of these discursive practices was the strategic use of public relations by governmental 
authorities. This has allowed state authorities to present policy in the form of ‘community 
information’. Similarly, the Australian government described the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ 
campaign as ‘practical and useful information’ (Todd, 2003: 10), which politicians forwarded 
as a non-politicised discourse of national importance. Nonetheless, information about anti-
terror responses within the campaign showed highly politicised descriptions of post-
September 11 insecurity. For example, governmental authorities such as the Federal Police 
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Commissioner Mick Keelty suggested that Australia would be an “inevitable” target of 
terrorism to ‘prove’ the importance of governmental response to their representations of 
insecurity (Das, 2002: 13). 
 
Keelty’s suggestion reflects the discursive manufacture of a terrible consequential reality to 
suggest its inevitability or ‘truth’. Similarly, in his conception of a ‘risk society’, Beck suggests 
that the production of tangible risks will express a ‘future component’. This future 
component refers to the anticipation of something that has not happened yet, but is 
threatening and accordingly, real (Beck, 1992: 32). For example, one month prior to the 
launch of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, a ‘special alert’ of a terrorist attack was 
relayed to the Australian public by the Howard government, though information was 
“generalised and not specific about possible targets and precise timing” (Parnell, 2002: 1). 
Nothing eventuated from the special alert; citizens were not given any updated information 
as to the possible location of the attack, the nature of the attack or who was responsible for 
the threat. The alert instead provided an opportunity for Justice Minister Chris Ellison to use 
the term “be alert but not alarmed” (Crabb, 2002) one month prior to launching the 
campaign based on reporting suspicious behaviour. This demonstrates the ways in which 
governmental discourse have sought to utilise the representation of post-September 11 
insecurity for political benefit. The Justice Minister’s use of the campaign’s terminology 
provided a framework of imagined insecurity with which to introduce the hotline and 
discourses of its perceived need. 
  
The signification of terrorism becomes more powerful through these authority figures’ 
staging of the horrific consequences that ambiguous ‘bad’ characters could unleash onto the 
clearly defined, freedom-loving ‘good’ characters. Insecurity becomes almost literary in the 
construction of this adult idealistic nightmare, complete with plotline, characters and 
dramatic narrative. These representations maintain a political status quo that confirms 
specific roles for both government and citizen. In this context, discursive practices attempt 
to maintain governmental authority by suggesting collective action in taking “the necessary 
steps to protect ourselves” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 1). This reflects the 
Foucauldian theorisation of governmentality in maintaining a two-way continuity between 
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the behaviour of the individual citizen and the well-being of the nation. Similarly, the ‘Be 
Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign shows that the good individual behaviour of citizenry, 
coupled with increased anti-terror regulation by the government is a necessary part of 
protecting Australia. 
 
Having described terrorism as a source of insecurity, the campaign’s information booklet 
does not suggest responses that make security seem like a matter of tangible or practical 
safety procedures. The brochure describes emergency services’ preparedness for attacks as 
diverse as car bombings to biological warfare. Yet terrorism experts quoted within the 
brochure do not suggest what activities terrorism might entail, the likelihood of serious 
terrorist attacks in Australia or whether there are in fact, any known terrorists operating 
within the country. Instead, experts quoted in the brochure suggested that terrorism takes 
many forms and thus, “there is no definite list of what to look out for” (Let’s Look Out for 
Australia, 2003: 4). Apart from generalised advice such as ‘Keep yourself informed’ and 
‘Keep an eye out for anything suspicious’ (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 7), Australians 
were asked to rely on personal experience and judgement to determine the people or 
activities that may be suspicious enough to report to authorities [1].  
 
The ambiguous nature of the information in the booklet reflects the paradoxical references 
to notions of security and insecurity within the campaign. For example, the campaign 
information booklet, Let’s Look Out for Australia, began by stating that “terrorism has 
changed the world and security may never return to the relaxed levels most of us grew up 
with” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 5). The tone of the booklet changes to control 
when reflecting on the governmental response to terrorism: “Australians can be confident 
that the government is doing everything it can do to prevent the possibility of a terrorist 
attack” (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 3). Government and associated security 
organisations are presented as the soothing, paternalistic guide through the frightening 
terrorist phantasm that creates vulnerability amongst Australian citizens. To this end,  Morris 
(2002) suggests that some of the original footage in the television advertisement depicting 
unidentifiable SAS troops storming houses and police look-outs on the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge was cut after concern over the militaristic style of imagery. Instead, the television 
 111 
 
commercial was directed by the reassuring presence of a popular Australian morning 
television presenter. 
 
Having provided an upward continuity by representing governmental figures whose actions 
are the model for the effective governance, the campaign also provides representations of a 
downward continuity, where citizens are seen to behave ‘correctly’ and contribute to the 
well-being of the state (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 195). In producing the Be Alert, Not 
Alarmed television campaign, Morris (2002) suggests “images previously tested amongst 
focus groups showed a smiling Muslim girl, indigenous children and traditional images of 
Australian life such as summer cricket and barbecues, interspersed with images of the army, 
customs personnel and sniffer dogs working at an airport”. These images seem to represent 
the governmental conceptions of how ‘good’ Australian citizens share in particular 
nationalistic duties to protect Australia from terrorists. This also ‘personalises’ understanding 
of these new modes of securitisation, where the engagement of unified national beliefs 
through suspicion is seen as a justifiable domestication of new insecurities.  
 
In this context, communities are retained as an important aspect of post-September 11 
Australian life, but their existence is now marked with the proviso that the nation’s ‘laid back 
nature’ (Let’s Look Out for Australia, 2003: 1) is coupled with ‘healthy’ suspicion. For 
example, domestic first aid information was coupled with ‘cut out and keep’ national security 
cards printed with the hotline number for safe keeping. The proposal of putting the card in 
one’s wallet implies that fear will become a part of everyday life within this less relaxed 
society. This bestowal of everyday paraphernalia as security objects suggests the ongoing 
domestication of suspicion. That security can emanate from the domestic procedures and 
objects of the everyday, like fridge magnets, demonstrates governmental re-presentation of 
the discourse of Australian community, where an ‘era of insecurity’ warrants mistrust as a 
‘natural’ course of action within a more vigilant nation. Thus we see that governmental 
communication has re-articulated cultural understandings about the nation and its 
protection.  Within this discourse post-September 11 insecurity maintains a continuing sense 
of danger to justify both governmental and individual actions to thwart terror.  
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The idea of an ‘ordinary’ individual being able to thwart global terror is a powerful appeal to 
patriotic—and somewhat nostalgic—ideals of freedom. This occurs by appealing to feelings 
of patriotic liberty encompassed within an idealised and over-simplified sense of community 
where: “we are all assumed to belong to families, live in neighbourhoods, go to work and 
hold the same ideas about being ordinary” (Tilley, 2004: 39).  In a similar fashion, the Let’s 
Look Out for Australia information brochure appeals to this sense of homogenous nationalism 
manifested through state capability. For example, in the campaign booklet the benefit of 
public vigilance is legitimised using ‘real life stories’ explaining how terrorist plots were 
thwarted through public alertness. Nonetheless, the stories are situated in England and 
Israel—countries historically proven to be targets of terrorist attack. The only story 
involving a potential threat to Australian security seemed more likely as a case of money 
laundering than a terrorist plot. Nonetheless, this narrative of the individual working within a 
collective national identity provides a reference back to the individualising and totalising 
notions of governmental power. This is because the government’s introduction of the anti-
terror hotline works concurrently with their suggestion of the nationalistic duty that comes 
with an individual working for the security of the nation.  
 
While in this section of the chapter I have suggested that notions of a unified national 
identity underpin governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity, media 
representations also refer to cultural discourses about the nation. Both governmental 
authorities and media participate in forming the structure and understanding of the nation 
and its culture. Mainstream newspapers often seem confirming of governmental authority 
because they also participate and exist within cultural constructions of the nation. We can 
therefore suggest the nation as not simply a static structure, but rather, constructed in terms 
of the “rituals, daily practices, techniques, institutions, manners and customs which enable 
the nation to be thinkable” (Mercer, 1992: 27).  The newspapers’ discursive references to 
‘nationhood’ are powerful because they generate a strong sense of identity and allegiance. In 
this way, mainstream newspapers are confirming of these structures because they perpetuate 
an important cultural role and authority through them. Nonetheless, in this simultaneously 
dependent and competitive relationship, government and media utilise different 
representations of the nation and their role within it to extend their own cultural power 
within the public sphere.  
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Conversely, governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity have also been 
contested by newspapers wishing to re-articulate the cultural references to the nation used to 
justify the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. In their contestation of governmental 
representation of the campaign, newspaper reportage suggested that increasing modes of 
securitisation was not for ‘the good of the nation’, but for the good of governmental power. 
This re-presentation of governmental discourse exploited the tensions that I have suggested 
occur when the increase of governmental power is maintained as the public interest. 
  
Therefore, while I have so far illustrated that governmental discourse often provides 
hegemonic representations of post-September 11 insecurity, the broader thesis argues that 
interactions with the media are also profoundly implicated in the construction and 
negotiation of its meaning. Having discussed governmental discursive strategies of meaning 
making, I will now turn the discussion to the practices of mainstream newspapers in 
representing discourses about post-September 11 insecurity. Newspaper media differ from 
governmental authorities in their abilities and limitations to present and contest particular 
discourses. Newspapers utilise specific discursive practices of confirmation and contestation 
to construct their representation of meaning, and these are engaged in a continual interaction 
with governmental discourse. I will now discuss those practices and their role in negotiating 
governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
Practices of Australian mainstream newspapers 
 
This section of the chapter will discuss the discursive practices of Australian mainstream 
newspaper media to represent post-September 11 insecurity. I will suggest in this section that 
the media has an important role in the construction and maintenance of a national culture. It 
actively participates in creating a national culture through the suggestion of ‘everyday’ or 
‘natural’ expressions of what it is to be ‘Australian’. National culture is a discourse—a way of 
constructing meanings, which influence and organise both our actions and our conception of 
ourselves (Hall, 1976: 45). In this way, national culture is a discursive construction 
maintained not only by our structures and institutions, but also through symbols and 
representations. Our sense of national culture and national identity is influenced by the 
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meanings produced in the “stories which are told about it, memories which connect its 
present with its past, and images which are constructed with it”, most often seen in news 
reportage (Hall, 1976: 45). These stories are important because they not only suggest the 
community of the nation, but also the ‘continuity’ of the nation. Through these stories we 
share in the narrative of the nation, but we are also connected to a pre-existing narrative of 
nationhood that will continue into the future (See Anderson, 1991).  
 
The importance of the newspaper in maintaining the continuity of a unified culture is built 
around what Anderson suggests as the “mass ceremony” of reading and understanding the 
daily news (Anderson, 1991: 33). He argues that the very act of reading the newspaper 
creates an impression of a unified community moving forward through time in shared belief 
and culture: 
 
Each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated 
simultaneously by thousands of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of 
whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore this ceremony is 
incessantly repeated at daily or half daily intervals throughout the calendar 
(Anderson, 1991: 35). 
 
The subjective representations carried within the newspaper are given credibility through 
their repeated publication as the ‘truth’ of an event. In this way the newspaper is implicated 
in the structuring of what is available to be thought and said as ‘truth’. As this thesis has 
suggested, the power to maintain a hegemonic representation of ‘meaning’ is conducive to 
authority in the public sphere. The newspaper carries representations of the most important 
political, economic and social aspects of daily life—and can also maintain or contest 
alternate representations to an immediate audience. Therefore, its influence (and those who 
produce it) is significant to the production and maintenance of cultural discourses as the 
‘truth’ of an event (Schultz, 1997: 30).  
 
Understanding the processes of news-making is a necessary basis for grasping the 
opportunities for, and constraints upon the newspaper’s cultural influence (Tiffen, 1997: 
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197).  Despite the ever-changing nature of the modern ‘media-scape’, the newspaper is still 
important because its core values, methods and approaches can be–and still are—applied to 
other forms of media (Schultz, 1997: 23). As Schultz suggests:  
 
Newspapers were the starting point for all of Australia’s major commercial news 
organisations and the ethos of the press continues to influence the culture of these 
companies, even as they become irrevocably entertainment driven, constantly 
exploring new technologies, methods and means of communication (1997: 23).  
 
Despite the predominance of other sections of media and entertainment, most news media 
still follow newspaper-reporting style as the most effective way of structuring the narrative 
of daily news. 
 
That said, the newspaper is possibly the least successful form of media when considering the 
audience numbers for television, film or web-based multimedia. Indeed, the resilience of the 
newspaper form is significant because it is a somewhat flawed medium for the information 
age: it has high costs associated with its production, the content is not readily updated and 
already ‘old news’ by the time of purchase, and the product itself is quite bulky (Schultz, 
1997: 24). The regular production of the newspaper is only possible because of an enormous 
organisational feat (Tiffen, 1997: 191). Consequently, the newspaper’s organisational 
structure has a profound effect on the nature of the news reported.  
 
Newspapers are produced against two primary constraints: the deadline and the news hole. 
The deadline relates to the tight schedules which govern daily production. If they are not 
met, the financial penalties are severe. Therefore the deadline is easily manipulated by 
organisations wanting to withhold information for their own benefit. Secondly, the news 
hole designates the space to be filled with news after the number of pages and placement of 
advertising has been determined (Conley, 2002: 19). Major advertisers affect the profitability 
of the newspaper, which in turn affects the quality of the newspaper’s content. Many of the 
most publicly valuable aspects of news, such as investigative or international reportage are 
very expensive to produce, and do not guarantee—or even warrant—greater circulation. The 
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quality of news coverage is then affected by the general profitability of the industry at the 
time, and the ability and willingness of management to invest in such undertakings (Tiffen, 
1997: 198).  
 
These factors suggest that the newspaper’s power in the public sphere is affected by various 
constraints placed upon its production. Tiffen (1997: 195) suggests that:  
 
The key to understanding news organisations is that they involve an eternal tension 
between an irregular and unpredictable commodity whose pursuit—even whose 
definition—is full of uncertainties and rigid production parameters of time and space 
which are insensitive to fluctuations in the news and are unforgiving of instability.  
 
The newspaper’s power within the cultural sphere is tainted by economic interest, rigid 
production schedules and the subjective and transitory nature of the content. In producing 
or re-producing a particular discourse, the news does not offer an unproblematic view of the 
world. Much of the news consists of the claims of others and often results in the reporting 
of subjective, inaccurate or partial claims. Furthermore, the production times mean that 
news presents an episodic and fragmentary view of the world (Tiffen, 1997: 198). This is 
because an issue appears in the newspaper via a series of representations, focussing on the 
most newsworthy aspect of the story. News does not contain a single view or coherent 
storyline, nor does it provide a view that has not tainted by subjectivity (White, 1991: 40). 
 
Given the many shortcomings and constraints of newspaper production, their popularity and 
credibility within the public sphere is still significant. This popularity is largely constructed 
on the cultural merits that newspapers have presented about the institution of news-making. 
News organisations invoke notions of news-worthiness, proclaim their objectivity and above 
all, their democratic role and public importance represents their cultural authority in the 
public sphere (Tiffen, 1997: 197).  Newspapers continually maintain a conception of their 
central role in maintaining and representing a sense of national continuity and unity. This 
occurs through their presentation of the notion that a ‘free press’ assists in the maintenance 
of a representative democracy. These are debates that have stemmed from Enlightenment 
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ideals of the ideal political system, where it was seen that the media was entitled to its own 
independent role as the ‘fourth estate’. The doctrine of the Fourth Estate was based on the 
separation of powers between the estates of parliament, the executive and the judiciary 
(White, 1991: 14). It has been an enduring discourse relating to independent news media and 
free speech. 
 
The central tension of the newspaper’s role in the public sphere stems from its dual claim to 
commercial enterprise and its important public and political role. This poses a challenge for 
news reportage given that the original rationale of the press as the Fourth estate is often 
utilised as a way of ensuring the media’s continued commercial gain, sometimes through 
exploitative means. In this respect, what right do the media have to speak in the public 
interest when they are motivated by their own economic gain? Schultz (1997: 26) separates 
the points of divergence between the newspaper’s enlightenment ideal and commercial 
reality into five challenges for news reportage. These challenges question the diversity of the 
media, its capacity to represent public interest, its political independence and purpose, 
commercial prioritisation and reluctant accountability. These challenges suggest that the 
newspaper’s public importance has always been tempered by tensions over its political 
independence.  
 
In the contemporary media, questions of the newspaper’s role as the Fourth Estate have 
been highlighted given the increasing existence of global media conglomerates, new media 
technologies and new media legislation [2]. Cross media ownership laws have allowed media 
conglomerations’ ownership by one company, which actually seems to have assured the 
existence of newspapers, despite their declining readerships. In Australia, some of the largest 
media organisations have benefited from a close association to governmental authorities.  
Certainly the Fairfax and News Limited groups in Australia have consolidated their 
ownership of media through political and policy decisions, especially cross media ownership 
laws initiated in 2007. The sometimes close relationship between media and government has 
often been problematised in terms of the influence each institution has on the other. The 
commercial nature of the media industry has often blurred the idealised role of the press as a 
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unique political institution, committed to playing an independent and central role in the 
public life of a modern democracy (Schultz, 1997: 33).  
 
Nonetheless, simultaneously to confirming governmental and institutional structures, the 
media also provide one of the most effective public means of contesting dominant political 
discourses. Despite governmental attempts to secure meaning, I have argued that reliance on 
the continued assertion of a particular representation—such as the assertion of traditional 
Australian values—makes these collective modes of identity also problematic (Best, 2004). 
The collective notions of the nation forwarded by government are insecure because their 
representation is unstable and linked to political self-interest.  Therefore, the same discourse 
that was meant to garner consent can just as easily create dissent. This is because ‘schisms’ 
are created when the representation of insecurity within official communication ‘battles’ with 
the lived experience of insecurity to create differing meanings. This occurs through the 
media when reportage exposes the instability underlying governmental representation of 
discourse.  
 
The interaction between media and government thus implies processes of cajolement, 
persuasion and threat on the one hand, and resistance, engagement and incorporation on the 
other (Gramsci in Lewis, 2001: 135). In this sense, relations between media and government 
appear simultaneously dependent and competitive with each other. This shows how 
discursive processes of confirmation and contestation emerge within the relationship 
between media and government. The particular political, cultural and economic interests of 
each institution affect the way they relate to each to either confirm or negotiate each others’ 
particular representation of post-September 11 insecurity. To illustrate how discursive 
processes of confirmation and contestation within newspaper reportage have affected 
governmental representation of insecurity, I will now turn the discussion back to the ‘Be 
Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. This will provide empirical evidence of the power relations 
between media and government contribute to the evolution of a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. 
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Newspaper representation of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign 
 
In the previous section I have discussed the ways in which the discursive practices of 
newspaper reportage have served to both confirm and contest governmental representations 
of post-September 11 insecurity. This section will now illustrate these discursive practices 
through newspaper response to governmental representation of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ 
campaign. Initial newspaper response to the campaign actually confirmed aspects of 
governmental representation of post-September 11 insecurity.  This was illustrated in 
journalistic ambivalence towards the hotline, suggesting that a new era of insecurity would 
create ‘embarrassed’ acceptance of Australia’s ‘new’ paranoia. Despite the discomfort many 
respondents felt by “dobbing people in” (Devine, 2003) some media reportage suggested 
many respondents felt an ‘era of insecurity’ warranted a change in the apparently ‘laid back’ 
Australian attitude: 
 
I can’t help but feel, what’s the harm if some of us get a touch too paranoid and grab 
some innocent…I’d rather put up with that than have those same ‘vigilantes’ stand 
back, too polite to intervene, as some crazy parks a car bomb outside a shopping 
centre (Morrell, 2003: 23).  
 
In making this comment the journalist appears to confirm a governmental representation of 
the ‘new’ threat engendering ‘new’ responses. But newspapers often mediate between public 
and private interests in reporting the narrative of daily news. The same article that seemingly 
accepts the implied paranoia of the governmental campaign, also questions the validity of 
creating ‘national unity’ through suspicion: “There’s no suggestion in these ads so far about 
just how to be alert, which is just the kind of thing to make us alarmed” (Morrell, 2003: 3).  
 
While initial newspaper response acknowledged the governmental structure of security as 
revolving around the insecurity perpetuated by terrorist threats, this was tempered by their 
assumed role as public advocate. This occurred through newspaper criticism of the lack of 
specific information given to Australians within the campaign. For example, The Age 
expressed concern at the abstract nature of the campaign, suggesting that: “Without being 
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specific, the ads urge Australians to report any suspicious activity to a central hotline 
number” (Morris, 2002). This criticism was echoed by a newspaper articles across the 
country, such as the columnist who asked:  
 
What exactly is supposed to be suspicious? What’s the plot or, as I suspect, was that 
lost a long time ago? Certainly they are instructing us to become amateur police, 
social and religious vigilantes, searching for people and practices that are not like us 
(Brooks, 2003: 9).  
 
The use of the word ‘us’ personalises the issue in a different way to governmental 
representation of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign. While governmental 
representations communicate to an audience they are distant from, newspaper 
representations can suggest that they are part of the audience that the government are 
attempting to influence. Their role in representing the community to itself gives it the 
cultural power to suggest that it speaks on behalf of the audience. Therefore, in contesting 
governmental representations of the campaign, reporters can position themselves as the 
arbiters of ‘objective truth’ on behalf of the best interests of their audience. 
 
In forwarding this contestation of the need for the hotline, newspaper reportage contributes 
a re-articulation of terrorism as a source of insecurity. Where governmental authorities 
suggested that post-September 11 insecurity warranted increased surveillance and suspicion 
of “people and practices that are not like us”, some media reportage suggested this was an 
over-reaction to events of terrorism. By suggesting this understanding of the threat of terror, 
alternative understandings of post-September 11 insecurity are also created.  This reflects the 
broader thesis argument because it demonstrates that governmental representations of post-
September 11 insecurity continually develop through interaction with processes of media 
reportage. These alternative representations create more opportunities for audiences to re-
negotiate their understanding of discourse, resulting in a much more heterogenous 
representation of insecurity’s meaning. 
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As I previously suggested, one of the ways governmental representations become unstable is 
when alternative discourses expose the inherent political self-interest in their actions. These 
processes of contestation became evident in media criticism of governmental references to 
notions of national identity. This was illustrated especially in the initial campaign, which 
became the victim of many jocular remarks about the need for anti-terror strategies that 
involved ‘ordinary Australians’. A central theme developed across most newspapers 
suggesting that the advertisement had “a tiny spark of patriotic warmth, which is nice, but 
then the realisation that absolutely nothing of import had been said” (Bray, 2003: M2). This 
exposed the campaign to derision in the media, with most making bemused criticisms: 
“Grandmother’s advice that if you have nothing of interest to say, don’t waste $15 million of 
taxpayers’ money saying it, springs to mind” (Bray, 2003: M2).  
 
This tone of criticism continued to be influential in other forms of media and ultimately had 
the effect of eroding the credibility of the governmental campaign. As this chapter suggested 
earlier, the cultural power of the newspaper exists also because most other media continue to 
follow a newspaper structure when reporting daily events. This can be seen in various media, 
from the ‘inverted pyramid’ style of reporting on television news, to gossip media’s ‘serious’ 
news tone. This was also evident during the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign when the 
Australian comedy news program, CNNNN launched the ‘national security oven mitt’. 
Satirising the government campaign’s message and the use of domestic objects for security, 
CNNNN suggested that ‘if things don’t fit, check your mitt’. Under the slogan ‘Ok, be 
alarmed’, the show’s terrorism hotline, 1900-PANIC-TIME also gave advice about 
interrogating a neighbour without breaking Geneva Conventions (Government launches, 
2003).  
 
This media response to the initial ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign was also reflected in 
public responses ranging from apathy to apprehension and subsequently, scathing attack 
from other cultural actors in the public sphere. For example, former Brisbane Lord Mayor 
Jim Soorley was so incensed at what he saw as fear-mongering within the campaign that he 
spearheaded a ‘return to sender’ campaign (Morris, 2003, p. 2). Newspaper reports estimated 
that 150,000 anti-terror kits were returned after Soorley’s televised appeals (Countdown to 
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war, 2003: 9). Such was the intensity of public and media reaction that postal workers in 
Queensland threatened to strike over concern that such avid response to the campaign 
would result in ‘reverse terrorism’. Special handling measures were introduced to ensure 
returned kits were not contaminated (Terror kit strike averted, 2003: 10).  
 
Utilising this public criticism of the hotline, newspapers declared that the governmental 
campaign had been an exercise in “mock and ridicule” (Berg, 2004). Perhaps the more 
pertinent indicator of the campaign’s success against media attack was response to the 
hotline itself. The hotline number was organised to handle up to two thousand calls per 
hour, or up to 336,000 calls a week (Cumming, 2002). By the end of its first week of 
operation the hotline had only received 2615 calls—less than 16 calls an hour [3] (Marriner, 
2003). While it would seem that the campaign had cemented institutional acceptance of 
terrorism as a new source of insecurity, negotiation of this discourse by the media had 
created forms of dissent against the ways in which insecurity had been utilised. Within these 
power relations, governmental discourse was constrained by political interest in representing 
the hotline as an effective political response to post-September 11 insecurity, whereas 
newspapers were able to more freely confirm or contest aspects of the campaign. 
Nonetheless, newspaper reportage was also constrained by their inherent confirmation of 
governmental structures of power through their inability to critique notions of terrorism 
within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
In reporting critically on the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, newspapers broadly 
contributed alternative ways of understanding sources and responses to post-September 11 
insecurity. In this way, we can illustrate the main argument of the thesis that a discourse of 
post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between the media and 
governmental authorities. While the media’s processes of confirmation and contestation did 
not halt the campaign’s discursive premise of insecurity, changes in the possibilities for 
understanding this discourse did occur. We can suggest that this contributed to an evolution 
in the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity. This is because newspaper reportage 
contributed more diverse possibilities for audiences to understand the sources of, and 
responses to, insecurity. This is shown within the context of the campaign hotline, where 
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reportage suggested that governmental definition of ubiquitous terrorist threats as sources of 
insecurity were not justification for increasing modes of securitisation. Furthermore, these 
increased methods of securitisation were presented as either an exaggeration or political 
ploy, casting doubt on the validity of governmental responses to insecurity.  
 
After being subjected to public derision, authorities used the signification of post-September 
11 insecurity to re-launch the campaign in an entirely different image. Thus, in September 
2004, on the third anniversary of the September 11 political attacks and the eve of the 
Australian Federal elections, John Howard launched the ‘Help Protect Australia from 
Terrorism’ advertising initiative (Time to be alert, 2004). This new campaign attempted to re-
confirm governmental definition of post-September 11 insecurity, but the governmental 
communication techniques utilised to do this changed.  
 
The more sober campaign shed the Be Alert, Not Alarmed catch-cry, as well as the fridge 
magnets and brochures. Instead the campaign focussed on the possibility of terrorist attacks 
on public transportation, buildings and infrastructure. Posters were placed conspicuously at 
train stations, airports and bus terminals depicting a map of Australia composed of 
fragments of images of infrastructure. A televised advertisement featured a voice-over tersely 
suggesting that the smallest amount of information could be part of a much larger terrorist 
plot. Thus the campaign once again suggested that ‘ordinary’ Australians should work as a 
nation to remain safe: “Police and security agencies are working hard, but you could help 
them complete the picture” (National Security website, 2004). The Prime Minister attempted 
to publicly re-establish the credibility of the terrorism hotline by suggesting the ‘seriousness’ 
of the threat of terrorism:  
 
Many of the jocular, derisive, critical references to that campaign when it was first 
launched have, in the fullness of time, been demonstrated to have been totally wrong 
(Howard in Colman, 2004: 2).  
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The generalised nature of the information within the campaign was continued in the new 
advertisements, but with no security ‘products’ or folksy catch-cry, they outlasted the initial 
campaign.  
 
The re-presentation of the campaign can be seen to be a response to contestation forwarded 
especially in the news media. These moments of contestation can be seen to have negotiated 
the meaning associated with post-September 11 insecurity, especially in terms of the 
responses that governmental authorities were attempting to legitimate. In this respect, 
governmental discourse attempted to underline the initial suggestions of insecurity that had 
justified those responses initially. In the second campaign, governmental communication of 
the hotline focussed on insecurity; its powerful symbolism made it seemingly impervious to 
dissent at the time. Despite the power of the symbolism of insecurity, some journalists 
attempted to ‘answer’ governmental discourse by referring back to previous criticism of the 
campaign. For example, one journalist had tongue firmly in cheek when she ‘answered’ 
Howard’s quote with the suggestion that: “it was unclear whether fridge magnets will again 
appear in the nation’s letterboxes” (Colman, 2004: 2). Despite the journalist writing a 
‘serious’ news story, this aside suggests that she wished to continue the jocular treatment the 
campaign had previously been given. In this way, the journalist attempted to establish 
control over the representation of the campaign by directing a derisive understanding of 
Howard’s remarks. 
 
This journalistic power-play relates more broadly to the interactions between media and 
government. This relates to the argument that I will continue to build throughout this thesis 
that power relations between government and media contribute to the development of a 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Both media and government engaged broader 
relations of power attempting to establish hegemonic representation of the campaign. Within 
these power relations, battles to gain hegemony over specific representations have also 
contributed to evolutions in the broader understanding of a discourse of insecurity. This 
occurs as alternate representations gain public appeal, creating heterogeneity in 
understanding of otherwise dominant discourses. 
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As we have seen, governmental discourse about the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign 
attempted to define terrorism as a ubiquitous threat in order to justify the methods of 
surveillance, suspicion and securitisation encapsulated by the anti-terror hotline. As the 
broader thesis argues, governmental discourse was subject to negotiation by mainstream 
newspapers, contributing to alternate understandings of this representation of insecurity 
within contestation of the need for the hotline. This chapter has thus illustrated the specific 
discursive strategies utilised by government and media in attempting to maintain and 
negotiate a hegemonic meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. Both cultural actors have 
attempted to secure their own representations of the sources of post-September 11 
insecurity and their appropriate responses, subject to particular organisational restraints. 
These negotiations are situated within a broader evolution of the discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity because the discursive interaction between media and government 
contributes to the evolutions of particular representations of meaning.  
 
This chapter has thus provided the theoretical framework to conceptualise the power 
relations between the Australian media and governmental authorities to contribute to 
continual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter thus ends 
the discussion of the theoretical framework of thesis. The last four chapters have provided 
definitions of the major terms utilised, as well as the major theoretical and methodological 
approach taken to explore the primary argument of the thesis. In the chapters to follow, a 
more specific discussion will be presented about the discursive themes making up the 
representation of insecurity as a source of post-September 11 insecurity, and legislation and 
war as their response. These chapters will be similarly organised by separating research into a 
theoretical chapter and a case study chapter. Each of the theoretical chapters will focus 
specifically with the discursive themes evident in governmental discourse and the situation of 
its meaning according to particular epistemological frameworks. The case study chapters will 
discuss the negotiation of these themes and their frameworks by mainstream newspaper 
reportage. The next chapter, Representation of the terrorist other as a source of insecurity, will begin 
the theoretical discussion of the representation of the sources of post-September 11 
insecurity. 
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Endnotes: 
 
1. Furthermore, the effects of a phone call to the national security hotline would be a 
matter for further investigation by security or intelligence personnel. If a caller’s 
information appears credible, the police and even the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) can be called to investigate. While a telephone call to the 
hotline becomes a very serious matter, this is an incongruous aspect of the 
‘community building’ tone and focus of the campaign. Many questions about this 
process are left unanswered or ambiguous in the campaign information booklet, such 
as concerns of privacy and the extent of the power ASIO has to investigate 
otherwise innocent people.  
 
2. Newspapers have a history of presenting their public and political importance, 
derived from their history as the Fourth Estate of the political system. This is often 
despite the reliance on economic and political support outside of public interest. For 
example, in the earliest days of white settlement in Australia, newspapers were simply 
an adjunct to the process of government (Schultz, 1997: 28). The Sydney Gazette, first 
published in 1803, essentially re-published government notices and governmental 
authorities often awarded printing contracts as rewards for good editorial conduct. 
From 1824, newspapers in Australia began to be published without ‘official’ 
patronage, though the relationship between the media and the government continues 
to be based on mutually influential power relations. 
 
The rapid rise of industrial development in the 1900s created a rapidly maturing, 
highly competitive media (Baran et al, 2003: 44). In the US and Europe, popular 
demand for cheap media content drove the development of several new media 
forms—the penny press, the nickel magazine and the dime novel (Baran et al, 2003: 
43). Newspaper circulation competition led to the development of yellow journalism, 
designed by American newspaper baron William Hearst to lure low-income readers. 
His newspapers were less concerned with political argument and much more 
interested in human interest stories that included lots of pictures, serialised stories 
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and comic strips. Australian newspapers followed in the footsteps of their American 
and European counterparts, where competition had encouraged some sensationalist 
and irresponsible journalism. Some urban newspapers resembled ‘weekly scandal 
sheets’ (See Baran et al, 2003). Not surprisingly, at this period the public status of 
journalists was among the lowest of any profession (Baran et al, 2003: 44). 
Nonetheless, these trends enabled the increasing commercialisation of the newspaper 
industry, where it would continue to suggest its importance as a public service, whilst 
still pursuing content that ensured commercial success. 
 
To this end, more recent trends in newspapers have seen the commercial and 
political roles of the newspapers create increasing tensions in the reportage 
produced. In the wartime and the post-war years, Australian newspapers were quite 
politically conservative, with more space given to reporting political viewpoints of 
prominent politicians without much contextual reportage (Schultz, 1997: 30). It was 
during the political and social upheavals that marked the 1960s an 1970s, that a 
watchdog style of journalism became more apparent and journalism regained favour 
as a profession. The discourses of the public role of newspapers as the Fourth Estate 
also came back into favour.  
 
3. As of 2007, ASIO and the federal police were investigating 3000 calls made to the 
national security hotline, out of the 22,000 calls that were logged in the last year 
(Packham, 2007). A Freedom of Information request submitted by the Herald Sun 
showed that 88,000 calls were made to the hotline over 4 years and just under half 
offered information (Packham, 2007). Of that number 11,500 were followed up by 
either ASIO or the federal police. The government has dedicated $19.2 million to 
continuing the hotline for another four years (Packham, 2007). Australian Federal 
Police Commissioner Mick Keelty suggested the introduction of the hotline had 
been successful as an anti-terror resource: "There is not one terrorism investigation 
that we've conducted in this country that hasn't at one stage or another been 
reported through the hotline." (Terrorism Hotline, 2007). 
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It is difficult for those in the media to actually make an assessment of the success of 
the hotline itself, given that the content of the phone calls is not divulged, nor 
whether any of the investigations actually thwart crimes involving potential terrorist 
acts. Nonetheless, the security and the success of the hotline have been questioned 
due to a number of embarrassing governmental gaffes. Specifically, the security of 
the information given to the hotline came under fire in 2005 after the personal 
details of a man who reported that a large purchase of chemicals were revealed to the 
people he had reported during a raid on their home. Adding to the embarrassment, a 
journalist was also able to get the information and call the tipster for comment 
(Seccombe, 2005: 9). This led to an internal inquiry into the security of the hotline by 
the Attorney General’s office, though the inquiry’s conclusions were never made 
public. 
Though the federal government has continued to dedicate funds towards the security 
hotline, a 2006 Labor government survey found that 99 per cent of Australians had 
no idea what the phone number of the hotline was. This is despite $7 million being 
spent on a campaign to raise public awareness of the hotline. This was discovered in 
a somewhat embarrassing gaffe made by the Federal Finance Minister Nick Minchin 
who confirmed that he did not know the phone number either  (Wright, 2006).  
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Chapter Five 
Representation of the terrorist other as the source of insecurity 
 
 
From Osama bin Laden to Bali’s ‘smiling assassin’ (Amrozi bin Nurhasyim), both media and 
governmental representations of the terrorist are marked by total incomprehensibility of 
their actions. Their images interspersed with the imagery of the twisted ruins of the site of a 
terrorist attack were often used to relate media and governmental disbelief over the 
annihilation of so many innocent people. The ubiquitous fear that these images promote, 
through the imaginary of the sudden destruction of infrastructure and life, has contributed to 
understandings of post-September 11 insecurity. Within discourses of post-September 11 
insecurity, both media and government have asked how a terrorist’s sense of morality could 
be so different to our own. This sense of complete difference to ‘us’ has framed 
representations of the terrorist as a source of post-September 11 insecurity. This 
understanding has also been strategically utilised by governmental authorities within 
discourses justifying many ‘anti-terror’ responses. 
 
Having provided the conceptual basis of this thesis, this chapter will now begin the 
discussion of epistemological frameworks within governmental discourse about post-
September 11 insecurity.  In this chapter, I will argue that discursive themes of terrorism in 
governmental discourse were situated within epistemological frameworks of otherness. As an 
epistemological framework, otherness perpetuates a sense of opposition to unified 
Australian values and beliefs.  This refers the meaning of terrorism to threats that otherness 
poses to the Australian ‘way of life’ constructed though the discursive ideal of nationhood. 
Otherness also perpetuates a re-formulation of traditionally inclusive ideas of citizenship, 
which subsequently become exclusionary and contingent on demonstration of ‘Australian-
ness’. In certain instances, this referral of meaning has manifested in discourses suggesting 
that governmental authorities should ‘police’ adherence to a particular political and cultural 
ideology, as proof of a citizen’s ‘Australian values’. Therefore, this discussion of otherness 
should be seen as connected to the later discussion of the justification of particular 
governmental actions in response to insecurity.  
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This chapter will proceed firstly by defining and theorising otherness as the epistemological 
framework for terrorism within governmental discourse. Edward Said’s conception of 
otherness in his text Orientalism (1978) will be utilised to describe how ‘others’ are defined in 
opposition to understandings of the superiority of Western governments or nations. 
Orientalism illustrates how government and some media utilise themes of otherness within 
‘administrative’ discourse to perpetuate this sense of superiority. The next section of the 
chapter will take a critical approach to Said’s conception of otherness, by suggesting 
Orientalism’s theoretical limitations. Utilising criticism sourced primarily from Terry 
Eagleton, I will illustrate that aspects of Said’s work are ahistorical and ignore possible sites 
of resistance to Orientalist thought.  
 
In contrast to Said, this thesis has argued that power relations contribute to the evolution of 
discourse over time. Therefore, in the final section of this chapter I will utilise the 
Foucauldian perspective initiated in the previous chapters to argue that discursive 
constructions of otherness are subject to contestation by other cultural actors. This will allow 
the following chapter to illustrate through its case study, how contestation of terrorism and 
its framing within otherness can lead to changes in a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity. This will contribute to the primary argument that I have been establishing in this 
thesis, because it will illustrate that governmental representations of post-September 11 
insecurity have evolved according to power relations with Australian media reportage. 
 
Terrorism as the source of post-September 11 insecurity 
 
In this section I would firstly like to discuss how this chapter will approach a definition of 
terrorism and its situation within epistemological frameworks of otherness. This discussion 
will begin by situating governmental discursive strategies in representing the meaning of 
terrorism. This will be followed by discussion of how governmental definition of terrorism 
has been utilised within mainstream media reportage. In this chapter I argue that 
governmental definition of terrorism as a source of post-September 11 insecurity has been 
situated through epistemological frameworks of otherness. I have previously suggested that 
epistemological frameworks refer the meaning of governmental discourse back to 
established knowledge, such as discursive constructions of an ‘ideal’ nation. Within these 
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frameworks the role of governmental authority is established, as well as other cultural 
understandings about our particular ‘way of life’. The continual referral to these 
understandings is powerful because it implies a particular sense of national identity through 
which we can structure and understand our actions as ‘Australians’.  
 
Otherness refers meaning back to these discursive constructions of nationhood, by 
suggesting acts of terrorism within a system of opposition to constructed Australian ideals. 
This epistemological framework situates acts of terrorism and their perpetrators as a threat 
not only to a citizen’s life, but also to the maintenance of national ideals and community. 
This is because the representation of the terrorist is based on their violent repudiation of the 
ideals that construct a sense of nationhood. As US president George Bush (2001a) argued, 
the terrorist threat is not simply violent, but ideological:   
 
This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views.  We value life; the 
terrorists ruthlessly destroy it … We wage a war to save civilization, itself.   
 
 This is seen as the most dangerous ‘act’ of terrorism because it attempts to dismantle a 
political and cultural status quo that is revered as a national and cultural identity. 
 
This referral to ‘otherness’ to situate understanding of terrorism is important because it 
allows governmental authorities to justify their actions as within the ‘national interest’. 
Whereas governmental authorities can justify their use of violence as a form of protection of 
the nation, terrorism is presented as solely fulfilling ideological agendas. It is therefore 
represented within governmental discourse as an illegitimate use of violence against people 
or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies. The aim of terrorism is to 
induce a state of fear in the victim and thereby seek publicity for particular politicised aims 
(Lewis, 2005: 24). The victims of a terrorist act are comprised both of those directly affected 
by the physical assault of the terrorist act, and those who feel the repercussions of the attack, 
whether through fear of reprisal or the trauma of having witnessed the event (Lewis, 2005: 
24). 
 
 133 
 
Though governmental discourse represents terrorism in this way, it is not a definitive 
description. The definition of terrorism is subjective, politicised and open to contestation 
because it is situated by epistemological frameworks that are discursively constructed. In 
chapter three, I suggested that the definition of terrorism must be situated within discursive 
battles over representation because its meaning is often dependent on contested 
understandings of the phenomenological act.  As Lewis (2005: 31) suggests: 
 
An act of terrorism is, of course, immediately phenomenal, but it is also and 
inevitably a discourse which is available to the broader expressivities of 
representation…the act becomes engaged in the amplitude of communicative 
dissemination and culture (including the economic and political context). 
 
What Lewis is suggesting is that while an act of terrorism is immediate, shocking and 
destructive, it also occurs within a broader context of politicised representation that seeks to 
define and respond to the act long after it has occurred. Therefore, the differing 
representations of terrorism illustrate the conflicts that can occur over the representation of 
meaning. These battles over meaning can also suggest the symbolic intensity with which 
terrorism becomes imbued. This symbolic intensity must be seen as part of politicised 
discourses employed by governmental authorities to define the acts as ‘illegitimate violence’ 
and to therefore present responses that underline the need for governmental authority.  
 
This chapter focuses on the processes of representing the meaning of terrorism rather than 
the acts themselves. This is important because the power to use violence is often taken from 
the discursive legitimacy given to the need for violent action. As I have previously suggested, 
all cultural actors fight over the right to define sources of insecurity in order to legitimise 
their particular responses to the subsequently established threats. The cultural actor who 
dominates the representation of meaning in the public sphere also increases their cultural 
power. This cultural power is often utilised to justify the material actions taken by those 
actors. Indeed we can draw similarities between the discursive techniques used by those 
accused of terrorism and those of governmental authorities in attempting to legitimise their 
responses to terrorist threats. These justifications are usually centred on insecurity about the 
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continuation of a particular national culture, or ‘way of life’. Just as US President George W. 
Bush may suggest the threat that terrorists pose to ‘freedom loving Americans’, similarly 
Osama bin Laden might also suggest the danger that US economic and military policy in the 
Middle East might pose to Islamic states.  I do not seek to forward an ethical understanding 
of indiscriminate acts of violence with this example. I simply wish to draw attention to the 
importance of discursive processes of meaning making underlying all political action. This is 
important because it will allow me to forward the broader thesis argument illustrating that 
power relations between cultural actors can lead to changes in the understanding of 
discourse. The interactions between different cultural actors in ‘battling’ over a particular 
representation of meaning like ‘terrorism’ contribute to evolutions in understanding of 
discourse.  
 
Focussing on the representation of terrorism is also important because we can subsequently 
conclude that responses to insecurity through the ‘war on terror’ are profoundly ‘discursive’ 
political acts. This is because it is a response to a threat that resides mostly within a 
discursive imaginary. While groups that wish to kill civilians do exist, and have been named 
‘terrorist organisations’, the symbolism of this threat outweighs the occurrence of terrorism 
itself. The terrorist other therefore exists within an epistemological framework initiated by 
physical acts of terrorism, but is discursively powerful because it is based on understandings 
of ubiquitous and unknown threats (James et al, 2005: 240). Similarly, Lewis (2005: 29) 
suggests that the idea of the terrorist other is powerful: “not merely because it is insidious 
but because it can never be seen other than through the lens of a highly politicised cultural 
imaginary”. Thus, the threat of the terrorist other can also be described as ideological. These 
representations of threat prioritise a constructed understanding of the threat to cultural and 
democratic ideals, even if those ideals are evolving concepts in themselves.  
 
This understanding of terrorism has placed greater importance on the politics of citizenship 
by defining and scrutinising the actions of ‘true’ citizens against a ubiquitous ‘enemy’. When 
potential terrorists are described, it is to illustrate how different they are to ‘true citizens’. 
This idea of citizenship is based on categories of inclusive and exclusive rights. It is based on 
the notion of belonging to something when others do not, and the benefits and protections 
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that this may bring. As Binoy Kampmark (2003) suggests: “Citizenship, in its obsession with 
charting the boundaries of belonging, excludes and privileges”. Within governmental 
discourse, citizenship is seen as a legal and social contract between citizens and government. 
These mutually observed rights and responsibilities form a ‘consensus’ of society (Lentini, 
2005: 2), that is, a political community with a recognisable and communicated identity. 
Citizenship is not merely a legal status, defined by rights and responsibilities, but also the 
expression of an identity within a particular political community.  
 
The ‘otherness’ of terrorism is therefore situated around the threat they place to the 
particular ways of life that citizenship is meant to guarantee. Terrorists, by the very nature of 
their activities, reject the political, social and legal dominion of citizenship within a discourse 
of national identity. This is because their acts are represented as being directed against the 
structure and legitimacy of particular Western national cultures and people. As a terrorist 
does not ‘play by the rules’, the rights given to civilians are altered for a terrorist. The 
politicisation of this discourse is evident when a suspect of terrorism is not afforded the 
rights of a civilian but instead assigned the illegitimacy of being an ‘unlawful combatant’. In 
this regard, the signification of the ‘terrorist other’ has become powerful enough to dictate 
new understanding of the ways in which national culture should be protected. 
 
It must also be acknowledged that the media has made a significant contribution to this 
representation of the terrorist other in the public sphere. While the media discussed in this 
thesis as a catalyst for negotiating discourses of post-September 11 insecurity, the ‘spectacle’ 
of terrorism has been disseminated mainly through media discourses. Notions of the 
terrorist other have been amplified by media reportage and perpetuated as a source of news-
worthy discourse. In many respects the media, especially broadcast media, has accelerated 
the process of defining the terrorist other. This has occurred through the proliferation of 
‘information’ and imagery regarding the nature of the terrorist threat. Jean Baudrillard (2001) 
suggested that the media has been so instrumental is amplifying the symbolism of terror that 
spectacle has overwhelmed the actual event of disaster. This sense of spectacle has thus 
created ‘games’ of violence and celebrity that are both insidious and ultimately vacuous 
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(Baudrillard, 2001). Similarly, Brigette Nacos underlines the important link between media 
and terror, suggesting that:  
 
Terrorism fits into the infotainment mould that the news media increasingly prefers 
and offers villains and heroes in its search for box office hits. Moreover in our 
celebrity culture, whenever possible at all, terrorists receive celebrity treatment 
(Nacos, 2002: 5). 
 
This is evidenced by the vast amounts of reportage that groups like al Qaeda and individuals 
like Osama bin Laden receive, which is arguably in asymmetrical proportion to their actual 
size and continued relevance in international politics. 
 
As discussed in chapters three and four, the media is an imperfect agent of contestation of 
governmental discourse given their organisational constraints. Although mainstream media 
reportage is also one of the strongest forms of contestation of these representations of 
terrorism the amplification of notions of terrorism must also be attributed to the media. 
Despite the inherent paradox of contesting the discourses that they have helped establish, 
the media’s contestation of governmental discourse is accepted within the public sphere as a 
part of their role as a cultural actor. The important point to make is that the interests of 
cultural actors are often played in an increasingly mediated and competitive public sphere.  
 
Dominance over the representation of meaning as ‘truth’ is one of the most important 
aspects of maintaining power within the public sphere. Therefore, both media and 
government engage in power relations to ensure their representation of terrorism is seen as 
constitutive of meaning. We can relate this back to the primary argument of this thesis 
because it shows the inherent struggle between both media and government to maintain 
their representations of meaning within the public sphere. It is these struggles within the 
power relations between the two institutions that contribute to the continual evolution of 
discourses of post-September 11 insecurity. As this section has illustrated, both media and 
governmental discourse attempts to represent terrorism within the public sphere. The next 
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section will turn to discussion of the way epistemological frameworks of ‘otherness’ have 
situated representations of terrorism.   
 
Otherness as the epistemological framework for terrorism 
 
The previous section defined the representation of terrorism as a source of post-September 
11 insecurity by both media and government. This has provided a context for defining 
otherness as the epistemological framework used by governmental authorities to situate the 
meaning of terrorism. As previously discussed, the epistemological framework of otherness 
was utilised by governmental discourses to position terrorism outside notions of ‘normality’ 
and ‘rationality’. For example, the day after the September 11 attacks in the US, President 
Bush publicly resolved to retaliate against “those behind these evils acts”. In a strident US 
policy to fight terror, there would be no distinction made between those who committed 
terrorist acts and those who supported them (George W Bush’s, 2001). Within a month, 
Bush had launched a retaliatory military attack on Afghanistan with the central aim of 
destroying the Islamic group al Qaeda and the semi-official government of Afghanistan, the 
Taliban. This was the first part of the global ‘war on terror’ and Bush quickly established that 
“you were either with us, or you were with the terrorists” (The President, 2004). Anyone 
who did not support the various political actions defined within the ‘war on terror’ discourse 
was seen by both the US military and government as “America’s enemies” (George W 
Bush’s, 2001).  
 
As I discussed in the previous section, maintaining hegemony over the definition and 
representation of terrorism allows governmental discourse to legitimise its responses to 
threat. This has been particularly important in Australian governmental discourse, where the 
terrorist threat has been centred on imminent danger, rather than actual events of terrorism. 
Governmental discourse has instead suggested the detection of potential terrorists in 
everyday life. Similarly to the sentiments expressed in the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ campaign, 
terrorism is presented as a shadowy, yet ubiquitous threat that could only be detected 
through suspicion of those that did not embrace the political and national status quo 
presented by governmental authorities. This suspicion is given legitimacy through the 
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representation of the ‘terrorist other’ who threatens a particular way of life. The threat that 
this otherness presents thus entitles governmental authorities to respond with particular 
military and legislative acts in the name of protecting the nation. We see in these examples 
that the underlying epistemological frameworks of otherness create poles of opposition that 
justify governmental action.  
 
In taking this approach, this chapter will describe otherness as an epistemological framework 
utilising Edward Said’s conceptions of otherness in his text Orientalism (1978). Said is 
considered a pre-eminent post-colonial scholar, though his work has also influenced literary 
theory, media and cultural studies. While Gayatri Spivak initiated a theorisation of otherness 
(See Spivak, 1988a), Said’s conception of Orientalism illustrates how government and some 
media utilise themes of otherness within ‘administrative’ discourse. Said’s examination of 
Orientalism in his three books, Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism (1993) and Covering Islam 
(1997) are credited as the first texts to examine perceptions of the ‘East’ from a ‘Western’ 
literary and administrative perspective. This analysis of Orientalist thought covered artistic, 
governmental and administrative texts to examine how ‘the other’ was created through 
discursive structures of binary opposition.  
 
Utilising work from Foucault and Derrida, Said argues that ‘East’ and ‘West’ was created as a 
binary within power relations that continually perpetuate a sense of the superiority of 
Western culture. Depictions of the Oriental character as an irrational and weak other were 
suggested as the ‘essence’ of their identity.  Said’s contention was that the relegation of 
Eastern identity to a primitive essence allowed the West to dominate over the East, resulting 
in the exploitation of Oriental languages, history and culture. These romanticised notions of 
‘the East’ had ramifications for the construction of Asian and Middle Eastern identity. Thus 
Said’s intention in writing Orientalism was a post-colonial reclamation of ‘Oriental’ identity. 
Said’s work always remained inherently interested in the political use of theory. In Covering 
Islam (1997), for example, Said examined how the Victorian notions of otherness described 
in Orientalism still survives today in Western media reportage of Eastern, especially Arab 
countries (McLeod, 2000:39).  
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Despite this thesis’ use of Said’s work, initial conceptions of otherness must be attributed to 
broader post-colonial theory. Specifically, Spivak describes the ‘Othering’ process in 
Lacanian terms, suggesting the ‘other’ as  a crucial aspect of locating the self and in defining 
what is ‘normal’ (Spivak, 1988: 119). Spivak, following Lacan, makes a distinction between 
the ‘Other’ and the ‘other’. The ‘other’ is important in defining the identity of the subject. In 
post-colonial theory, it can refer to the colonised others who are marginalised by imperial 
discourse and become the focus of anticipated mastery through the identification of their 
difference (in Ashcroft et al, 2000:170). It is in the gaze of the ‘Other’ that the subject gains 
identity. The symbolic ‘Other’ is crucial to the subject because it defines how the subject 
should exist. Within post-colonial theory, this Other can be compared to the imperial centre 
in two ways: firstly, it provides the terms in which the colonised subject becomes ‘other’, 
secondly, it becomes the ‘absolute pole of address’ or the ideological framework for the 
colonised subject to understand their world (Ashcroft et al, 2000:170). According to post-
colonial theory, these processes of ‘othering’ occur at the same time because the colonial 
subject is both a ‘child’ of empire, and a primitive and degraded subject of imperial discourse 
(Ashcroft et al, 2000:171).  
 
Spivak (1988: 121) suggested the term ‘othering’ for the process by which imperial discourse 
creates its unequal partners. In Spivak’s explanation, othering is a dialectical process because 
the colonising Other is established at the same time as its colonised others are produced as 
subjects (in Ashcroft et al, 2000:171). She draws on these practices of othering to describe 
the context in which the terrorist attacks of September 11 occurred: 
 
Suicide bombing—and the planes of 9/11 were living bombs—is a purposive self-
annihilation…killing oneself as other, in the process killing others....Suicidal 
resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. 
It is both execution and mourning...you die with me for the same cause, no matter 
which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated 
killees [sic] in suicide bombing....It is a response...to the state terrorism practiced 
outside of its own ambit by the United States (in Alexander, 2003). 
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In this description of the events of September 11, 2001, Spivak is suggesting that the 
inscription of otherness onto the culture of the terrorist attackers has manifested in bodily 
modes of resistance. In a globalised, mediatised age bodily forms of resistance seek publicity 
through ‘media-friendly’ spectacle. Both the inscribed understanding of the terrorists’ 
Otherness and the terrorist’s understanding of the politicisation of his identity as Other, fuse 
in subsequently violent actions of resistance.  
 
In a similar way, I have suggested that the way in which meaning is constructed often 
dictates the actions that are taken in response to those particularised understandings.  
Nonetheless, this chapter refers to otherness in terms that illustrate Foucauldian conceptions 
of power relations, rather than Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. While Spivak’s analysis 
remains rooted in psychoanalysis, feminist theory and Marxism, Edward Said drew on 
Foucauldian paradigms of power to suggest the ways the other is adopted into administrative 
discourse [1]. Said’s description of otherness in the form of Orientalist theory is more 
instructive in this chapter because it specifically explores Western representations of the 
Middle East and Islam within institutions and texts. Unlike Spivak’s initial conception of 
otherness, Said’s theory of Orientalism is not confined to post-colonial concerns with the 
‘children of colonialism’. The discursive reach of Orientalism can apply to contemporary 
migratory flows as well as it does to British colonial India. This is because Orientalism is 
applied as a ‘discourse of knowledge’ that Said suggests is used as a form of marginalisation.  
 
Otherness occurs as a ‘discourse of knowledge’ within Said’s analysis of Orientalism as part 
of the political ramifications of communicated forms of binary opposition. Said draws upon 
Foucauldian notions of power to show how this knowledge is produced to ‘prove the truth’ 
of the others’ inferiority in a post-colonial era. He does this by analysing literary and 
administrative texts from the 19th century within and about areas dominated by colonial rule. 
This firstly establishes a tradition of romanticised or ‘false’ notions of Oriental identity as an 
implicit justification of post-colonial rule. Said then traces these notions within 
contemporary understanding of Middle Eastern culture, suggesting that colonial notions of 
the Middle East have been translated into contemporary understanding:  
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Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. 
Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life has 
entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab 
world. What we have instead is a series of crude, essentialised caricatures of the 
Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military 
aggression (Said, 1980: 489). 
 
Said suggests in this comment that this representation of Muslims perpetuates a power 
relation that ensures Western dominance of Middle Eastern politics. This power relation is 
based on the construction of a discourse through simplistic binary oppositions between East 
and West as ‘truth’ or expert information about Muslims.  
 
In this respect, the Orient is described in a series of negative terms that serve to buttress a 
sense of the West’s superiority and strength. This binary division is perpetrated primarily 
through the discourse of Western institutions and media that often present knowledge of the 
non-Western world in negative opposition or hierarchical position. Within these binary 
divisions, a number of stereotypes about the Orient are perpetrated as ‘knowledge’. Among 
the most pertinent are, firstly, that the ‘West’ is a place of historical progress and scientific 
development, but the ‘Orient’ is changeless and somewhat primitive, cut off from the 
progress of Western history (Said, 1995: 35). We see examples of this understanding in 
‘expert’ descriptions of the Middle East or in media reportage claiming to understand the 
underlying political and historical motives of groups like al Qaeda. Often these expert 
opinions have suggested a historically based ‘clash of civilisations’ between Middle East and 
West that can never be remedied and will always leave Western civilisation at threat from 
militants who wish to see global Islamic rule (See Huntington, 1997). 
 
Their continuing fundamentalism and primitivism means that the inhabitants of the Orient 
are also ‘strange’.  It is this suggestion of ‘strangeness’ that provides the platform for 
understanding of ‘otherness’.  ‘Others’ are not just different; they are ‘oddly’ different. 
Therefore knowledge about the Orient usually serves to accentuate all that is unusual, 
fantastic or bizarre. Oriental stereotypes often portray people with weaknesses such as 
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cowardliness, laziness, untrustworthiness, laxity, violence and deviant lust (Said, 1995: 39). 
Oriental people themselves are represented as lacking moral sense and a readiness to indulge 
themselves in the more dubious aspects of human behaviour (Said, 1995: 39). We see 
examples of this understanding of otherness in the media uproar surrounding Muslim cleric 
Sheik Taj Aldin Alhilali whose chauvinistic comments about women were reported as part of 
Islamic teaching, rather than the comments of an individual (Zwartz, 2007). Politicians were 
moved to comment on Sheik Alhilali’s opinion, suggesting that some of his Islamic teachings 
were offensive enough to warrant a review of his Australian citizenship (Zwartz, 2007). In 
comparison, reports in the US at the same time of a Catholic Senator suggesting that rape 
victims should be forced to give birth if they were impregnated by the attacker were 
commented on as the chauvinistic comments of an individual zealot (Davenport, 2006; 
Chester, 2007).  The usual outcome of these representations is that the ‘Oriental’ is seen as 
the concurrently degenerate product of primitivism. Thus, conceptions of Orientalism can 
often cross over from culture and categorise people according to race. Negative racial or 
cultural stereotypes of a certain ethnicity are presented as an in-depth understanding of what 
kind of person an Oriental is likely to be, despite individual qualities or failings (McLeod, 
2000:45).  
 
This representation does not suggest that these discursive binary oppositions physically exist, 
nor do I want to make totalising assumptions about essential Islamic ‘victims’ or ‘Western 
oppressors’. This chapter is utilising the theory merely to suggest the discursive strategies 
used within governmental or media discourse to communicate a politically expedient 
response to terrorism. As Said suggests in Orientalism:  
 
I have no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient or Islam 
really are… words such as Orient and Occident correspond to no stable reality that 
exists as natural fact (Said, 1995: 331). 
 
Instead, I would suggest that construction of a discourse of a unified ‘national identity’ often 
involves an exclusion of sorts. It involves establishing ‘Others’, “whose actuality is always 
subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from us” 
(Said, 1995: 332). Said argues that ‘the orient’ is itself a constituted entity, and consequently  
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the notion that there are any geographical spaces with radically different inhabitants who can 
be defined on the basis of religion, culture or racial essence is a “highly debatable idea”  
(Said, 1995:322).  
 
Similarly, this thesis illustrates that epistemological frameworks situate the meaning of 
discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war according to discursively constructed 
notions of national identity.  Just as the orient is a “constituted entity”, national beliefs that 
are situated in opposition to ‘others’ emerge discursively out of complex historical and 
cultural power relations. These categorisations are not neutral designations. They act as an 
evaluative interpretation of one national identity over ‘others’ within particular cultural 
power relations. As Said suggests: “underlying these categories is the rigidly binominal 
opposition of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ with the former always encroaching upon the latter” (Said, 
1995:227). Epistemological frameworks refer to these understandings of national identity to 
justify governmental authority as the ‘protection’ of these constructed ideals. Otherness, 
therefore, is situated as an epistemological framework for defining a terrorist threat to allow 
governmental authorities to subsequently justify their legislative and military responses. This 
is important because this authority is asserted to gain dominance over discourse within 
power relations with other cultural actors. If a cultural actor gains this dominance over the 
representation of meaning of terrorism, they also gain power over other cultural actors in the 
public sphere to represent its appropriate material responses. 
 
What these representations suggest is that institutions have a vested interest in producing a 
political and social status quo that maintains their cultural power. This knowledge of the 
Orientalist other takes its form as a “western fantasy”. It is a discursive construction that 
represents the ‘reality’ of the Orient for those in the ‘imagined community’ of ‘the West’ (See 
Anderson, 1991). This contrived reality does not actually reflect what may or may not 
actually be in the Orient. Instead, Orientalism imposes upon the Orient specifically Western 
views of meaning (Said, 1995: 36). As I have suggested above, Said follows Foucault in 
suggesting that power is maintained through the formation of dominant forms of knowledge 
about the ‘inferior’ culture: 
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The argument, when reduced to its simplest form, is clear, precise and easy to grasp. 
There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must 
be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs 
rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another 
Western power (Said, 1995:36). 
 
The purpose in propagating these stereotypes is fundamentally legitimating; its discourse is 
part of a far-reaching system of representations that structure a relationship based on 
political domination. They legitimate the marginalisation and domination of other peoples 
and lubricate the political and judicial structures that maintain this power (McLeod, 2000:43). 
 
Otherness must therefore be seen as allowing certain forms of knowledge to ultimately allow 
a whole institutional structure, where opinions about ‘others’ circulate as objective 
knowledge or wholly reliable truth. These forms of knowledge allow institutions to speak for 
their ‘others’ and to dominate them in ways that are suggested as “the powerful and up-to-
date empires effectively [bringing] them out of the wretchedness of their decline” to 
rehabilitate them into aping productive Western ways of living (Said, 1995:35). For example, 
George W. Bush (2001a) suggested that the military presence in Afghanistan is part of their 
aid to innocent and deprived victims of the Taliban: 
 
We care for the innocent people of Afghanistan, so we continue to provide 
humanitarian aid, even while their government tries to steal the food we send.  When 
the terrorists and their supporters are gone, the people of Afghanistan will say with 
the rest of the world:  good riddance. 
 
Said would argue that this type of legitimation of orientalist dominance has also been 
occurring during the implementation of the Iraq war, where conflict has been presented as 
part of a reconstruction process to assist the Iraqi people. All of these representations form 
part of a larger discourse about post-September 11 insecurity, which governmental 
authorities have attempted to assert dominance over. Nonetheless, these discursive practices 
are part of larger relations of power with other cultural actors, which Said does not theorise. 
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In the next section of this chapter, I will take a critical approach to Said’s conceptions of 
otherness. I will illustrate that Said’s work on Orientalism does not allow opportunities for 
understandings of otherness to evolve according to the contestations of other cultural actors. 
This will be contrasted with my broader thesis argument that power relations between media 
and government have contributed to continual evolutions within a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. 
 
Criticisms of Said’s conception of otherness 
  
While Said’s work has provided the framework for defining otherness, his analysis has been 
criticised for being ahistorical, and for ignoring possible sites of resistance to Orientalist 
thought within both Eastern and Western cultures (in McLeod, 2000:45). This chapter will 
now turn the analysis towards a more critical understanding of Said’s theorisation of 
otherness.  I will use this critical analysis to suggest that criticism of Said’s work could have 
been avoided by utilising Foucault’s conception of governmentality. This would have 
allowed Said to suggest that although notions of otherness have been dominant textual 
representations, they have also been contested by cultural actors within the public sphere. 
This is important as it allows the broader thesis to show how discourses of post-September 
11 insecurity have been subject to processes of confirmation and contestation within power 
relations between the media and governmental authorities.  
 
Orientalism and its associated themes of otherness admittedly have limitations as analytical 
tools. Criticism of otherness, particularly from Terry Eagleton, has suggested that the term is 
overused and simplistic and has the result of victimising, rather than empowering minorities. 
Said’s text Orientalism has been criticised for its ahistorical tendency to make totalising 
assumptions about a vast, varied expanse of events pertaining to Orientalist discourse (See 
McCleod, 2000: 48). Said’s method in Orientalism was to review a vast array of literature and 
administrative texts from across colonial to post-colonial eras in a variety of different 
colonised nations. This expansive methodology often seems to insist on an internal 
consistency of Orientalist thought because the ‘production’ of otherness does not consider 
historical, political and geographic factors that may appropriate or modify the discourse. 
Specifically, the structure of Orientalist discourse does not take into account the unique 
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experiences of non-European or US countries in responding to and utilising Orientalist 
discourse. For example, Australia’s experiences of colonialism as well as subsequent political 
adherence to US policy in the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ present a unique 
understanding of Orientalism. This is because it suggests the use of a discourse of 
knowledge over colonial and post-colonial eras experienced by both European and non-
European ethnicities.  
  
From the perspective of this thesis’ broader argument, the main objection to Said’s 
methodology is that he seemingly ignores resistance by colonised people and from within the 
West itself. He states, for example, that: 
 
… a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, 
political theorists, economists and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic 
distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, 
novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, 
customs, ‘mind’, destiny and so on (Said, 1995:3).  
 
This description is given without cultural variation, nor does the subsequent text suggest 
discrepancies in the illustrations of orientalism and otherness within discourse. Thus, “every 
European, in what he could say about the orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, 
and almost totally ethnocentric” (McLeod, 2000: 48). This methodological perspective is 
undermined by the complexity and range of positions taken by the writers within his 
analysis. Graham Huggan has suggested that this leads to a propensity in the analysis towards 
‘self cancelling procedures’. That is, Said’s analysis duplicates practices of Orientalism in its 
methodology because it does not suggest the efforts that cultural actors have made in 
responding to, resisting, or refuting the dominant representations of the Orient (Huggan, 
2005).  
 
The theorist Terry Eagleton has also criticised notions of otherness within a broader 
theoretical dissatisfaction with post-colonial theory. Eagleton’s strongest criticism of 
otherness is what he sees as its ‘political impotence’. That is, notions of otherness criticise 
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Imperialism and colonisation, but do not advance any ideas for political change. In his text 
Figures of Dissent (2003), Eagleton suggests that the post-modern fascination with ‘savages’ 
has become symptomatic of a cultural theory that glorifies ‘otherness’. These popular 
representations of otherness have become essentialised in themselves. Others, as figures of 
dissent, have become “cultural islands of theory where the specificities of differing cultures, 
and indeed their characteristics, are classified in identical ways” (Eagleton, 2003: 162). To 
this end, Eagleton’s tongue is firmly in cheek as he upbraids the ‘other industry’ by 
suggesting: “One wonders what the Tuareg would think, if they ever got wind of it, about 
being classified with werewolves and fallen women” (Eagleton, 2003:1). If openness to the 
other is meant to be a rebuke to parochialism, Eagleton suggests that this rebuke has come 
largely from America; a dominant nation whose home-grown concern for otherness is: 
 
… projected onto the rest of the globe rather like the cultural version of nuclear 
missile bases, so that post-colonial others find themselves obediently adopting the 
agenda of a largely American-bred cult of otherness (Eagleton, 2003:3).  
 
Eagleton’s criticisms suggest that the concern of a dominant country for the plurality and 
openness of those who are considered ‘other’ becomes a subsuming theory. They     
parochially assume that their fashionable concerns with margins and minorities mirror the 
concerns of actual minority groups and cultures around the world. Thus, Eagleton concludes 
that otherness as a cultural theory eventually becomes intellectually void. Once you have 
observed the stereotypes that describe the other in a range of somewhat contradictory 
negative images, “it is hard to know what to do next apart from reach for yet another textual 
illustration of the fact” (Eagleton, 2003:2). As a Marxist, Eagleton’s criticism is clear—as a 
politically pressing theory of attitude and reference, otherness is theoretically thin. 
 
More recently Mark Poster (2006) has questioned whether the ‘epoch’ of post-colonial 
theory is over, suggesting that modern globalising practices are much more pressing issues 
than a heritage of colonial rule. He suggests that globalising movements and trends restrict 
freedoms in non-Western nations, with issues of otherness folding into the outcomes of 
global flows (Poster, 2006: 26). Modern communication systems create, enable and promote 
news kinds of relations across cultures and thus:  
 148 
 
… post-colonial theory of the 1980s presumes a proximate relation of coloniser and 
colonised that obscures the trans-culture of new media, communication that 
inscribes types of hybridity in electronic spaces very different from that envisaged by 
[postcolonial] theorists (Poster, 2006: 31). 
 
Poster’s preoccupation with the democratising potential of new media leads him to suggest 
that recent post-colonial theory suffers in its focus on nation-bound intercultural encounters 
and misunderstandings contributing to the formation of a hybridised post-colonial subject 
(2006: 27). 
 
Following Arjun Appadurai (1996), Poster thus argues for a greater recognition of the role of 
the media in the situation of post-colonialism and globalisation. Stemming from the massive 
migration of non-Westerners to the West, penetration of Western influenced commodities 
into the non-West and exchanges of cultural objects introduce new relations between 
people. Poster argues that these relationships do not easily fit into the categories of coloniser 
and colonised. Similarly, Appadurai contends that recent migratory flows and media are 
importantly interlinked. The colonised may now enter the realm of the coloniser and even 
constitute themselves and their identity within that sphere through use of the media: “For 
migrants, both the politics of adaptation to new environments and the stimulus to move or 
return are deeply affected by a mass-mediated imaginary that frequently transcends national 
space” (Appadurai, 1996: 6). 
 
Both Poster and Eagleton make important points regarding the lack of ambivalence within 
Said’s conceptions of otherness. I believe that Poster’s conception of post-coloniality and its 
relationship to the media mis-reads the goal of post-colonial theory at a number of points. 
Firstly, in forwarding Appadurai’s analysis of migratory flows and globalisation, Poster 
suggests that post-colonial theory is dependent on modes of state-formation that will soon 
become outmoded by globalisation and new media use. Poster (2006: 33) argues:  
 
Post-coloniality depended on a stable geography of nations, each one harbouring its 
people and better peoples with the asymmetry of the West and the rest shaping the 
cartography of interaction and strife.  
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Said’s analysis of otherness suggests that post-colonial theory relies not on political 
formulations, but on formulations of language and discourse. Understandings of otherness 
were formulated (and later contested) through the dominant forms of media at the time. The 
media was, and continues to, be profoundly implicated in both the confirmation and 
contestation of discourses of otherness. The importance of Said’s use of postcolonial theory 
itself is that it shows how modes of discourse presented ways of thinking about relationships 
of power as constituted by superiority and otherness. These notions of language are 
constitutive of practices of meaning making and cultural formation that go beyond the 
political cartography of nation-states. 
 
Apart from this, I believe Poster’s important work in new media, including the 
democratising potential of internet mediated networks has driven a too-hasty revision of the 
way in which processes of meaning making function. Despite the obvious changes that 
mass-mediated, globalised forms of communication have on the dissemination of 
information and the formation of different cultural, social, political and economic 
relationships, as yet, new media have not led to a wholesale revision of notions of the nation. 
Indeed, this thesis argues that notions of global, ubiquitous forms of post-September 11 
insecurity have led to discourses emphasising national unity and the need for legislative and 
military responses from nations wishing to protect their specific ‘way of life’. Other theorists 
have argued that governmental management of internet function have led not to global 
networks, but intranet-like modes of niche relationships and cultural understandings (See 
Johal, 2007). Globalisation theorists have also pointed to the gross inequity of new media 
resources and applications, as well as the western cultural hegemony of the language and 
content of the internet (See James et al, 2005). This illustrates a continuation of the 
discursive practices of exclusion and otherness by nation-states within an increasingly 
globalised world.  
 
The deployment of communications technology as having liberational qualities is important 
in defining the cultural and political uses of the media. This should not disguise the fact that 
technologies exist because they are needed or valued in terms of already existing abilities of 
human communication. It is language and discourse that formulate culture. While interaction 
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and dissemination through technologies affects meaning making, the technologies 
themselves are not solely constitutive of culture. The point to make in relation to post-
coloniality is that we cannot yet say that new media has opened ‘new’ processes of meaning 
making that have annihilated discourses about difference. While modes of communication 
continue to change, their effects on processes of meaning making must be understood as 
overlapping and interlinked, rather than revolutionary. 
 
While I must highlight these issues, Eagleton and Poster’s criticisms must be addressed 
regarding the limitations of otherness. As I have already suggested, at times, Said does not go 
far enough to suggest the ambivalence of otherness beyond a fixed homogeneity. Instead the 
understanding of otherness within discourse and text is always a successfully realised 
intention. For example, Said (1995: 2) suggests that the Orient has helped to define the West 
“as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” and therefore seems unchangeable as 
“an integral part of European material civilisation and culture”. This implies that themes of 
otherness are the only modes of addressing other cultures, and in doing so, allows Orientalist 
discourses to continue unabated.  
 
To remedy this criticism, this chapter will illustrate that a closer reading of Said’s use of 
Foucault in Orientalism will result in a more practical use for themes of Otherness. The next 
section will discuss the ways Foucault’s notions of discourse and power can extend 
conceptions of otherness. This discussion will utilise Foucault’s theorisation to suggest that 
understanding of otherness is subject to change according to the differing representations of 
meaning forwarded by cultural actors in the public sphere. This contributes to the broader 
thesis because it illustrates that power relations between cultural actors affect the 
representation of meaning in the public sphere. The Foucauldian perspective demonstrates 
that negotiation of representations within power relations contributes to the continual 
evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
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Foucault and conceptions of otherness 
 
In the previous section I forwarded some criticisms of Said’s Orientalist analysis. I now wish 
to situate this criticism within Said’s problematic use of Foucault’s archaeological method. 
This will enable me to subsequently extend the Foucauldian approach to otherness more 
along the lines of the primary thesis argument. Said’s use of Foucault’s power/knowledge 
formations differed slightly from the approach taken within this thesis.  Said primarily 
utilised the archaeological phase of Foucault’s work to suggest that systems of knowledge are 
bound to regimes of power. As Foucault (1995: 27) suggested:  
 
Power produces knowledge…power and knowledge directly imply one 
another…there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations.  
 
Said used this conception to suggest the ways in which Orientalist thought could be shown 
through administrative and literary texts as a will to power over Oriental ‘others’. Similarly to 
Foucault’s suggestion of power/knowledge formations, Said suggested Orientalist texts 
illustrated that: 
 
… to have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over 
it. And authority here means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’—the Oriental 
country—since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it (Said, 1995:32). 
 
Thus, Said’s use of Foucault to analyse Orientalism as a colonial discourse is not directly 
concerned with language, but with a discursive regime of knowledge. In this regard, 
‘discourse’ describes the language to which a specific knowledge conforms in order to be 
regarded as ‘true’. 
 
After publishing Orientalism, Said grew somewhat disillusioned with Foucault’s work, 
suggesting that his power/knowledge formations did not ultimately have a political use. He 
argued that Foucault’s archaeological method suggested an “unremitting and unstoppable 
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expansion of power…It is overcoming, co-opting, infinitely detailed and ineluctable in the 
growth of its domination” (Said, 1986:150). He concluded that this tendency towards 
unidirectional conceptions of power—as that which inevitably only exists amongst the 
administrators, managers and technocrats of disciplinary society—leads to an incomplete 
conception of power (Said, 1986: 151). Foucault’s conception of power seemed ultimately 
pessimistic because it did not suggest any forces of effective resistance to the tyrannical 
power he ascribed to modern society (Said, 1986: 151).  
 
Said suggests that this unopposed power comes from Foucault’s conceptual approach, 
focussing on the realisation of actual power, rather than the imagination of its opposition. 
Foucault emphasises the productivity of power, its “provocative inventiveness and 
generative ingenuity” to suggest how “discourses get things done, accomplish real tasks and 
gather authority” (Said, 1986: 152). Thus any utopian imagination of the end of power does 
not interest Foucault: 
 
This translates into the paradox that Foucault’s imagination of power was by his 
analysis of power to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorisation to let it go 
on more or less unchecked (Said, 1986: 152). 
 
Said is suggesting that Foucault does not show the limitations of social systems or, therefore, 
the potential for counter discursive efforts (Said, 1986:154). He suggests that a monolithic 
account of power as domination creates a functionalist account of knowledge (Said, 1996: 
154). If knowledge has no autonomy from dominant power relations, it is little more than an 
instrument and effect of domination (McNay, 1994: 63).  
 
Nonetheless, criticisms of Said’s work (See Young, 2001; Huggan, 2005) argue similarly that 
the notion of an ‘Orientalist discourse’ is too determinist. Young argues that Foucault’s 
notion of discourse would not be restrictive or homogenising in the way that Said later 
suggested. The ‘problem’ with Said’s work, as Young (2001: 388) suggests, is that Said 
focuses on the analysis of textual materials, without analysing the relations between 
institutions as Foucault would do. This is problematic because it implies that the 
misrepresentation of Orientalism has worked effectively every time it encountered the 
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reality, which it distorted (Huggan, 2005: 127). To this end, Said’s argument is forced to 
move between a conception of Orientalism in which knowledge is produced discursively, 
and as a representation that is only a virtual reality. The obvious problem that follows is that 
if truth is a representation, how can Said, or anyone else, know that anything has been 
misrepresented? This constitutes a fundamental difference from Foucault’s analyses, where 
he suggests that discourse is not a “disembodied imaginative representation prior to any 
interaction with the real”, but instead knowledge acting in and on the material world.  
 
In his archaeological method, Foucault (1970: 32) considers written or spoken language as 
part of an “historical event”, and traces the ways it interacts with material circumstance such 
as governmental policy formation or practice. Unlike Said, Foucault’s concept of discourse 
does not simply suggest a body of texts for interpretation according to common themes or 
language. Indeed it has been suggested that Said’s stress on the question of representation 
disengages Foucault’s emphasis on discourse as a material force (See Young, 2001: 399). As 
Young (2001: 399) suggests, using a Foucauldian analysis is valuable because: 
 
… [it] is bound up with the desire to characterise discourse as a material, historical 
entity. Whereas language can be considered solely in the aesthetic realm of the text, 
and knowledge can be considered in the abstract, transcendental field of philosophy, 
discourse works in the realm if materiality and the body, in the domain of objects 
and specific historical practices…He looks at the discursive formation as a way of 
analyzing a discipline and a disciplinary practice. 
 
Similarly, governmental discourse about post-September 11 insecurity and its related themes 
are part of the larger material workings of governmental policy and political practices. While 
I have shown that material circumstance and political practice can be represented through 
text and the use of language, textual representation is not simply a matter of language 
mediating reality. The ways these institutions interact can be shown to have an affect on the 
way certain events are represented and thus, how knowledge is presented and understood as 
‘truth’.  
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The difference is that I have utilised Foucault’s work to emphasise that discourses operate in 
an unstable environment of change and transformation. Therefore, the objects of a discourse 
are quite capable of being contradictory (Young, 2001: 403). Among all its various activities 
and relations, discourse operates as the systematic network linking all the forms of 
knowledge together, and thus, constitutes the very objects that occupy its field. A discourse 
rarely possesses a set of concepts that form a logical totality or coherent whole. Moreover 
discourses are not static but remain fragmented, dispersed and incomplete (Young, 2001: 
404). For example, in the next chapter I will illustrate that the events of David Hicks’ 
incarceration and their representation by governmental discourse and media reportage are 
‘heterogeneous material elements’. Their impact on what appears to be a stable discourse—
post-September 11 insecurity—becomes more complex as it becomes open to change and 
dissent.  
 
This understanding of the heterogeneity of discourses pertaining to ‘knowledge’ and their 
attachment to power relations is a helpful extension of Said’s use of Foucauldian theory in 
Orientalism. It must be acknowledged that Said’s criticism of the archaeological method is 
valid. I have forwarded similar criticism in chapter two of this thesis, suggesting that the 
archaeological method contains a tendency to fall back into a negative view of power as an 
imposed force. These criticisms can be addressed through utilisation of Foucault’s 
conception of governmentality. 
 
In conceptualising governmentality the emphasis on discourse as an internally regulating 
formation is replaced by a notion of discourse as determined by and also constitutive of 
power relations. The difference here is the suggestion of non-discursive relations and effects 
that are able to form the conditions of possibility for particular discourses. Whereas Foucault 
previously analysed discourse with reference to internal rules of formation, he subsequently 
outlined a series of external social forces—processes of control, selection, organisation and 
distribution—that govern the possibilities of discourse (McNay, 1994: 86). This necessarily 
creates space for ‘language wars’ to develop when the discourses of different cultural actors 
attempt to negotiate understandings of ‘otherness’. We can also suggest that within specific 
power relations, differing political viewpoints and discursive strategies lead to multifaceted 
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ideas of ‘knowledge’ about the meaning of otherness. We can therefore extend Said’s 
conceptions of otherness by suggesting that it occurs within discourses that strategically 
position forms of knowledge about ‘others’ as part of specific power relations. This can be 
related to the argument that I have been pursuing through this thesis. Using this Foucauldian 
‘extension’ of otherness, we can suggest the specificities of cultural, political and social forces 
that have contributed to this understanding of otherness, as well as suggest the possibilities 
for sites of resistance to this understanding. In this way we can demonstrate that a discourse 
of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved according to the power relations between 
cultural actors like governmental authorities and the media. In the next chapter, I will utilise 
this extension of otherness to suggest the ways that representation of David Hicks by 
governmental authorities and the media continually changed according to the negotiations of 
both cultural actors.  
 
In suggesting the inspiration for his texts, Foucault once said: “the greatest problem of our 
time is the inability to think difference: we are afraid to conceive of the other in our own 
thoughts” (1996, xxiv). Indeed, politics of exclusion have been an enduring feature of post-
September 11 Australian national identity. Themes of otherness have been central in 
governmental discourse attempting to circumvent the rights of those deemed ‘enemies’ to 
the political cause of the Coalition of the Willing. This chapter has situated otherness as the 
epistemological framework within governmental discourse about sources of post-September 
11 insecurity. In representing terrorism as the major source of insecurity, governmental 
authorities have suggested the otherness of terrorist acts in opposition to discourses about 
unified Australian political or national structures. Within a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity, otherness can also re-present traditionally inclusive notions of citizenship to 
become exclusionary. Through this re-presentation, governments are enabled to police the 
continual adherence to a particular political and cultural ideology. As a result epistemological 
framework of otherness has assisted in creating the political conditions for the acceptance of 
governmental actions. 
 
In the next chapter, this theoretical discussion of otherness will be illustrated via a case study 
of representation of David Hicks as a terrorist other. The case study will illustrate the 
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processes of confirmation and contestation that have allowed the negotiations of the ‘truth’ 
of his representation as a ‘terrorist other’. This negotiation of the meaning of terrorism 
corresponds to the broader thesis argument by showing that representations of post-
September 11 insecurity have evolved according to the power relations between news 
reportage and governmental authorities. 
 
Endnotes: 
1. Foucault can be considered a major proponent of psychoanalytic theory. Work in 
psychoanalytic theory has been anything but unitary, and my step away from Spivak 
in this chapter simply refers to one of the differences between the two scholars’ use 
of psychoanalytic theory. Spivak is much more interested in the theoretical 
connections that can be made between psychoanalysis, feminist theory and Marxism. 
Therefore, Spivak criticises Foucault for emphasising the pervasiveness of power 
while ignoring discussion of how ideology produces power. She suggests that 
Foucault’s political effectiveness is depleted by ignoring “the question of ideology 
and the own implication in intellectual and economic history” (1988a: 272). In this 
way, Spivak identifies with Marxism, because: “the relationship between global 
capitalism and nation-state allegiances is so macrological that it cannot account for 
the micrological texture of power” (1988a: 279). Thus dispensing with Foucauldian 
conceptions of power, she suggests: 
 … one must move toward theories of ideology—of subject formations that 
micrologically and often erratically operate the interests that congeal the 
macrologies…My view is that radical practice should attend to this double-session of 
representation rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalising 
concepts of power (1988a: 279). 
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Chapter Six 
A case study: Representation of David Hicks as a terrorist other 
 
In defining the post-September 11 terrorist threat, Australian governmental discourse 
became particularly preoccupied with finding ways to identify potential terrorists before they 
‘strike’. This new threat was confirmed in late 2001 with reports of yet another danger to 
Australian security: the ‘home grown’ terrorist. The ‘home-grown’ terrorist was the ultimate 
affront to the Coalition of the Willing’s fight against terrorism. This is because they were 
generally born and had jobs, families and lives within the country that they would 
subsequently attack. When Australian David Hicks was captured in Afghanistan as an alleged 
terrorist, his representation by governmental authorities reflected incredulity that a citizen’s 
actions could be so contrary to Australia’s apparently united front against terror. He was 
immediately branded by both government officials and the media as a ‘rat in the ranks’: a 
traitor to Australia’s role in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ and the embodiment of Australia’s 
‘new’ insecurity about the threat in ‘our own backyards’. 
 
This chapter will utilise a case study of the representation of Australia terror suspect David 
Hicks to illustrate the epistemological framework of otherness discussed in the previous 
chapter. I will argue that governmental representation of Hicks as a ‘terrorist’ was subject to 
the discursive processes of confirmation and contestation within Australian newspaper 
reportage. Within this case study, I will illustrate that epistemological frameworks of 
otherness were continually evident in governmental discourse about Hicks and his alleged 
‘terrorist acts’. In representing David Hicks within a framework of otherness, governmental 
discourse portrayed a citizen whose ‘un-Australian’ actions were justification both for his 
incarceration and the lack of governmental assistance in ensuring his expedient trial or return 
to Australia.  
 
This chapter will proceed in sections separated by a chronological discussion of Hicks’ 
representation by media and government after his initial capture in Afghanistan, his transfer 
to Guantanamo Bay and finally, his trial by military commission. In the first section, the case 
study will discuss governmental representation of Hicks after his capture in Afghanistan 
within a framework of otherness. I will also argue that this ‘otherness’ was confirmed within 
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initial media representation of David Hicks’ capture and transfer to Guantanamo Bay. The 
media confirmed Hicks’ ‘otherness’ by representing his terrorist activities through the 
apparent subversion of his character and thus, the values and beliefs of ‘true’ Australians.  
 
Over time, information about the conditions at Guantanamo Bay and Hicks himself began 
to filter through media reportage, leading to overt contestation of governmental discourse. 
This will be discussed in the second section of the chapter, where I will utilise the 
Foucauldian perspective on otherness established in the previous chapter to show that 
within power relations between media and government, ambivalent and contradictory 
representations of meaning can have effects on discourse. These effects are discussed in the 
third section of this chapter, where the case study will show that overt media contestations 
created difficulties for governmental authorities to maintain frameworks of otherness for 
understanding Hicks’ acts. This will be discussed within the context of the broader thesis 
argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved according to power 
relations between the media and government authorities. The case study will illustrate the 
discursive strategies presented by both media and government in attempting to dominate the 
representation of Hicks in the public sphere. The competition between the two institutions 
provided the differing representations that contribute to changes in discourses about the 
sources of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
The Rat in the Ranks: initial representation of Hicks as other 
 
Utilising the definition of otherness described in the previous chapter, we will now explore 
how this epistemological framework provides understanding of terrorism within 
governmental discourse. In the previous chapter, Edward Said’s theorisation of Orientalism 
suggested that otherness situates the opposition—and thus the threat—that ‘others’ pose to 
discursive constructions of the nation. In this chapter, I wish to utilise the case study to 
illustrate how this framework of meaning has also manifested in governmental discourse as 
an understanding of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. This refers to the potential of terrorist attacks 
in Australia perpetrated by citizens who no longer identify with Australian values. Where the 
US had captured American John Walker Lindh as a terrorist in Afghanistan and the London 
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bombings were perpetrated by British citizens, the Australian ‘home-grown’ terrorist was 
embodied by the South Australian, David Hicks.  
 
Though hundreds of newspaper articles have been written about David Hicks purporting to 
know the ‘truth’ behind his ‘unAustralian’ decision to join the Taliban, much information 
about his life or actions cannot be verified. In the absence of Hicks’ actual voice, accounts of 
his life and actions in the media have come from his family and friends, his lawyers, and the 
Australian and United States governments. Due to the multitude of voices claiming to know 
the ‘real’ Hicks, he has been represented variously as an illiterate Australian Army reject and 
a drug-addicted Satanist, as well as a sensitive poet and loving father who travelled to 
Kosovo and Afghanistan to help his ‘Muslim brothers’. It is difficult to find a middle ground 
between the varying representations of David Hicks. Hicks himself wrote from Guantanamo 
Bay to express his bemusement at his representation as “ten Rambos fitted [sic] into one 
person” (The President, 2004).   
 
In this respect, Hicks’ varying representation in the public sphere can be seen to be the result 
of the language wars that occur between different cultural actors trying to claim hegemony 
over meaning. In particular, governmental discourse and media reportage both attempted to 
maintain a dominant understanding of Hicks, whether as a perpetrator or victim of post-
September 11 insecurity. Though governmental discourse attempted to represent Hicks 
within frameworks of otherness, this representation was subject to the discursive processes 
of confirmation and contestation forwarded by newspaper reportage. Indeed, the news 
media was profoundly implicated in representing Hicks, to the extent that subsequent 
governmental discourse often took its cue from the suggestion of ‘public’ attitude presented 
in mainstream newspapers. This chapter will show through an illustration of the changing 
representation of David Hicks as a ‘terrorist other’, how the meaning of terrorism was also 
able to evolve within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
On December 14, 2001, Attorney General Daryl Williams and Defence Minister Robert Hill 
released a joint press statement about the capture of Australian citizen David Hicks in 
Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, and his subsequent handover to US custody [1]. 
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Other than general advice concerning Hicks’ safety, the statements revealed nothing of the 
circumstances surrounding Hicks’ arrest (Australian National, 2001). Governmental 
reticence with information or official response in the days after Hicks’ capture was justified 
in statements suggesting that “the capture of Mr Hicks raises a range of legal questions 
relating, among other things, to possible offences against Australian law” (Australian 
National, 2001). The Federal government needed to seek legal advice about how to respond 
to the situation, exercise diplomatic relations with the US and finally, communicate their 
united stance on the issue. This stance would exist within discourses presented to maintain 
hegemony over the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. A hint of future governmental 
attitude towards Hicks is shown in the initial press statements that contextualise the events 
by suggesting that, “If Mr Hicks has committed a crime against Australian law, the 
Australian government will do whatever is necessary to bring him to justice” (Australian 
National, 2001). The repetition of this sentence in another media statement released on 
December 17 (David Hicks transferred, 2001) is somewhat suggestive of the course that 
governmental discourse on David Hicks would take. This is because the idea of “bringing 
him to justice” suggests a somewhat emotive appeal often applied to fugitives of the law.  
 
This stance was also reflected in initial media reportage on the event, as newspapers were 
largely dependent on information from the government. Hicks’ capture was therefore 
reported according to the assumption that he was fighting against Coalition (and thus 
Australian) troops. Where governmental discourse took a legalistic focus, newspaper 
reportage was much more judgemental and sensationalist in representing Hicks’ capture. The 
overwhelmingly negative media reportage on Hicks suggests that it was not governmental 
discourse that led the initial negative representations of Hicks, but sensationalist mainstream 
media. This representation was clearly shaped by the epistemological frameworks of 
otherness in governmental discourse that previously defined the terrorist threat to Australia. 
As I have suggested previously, the symbolic ‘weight’ of terrorism became a very powerful 
referent used to justify subsequent governmental actions. Media reportage had now 
confirmed governmental frameworks of otherness by representing Hicks as a subversive 
character whose conversion to Islam and terrorist training was part of his abandonment of 
Australian ideals.  
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Most Australian newspapers utilised a negative editorial tone in their reportage on David 
Hicks’ capture.  Reportage was generally much more sensationalist in tabloid newspapers 
such as the Victorian newspaper, the Herald Sun. While Hicks was not formally charged with 
an offence until three years after his arrest, the prefix ‘alleged’ or ‘accused’ was not used in 
Herald Sun articles [2]. Instead, repetition of the term ‘traitor’ seemed to admonish a person 
the newspaper had already deemed guilty of crimes of ‘terrorism’ [3]. This representation of 
Hicks’ character was structured within the Herald Sun to support an editorial decision made 
to present Hicks as a ‘traitor’. This decision was likely made in consideration of a number of 
factors, including the economic value that audience interest in an Australian ‘terrorist’ would 
produce. But more broadly, the newspaper was working within processes of confirming 
governmental discourses about terrorism as a source of insecurity. This is because the initial 
representation of Hicks’ capture was dominated by epistemological frameworks of otherness 
suggested by governmental authorities—the only source of information about Hicks at the 
time. 
 
The Herald Sun’s reportage on Hicks’ capture began on December 13, 2001 with the 
headline, “Traitor” (Traitor, 2001:1). The headline aimed to dominate the reader’s eye by 
taking up more than one-fifth of the total page space. Above the headline, the newspaper 
signalled the theme of its reportage with the words, “Rat in the Ranks” (Traitor, 2001:1). The 
phrase “Rat in the Ranks” was placed in the masthead of the next five pages of the Herald 
Sun’s reportage on Hicks’ capture and continued over the next two days of reportage 
(Traitor, 2001:1-7). Two-page running headlines were placed underneath this ‘theme’, such 
as “Aussie who turned to terror” (Dunn, 2001c: 2-3) and “Dad…I fight for the Taliban” 
(Dunn, 2001b: 4-5). In an article again entitled “Traitor”, journalist Mark Dunn (2001a:1) 
confirmed that Hicks was a “terrorist fighter”. Another article in the same edition entitled 
“Traitor faces death” claimed that Hicks was a “captured terrorist”. The next day, in the 
article, “Rebel trained for jihad” it was claimed that Hicks “chose to betray his country [and] 
train with terrorist group al Qaeda and fight for the Taliban” (Dunn, 2001e: 6).  These 
journalistic claims of betrayal situate the representation of Hicks within epistemological 
frameworks of otherness. By defining him according to his betrayal of Australians, Hicks is 
seen within media discourse as the opposite of an ideal Australian. Therefore Hicks’ 
representation as other becomes emblematic of the global, ubiquitous threat of terrorism. 
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His allegedly subversive character confirms previous media and governmental 
representations of the threat in ‘our own backyard’ as part of discourses about post-
September 11 insecurity.  
 
Hicks’ subversive character is continuously perpetuated through media representations that 
confirm his ‘otherness’ in comparison to ‘true’ Australians.  As I have discussed in the 
previous chapter, otherness is asserted primarily through the discourse of Western 
institutions that present stereotypes about the Orient as expert ‘knowledge’. This knowledge 
serves to underline that the other is not just different, but odd, primitive and incompatible 
with the superiority of the West. As Said (1995: 40) suggested, the ‘other’ is depicted as 
“something one judges, something one studies and depicts, something one disciplines, 
something one illustrates”. Similarly, the apparent subversion of Hicks’ character that led to 
his conversion to Islamic fundamentalism, and subsequently to terrorism, was an important 
component of mainstream newspaper reportage’s attempt to provide ‘information’ about 
Hicks. Thus Hicks’ rebellious teenage years were utilised by Herald Sun journalists trying to 
explain his deviant interest in Islam and war.  For example, the newspaper reported that in 
his late teens Hicks took up martial arts with a friend (Tormented child, 2002:4). The reader 
is left to come to their own conclusion after a quote from his teacher suggested an 
undisciplined Hicks left Tae Kwon Do school after eight months, “before learning the 
importance of loyalty to country, family and religion” (Tormented child, 2002:4). 
 
This evidence of character weakness is also built through ‘expert’ opinion of Hicks’ 
inevitable slide towards fundamentalism. Belinda Heggen reported on “A Boy’s dark side”, 
where a 15-year old Hicks is described as a “freak with a passion for drugs and Satanism” 
(2001:2). Heggen’s report is based on an interview with a classmate from Hicks’ high school, 
who said that he knew Hicks ten years ago, but was “never really close” to Hicks, nor did he 
see him “outside of school” (Heggen, 2001:2). The classmate suggested that while in high 
school Hicks drank, smoked cannabis and scratched “satanic symbols” into his arm with a 
compass. The ‘friend’ did not specify how many times he saw Hicks engage in those 
activities. Heggen’s report is nonetheless legitimised by “psychological experts”, who have 
never met Hicks, but:  
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… paint a chilling portrait of Hicks as a lonely young man seduced by religious 
fanaticism. They said fundamentalist militants had lured an alienated man into 
Osama bin Laden’s terror network (Heggen, 2001: 2).  
 
These representations of Hicks’ character, coupled with the assumption of his terrorist 
activities against Australian political and military interests in the ‘war on terror’ lend 
themselves to an understanding of Hicks as a traitor to Australian values. As a binary 
opposition, this framework of otherness assists in this situation of meaning because it 
perpetuates this understanding as ‘common sense’. 
 
These frameworks of otherness subsequently justified the Herald Sun’s assertion that 
“Australians have no doubt that, on the facts revealed so far, Adelaide man David Hicks has 
betrayed his country” (Editorial, 2001:20). This sentiment was supported by a letter to the 
editor the next day which urged the Herald Sun to “stop calling this Hicks fellow an 
Aussie…this man has renounced his Australian citizenship by taking up an alien cause” 
(McWhirter, 2001:28). The writer suggests that a true ‘Aussie’ can be described as people 
like: “the players we support at the Davis cup” or “the Digger who fought to keep this 
country free” (2001:28). Thus, before he had been formally charged with a crime, the Herald 
Sun published several articles that called for Hicks to be given the death penalty on charges 
of either terrorism or treason. Reporting that “Death penalty calls came from around 
Melbourne” (Frenkel et al, 2001:7), a prominent Victorian, David Galbally QC, was quoted 
as saying: “I think that in the situation now, what we have is a group that have virtually 
declared war against western civilisation…I think that you need to have the death penalty as 
the ultimate penalty” (Frenkel, 2001:7). On the same day, a somewhat macabre survey was 
published as a ‘treason debate’ asking whether “Taliban fighter David Hicks should be put to 
death?” (Should Taliban, 2001:15). Of more than 2272 calls received, almost 2000 
respondents said “yes” (Should Taliban, 2001:15).  
 
What these examples suggest is the symbolic ‘weight’ that epistemological frameworks of 
otherness transpose to the representation of terrorism as a source of insecurity. Because 
epistemological frameworks refer meaning to discursive constructions of the unified beliefs 
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of nation, otherness situates the threat of the terrorist through powerful appeals about the 
continuance of these defining beliefs. According to these frameworks of meaning, if an 
Australian citizen betrays the nation through terrorist-related activities or sympathies, they 
have betrayed a discursive construction that serves to establish an ideal of national unity. 
Both governmental and media authority is structured along their hegemonic role in the 
protection and maintenance of this ideal. Therefore, the situation of Hicks as ‘other’ in 
media reportage was subsequently also utilised as the justification for the particular 
governmental actions taken in response to Hicks’ incarceration at Guantanamo Bay.   
 
As I have previously suggested, in the post-September 11 age, terrorism fears have allowed 
ideas of citizenship to be held as more ‘contingent’ on the faithful adherence to particular 
social and cultural duties that suggest their ‘true’ Australianness. Within this discourse, 
governmental authorities suggested that citizenship is contingent on ‘true’ Australian 
behaviour and thus, are able to revoke citizenship rights at politically opportune moments. 
In an age of post-September 11 insecurity, even if a citizen is merely associated with a charge 
of terrorism, the symbolic strength of this association is enough to repudiate any notions of 
citizen’s rights or sympathies. I would now like to shift the discussion to illustrate the ways 
in which governmental authorities represented Hicks’ transfer to Guantanamo bay. In the 
next section I will discuss the frameworks of otherness that governmental authorities utilised 
to suggest that Hicks’ imprisonment was appropriate to his ‘unAustralian’ actions. This will 
be compared with an increasingly ambivalent media response to his incarceration, which was 
affected by new information about Guantanamo Bay and new descriptions of Hicks in the 
public sphere. 
 
Hicks, Guantanamo Bay and ambiguities in themes of otherness 
 
The previous section illustrated that epistemological framework of otherness situated 
representation of David Hicks as a terrorist threat. It was this representation of Hicks that 
justified his imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay. In January 2002, David Hicks became 
detainee 002 at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Guantanamo Bay is America’s oldest 
naval station outside the US, occupying 45 square miles of land on the southeast coast of 
Cuba [4] (Murphy, 1953). After September 11, Guantanamo Bay was chosen as the site for 
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detention of people caught fighting against Coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. ‘Camp 
X-Ray’ was created as a temporary detention facility, initially used to house ‘unlawful 
combatants’, so called because of US refusal to grant the detainees Prisoner of War (PoW) 
status according to Geneva Conventions (Guantanamo Bay, 2005) [5]. An unlawful 
combatant was defined by the US as a fighter who does not utilise the accepted rules of war, 
and therefore does not qualify for the Convention’s protections. The US government had 
legislated against providing PoW status to Guantanamo detainees because they wanted them 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal rather than a civilian court (Eastman, 
2001; Greene, 2006). As of June, 2007, approximately 385 detainees remained at 
Guantanamo Bay (Alcorn, 2002:11). [6].  
 
The overwhelming negativity of Australian media coverage about David Hicks after his 
capture made it easier for governmental discourse to frame its public response to the 
situation in a judgemental way. The repeated ‘reminder’ of Hicks’ link with terrorist groups 
was utilised by governmental authorities to do three things: firstly, imply Hicks’ guilt of 
terrorism, secondly, suggest that US measures to seek justice were justified, and lastly, argue 
that in abrogating his duties as an Australian citizen, Hicks could no longer be assured of 
governmental assistance or sympathy to his plight. For example, when Attorney General 
Daryl Williams first commented publicly about Hicks’ transfer to Guantanamo Bay, he 
‘reminded’ the media that Hicks was a potential terrorist: “it needs to be remembered that he 
was captured with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He has had significant training with al Qaeda” 
(Williams, 2002). Two days later, in justifying the transfer to Guantanamo Bay the Attorney 
General again preceded media questions with the reminder: 
 
It needs to be borne in mind that the people in question were either members of the 
Taliban or associated with al Qaeda and had, as in the case of David Hicks extensive 
training. Now, that makes them potentially quite dangerous terrorists. That requires 
therefore that there be strict security arrangements (Williams, 2002a).  
 
This association with terrorism served to justify the government’s lack of assistance to an 
Australian citizen. This is because terrorism, as the crime of an individual ‘other’, is afforded 
an individualistic justice according to how strong governmental authorities believe their link 
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to terrorism is. For example, when Radio 3AW presenter Neil Mitchell asked whether Hicks 
was receiving his “proper civil rights”, Prime Minister John Howard also suggested that 
Hicks’ association with terrorists and his personal opinion of Hicks were proof enough of 
his guilt: “He knowingly joined the Taliban and al Qaeda. I don’t have any sympathy for any 
Australian who’s done that” (Howard, 2002). 
 
Given that the Federal government’s legal advice had suggested that it was impossible to 
charge Hicks with a crime in Australia (which was untenable to their diplomatic 
responsibility to the US) and that the mainstream media had presented the ‘character’ of 
David Hicks in such a negative fashion, governmental discourse was marked by apathy 
towards his incarceration. In much public communication about David Hicks, governmental 
response repeatedly suggested that responsibility for Hicks was now a “matter for the 
Americans” (Coorey et al, 2004: 12).  In terms of governmental response, it seemed that the 
official position was that as a confirmed terrorist ‘other’, Hicks was on his own. 
Measurement of initial attitudes on talkback radio towards Hicks seemed to reflect this 
indifference: while another Australian imprisoned overseas, Schapelle Corby, prompted 1294 
callers, Hicks barely provoked 100 calls (Kissane, 2005).   
 
Nonetheless, this governmental apathy towards Hick was not shared by everyone.  This 
section will illustrate that by the time Hicks was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, increased 
public outcry from other cultural actors created more space for debate about Hicks’ 
treatment in the media. As I have suggested previously, the presentation of differing 
representations of ‘meaning’ has effects on the maintenance of particular discourses. The 
number of people and organisations contributing alternate representations of the treatment 
of ‘terrorist others’ at Guantanamo Bay also began to have a negotiating influence on the 
dominance of governmental discourse about David Hicks. 
  
For example, allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay in a confidential International 
Committee of the Red Cross report were discussed internationally after the Wall Street Journal 
reported that interrogators at the prison used psychological and physical techniques on 
detainees that were “tantamount to torture” (in Banham et al, 2004:9). Similar public 
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discussion about the legality of detaining Hicks without charge became especially frequent 
after the arrest and subsequent release of another Australian, Mamdouh Habib. Habib’s 
arrest in Pakistan and imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay allowed for a more in-depth 
examination of the legality of interrogation and detainment methods utilised within a ‘war on 
terror’. When Mamdouh Habib was released from Guantanamo without charge, he claimed 
that he had been tortured in Egypt as part of US interrogation programs of ‘rendition’ [7]. In 
the aftermath of Habib’s release, media outlets publicly questioned the severity of Hicks’ 
alleged crimes in comparison to its alleged punishment (Hovell, 2004). Despite these 
questions, governmental response to Habib was similar to Hicks in its apathy. Prime 
Minister John Howard refused to apologise to Habib for his treatment by both United States 
and Australian authorities. Instead Howard suggested that he would continue to be a person 
of interest to ASIO. This statement continued to imply that Australians should still be 
suspicious of Habib despite his freedom.   
 
If Hicks and Habib demonstrate a key development in discourses of post-September 11 
insecurity, it is to suggest that a government can set the limitations and protections of 
citizenship according to their evaluation of an individual’s adherence to Australian values. 
Kampmark (2003) argues that this response is couched within issues of Australian 
citizenship: “Habib is faced with the problem of being a Muslim in a conflict purportedly 
arraigned against Muslim fundamentalism”, where Hicks is still “privileged in its white-
centric favouritism of rights”. Nonetheless, the argument about discourses of citizenship in 
an age of insecurity appears to be more complex than issues of racial or cultural 
discrimination. Habib was subsequently freed by the US, while Hicks remained in detention 
despite continued debate about the legitimacy of his imprisonment. It could indeed be 
argued that the fact of Hicks’ nationality was actually an important part of his imprisonment. 
The first military trial involving a fair, blue-eyed Australian would be the perfect illustration 
of the US government’s argument that the ‘war on terror’ is not an attack on the Middle 
East, its people or culture. The governmental discourse of post-September 11 insecurity 
requires a terrorist ‘other’ to be ubiquitous and capable of defying traditional understandings 
of what a terrorist might be. This representation of Hicks as a white, Australian terrorist 
certainly illustrates governmental representation of terrorism as a ‘new threat’ requiring ‘new 
responses’.  
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While governmental response was in part assisted by negative media representation of Hicks, 
utilisation of otherness also served to stem growing questions in the media about the legality 
of Hicks’ imprisonment. These new questions were prompted by the increasing availability 
of information from sources other than government. Mainstream newspapers began 
especially to turn their attention to David Hicks’ father, Terry. Terry Hicks proved to be a 
media-friendly spokesperson for his son, given his predisposition to quotable comments, his 
characterisation as the ‘average Aussie bloke’ and his willingness to engage in media events 
and publicity. Terry Hicks publicly denounced the Australian governmental response his son 
and took very public steps to highlight his criticisms. He flew to Guantanamo Bay to visit his 
son several times. He also took part in a filmed documentary (The President vs David Hicks, 
2004) where he travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to re-trace his son’s actions. He even 
staged a mock imprisonment on Broadway in New York to draw attention to the treatment 
of detainees at Guantanamo. Coverage of Terry Hicks’ protest in New York, where he 
donned an orange boiler suit and stood in a cage equivalent to that in which his son was 
being held, was reported across all of the major papers in Melbourne and within the 
international press. Whereas David Hicks could not speak for himself to counter his label as 
a ‘traitor’, his father Terry had a wide public appeal. This seemingly assisted in his fight to 
contradict governmental discourse by portraying his son as an average Australian who 
“hasn’t broken any laws” (in Overington, 2003).  
 
Apart from Terry Hicks’ important media role, David Hicks’ US-appointed lawyer Major 
Michael Mori also dominated Australian newspapers in representing Hicks. As a serving 
military officer, Mori had to be granted approval from his superiors before he spoke publicly 
(Playing defence, 2004). Nonetheless, Mori was tirelessly outspoken in his criticism of the 
US government. His persona seemingly appealed to the Australian media as someone 
inherently quote-worthy with an ‘inside’ on the US government. For example, The Age 
published a feature on the “strapping, clean-cut American Marine Corps Officer”, suggesting 
that: 
 
Mori comes across as a down home boy one minute, and a combative, articulate, 
defence council the next…beneath his disarming “aw-shucks” charm, Mori exudes 
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the confidence of a man who knows how to work the system (Playing defence, 
2004).  
 
Aware that there was little public sympathy for Hicks, Mori and his defence team attempted 
to refocus the media-image of Hicks as a terrorist ‘other’ (Playing defence, 2004). Mori 
counter-argued that Hicks went to Afghanistan to educate himself and support the legal 
Afghan government against an insurgency from the Northern Alliance before the September 
11 attacks. According to Mori, Hicks was caught on the wrong side of history (Playing 
defence, 2004):  
 
He is not a terrorist evil guy. He’s a five foot three inch Aussie who seemed to me 
like every other Aussie I have ever met and not a danger to anybody. He misses his 
family. He misses his kids. He misses Australia (Shiel, 2004:12). 
 
In a counter-discursive strategy to governmental representation of Hicks as a traitor to 
Australia, Mori has continually played on notions of citizenship to humanise Hicks and re-
affirm his identity as an ‘Aussie’.  
 
The increasing appearance of both Terry Hicks and Michael Mori certainly had a ‘softening’ 
effect on newspaper tone in reportage of Hicks. This also resulted in increasingly ambivalent 
representations of Hicks in the media. For example, the use of the headline “Push to get 
Hicks uncaged” in The Age (McGarry, 2002:7) and the broadsheet’s coverage of Hicks’ 
transfer to Guanatanamo seemed especially focussed on the legal and ethical ramifications of 
an impending military trial. Furthermore, the editorial published after his transfer seemed to 
share international concern about the legal precedents being set by Guantanamo Bay: 
 
For the US to waver from civilised standards of justice and the treatment of 
prisoners would set a poor example to the countries it is trying to win to the side of 
democracy and the rule of law (The US should, 2002:10).  
 
This change in tone was counter-balanced the next week with a front page article headlined: 
“He’s a cocky guy and he talks about killing Americans”. The headline was sourced from an 
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interview with a security officer at Camp X-Ray, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernie Liswell, who 
described Hicks as a “hothead” (Alcorn, 2002:1). In the report, Hicks is described as an 
infamous “minor celebrity” in the US because “he was the one who threatened death to 
Americans soon after he arrived from Kandahar” (Alcorn, 2002:1).  
 
These changes in media responses to Hicks’ incarceration present an illustration of criticism 
of the ‘singularity’ of Said’s conceptualisation of Orientalism. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Orientalism is used as the framework for describing the themes of otherness that 
manifested within the representation of David Hicks by governmental authorities and initial 
media reportage. So far, the representation of David Hicks has illustrated Said’s argument 
that ‘otherness’ attempts to legitimate governmental power by suggesting threats against 
homogenised ideas of national identity. The previous chapter introduced a critical approach 
to Said’s use of otherness. We have already seen how criticism sourced from theorists such 
as Terry Eagleton and Mark Poster show that Said’s analysis ignores possible sites of 
resistance to Orientalist thought. Therefore this chapter will now turn to utilisation of a 
Foucauldian perspective, reconceptualising otherness to account for the precarious nature of 
power relations that determine meaning. As discussed previously, Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality suggested “a multiplicity of discursive elements [can] come into play in 
various strategies” of maintaining hegemonic meaning (Foucault, 1981: 100). 
Governmentality also illustrates that power is not embedded in the social structures that 
employ processes of governmentality. Instead power is a process; a matter of exchange that 
is open to challenge and mutability.  
 
These notions of governmentality were illustrated in news reports concerning the legality of 
the detainees’ ‘unlawful combatant’ status. The new information created complexity within 
traditionally simplistic representations of the detainee’s otherness. Even within the same 
institutions, the approaches to understanding the terrorist other were contradictory. For 
example, in the Herald Sun, a journalist who toured the facility describes the detainees 
simultaneously as victims and deserving of their incarceration. The report, headlined 
“Fanatical even behind barbed wire” (Johnston, 2002:8) is emotive in its description of 
prisoners that she would only have been able to see from over 180 metres away (the distance 
from detainees allowed by the US military). The journalist nonetheless describes a prisoner: 
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His Arabic face, covered with a thickening dark beard, is blank. His eyes, narrowed 
to slits, are dead…Watching the captured Islamic fanatic from just a few metres away 
it looks as though his spirit has been crushed by Camp X-Ray (Johnston, 2002:8).  
 
The journalist’s discursive swap between Orientalist imagery and criticism is another 
example of the complexity of power relations that define knowledge within certain 
discourse. As Foucault suggests, it is quite possible for the objects of discourse to be 
contradictory (Foucault, 1970: 28). Thus, the journalist reports that in Camp X-Ray “morale 
among the detainees was as high as it has ever been” (Johnston, 2002:8). Any sense of the 
brutality that had been previously suggested at the facility is omitted in favour of the US 
military’s suggestion that “in recognition of the Haj [sic], a holy day of the Muslim calendar, 
they [the detainees] enjoyed a breakfast of dates, sweets and tea” (Johnston, 2002:8). The 
journalist writes that it is the detainees that are not grateful for their “culturally appropriate 
meal”. Instead the report suggests that the detainees were “ignoring the call to prayer, part of 
a growing campaign by detainees to irritate their guards by refusing to comply with camp 
routines” (Johnston, 2002:8). In this report the detainees seem both broken by Guantanamo 
Bay but also responsible for their negative experiences through their ‘otherness’.  
 
It seems that the multitude of previous representations of Guantanamo Bay, as well as the 
journalist’s use of the US military public relations viewpoint, and her own observation of the 
facility, with all the subjectivity and imagination this allows, created a multifaceted 
representation of Guantanamo Bay. It is these changes in media representation of 
Guantanamo Bay that also had effects on the representation of Hicks according to 
frameworks of otherness. These changes in representation led to media contestations of 
governmental representation of Hicks as a terrorist other. This should be seen in a broader 
context of power relations where media and government battle for dominance over the 
meaning of the sources of, and responses to post-September 11 insecurity. As this thesis 
argues, these power relations contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. To illustrate these discursive processes, I will now turn to 
discussion of Hicks’ trial by military commission. This section will illustrate that media 
contestation created problems for governmental authorities’ management of their 
representation of Hicks as a terrorist other.  
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Hicks’ referral to Military Commission trial 
 
The ambivalence in media reportage suggested in the previous section began to translate into 
discursive processes of contestation in 2002, when it was announced that Hicks was eligible 
for a military commission trial. That Hicks, who had not yet been charged with a crime, 
could be found eligible for a trial was an interesting progression within governmental 
administration in an era of post-September 11 insecurity. As discussed in chapter four, in 
communicating ‘new responses to new threats’, simply the threat of terror could be an 
indictable crime. This governmental discourse constructs its language to involve a set of 
procedures that both legitimate and exclude. That is, representation of ‘terrorists’ within 
frameworks of otherness justified trials being conducted without conforming to the usual 
civil or national protections. A terrorist had eschewed the traditional notions of nation and 
citizenship and therefore appropriate justice did not include those protections. This new 
meaning of justice is imposed within the specific context of September 11 insecurity to 
legitimate these paradigms for governmental action.   
 
This development is seen particularly in the US implementation of the military commission 
trials. The US government had already determined that enemies caught on the battlefield 
would not be classified as prisoners of war, but rather, ‘unlawful combatants’ [8]. Given that 
Prisoner of War status affords certain legal rights at trial, including the right of appeal, 
evidentiary rights and specifications for interrogation or questioning from a detaining party, 
the decision to quell those rights sparked worldwide controversy. The US administration 
responded to this criticism by suggesting the significant danger that the detainees posed. 
George W Bush described the detainees at Guantanamo Bay as “killers, [who] don’t share 
the same values as we share” (Bush, 2002). His Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld also 
described the detainees as “hard core, well trained terrorists,” who were “among the most 
dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the face of the Earth” (Astill, 2004). Given that 
these were the men who would ultimately decide whether Hicks would be found guilty of 
terrorism in a military commission process, paradoxical descriptions of these “free and fair” 
trials would also take on an obvious undertone of bringing justice to those already believed 
to be guilty [9].  
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The initial military commission trial procedures required the presumption of innocence and 
requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This was qualified by allowing 
evidence to “take into account the unique battlefield environment” (Department of Defense, 
2004). This provision allowed hearsay and evidence gathered from interrogation of other 
detainees, even those who could no longer be called to be cross-examined. Evidence from 
witnesses could also be used even if they refused to be sworn in or affirm their testimony. 
There was no voir dire (preliminary examination of bias in jurors or witnesses) into the 
voluntariness of any testimony or alleged confessions. The Australian government seemed 
satisfied with the conditions of the trial, discussing “possible solutions to Hicks’ case and, in 
particular, how procedures for Mr Hicks’ possible trial would practically be implemented” 
(Delegation to visit, 2005) [10]. The US promised that the death penalty would not be sought 
in Hicks’ case and if he was convicted, Hicks could serve any penal sentence imposed in 
Australia (Delegation concludes, 2003) [11].  
 
Having finalised how he would be brought to trial, the United States formally charged David 
Hicks three years after his capture with conspiracy to commit war crimes, attempted murder 
by unprivileged belligerent, and aiding the enemy (Labor dismissed charges, 2004) [12]. The 
US military did not charge that Hicks killed or specifically harmed anyone but that he aided 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban “as a perpetrator, co-conspirator, member of an enterprise of 
persons who shared a common criminal purpose, an aider or abettor, or some combination 
thereof, attempted to murder…while he did not enjoy combatant immunity” (Department 
of Defence, 2005).  
 
The charges against Hicks and his referral to military commission trial created a storm of 
response in the media, especially after reports from international rights groups questioned 
the legality of the commission process. In Australia, The Law Council commissioned Lex 
Lasry QC to report on the legal and ethical implications of the Military commission process. 
His first report was published from his observation of Hicks’ directions hearing before the 
military commission in 2004. Central to the report was Lasry’s conclusion that, “as a 
fundamental principle of criminal justice… [the]...proceedings are, and will be, flawed and 
that a fair trial of David Hicks in the military commission is virtually impossible” (Lasry, 
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2004:4). Lasry’s fundamental dispute was that the trial was a partial process and the rules of 
evidence could at best be seen as ‘abstract’: “the US military is captor, jailer, prosecutor, 
defender, judge of fact, judge of law and sentencer with no appeal to an impartial and 
independent judicial body” (Lasry, 2004:26) [13]. 
 
In responding to the report, it seemed that for the first time since Hicks’ arrest, Australian 
governmental discourse needed to respond to public criticism from social groups and from 
within the media itself. In contextualising the government’s support for the trials, Downer 
suggested that the “technical issues” of a fair military trial paled in comparison to the alleged 
actions of Hicks as a terrorist other: 
 
Whilst on the one hand people will no doubt take the view that the military 
commission process should be fair, on the other hand you have to ask yourself what 
these people were doing in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time they were 
picked up (Forbes, 2004:2).  
 
Downer’s comments suggest the governmental reliance on the association of the symbolism 
of terrorism with Hicks’ guilt. It implies that association with ‘terror’ can systematically 
justify and excuse political appropriation of civilian rights. This is important because it 
illustrates how governmental discourse has attempted to define sources of insecurity in ways 
that have subsequently been utilised to legitimate their actions. Within power relations 
between the media and government, the institution that dominates the definition of meaning 
as ‘truth’ increases their cultural power in the public sphere. Discursive strategies like 
Downer’s use of otherness attempt to maintain a dominant representation of Hicks to justify 
their actions against criticism from the discourses of competing cultural actors.  
 
The continual reminder of Hicks’ otherness did not have the same impact in the mainstream 
media at this stage of his incarceration. The sensationalism of early media response had since 
been re-focussed onto the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Downer’s 
continuation of governmental discursive themes of ‘otherness’ mis-read shifting media 
attitudes. As discussed in chapter four, institutions like government are often stifled by their 
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need to continually represent a ‘unified’ and unchangeable discourse. Governmental 
authorities continued their discourse about sources of post-September 11 insecurity, often to 
their detriment in the mainstream media. It was not obviously in the best interest of 
newspapers’ popularity to confirm governmental discourse in the context of increasing 
criticism of Guantanamo and the military commissions. Instead governmental discourse was 
increasingly contested in mainstream newspapers. This contestation also assisted in 
maintaining the media’s cultural power as the ‘Fourth Estate’ and a protector of the public 
interest. For example, The Australian newspaper lodged a Freedom of Information request to 
obtain correspondence between Washington and Canberra about Hicks’ case. This suggested 
that the newspaper was utilising its Fourth Estate powers to signal its contestation of 
governmental response to Hicks (Kerin et al, 2003:2) [14]. 
 
Within this new atmosphere of aggressive reportage the media once again took control of 
Hicks’ representation, this time by contesting governmental discourse. A particular method 
of securing media focus on the legality of Guantanamo Bay detention and military trial was 
to condense the discursive space given to governmental communication in the media. 
Instead, reportage was dedicated to finding legal experts to either suggest that Hicks could 
be charged in Australia, or that the military trials were unfair. For example, The Age quoted 
Tim McCormack, a professor of international humanitarian law, who suggested that Hicks 
should be brought back and charged in Australia according to Geneva Convention laws 
under the Crime Act (Grattan, 2005:2). Cherif Bassiouni, who investigated human rights 
abuses in Afghanistan, Antonio Cassese, chairman of the UN’s inquiry into genocide in 
Sudan, and Michael Schmitt, a retired US Air Force judge were also quoted as suggesting 
that the charges against Hicks do not exist in international criminal law (David Hicks has a 
right, 2005). In Australia, Professor George Williams, a “leading” constitutional lawyer and 
Devika Hovell, a lawyer and associate for a High Court Judge were quoted as saying that 
Hicks could be charged under the Australian Crimes Act (Grattan, 2005:2).  
 
Similarly, the Herald Sun went so far as to report Australian entrepreneur Dick Smith’s charge 
that Hicks had been set up (Hicks set up, 2005:17) Indeed, the Herald Sun seemed to alter its 
tone of reportage remarkably with headlines like: “Suspect doing time hard” (2003), “Hicks 
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given no support” (2005: 13) and “Hicks detention illegal” (Dunn, 2005: 30) a lot more 
sympathetic towards Hicks than during his initial arrest. Thus, media reportage 
demonstrated a profound change in tone and style of reportage from the time Hicks was 
arrested until he was brought to trial. The important conclusion to draw from this is that the 
media’s power relations with governmental discourse have ramifications for the 
representation of meaning in the public sphere. In the next section I will illustrate these 
changes in Hicks’ representation. I will illustrate how media contestation attempted to 
change Hicks’ representation from Australia’s ‘rat in the ranks’ to a kind of iconic figure for 
the various injustices perpetrated in the name of post-September 11 insecurity. We can refer 
to this change as a reflection of the broader thesis argument because it illustrates that power 
relations between the media and government have contributed to evolutions in discourses of 
post-September 11 insecurity. This is because changes in understanding of Hicks as a 
‘terrorist other’ have consequences for how broader representations of terrorism within a 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity are understood. The next section will show the 
effects that a more blatant media contestation of Hicks’ representation as a terrorist other 
had on governmental discourse, and subsequently their actions. 
 
The final military commission and Hicks’ release 
 
This section will turn the discussion to how power relations between media and government 
affected the representation of Hicks as a terrorist other during his final trial and release from 
Guantanamo Bay. The last two years of Hicks’ detention at Guantanamo were dominated by 
contending legal claims and confusion over rights and responsibilities. In 2005, it seemed 
that the entire military commission process itself had been thrown into disarray by 
contending law suits and international condemnation. Despite attempts by the US 
government to rush through the military commission processes, several detainees 
successfully thwarted trials with appeals to prove the commission’s legality. [15]. On June 29, 
2006, the US Supreme Court ruled that the military commissions were not authorised by 
congress and were against the US Constitution. This meant that the military commission was 
dismantled and any impending hearings were quashed. This also meant that the charges 
against Hicks were voided and he was once again being held at Guantanamo Bay without 
charge [16].  
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Despite the myriad of trials and heated debate regarding the legality of the military 
commissions, the US Senate voted to allow re-worked Military Commission legislation in 
September 2006. The new bill did not differ much as it continued to allow evidence taken by 
questionable interrogation methods to be used in the trials. The bill states that the US will 
adhere to the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of ‘enemy combatants’ and it set some 
limits to techniques used by CIA interrogators. Nonetheless, the bill still allowed the 
President to vary those limits if he believes it necessary to protect Americans from terrorism. 
In a major victory for the Bush administration, detainees were actually stripped of their right 
to appeal against their detention in US courts under the new military commission laws [17] 
(Bush set for, 2006).  Passage of the bill followed more than three months of debate which 
included angry rebukes by the Democrats, a rebellion by a group of Republican Senators and 
a threat by President Bush to use his veto powers to push the legislation through (Hicks like 
a monkey, 2007). Nonetheless, congress eventually approved the bill and in October, 2006, 
George Bush finally signed legislation to continue the military commissions. 
 
To add to the confusion, Hicks’ lawyers had also applied for British citizenship on his 
behalf, in a bid to remove Hicks from Guantanamo Bay and avoid the military commission 
(Coorey et al, 2005:2). The British government had successfully demanded that British 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay be repatriated and not face the military commission trials, 
which they had deemed ‘unfair’ (in Coorey et al, 2005:2) [18]. Hicks’ mother was a British 
national who never converted her citizenship when she arrived in Australia (Coorey et al, 
2005:2). While it was immediately obvious that the British government would not embarrass 
the Australian government by allowing Hicks to become a citizen, the citizenship bid incited 
interesting discursive responses from both the government and media. Alexander Downer 
utilised notions of terror and citizenship to suggest that “Mr Hicks and his lawyers want to 
try to circumvent justice. I would have thought charges like conspiracy to commit war 
crimes and attempting to murder people are charges that should be heard” (Downer, 2005).  
 
This response illustrates an interesting opposition between the unity of ‘true’ Australian 
citizens and the dangerous individualism of the ‘terrorist other’. As discussed previously, 
governmental discourse in regard to Hicks has played on notions of the dereliction of his 
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obligations as a citizen to justify his imprisonment at Guantanamo and trial by military 
commission. In attempting to gain representation from a sovereign government by 
becoming a British citizen, Hicks is proven to be a traitor to the Australian national ideal. 
This response attempted to wrest control of understanding back from media reportage that 
was not conducive to support for governmental action in regard to Hicks. Downer’s attempt 
to situate understanding of Hicks’ legal actions as a betrayal of the Australian national ideal 
illustrates that power relations between media and government had become much more 
antagonistic. As I suggested in chapter four, the relationship between government and media 
often functions on mutual dependence, in that it is mutually beneficial to maintain a 
particular status quo that reinforces the institutionalisation of their roles in the public sphere. 
Nonetheless, both government and media engage in processes of meaning making to 
establish their cultural power in the public sphere, and in this respect are also competitive 
with each other. In representing Hicks, it was not always in the media’s best interests to 
confirm governmental discourse. This was especially true when governmental discourse was 
at odds with notions of public opinion—and the media could gain a powerful cultural 
advantage in representing meaning through their opposition to governmental discourse. 
 
Downer’s response was not widely reported in the media, which was now engaging in 
contestation of governmental discourse to secure their hegemony of Hicks’ case. Changes in 
media reportage illustrated that the relationship between government and media was 
functioning on the media’s contestation rather than confirmation of dominant discourses 
regarding post-September 11 insecurity. Media reportage dominated understanding of both 
Hicks himself and the wider administration of a global war on terror. This was supported by 
global reportage of the military operations in Iraq, which continually showed Baghdad and 
its surrounds descending into chaos, and the US administration becoming increasingly 
embattled by rebel governmental officials and a growing public opposition to the war.  As 
previously discussed, the increasing flow of information from sources other than 
government created a ‘filtering effect’ on the power of otherness within governmental 
discourse. This atmosphere created opportunities for the media to forward contestation to 
Australian governmental discourse within a sense of ‘investigative reportage’, rather than 
particular political subjectivities. 
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In re-presenting Hicks as a victim of the Australian government’s lack of support, we can 
suggest an evolution in the way the meaning of terrorism was framed. As the broader thesis 
has demonstrated, governmental discourse is subject to the processes of confirmation and 
contestation forwarded by media reportage. Contesting Hicks’ representation as an other, 
creates evolutions in understandings of terrorism as a source of post-September 11 
insecurity. This can be related to the primary thesis argument because it illustrates that 
discursive processes of confirmation and contestation occur within power relations between 
the media and governmental authorities. These power relations have contributed different 
representations of terrorism, and this has led to changes in how a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity is understood.  
 
This argument was illustrated on the fifth anniversary of Hicks imprisonment in December 
2006, when thousands of people in capital cities across Australia took part in protests to 
bring Hicks back from Guantanamo Bay (Hicks to face, 2006). This sense of public support 
was used by the media to contribute to its own power in the public sphere by representing 
Hicks within its own public campaign. To this end, The Sunday Age took an unprecedented 
step by beginning a ‘Bring David Home’ media campaign. At the end of some articles 
published on Hicks in the Sunday Age, a message to “Join our campaign” was also published. 
The message explicitly told readers of the newspaper’s political subjectivities: “The Sunday 
Age believes that David Hicks should be brought home”. Readers were then asked to join an 
email campaign on Hicks’ behalf (See Egan, 2007). An editorial explained that the campaign 
was begun on December 3, 2006:  
 
… because sometimes you have to make a stand: with Hicks, surely enough is 
enough. In the six weeks since we first said that, we have received almost 7000 
supporting emails and letters. They have been delivered to the Attorney General 
Philip Ruddock (Five years, 2007).  
 
This signalled a clear end, at least in The Sunday Age, of the dominance that governmental 
discourse about Hicks had initially enjoyed in mainstream newspaper reportage still obsessed 
with the minutiae of the post-September 11 threat. Previous representations of the ubiquity 
of the terrorism as a source of post-September 11 insecurity seemingly evolved in this 
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atmosphere. This was a result of counter-discursive statements about Hicks suggesting that 
this threat was overly politicised and too often used to bolster governmental power. 
 
This evolution in representation of Hicks in newspapers began to erode the power of 
governmental discourse to legitimise the newspapers’ response to Hicks’ detention. For 
example, a NewsPoll survey suggested that 90 per cent of Australians believed that Hicks 
deserved a fair trial without delay. The survey also showed that less than 24 per cent of 
respondents thought that he would get a fair trial in the military commission process at 
Guantanamo Bay (Public overwhelmingly behind, 2006). This change in public 
understanding also began to have political ramifications. In November 2006, the Federal 
government suffered its first significant break in its ranks when the Senate backed a call by 
National Party MP Barnaby Joyce to press the US more firmly to set a date for Hicks’ trial 
(Nicholson, 2006a). The next day, Major Mori briefed the state and territory attorney-
generals on the military commission process Hicks would be judged under. In another blow 
for the Federal government, every attorney general except the Commonwealth’s Philip 
Ruddock was convinced to sign the ‘Fremantle Declaration’ demanding immediate justice 
for the terrorism suspect (Nicholson, 2006b). In the next months, even members of the 
Liberal Party became more vocal in their concern for Hicks, with five politicians putting the 
matter directly to Howard in a joint party meeting (Hicks granted, 2006).  
 
The ramifications of these governmental rebellions seemed to finally convince the Federal 
government that a different communication tack was needed to stem political damage. While 
governmental authorities are often bound by the need to present a unified response to 
particular events, in 2007 there was an increased dynamism in their response to Hicks’ 
detention. Early in 2007, Prime Minister John Howard suggested that he was pushing 
President Bush to expedite Hicks’ trial because “the fact that he’s been five years without 
trial does trouble us a great deal” (in Bush to speed up, 2007). Howard suggested that he 
understood public sentiment towards the issues and was acting on their behalf in his 
‘confrontation’ with the President: “I left him [Bush] in no doubt during our discussion that 
this was an issue of great concern to the Australian people, not a judgement as to whether 
Hicks is guilty or innocent” (in Bush to speed up, 2007).  
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This was a major shift in attitude by the Prime Minister in comparison to previous response 
to Hicks, which was to suggest that Hicks’ detention was a matter for the US government. In 
the next month, he told the media that he had spoken to President Bush three times and 
once to Vice President Cheney and that he believed the process had been sped up as a 
“direct result of the representations I have made” (in PM won’t tolerate, 2007). The Prime 
Minister was now forwarding a new representation of governmental action in response to 
Hicks. Nonetheless, media response to this new governmental attitude was tainted by 
scepticism as to its political motivations. In the same news article reporting Howard’s 
confrontation with Bush, the journalist reported as ‘objective’ statement of fact that: “The 
government has been trying to neutralise Hicks’ detention as an election issue with 
community dissatisfaction growing with the way his case has been handled” (Bush to speed 
up, 2007).  
 
The Australian government continued with its new ‘tough on the US’ stance, publicly 
announcing that it had asked that the US charge Hicks by February, though there was no 
discussion of what would happen if the US did not comply (Grattan et al, 2007). This 
proved to be unimportant, because Hicks was charged again in March 2007 with providing 
material support for terrorism (Coorey, 2007). Hicks was not charged with any war crimes 
and a second charge of attempted murder was dismissed after Judge Susan Crawford 
concluded that there was no “probable cause” to justify it (Terry Hicks takes, 2007).  The 
charge carries a life sentence, though the prosecution said at the time they would not press 
for a full term (Debelle et al, 2007). Hicks subsequently accepted a plea bargain where he 
pleaded guilty to providing material support for terrorism in return for a shorter jail term 
(Father’s tears, 2007).  
 
In March 2007, Hicks was sentenced to seven years jail, but six years and three months of 
the sentence were suspended, leaving only nine months remaining for Hicks to serve. Hicks 
directed his lawyer to drop all outstanding legal action, including a Federal court challenge to 
the Australian government over the exercise of its duty of citizenship, and an appeal in the 
United Kingdom regarding its revocation of his British citizenship (Debelle, 2007c). An 
affidavit, where Hicks detailed physical and mental abuse suffered at Guantanamo Bay was 
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also withdrawn [19]. In May, after five and a half years imprisonment at Guantanamo, Hicks 
was transported back to Australia to spend the remainder of his sentence at South Australia’s 
Yatala labour prison. As well as keeping Hicks in jail until after the Australian Federal 
election, the plea bargain also demanded that Hicks not speak to the media for one year 
upon his release. Any proceeds from media engagements after the year would be forfeited to 
the Australian government (Coultan, 2007). At the time of writing, Hicks was expected to be 
released from prison just before 2008. 
 
His plea bargain was treated by many left-leaning media as a forced confession to get out of 
Guantanamo Bay. The Age’s headline suggested that “Desperation drives the deal”  (Debelle, 
2007b) and reflected community groups like Liberty Victoria who suggested that “After five 
years in shocking conditions...any ray of light showing a way out would be taken and it has 
been” (in Bolt, 2007).  In the more conservative media there remained an element of 
negative representation, despite obvious change in overall media sentiment about Hicks. For 
example, Frank Devine suggested that Hicks would be a threat to Australian society because 
he was a trained terrorist: “impressionable inmates, such as young Aborigines will need 
protection from an evangelical Islamic extremist” (Devine, 2007). The inference here is 
complex in its references to otherness. Aborigines, already ‘problematic’ to notions of a 
homogenous Australian society should not be exposed to ‘terrorist others’ because of 
Devine’s supposed indigenous predilection to inappropriate pursuits. Devine’s comments 
about both Hicks as a terrorist other and indigenous Australians illustrates Said’s argument 
about the representation of others. The intimation of Devine’s comments are that both are: 
 
… shown to be gullible, ‘devoid of energy and initiative’, much given to fulsome 
flattery, intrigue, cunning…they are ‘lethargic and suspicious’, and in everything 
oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo Saxon race (Said, 1995:39). 
 
Therefore Devine’s representation of Hicks as a national threat exposes the most 
problematic aspect of two of Australian society’s ‘others’ coming together. Their inability to 
share in Australia’s unified beliefs would threaten an existing cultural and political status quo. 
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This sudden heterogeneity of representation about Hicks after so much media sympathy can 
be analysed within broader understanding of the relationship between government and 
media to represent themes of post-September 11 insecurity. Each institution is bound by 
certain cultural, political and social understandings of their role within the public sphere. In 
their relationship with each other, these understandings affect the ways in which each 
institution can represent meaning. In this way, we see that the media is stifled by the 
haphazard way in which they can present meaning. Each newspaper is in competition with 
the other, with particular political subjectivities affecting the way ‘the media’ is seen to 
represent meaning. Governmental authorities are stifled in their need to represent unified 
and unchanging responses to particular events and discourses. This was seen in the way that 
media contestation began to work against their maintenance of a unified representation of 
Hicks.   
 
In this respect Foucault’s notion of governmentality is important to understanding the 
everyday practices and exchanges of power between different cultural actors.  As Foucault 
has suggested, a multiplicity of discursive elements come into play in the various power 
strategies aimed at representing dominant meaning. Therefore, in the representation of 
discourses of post-September 11 insecurity, discursive themes such as terrorism are not 
always dominant representations of meaning, but contested and evolving according to the 
negotiations of various cultural actors. In this chapter, I used governmentality to illustrate 
that power relations between media and government have contributed to the inherent 
heterogeneity of David Hicks’ representation in the public sphere. The ‘language wars’ that 
develop when different groups fight for the right to present their version of ‘truth’ allows a 
multiplicity of representations that can destabilise even the most repeated and self-
referencing of cultural discourses (Lewis, 2002: 439). Thus, Hicks’ initial representation as a 
‘traitor’ was used to great effect by both governmental authorities and the media, but the 
discursive interactions between individuals and information has allowed heterogenous 
effects on discourse. This relates to the broader argument of the thesis because it 
demonstrates that power relations between media reportage and governmental discourses 
have contributed to continual evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. 
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The next chapter, Legitimation in the legislative war on terror moves the thesis into discussion of 
communicated governmental responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Discussion in the 
thesis so far has centred on the discursive strategies used by governmental authorities to 
represent the sources of post-September 11 insecurity. Hegemony over the definition of the 
sources of insecurity should nonetheless be seen as connected to subsequent justification of 
governmental actions in response to insecurity. Where we have established that sources of 
insecurity have been situated within epistemological frameworks of otherness, governmental 
discourse has concurrently represented both legislative and military action as the most 
appropriate responses to insecurity. The next chapter will discuss how references to 
otherness have provided a platform for governmental justification of legislative changes in 
response to post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
Endnotes: 
 
1. The Northern Alliance, or United Islamic Front for the salvation of Afghanistan is a  
military-political organisation of Afghans fighting the Taliban as the ‘legal’ 
government of Afghanistan.  
 
2. Australian journalists are bound by some legal constraints relating to libel and 
defamation but the MEAA Journalism Code of Ethics forwards 12 basic guidelines 
for journalists to report ethically, based mainly around reporting and interpreting 
information honestly, striving for accuracy, fairness and disclosure of all essential 
facts (MEAA, 2007).   
 
3. Herald Sun reporter Mark Dunn was given a prestigious Quill award for his initial 
expose of David Hicks’ connections with the Taliban (in Herald Sun’s winning team, 
2002:2). The Insight team of journalists were given the opportunity to track Hicks’ 
route through Pakistan and Afghanistan. They began reportage of their travels with 
the headline “A star pupil at terror school” where the team suggest that they have 
established strong links between “Hicks and the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad 
(Centre for preaching), funded by Osama bin Laden, and its armed wing, the 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous)” (Callinan, 2002:4). Having travelled to 
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Pakistan to visit the school, they could not get a quote from anyone within the 
school to say that they knew Hicks. They did not speak to a director or principal of 
the school. They found one man who said that he knew Hicks—but not that he had 
been at the school. In fact, a former Lashkar spokesperson said that Hicks had not 
joined Lashkar at all and the group had tried to make this known to American 
authorities (Callinan, 2002:4). The journalist’s proof that Hicks had trained with the 
group was a letter written by Hicks with the group’s foreign office address on the 
letter-head and the suggestion that local “experts” have suggested that Lashkar “is 
hardly likely to acknowledge responsibility for Hicks after a Pakistani government 
crackdown on the group” (Callinan, 2002:4). 
 
4. US land at Guantanamo Bay is occupied through a lease agreement between the US 
and Cuba that began in 1903 when it was first used as a fuelling station for the US 
Navy when they were at war with Spain (Murphy, 1953). The lease agreement 
became more controversial after 1958 when Fidel Castro assumed power in Cuba. 
After official diplomatic relations with Cuba were cut by US President Eisenhower in 
1961, Castro cut resources to the base in an attempt to force the US off Cuban land. 
The base now operates independently of Cuban resources. Castro reportedly never 
cashes the annual lease payment cheques from the US; a continued annual payment 
of $2000 in gold coins or $US4085 (Alcorn, 2002:9; Murphy, 1953). According to the 
original contract, termination of the lease requires the consent of both the U.S. and 
Cuban governments, or the abandonment of the base property by the US (Murphy, 
1953).  
 
5. Article IV of the Geneva Convention states that members of irregular militias like al 
Qaeda qualify for prisoner-of-war status if their military organization satisfies four 
criteria. The criteria are: “(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; [and] (d) that of conducting their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war” (Geneva Convention, 2005) 
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6. There were reportedly 25 different nationalities held at Camp X-Ray, including 
British, French, a Swede, a Belgian, Saudis and Yemenis (in Alcorn, 2002:11). Camp 
X-ray was closed on April 29, 2002, when the new Camp Delta site was built by 
military contracting company Halliburton. Initially, US military spokespeople refused 
to confirm that there were minors amongst the inmates at Guantanamo Bay, citing 
policy that prevented them from giving detainee’s personal details (Catherwood, 
2002:9). Nonetheless a British reporter spoke to three Afghan boys who were most 
likely held at Camp Iguana and remembered the experience fondly (Astill, 2004).  
 
7. Rendition refers to the extra-judicial transfer of a person from one state to another. 
Legal Rendition has been used by the United States since the 1980s as a method for 
dealing with foreign accused.  ‘Extraordinary rendition’ was created specifically for 
the ‘war on terror’ and is a wholly extra-legal process (Bonner, 2007). Modern 
methods of rendition include taking suspects into US custody, but delivered to a 
third-party state, often without ever being on American soil, and without involving 
the US judiciary. Despite many credible claims otherwise, the US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice has publicly stated that the US does not transfer people to places 
where they know they will be tortured (in Naughtie, 2006). 
 
8. Citing the Third Geneva Convention, the US administration suggested that Prisoner 
Of War status is only afforded to enemy forces that wear uniforms, do not target 
civilians and otherwise fight in accordance with the rules of war (Dorf, 2002). The 
Third Geneva Convention does specify that “Should any doubt arise as to whether 
persons, having committed a belligerent act…belong to any of the categories…Such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present convention until such time as their 
status has been determined by a competent tribunal” (Geneva Convention, 2005). 
The US administration did establish a process of determining enemy combatant 
status as distinct from a prisoner of war, but the competent tribunal used was the US 
Military.  
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9. The military commission is not a new form of military justice. The Nuremberg trials 
of Nazis involved in the implementation of the Holocaust were conducted utilising 
military commissions (Bard, 2002: 4).  
 
10. On July 21, 2003, an Australian government delegation was sent to the USA to 
coincide with a visit from a high-level British delegation for discussions about the 
trial procedures (Delegation to visit, 2003). The British government would question 
the overall legality of the trials and subsequently demand the release of British 
detainees in 2005 (Guantanamo Four, 2005).  
 
11. Other benefits that the Australian authorities secured were that conversations 
between Hicks and his lawyers would not be monitored, Hicks could have access and 
direct contact with an Australian lawyer, and during the trial, the prosecution would 
not rely on evidence requiring closed proceedings and the exclusion of the accused. 
The trial itself would be open to the media and Australian officials (Delegation 
concludes, 2003). 
 
12. The US Defence Department charge sheet maintained under the charge of 
conspiracy that Hicks, from January to August 2001, attended al Qaeda camps in 
Afghanistan and was trained in the use of assault and sniper rifles, landmines, 
explosives, ambush, camouflage, kidnapping techniques, assassination methods, 
information collection and surveillance (Department of Defence, 2005). In October 
2001, it is alleged that he joined al Qaeda fighters near Kandahar Airport and was 
armed with an AK-47 rifle, ammunition and grenades when guarding a Taliban tank 
(Department of Defence, 2005). After guarding the tank for a week, Hicks travelled 
to Konduz and joined Taliban forces that were engaged in combat against US-led 
coalition forces (Department of Defence, 2005). 
 
13. Lasry criticised a number of the commission’s procedures, especially in the 
examination of the commission members. He suggested that allowing the Secretary 
of Defense to be the Appointing Authority—the authority that appoints the 
commission—maintains governmental control over the people and processes 
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involved in the commission. That the commission’s presiding officer—the person 
who also decides what evidence is probative—is employed by the US military also 
affects the impartiality of the trials. In Hicks’ preliminary hearing, Lasry pointed out 
a strong personal relationship between the Presiding Officer and the Appointing 
Authority (Lasry, 2004:29). In establishing voir dire through questioning the 
commission members, Hicks’ defence team found that several of the members had 
some predisposition to particular bias because of their involvement in various 
operations against the Taliban, or because of their loss of professional colleagues in 
the events of September 11, 2001 (Lasry, 2004:42). Apart from this, Hicks’ defence 
team found evidence that some of the members had already formed and expressed 
views of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, one having suggested to a colleague that 
“they are all terrorists” (in Lasry, 2004: 34).  
 
14. The Freedom of Information request was refused on the grounds that “it could 
jeopardise relations with the US” (Kerin et al, 2003:2).  
 
15. While Washington District Court Judge Joyce Green ruled that the US military could 
not hold Hicks—or any other unlawful combatants—without the legality of their 
detention being tested in a civil court (in Dunn, 2005:30), Judge Richard Leon ruled 
the opposite on US appeal and the Court of Appeals was called in to resolve the 
dispute (Dunn, 2005:30). A key ruling by US District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly to 
allow Hicks to challenge the military commission’s legality in her court halted the 
military commissions altogether. Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted a stay in the trial and 
ordered the commissions not to continue until a case determining Habeas Corpus of 
the detainees was resolved. Habeas Corpus is a judicial mandate ordering that it be 
determined whether or not a person is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not they 
should be released from custody. (Hicks’ lawyers’ win, 2005).  
 
16. Hicks’ continued imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay was justified by the US 
Ambassador Robert McCallum by suggesting that at least 12 detainees released from 
Guantanamo Bay were later killed or captured while fighting against US forces 
(Nicholson, 2006). 
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17. At time of writing, the US Supreme court had reversed this decision and had voted 
to review whether detainees could appeal an indefinite detention. 
 
18. Hicks was secretly made a British citizen from his cell at Guantanamo in July 2007, 
but after only five hours, the British Home Office stripped him of his citizenship, 
citing a new amendment in British immigration law, drafted especially in response to 
Hicks’ case (Crabb, 2006). 
 
19. In the affidavit Hicks claimed that he was randomly beaten over an eight-hour 
period while handcuffed and blindfolded. Other allegations included being forcibly 
injected with sedatives and unknown drugs, being terrorised by attack dogs and 
offered the services of a prostitute in return for spying on other detainees.  
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LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO INSECURITY 
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Chapter Seven 
Legitimation in the Legislative war on terror 
 
 
Until September 11, 2001 Australia had no collective national laws regarding terrorism.  Acts 
of terrorism were dealt with under existing criminal law as offences such as ‘conspiracy’ or 
‘mass murder’.  Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Australian government 
continually suggested the need to table a legislative response to the threat of terrorism 
(Faulkiner, 2003). Australian governmental representation of responses to insecurity has 
been conceptualised within two interrelated categories: legislative and military responses. The 
military commitment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq has been accompanied by extensive 
legislative amendments to the criminal act within Australia. These amendments have sought 
to strengthen the powers of counter-terrorism agencies to investigate terror suspects and 
impose harsher penalties on those found guilty of terrorist-related charges. Specifically 
governmental authorities agreed to create a ‘new’ offence of ‘terrorism’. This change 
broadened the constitution of a ‘terrorist act’ and more importantly, gave Commonwealth 
authorities wider scope to investigate and arrest individuals. In essence, the anti-terror laws 
are a re-presentation of the way Australian authorities and the court system signifies murder, 
where intent is given greater signification if no attack occurs. This re-conceptualisation of 
meaning is nonetheless important because it affects the material responses to the 
representations made in legal discourse. 
 
This chapter discusses the representation of legislative responses to insecurity by 
governmental authorities. Specifically, this chapter argues that epistemological frameworks 
of legitimation situated understanding of governmental legislative responses to post-
September 11 insecurity. Legitimation situates understanding of the need and logic of 
governmental actions according to the specific context of September 11 insecurity. This 
occurs by referring to governmental legislative actions as appropriate to the level of 
insecurity that previous definitions of terrorism have inspired. Therefore, legitimation can be 
presented as a ‘claim to certain action’, where governmental legislation is seen as the most 
appropriate and legitimate response to their defined sources of insecurity.  
 
 192 
 
This chapter will proceed firstly by defining legitimation according to Jurgen Habermas’ 
analysis of ‘legitimation crises’. His analysis will provide the initial discussion of how the 
maintenance of legitimation as a ‘discursive strategy’ is used to justify governmental actions. 
This is followed by discussion of his work on a theory of communicative action to illustrate 
the ways in which he conceived of discursive relations in the public sphere. 
 
Though Habermas’ work is utilised to provide a definition of legitimation, in the third 
section of the chapter, I will critically address Habermas’ understanding of relations within 
the public sphere. This criticism will focus on the structuralist framework of his work, 
especially his insistence on a rational structure of meaning within the public sphere. Instead, 
this chapter re-frames conceptions of legitimation to incorporate the Foucauldian analysis of 
power initiated in previous chapters. Foucault argued that attempts at the rationalisation of 
culture should not be analysed as universal, social phenomena, but as culture-specific and 
micro-economic (Hanssen, 2004: 300). Therefore the last section of this chapter will 
conceptualise legitimation to prioritise plurality and the contestation of dominant structures 
of meaning. This is important as it allows the subsequent case study chapter to suggest the 
changes that occur in discourse as a result of contestations forwarded by other actors in the 
public sphere. This contributes to the primary argument that I have been establishing 
throughout this thesis because it shows that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has 
evolved through power relations between the government and news media. 
 
Legitimation as an epistemological framework 
 
In moving the discussion from sources to responses to insecurity, this chapter also shifts the 
discussion of how these themes are discursively framed. In the previous chapters I suggested 
that epistemological frameworks situate the meaning of sources of insecurity by referencing 
discursive constructs of the nation. This allows governmental discourse to suggest the threat 
that terrorist others pose to the ‘unity’ of the nation. This framework is also referenced in 
representations of responses to insecurity, specifically through the need for specific 
governmental action to protect the unity of the nation. In this section  I will discuss how 
epistemological frameworks of legitimation situate the meaning of legislation through 
understanding of the logic and need for governmental action. This is situated within larger 
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understandings of the legitimation of governmental action itself. While this broader 
justification of governmental authority will be discussed in the chapters regarding 
exceptionalism, I acknowledge here that representing governmental authority is also 
important in situating the meaning of specific governmental actions. 
 
We can see these references to governmental actions as protection for the nation specifically 
within processes of creating legislation. The process of creating governmental legislation is 
conceptualised via ‘agreement’ entered into by the citizenry and the state. It provides citizens 
with actionable rights where laws are broken and provides legitimacy to the administrative 
power of the state to act on behalf of the citizenry (Heath, 2006). While it is commonly 
accepted in a democracy that the will of popular sovereignty is required to change or create a 
law, this of course is not always the reality. The passing of an unpopular law does not 
necessarily revoke the legitimacy of governmental authority more generally. In many 
instances laws are passed without any real sense of public confirmation, and even when there 
is a clear sense of opposition from the public. Indeed, Australian anti-terror legislation was 
passed despite actually impinging on citizens’ civil liberties. What this suggests is that 
changes to legislation are often promoted not on their particular qualities, but through the 
discursive strategies of legitimation that typically underpin governmental discourse. This 
chapter will now conceptualise the epistemological frameworks of legitimation that have 
justified the introduction of anti-terror legislation. 
 
A legislative ‘war on terror’ has been conducted through the language of governmental 
policy and new legislation. The language utilised within these policies represent meanings 
that affect new understandings of governmental action in the public sphere. Having 
constructed discursive themes of terrorism as the source of insecurity, governmental 
authorities have also presented ‘anti-terror’ legislation as the most logical response to this 
threat. This chapter argues that as a discursive theme within governmental discourse, 
legislative responses to insecurity have been situated within epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation. Legitimation perpetuates the validity of governmental actions in response to 
post-September 11 insecurity. It refers the meaning of governmental action to the logic of 
particular actions and the need of governmental authority to enact them. For example, 
governmental authorities have presented anti-terror legislation as the most logical response 
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to the threat of terrorism (See Howard, 2005). Legitimation is also utilised by governmental 
actors to suggest the logic of their authority to act on behalf of the nation. In responding to 
post-September 11 insecurity, they refer to this legitimacy to stifle any criticism of their 
legislative actions. In this way, governmental discourse forwards a representation not only of 
the pertinence of governmental action in an age of insecurity, but also their power to 
implement the laws as part of their management of the nation. 
 
Epistemological frameworks of legitimation refer to an understanding of the logic of 
governmental legislative action via two approaches. The first refers meaning back to a 
contextual threat—namely the sources of post-September 11 insecurity—to promote the 
immediacy of the need for action. The ubiquitous and enigmatic nature of terrorist threats 
has propelled understanding of the need for legislative responses because it suggests 
governmental preparedness for the unexpected. The second approach propels 
representations of governmental action as the only response that is able to counter-act the 
threat. This also relates to understanding of the nation as the protectorate of governmental 
authority. Referring to this understanding of their role, governmental authorities were able to 
claim that if the anti-terror laws were not enacted, they would not be able to adequately 
protect Australians against terrorism. Thus legitimation enables governmental authorities to 
claim the power firstly, to define terrorism as a crime and secondly, define the actions to 
respond to ‘terrorism’ within the language of the law.  
 
Legitimation can therefore be seen as a framework utilised for the ongoing discursive 
practices of justification needed to validate governmental legislative action. Nonetheless, the 
need for the constant justification of actions suggests that legitimation is part of a process of 
securing power that is not necessarily unquestioned. Legitimation can instead be seen as an 
‘argument’ for the justification of particular actions. The presence, and the need for, a 
justification for action positions these actions as subject to contestation. Young (2005) has 
argued that legitimation has a ‘bi-modal’ character. It implies acceptance of a justificatory 
argument, but the very presence of a justification suggests that this acceptance is somewhat 
uneasy.  
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While legitimation ‘convinces’ citizens of the validity of particular actions, if inconsistencies 
in the legitimation and practice of those actions develop, dissenting discourses may gain 
greater power in the public sphere. Relating this to the broader thesis argument, the 
existence of legitimation suggests that power relations between news media and 
governmental authorities have effects on the understanding of particular discourses. This 
chapter thus illustrates the complex power relations inherent in struggles to create 
hegemonic discourses. These struggles translate into cultural meanings that evolve, shift or 
live alongside each other in a contradictory relation. This demonstrates that the ‘meaning’ of 
post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through complex power relations between the 
media and governmental authorities. Having defined epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation, I now wish to conceptualise their use within the power relations between media 
and governmental authorities. To do this, the next section will utilise Habermas’ conception 
of legitimation ‘crises’ to suggest the ways in which legitimation form part of governmental 
discursive strategies. 
 
Habermas and legitimation ‘crises’ 
 
This section of the chapter will utilise Jurgen Habermas’ conception of ‘legitimation crises’ 
to define the utilisation of legitimation by governmental authorities. Habermas provided a 
broad conceptual framework to define legitimation within ongoing discursive practices of 
justification. While Habermas conceptualises legitimation as an all-encompassing process of 
maintaining governmental authority, this chapter is more concerned with his description of 
discursive strategies of legitimation as a way of situating understanding of a particular 
governmental action. Similarly I will argue that epistemological frameworks do situate the 
meaning of legislation according to notions of governmental authority. Specifically 
legitimation justifies the logic and need of particular governmental action within the context 
of post-September 11 threats of terrorism. 
 
Though he forwards a more idealistic conceptual framework than his Marxist counterparts in 
the Frankfurt School, Habermas is still concerned with the political conditions that both 
stifle and permit societal change (Bronner, 2002: 190).  In his text Legitimation Crisis (1975), 
Habermas suggested that contemporary governmental authority relied on cultural discourses 
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of ‘consensus’ to continually justify the logic or need for capitalist economic structures 
within the state. Habermas’ analysis of legitimation crises suggests that cultural processes of 
meaning making occur within a schema where cultural, economic and political life are 
framed as distinct social structures. This suggests the structuralist foundations of his work 
because it separates social life into particular fields of organisation. For example, Habermas 
begins his analysis of legitimation crises by suggesting that in capitalist societies, the 
economic system is the major steering mechanism of social and political life (Habermas, 
1975: 26). While this thesis is not concerned with Marxist social structures, Habermas’ 
analysis is useful for conceptualising governmental reliance on discursive ‘arguments’ for the 
legitimacy of social structures that ensure the ‘status quo’ of governmental political and 
economic power. This will be used to define legitimation as providing justification for the 
logic and need of legislation within governmental responses to post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
Habermas (1975: 20) argued that legitimation crises occur once economic problems are re-
directed into the political sphere. These political crises require that the state draw upon 
resources within the cultural system to restore a sense of consensus. The problem for 
governmental authorities is that the citizenry’s socio-cultural power over meaning inevitably 
clashes with their need to coerce a ‘consensual reality’ that benefits their capitalist economy 
and political power.  We see this occurring for example, when media reportage becomes 
critical of the notions of legitimacy represented within governmental discourse. As long as 
political systems require justification of power, other forms of meaning in the cultural sphere 
could potentially threaten governmental forms of legitimation. 
 
Habermas defined this scenario as a ‘legitimation crisis’ based on “a discrepancy between the 
need for motives declared by the state… and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural 
system” (Habermas, 1975: 75). Habermas suggests that governmental action requires 
discursive framing through legitimation to continue the status quo of governmental power. 
‘Crises’ occur for governmental discourse through public contestation because: “the 
procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement is seen 
through” (Habermas, 1975: 69). Public contestation creates tensions in governmental 
discourses maintained to engender political hegemony over particular social structures. Thus, 
the goal of political authorities is to use legitimation strategies to repress dissent once an 
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‘official’ consensus is reached that is satisfactory to political power and economic function 
(Habermas, 1975: 27).  
 
Habermas’ conception of legitimation can similarly describe the utilisation of epistemological 
frameworks by governmental authorities. Epistemological frameworks of legitimation situate 
an understanding of the need and logic of legislative action. This is a discursive strategy 
employed by governmental authorities to justify their actions in response to any contestation 
forwarded by other cultural actors in the public sphere. This is important because 
maintaining a dominant discourse in the public sphere increases the authority a particular 
cultural actor has over material actions. The dominance of these discourses in the public 
sphere are nonetheless always subject to the processes of contestation and confirmation by 
cultural actors, such as the media. This is reflected in the primary argument of this thesis that 
a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations 
between media and governmental authorities. Ensuring the dominance of particular 
representations is one of the discursive strategies used by institutions like government acting 
within power relations between other cultural actors. They have a vested interest in 
maintaining their dominance over understanding of post-September 11 insecurity because it 
necessarily justifies their authority to act.  
 
To therefore ensure the dominance of their discourses, epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation refer to notions of the government’s role as protector of the nation to justify its 
actions.  On behalf of ‘the body’ of the nation, governmental authorities are entrusted with 
the power to make legislation to protect constructed understandings of national identity. 
Habermas extends this by suggesting that ‘legitimation’ is seen as an output of a particular 
social system. This social system is responsible for the socialisation of shared values, which 
maintains the flow of the resources that allow capitalist society to function (Heath, 1996: 9). 
Habermas suggests that these resources to secure legitimation are maintained through 
strategies of representation such as:  
 
… the personalisation of substantive issues, the symbolic use of hearings, expert 
judgements, juridical incantations, and also the advertising techniques that at once 
confirm and exploit the existing structures of prejudice and garnish certain contents 
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positively, others negatively, through appeals to feeling, stimulation of unconscious 
motives etc (Habermas, 1975: 69).  
 
Habermas argues that these are obfuscating discursive strategies employed by governmental 
authorities to “push other themes, problems, and arguments below the threshold of 
attention and, thereby, of withholding them from opinion-formation” (Habermas, 1975: 70). 
In attempting to withhold critical opinion, themes of legitimation are employed to suggest 
that governmental authority supplies the most effective management of a shared social 
system. 
 
This thesis does not take a Marxist perspective in suggesting these strategies as ‘obfuscating’ 
practices designed to repress democratic potential. I have suggested that legitimation refers 
to the authority of governmental actors to define and therefore respond to post-September 
11 insecurity. These strategies can be illustrated in governmental discourse regarding the 
introduction of anti-terror laws in Australia. Habermas’ suggestion of ‘obfuscating’ 
representations such as the use of advertising techniques, expert judgements and juridical 
language can all be seen within governmental discourse suggesting terrorism as a ‘new threat’ 
requiring ‘new responses’. I have discussed some of these strategies already in the Chapter 
Four case study of the ‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’ governmental campaign. Similarly, 
legitimation can be seen to provide a framework for an understanding of the need for ‘new’ 
responses to post-September 11 insecurity. For example, as the following chapter will show 
in extended detail, governmental authorities have used arguably symbolic arrests of 
Australian ‘terrorists’ to justify the introduction of controversial anti-terror legislation. Prime 
Minister John Howard utilised frameworks of legitimation to refer understanding of these 
arrests as the successful implementation of legislation by government authorities entrusted 
to act on behalf of their constituency. 
 
In the previous example, epistemological frameworks of legitimation were utilised by the 
Prime Minister to suggest the logic and need of legislative action in response to criticism of 
the severity of the laws within media reportage. Habermas (1975: 69) argues more broadly 
that if the discursive strategies used to increase governmental authority are disputed within 
the cultural sphere: “governmental crisis management fails…it lags behind programmatic 
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demands that it has placed on itself. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of 
legitimation”. This relates to my previous suggestion of the bi-modal character of 
legitimation. I have described this bi-modal character as creating a conditional and 
contestable acceptance of particular understandings of the need for particular governmental 
action. This means that any inconsistencies in the discursive practices of governmental 
authorities create opportunities for dissenting discourses to forward alternate representations 
of meaning. This reflects the main argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity has continually evolved according to the power relations between 
news media and governmental authorities. The various contestations forwarded by other 
cultural actors in the public sphere can therefore affect the authority with which 
governmental representations can be presented.  This is important because it illustrates the 
ways in which power relations between the media and governmental authorities contribute 
to evolutions in the meaning of particular discourses. The case study in the following chapter 
will illustrate how these contestations affected understanding of anti-terror legislation.  
 
Similarly, Habermas has conceptualised power relations through cultural processes of 
meaning making. He suggests that meaning making processes are responsible for the ability 
of those in the public sphere to contest governmental claims to power. Habermas (1975: 27) 
argues that the production of meaning within the cultural sphere “follows an independent 
logic” that does not conform to administrative control. Since this character cannot be 
compromised for political or economic purposes without undermining the validity of the 
whole system, the cultural sphere maintains autonomy in comparison to the other 
subsystems of society (Heath, 2006: 12). It is this functional autonomy in the cultural 
sphere—which Habermas called the ‘lifeworld’—that continually undermines governmental 
processes of legitimation. As I suggested previously, governmental authorities utilise 
legitimation to ‘repress’ the possibilities of contestation from other cultural actors within the 
public sphere.  
 
Given the independent logic of meaning making processes, these processes of legitimation 
do not always have the desired effect, especially if it is seen within the public as an 
‘obfuscating’ discursive strategy.  The strategic use of legitimation by governmental actors 
may instead have the effect of compromising the validity of the meanings they seek to 
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employ. As Habermas argues (1975: 70), the bureaucratic use of cultural tradition for self-
interest has the effect of undermining the force of its suggestion of a ‘shared value’: 
 
A cultural tradition loses precisely this force as soon as it is objectivistically prepared 
and strategically employed. In both cases conditions for the reproduction of cultural 
traditions are damaged, and the tradition is undermined. 
 
The end effect is the citizenry’s consciousness of the contingency not only of the contents of 
a socio-cultural tradition, but also its techniques of socialisation. Habermas (1975: 72) 
suggests this inevitably leads to a questioning of the governing authority’s legitimacy. If this 
instability of meaning is not addressed adequately, the citizenry lose faith in public 
institutions, or a motivation crisis occurs in which productivity begins to wane (in Heath, 
1996: 14). 
 
With these specific discursive practices of legitimation, Habermas has provided a framework 
for understanding how the meanings of discursive themes are framed within governmental 
discourse. His analysis can be used to illustrate that frameworks of legitimation manifest 
within particular discourses to justify structures of meaning most beneficial to governmental 
action. This is evident in his illustration of the strategic use of discourses within the cultural 
sphere to justify particular governmental political or economic action. The legitimation of 
governmental action also serves a purpose within particular power relations in the public 
sphere. Habermas’ theorisation of legitimation crises can also be related to the broader thesis 
argument by illustrating the ways in which forms of contestation are available to destabilise 
governmental discourses in the public sphere.  
 
Habermas’ theorisation of legitimation provides evidence of the kinds of discursive strategies 
utilised by governmental authorities to justify their authority to act within the public sphere. 
I have previously argued that this is important because the cultural actor who maintains 
dominant discourses in the public sphere also increase their cultural authority to act in 
particular ways. Nonetheless, the existence of ‘legitimation crises’ suggests that the 
maintenance of these discourses is subject to the discursive practices of confirmation and 
contestation forwarded by other actors within the public sphere. In this way the utilisation of 
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epistemological frameworks of legitimation become part of broader power relations between 
the media and governmental authorities. The outcomes of these discursive practices 
contribute to the changes in understanding of discourse that I have been pursuing through 
my primary argument that power relations between media and government have contributed 
to the continual evolution of a discourse of post September 11 insecurity. 
 
Though these similarities are important in utilising Habermas’ theorisation as a framework 
for legitimation, we must do so in recognition of his structuralist methodological and 
intellectual approach. This means that Habermas’ broader approach to legitimation must be 
addressed critically in his chapter. For example, Habermas’ later work is characterised by his 
insistence that philosophy provide public utility by way of developing “the philosophical 
foundations for a reinvigorated public sphere in which political debate can spur an even 
greater form of democratic will formation” (Bronner, 2002: 213). Habermas suggested that a 
critical theory of ideal democratic society would incorporate an emancipatory interest in how 
human knowledge could foster autonomy. Habermas resolved that meaningful or competent 
communication would best preserve the conditions for emancipatory use of discourse. He 
suggested that it was possible to uncover the possibilities for freedom, truth and justice in 
the very structure of ‘ideal communication’ (Bronner, 2002: 196). Habermas wanted to 
restore ideas of an absolute, rational truth to create a critical theory that could provide 
direction for a better society. Habermas was highlighting the ‘performative’ aspect of 
language use here, as a pragmatic rather than a post-structural discussion of language 
(Bronner, 2002: 196). 
 
This renewed interest in contestation of governmental discourse by other cultural actors in 
the public sphere led to a more intense focus on practices of meaning making.  In his 
subsequent text, Theory of Communicative Action (1986), Habermas began to treat the ‘lifeworld’ 
and its cultural practices as a comprehensive model of the public sphere, rather than as a 
differentiated socio-cultural subsystem as he did in Legitimation Crisis. Given this change in 
Habermas’ theorisation, we must now turn to discussion of this aspect of his work. The 
theory of communicative action will be illustrated in the next section of this chapter. This is 
important to the thesis insofar as it attempts to situate the importance of cultural processes 
of meaning making in political life. This will provide a basis to utilise Habermas’ theorisation 
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of legitimation that is more conducive to illustrating the thesis’ primary argument. It allows 
me to situate these processes within the power relations between the news media and 
governmental authorities. This is because Habermas’ theorisation situates the importance of 
discursive processes of confirmation and contestation in maintaining and negotiating the 
meaning of particular discourses The primary argument of this thesis is illustrated by the 
power relations that situate these discursive processes because they lead to the continual 
evolution in discourses of post-September 11 insecurity.    
 
Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action 
 
Within Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, the public sphere provides mediation of 
claims of truth and validity in order to produce a consensual, rationalised truth. As a utopian 
model, this provides the ‘ideal speech situation’ for the perfection of modernity and 
liberation (See Habermas, 1984). Habermas (1984: xi) argues that the ideal speech situation is 
universal and is made possible by human activity that inevitably seeks to represent itself and 
its culture in language. The representations that come out of language are thus fundamental 
to the constitution of society. He suggests (1984: 27) that the dynamics of development will 
always be impelled towards an ideal speech situation and the ultimate rationality of language. 
The structural components of the lifeworld are reproduced through communicative action. 
Instead of being limited to specific rules, in communicative action, agents coordinate their 
action objectives through mutual agreement, which is reached through speech acts which 
maintain shared linguistic meaning (Habermas, 1984: 27). 
 
The most obvious change in Habermas’ conception of communicative action is that it brings 
a sense of political action and responsibility to a theorisation of culture. This creates new 
possibilities within his traditionally Marxist theorisations of political action, because it 
acknowledges the importance of processes of meaning making to various politicised actions. 
For example, Habermas suggests that communicative action increases the possibilities for 
the working classes to increase their autonomy in political decision-making processes of 
government.  Habermas’ prioritisation of processes of meaning making and culture in his 
theorisation of communicative action is also a valuable extension to critical theory, allowing 
the possibilities for liberation to be sourced from within cultural relations between citizenry, 
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rather than slipping into the pessimism of his former mentors Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno [1].  
 
In relating Habermas’ theorisation of the ‘lifeworld’ to this thesis, we must nonetheless look 
critically at the structures he imposes on processes of meaning making. Arguably Habermas 
goes much further than his Marxist predecessors in highlighting the importance of 
communication in the maintenance of a citizen’s autonomy, but his Marxist roots seem to 
imbue his theory with an impression that communication is part of a structural process of 
society, rather than constitutive of human life itself. Thus, his suggestions of democratic 
potential become limited when subjected to the contingencies of social and cultural life. In 
this chapter I suggest that discourses do not always conform to political or economic 
structures. The most powerful discourses are still available for contestation by other cultural 
actors wishing to suggest a different representation of meaning. This is utilised to suggest the 
broader thesis argument that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved 
according to power relations between the media and governmental authorities. 
 
In this respect, Habermas’ insistence on social structure seems most problematic when 
theorising the complexities of maintaining a discourse within the ‘lifeworld’. The idea of 
consensus implies an enforced structure on meaning, which suggests that each individual is 
acting for the same political outcome. But cultural actors can be just as competitive as they 
are consensual in attempting to maintain a representation of meaning in the public sphere. 
Thus Habermas denies the complexities involved in representing meaning. Meaning making 
is a much more slippery, active, subjective and contingent process and thus, it does not 
necessarily incorporate consensus to be legitimate. This thesis argues that relationships 
within cultural life do not necessitate consensus in order to mediate meaning. In fact, the 
inclusion of different relationships within culture allows often quite contradictory meanings 
to exist together with no need for consensus. The following chapter will illustrate that 
governmental discourses about post-September 11 insecurity often exist in tandem with 
newspaper reportage that actually contests particular governmental representations. 
Language utilised in discourse does not adhere to cause and effect categorisation within 
spheres of society.  In fact representations within discourse illustrate how complex and 
interconnected the processes of meaning making are. 
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Habermas’ adherence to structures results in his analysis of the social development of 
everyday life being subsumed by static categories. Bronner (2002: 207) suggests that this 
occurs in two ways.  Firstly, these categories occur structurally by dividing the ‘lifeworld’ 
from ‘the political system’, and secondly, they occur analytically by divorcing dialogic 
communication, which is confined to the lifeworld, from strategic communication associated 
with administration of the political system. This suggests that cultural actors can have no 
participation in political life, other than to resist the machinations of a larger political system. 
Thus, political action is divorced from strategic interaction and culture, and the ‘lifeworld’ is 
now posed against the system. The enforcement of a structural framework to relations of 
cultural interaction seems to be a fundamentally disabling prospect. While I have argued that 
institutions are structured to represent meaning in certain ways, it is this structure that is 
inherently stifling to their methods of response. These institutional meanings thus become 
unstable when they collide with other representations in the public sphere. As shown in the 
previous chapter regarding the representation of David Hicks, where governmental 
discourse was dominant in early media reportage, subsequent negative editorial and the 
critical voices of other cultural actors created instability in an otherwise powerful 
representation of a ‘terrorist other’. Furthermore, the inability of governmental authorities to 
create more dynamic responses in regard to Hicks allowed newspaper reportage to attack 
frameworks of otherness underpinning governmental representations. 
 
In this chapter, legitimation situates claims to certain action forwarded by governmental 
authorities. These claims ‘battle’ against other cultural actors to maintain a hegemonic 
discourse. This suggests that even the most powerful governmental discourses are subject to 
contestation within the public sphere, even when taking into account the unequal resources 
and abilities that different cultural actors have to present their discourse at a given time. 
Once the different relationships between institutions, individuals and groups within culture 
become involved in the representation of meaning, these representations become much 
more complex and open to change. In a sense, this is what Habermas meant when he argued 
that meaning can only be made in the cultural sphere: “there is no administrative production 
of meaning” (1972: 34). He meant that the ‘lifeworld’ was not readily controlled by 
governmental authorities. Nonetheless, his theorisation of culture is too stringently insistent 
on a model of political action that does not allow space for the plurality and flux of meaning 
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making. Despite his philosophical aims towards the liberation of citizens within the public 
sphere, Habermas’ insistence on consensus seems to stifle the opportunity for change. 
Instead, this chapter and the corresponding case study illustrate the complex negotiations of 
meaning that occur when particular cultural actors battle for dominance. The suggestion of 
these ‘battles’ in turn creates the potential to destabilise any political oppression in the public 
sphere in a way that does not negate the plurality of representations of meaning. I will 
continue to discuss these criticisms in the next section of the chapter. I will suggest that the 
Fouauldian conception of power relations that I have developed throughout this thesis will 
extend the limitations of Habermas’ work on legitimation crises. 
 
Habermas and post-structuralist debates 
 
Given the criticisms of Habermas’ theorisations of communicative action that I have 
forwarded in the previous section, I must now reconcile the way I have used his conceptions 
of legitimation with the post-structuralist influence within this thesis. In this section, I will 
turn the discussion to a comparison of Habermas structuralist approach to the broadly post-
structuralist approach taken in this thesis. Habermas’ analysis of legitimation crises prioritises 
universalism and ideal structures of speech. My conception of legitimation prioritises 
plurality and the contestation of dominant structures of meaning within a broadly post-
structuralist perspective. Habermas (in Bernstein, 2006: 82) has criticised this perspective, 
claiming that it is politically and ethically vacuous to illustrate the instability of meaning 
without a political goal. His approach has in turn been criticised—especially by Jacques 
Derrida—for excluding difference, disagreement and otherness (in Borradori, 2003: 3). 
Derrida argued that language can never be so transparent or unproblematic as to ensure 
‘rational discourse’ (in Thomassen, 2006: 7). He conceives of meaning as an unstable “field 
of forces…heterogenous, differential, open interventions that transform contexts without 
limiting themselves to theoretical or constantive utterances” (Derrida in Bernstein, 2006: 85). 
Derrida claims that this strategic re-evaluation of the concept of meaning in text brings 
together the practical political practises that Habermas required. This is because Derrida’s 
conception of meaning making suggests there are no fixed boundaries between theoretical 
and practical domains in these political practices.  
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This chapter has argued that Habermas’ conception of social structures and insistence on 
consensus does risk reifying the practices of governmental power. Habermas’ theorisation 
illustrates that political change can only occur as a response to governmental power, not in 
spite of it. This chapter illustrates that while governmental authorities have presented 
dominant representations of post-September 11 insecurity, these representations are open to 
interventions from other cultural actors. Nonetheless, Habermas’ structuralist framework for 
legitimation crises can be reconciled with the post-structuralist influence of this thesis. To do 
this, it is necessary to illustrate that these theorisations can be seen to exist as complementary 
rather than as an ‘either/or’ relationship. This is not to claim some theoretical pathway in 
which the crucial differences between structuralism and post-structuralism can be reconciled.  
Instead, it is to suggest that it is possible to build a framework through which concern with 
processes of representing meaning can be foregrounded as a major concern from both 
perspectives. Thus, in theorising legitimation, this framework would prioritise how this 
epistemological framework has represented responses to insecurity, as well as its negotiation 
by various cultural actors.  
 
In this respect Habermas’ debate with Foucault is useful for the purposes of this chapter 
because Foucault did present a somewhat programmic analysis of power between 
individuals, collectives and the state (See Foucault in Burchell, 1991). Habermas places post-
structuralist philosophy under scrutiny for its political potential. Thus when Habermas 
argues that Derrida and Foucault have exhausted all possibilities in their philosophies of 
subjectivity, he means the possibilities for political usefulness. Rorty argues (2006: 62) that 
Foucault might be considered a post-structuralist who seriously engages ideas of human 
emancipation with theories on how this might be achieved, especially in his work on 
governmentality. More recently, some theorists (See Hanssen, 2004; Bernstein 2006; 
Thomassen, 2006) have suggested that the debate that has occurred between critical theory 
and post-structuralism may have obscured some of the possible theoretical connections that 
can be made between the two, especially in respect to possibilities for political liberation. 
Thus, the possible relations between Foucault and Habermas will contribute to this chapter’s 
theorisation of legitimation by foregrounding the framework as part of strategies of 
governance, but also as part of power relations between different cultural actors. 
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Habermas traced post-structuralism back to Friedrich Nietzsche’s radical rejection of the 
Enlightenment in favour of a decentered aesthetic subject who would shun the imposition of 
values on the basis of sheer power or force (in Hanssen, 2004: 291).  Out of Nietzsche’s 
work, two perspectives would form post-structuralism: that of the ‘sceptical scholar’ who 
exposed the ‘will to power’, and the critic of metaphysics (Hanssen, 2004: 291). This opened 
the way for the anti-democratic, anti-Enlightenment perspective of post-structuralism, which 
abandoned the Western tradition of reason as a theory that celebrated the ‘other’ and 
devalued conceptions of political power (Habermas, 1997: 53). Reason was consequently 
seen as a deceptive manifestation of a deeper ‘will to power’. This, Habermas argued, was 
simply a philosophical language game that did disservice to the utility of philosophy to public 
consciousness and political liberation. Thus, Habermas (in Hanssen, 2004: 282) concludes, 
for all its political intent, post-structuralism succeeded only in being an ‘aestheticisation’ of 
politics that put the viability of critique and the possibility of the liberation of public 
consciousness at risk. The ‘aestheticisation’ of politics as defined by Habermas, consisted of 
the over-extension of the value of art to the other value spheres (Habermas, 1997: 53). 
Habermas was to detect the same aestheticism in Foucault’s theorisation of the history of 
the human sciences. Focussing on Foucault’s use of methodologies of archaeology and 
genealogy, Habermas took issue with the anti-humanism he saw as inherent in Foucault’s 
pursuit of the ‘will to truth’. He suggests that Foucault’s agonistic historiography is a history 
of force, propelled by antagonistic battles among adversaries with no conclusions (in 
Hanssen, 2004: 293). 
 
Though seemingly committed to a history of contingent discursive practices, Foucault still 
relied upon a political platform dedicated to alleviating social injustice (Habermas, 1996: 72). 
Hanssen (2004: 293) suggests that much of the criticism levelled at Foucault’s historiography 
relates to the fact that his work has been read as a comprehensive social theory. It is not 
evident that his work was presented as an all-inclusive application to society as Habermas’ 
theory was. Rather, Foucault saw his work as an understanding of history preoccupied with 
points of resistance to different types of power. Foucault understood history as an agonistic 
domain of multiple discursive techniques and practices, which at any point allowed for the 
reversal of existing power relations through various acts of insurrection (in Hanssen, 2004: 
294). Similarly, the broader argument of this thesis relates to the power relations that occur 
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between cultural actors attempting to secure their dominance of a particular discourse. For 
example, the historical context of post-September 11 insecurity can be seen as the site of 
multiple practices of contestation and confirmation of particular discursive understandings 
as part of particular power relations. Specifically, legitimation relates to these practices 
because it illustrates the discursive strategies of governmental actors attempting to secure 
dominance of the representation of responses to insecurity. As both Habermas and Foucault 
point out, discursive strategies such as the framing of meaning via legitimation are subject to 
the destabilising influence of other discourses in the public sphere. 
 
Foucault’s analysis of power extends Habermas’ structuralist conception of the relationship 
between political actors and cultural life. Just as Habermas had done, Foucault criticised the 
first-generation Frankfurt School’s use of the ‘dialectic of reason’, though Foucault argued 
from a different methodological perspective. Similarly to Habermas, Foucault saw traditional 
critical theory as too totalising and negative. Foucault argued that the rationalisation of 
culture should not be analysed as a universal, social phenomenon, but as culture-specific and 
micro-economic (in Hanssen, 2004: 300). Distancing himself from Habermas’ prioritisation 
of ‘one reason’ and ideal speech, Foucault would classify the use of critique within a concern 
for individualising power as a source of liberation. As Hanssen (2004: 300) suggests:  
 
Critique was to be practiced individually and collectively; as a matter of attitude, 
critique expressed the decisive will not to be governed too much—a freedom that 
needed to be expressed at the level of historiography.  
 
Just like Habermas, Foucault committed his later study to the identification of the use of 
power as a positive force, with the potential to give freedom to individuals. In the context of 
his own work, Foucault never wanted to reduce Habermas’ conception of the ‘lifeworld’ to 
an aestheticisation. Rather, the differences between Foucault and Habermas were in the 
intellectual and methodological approach to securing social justice and liberation. For 
Habermas, this meant consensus of the collective fighting for ‘ideal’ situations of 
communication. For Foucault, it was a mixture of critique and recognition of plurality of 
meaning that would ensure individual liberation.  
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In relating this debate back to the thesis, the analysis of governmental use of legitimation to 
frame understanding of anti-terror legislation has been informed by both theorists’ concerns. 
Adapting the use of legitimation as a tool in the ‘statecraft’ of governmental representation 
of legislative responses to insecurity takes in both a Habermasian prioritisation of the ways 
communication can affect various political actions, as well as a Foucauldian concern with the 
contingency and instability of power relations between cultural actors. By attempting to do 
this, this chapter has prioritised the evolving nature of the representation of insecurity to 
illustrate the potential for political and cultural change within the public sphere. This needs 
to be shown without resorting to either abstraction or reductive structures of response, such 
as simplistic or unquestioned confirmation of governmental discourse. Contrary to some 
structuralist approaches, this chapter does not suggest legitimation speaks to the centrality of 
‘official’ or dominant representations by governmental structures in order to create 
acceptance of certain power relations and actions. This chapter, like the broader thesis, 
prioritises the interplay of different groups within culture and the power relations inherent in 
battles over representation of meaning.  This contributes to the primary argument of the 
thesis that power relations between the news media and governmental authorities contribute 
to the continual evolution in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
While it seems that certain institutions are centrally structured, and thus are structured to 
communicate in certain ways, this sense of structure cannot be translated into meaning 
making, which is subject to much more complex sites of negotiation. The primary thesis 
argument is illustrated because representations within discourse do not go unmediated into 
the public sphere, but interact with other representations and cultural actors. This is not to 
create a hierarchical or ‘culturalist’ perspective of social relations, but to indicate that change 
does not simply occur in the top-down fashion envisioned by structuralist-based thinking. 
Indeed, discussion about the use of legitimation by governmental authorities engages debates 
between structuralist and post-structuralist theoretical perspectives about the ways that 
relations between government, citizenry and media are constituted. Structuralist conceptions 
have presented legitimation in terms of ‘crisis’, a consequence of governmental failure to 
manipulate public understanding. Contrary to structuralist thinking, this thesis argues that we 
cannot assume the existence of a unified or hierarchical body called ‘society’ but rather, a 
constructed “patchwork-like series of social and political institutions that are connected 
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together in a series of relations characterised by both conflict and cooperation” (Yell, 2006: 
17). This allows the broader thesis to suggest legitimation as a framework situating a 
particular representation of meaning that is fought over within the public sphere, rather than 
an imposed form of knowledge.  
 
This conception of legitimation allows me to illustrate the main contention of this thesis that 
a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through the power 
relations between media and government. Legitimation is presented as part of the discursive 
struggle between cultural actors to perpetuate a dominant representation of post-September 
11 insecurity. Epistemological frameworks are presented as part of the struggle between 
cultural actors to dominate particular representations of the responses to post-September 11 
insecurity. These complex and interconnected relations involved in representing post-
September 11 insecurity are open to contestation, thus allowing the ‘meaning’ of discourse to 
evolve over time. The next chapter: A case study: themes of legitimation in the introduction of the anti-
terror laws will explore the manifestation of frameworks of legitimation in governmental 
discourse regarding the introduction of anti-terror legislation in Australia. This case study 
will also suggest the ways in which discursive themes of legitimation have been contested by 
mainstream newspaper reportage. This will be related to the broader thesis  argument by 
illustrating the way that processes of contestation and confirmation forwarded by media 
reportage can affect evolutions in the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
Endnotes: 
 
1. Both Adorno and Horkheimer have been criticised for their pessimism of 
contemporary cultural life. Adorno especially, has been criticised for suggesting that 
popular culture was a capitalist tool for making masses docile and content.  
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Chapter Eight 
A case study: legitimation in the introduction of the Australian anti-
terror laws  
 
 
In July 2002, the Australian Government introduced a package of six pieces of anti-terror 
legislation designed to strengthen and consolidate Australia’s legislative framework in regard 
to terrorism. Giannacopoulos (2006) has observed that the anti-terror laws have been 
implicated both in the “production of sovereignty” as the legitimation of particular 
governmental rule, and also the “violence” of its manifestations in the physical use of the 
laws. Thus, the new laws signify an ‘official’ representation of terrorism as a threat to 
Australian society, but also the unofficial understanding of insecurity within Australian 
culture. Enshrining this understanding in the ‘official’ doctrine of legislation also legitimises 
the power of governmental authorities to frame the discourse of terrorist threat and 
response.  
 
Following the previous chapter’s definition of legitimation, this chapter now turns to a case 
study of the way this epistemological framework situates understanding legislation as a 
response to post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter argues that frameworks of 
legitimation situating understanding of governmental legislative action were subject to 
discursive processes of confirmation and contestation by media reportage. In the first 
section of the chapter, I will discuss the utilisation of epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation by governmental authorities to situate understanding of the need and logic for 
anti-terror laws.  
 
This will be followed in the second section of the chapter by discussion of how these 
frameworks were reported within mainstream Australian newspapers. Though the previous 
case study illustrated newspaper reportage as an effective site of contestation, this case study 
will illustrate more of the complexities inherent in media and government power relations. 
This will be seen in the competition between differing newspapers’ representations of the 
need and logic of the laws, which created subsequent difficulties in effectively contesting 
governmental discourse. Though these sites of contestation in the public sphere did not 
necessarily change particular governmental action, the intersection of governmental 
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discourse and media about particular events in the public sphere gave rise to specific 
relations of power. This contributed to the negotiation of the representation of the anti-
terror laws, and subsequently the way in which the laws were enacted as a response to post-
September 11 insecurity. 
 
Where the previous chapter adopted a Habermasian perspective in exploring the use of 
legitimation as a tool in the ‘statecraft’ of governmental representation, the previous chapter 
criticised the theorist’s separation of political and cultural systems. Instead this chapter 
situates the process of meaning making as a much more complex process of interdependent, 
contingent and evolving negotiation between different cultural actors.  Using the 
Foucauldian framework of power relations established in the previous chapter, the last 
section of this chapter will illustrate that complex battles have occurred when both 
government and media have attempted to gain control over the representation of the anti-
terror laws. The various discursive battles over representation will be evidenced in this, and 
the following chapters, by the ways in which a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is 
subsequently negotiated. This illustrates the primary argument of this thesis that a discourse 
of post-September 11 insecurity has evolved through power relations between news media 
and governmental authorities.  
 
Legitimation and the Australian anti-terror laws  
 
In the previous chapter, legitimation was defined as the epistemological framework that 
situates understanding of the logic and need for legislative responses to insecurity. These 
forms of legitimation are forwarded within two discursive approaches. The first provides a 
contextual threat—defined within governmental discourse as terrorism—to promote the 
immediate need for legislative action. The second forwards the importance of governmental 
legislative action as the most logical response to this form of insecurity. Following 
Habermas’ definition of legitimation crises, I suggested that legitimation also strategically 
counter-acts dissenting discourses in the public sphere. Thus, these forms of legitimation 
situate strategic ‘arguments’ forwarded by governmental authorities to maintain hegemony 
over the representation of particular actions as the most pertinent responses to insecurity.  
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Importantly, this chapter also continues to build on the primary thesis argument regarding 
the power relations between the news media and governmental authorities that contribute to 
evolutions in a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. So far, discussion has focussed on 
processes of effective contestation of governmental discourse by media reportage. This was 
shown in the previous case study, which suggested processes of contestation of 
governmental discourse through somewhat united media representations. This chapter will 
imbue the discussion with more complexity, by illustrating that differing media organisations 
also compete with each other to both confirm and contest aspects of governmental 
discourse. This brings together the previous chapters’ discussion of the constraints and 
opportunities afforded to different cultural actors representing meaning in the public sphere, 
within a Foucauldian concern for the complex and inter-related relations of power that 
negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. In this section I will discuss these 
practices within a case study of the introduction of the Australian anti-terror legislation. 
 
As the legislative response to post-September 11 insecurity, the anti-terror laws represented 
governmental response to previously defined terrorist ‘others’. Most of the legislation 
comprised new juridical and police powers against potential terrorists, including: 
 
o The Anti-terrorism Act 2004. This Act gives ASIO the power to arrest and question 
terrorist suspects for longer time. The Act also strengthened the Crimes (Foreign 
Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 for training with armed forces overseas in relation 
to providing training to or receiving training from terrorist organisations. It also 
made provisions to those obtaining money from terrorist organisation in the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002.  
  
o The Anti-terrorism Act (No. 2) 2004. This Act created new ‘association’ offences that 
allowed law enforcement agencies to arrest individuals before actually engaging in 
terrorist activity. These offences specifically targeted the perceived support of 
terrorism.  
  
o The Anti-terrorism Act (No. 3) 2004. This Act prevents terror suspects from leaving 
Australia [1].  
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o The National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004. This Act prevents the 
disclosure of information in terrorism related criminal proceedings. Where a court 
finds that sensitive security-related information should not be disclosed it enables a 
court to use documents and information in a summarised or edited form. The Act 
also requires legal representatives to obtain a security clearance. 
   
o The Surveillance Devices Act 2004. This Act allows a broader range of surveillance 
devices to be used for a wider range of offences in relation to terrorism. It also 
enables senior law enforcement officers (rather than a judge) to authorise the use of 
surveillance devices in emergency circumstances.  
  
o The Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004. This Act enables a 
group or organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation under Australian law 
without first being identified as such by the UN Security Council. 
 
The Federal government capitalised on its parliamentary power in the Senate in the final 
sitting days before the 2004 Federal election to force another three acts in the Anti-terror bill 
through Parliament. Amongst other changes, the legislation introduced non-parole periods 
for terrorism suspects, the implementation of ‘special prisons’ for terrorists who posed a 
security concern, and allowing ASIO to demand a suspect surrender their passport (Farr, 
2004). The Coalition had eleven days of sitting time to propose the amendments, but chose 
to raise the changes along with legislation implementing a Free Trade Agreement with the 
US and a ban on gay marriages. This effectively cut debate time in the senate, which forced 
the vote on the proposed laws (Farr, 2004). After 42 hours of discussion on Free Trade 
Agreements with the US, Labor voted with the Coalition to toughen the criminal code.  
 
Despite Labor support for the legislation, the Attorney General Philip Ruddock left open 
the possibility for further stringency in the legislation, suggesting that there were gaps in the 
constitution that needed state support to toughen Australia’s response to terrorism [2]. At a 
2003 meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) the Federal government 
agreed that it would not create the amendments without the approval of the majority of 
states and territories (Colman, 2004). Thus the government announced that it would 
introduce further amendments to the September 2005 COAG meeting.  
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Given that state and territory governments who had the power to quash the amendments 
would attend the COAG meeting, the Federal government attempted to create a political 
atmosphere conducive to their actions. In the lead up to the COAG meeting, frameworks of 
legitimation underpinned governmental communication attempting to justify the more 
stringent legislation in the public sphere. For example, governmental authorities drew on the 
context of post-September 11 insecurity to propel representations of the need and logic of 
their increasingly strict laws.  
 
Prime Minister John Howard continually suggested the threat of terrorism warranted the 
need for much stricter laws: 
 
These laws are designed to protect the Australian public at a time of unprecedented 
and different threat…we’re not dealing with a conventional challenge, we’re dealing 
with a challenge the likes of which our societies haven’t seen before and we therefore 
need some laws of unprecedented toughness (Howard, 2005).  
 
In defining this threat, the Prime Minister can then suggest the need for much more 
stringent legislation as a ‘new response’ required to deal with a ‘new threat’. This need was 
articulated through what Habermas suggests as “exploiting the existing structures of 
prejudice” (Habermas, 1975: 69). This was evident in Howard’s continual ‘warning’ that the 
events of terrorism in New York, Bali and London created a need for the anti-terror laws in 
Australia. While expressing sympathy for the victims, Howard re-framed the tragedies as a 
kind of ‘forewarning’ for the Australian legislative context. In the lead up to the COAG 
meeting, Howard suggested that Australians ‘learn the lesson’ of London in recognising the 
need and logic of anti-terror laws in Australia (See Howard, 2005).  
 
This suggestion of the need for the laws created opportunities for governmental discourses 
to forward a continual representation of the logic of governmental legislative action. For 
example the Prime Minister could suggest that the laws were ‘above politics’ because of the 
logical need for the government to protect Australians. In introducing the amendments to 
the COAG meeting he said:  
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If we weren’t living in a terrorist environment none of us would be here; they’re not 
the sort of things that any of us, whether we are Liberal or Labor, would be 
proposing in an environment where we didn’t face this shadowy, elusive and lethal 
enemy (Howard, 2005a). 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, frameworks of legitimation often refer to 
governmental action as conducive to their role in protecting constructions of national 
identity. This reference effectively suggests that any opposition to the laws could be seen as 
politicking to the detriment of the Australian citizenry. These forms of legitimation are 
strategic ‘arguments’ forwarded by governmental authorities to maintain hegemony over 
alternate discourses. In this respect, governmental justification of the laws did not centre on 
explanation of the laws themselves, but instead utilised legitimation to suggest that post-
September 11 insecurity created the need for new laws.  
 
The success of legitimation as the framework for understanding the legislation was evident 
in the results of the COAG meeting. Even Premiers who had been directly opposed to 
aspects of the anti-terror laws gave their support. They argued that although the laws were 
unsavoury, the circumstances of the post-September 11 environment required extra juridical 
reach (Premiers back, 2005). The weight of the signification of post-September 11 terrorist 
threats was such that no governmental authority would risk recording their opposition to the 
laws in the wake of a terrorist attack on Australia.   
 
From a Habermasian perspective these events illustrate the power of the state over political 
action and strategic maintenance of the cultural ‘lifeworld’. As previously discussed, 
Habermas’ conception of legitimation crises is useful for conceptualising the discursive 
strategies utilised by governmental authorities to ensure their political power. Indeed, 
governmental authority is seen to be maintained by the apparent act of their submission to 
public will in the context of post-September 11 insecurity. This is because their suggestion of 
acting through the ‘body’ of the nation frames understanding of their actions as being more 
than simply maintaining political power. This illustrates Habermas’ suggestion of 
governmental ‘maintenance’ of the cultural sphere, where certain representations of 
insecurity are continually maintained to ensure the legitimacy of governmental authority.  
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In the previous chapter I suggested Habermas’ conception of legitimation crises limits the 
potential for alternate discourses to negotiate dominant representations of post-September 
11 insecurity. Habermas’ separation of the political and cultural sphere creates a problematic 
stifling of alternative discourses and their influence in the public sphere. Instead Foucault’s 
conception of power provides an understanding of the complexity of discursive techniques 
forwarded by various cultural actors. Foucault argued that a micro-economic analysis of 
power would show historical events as the agonistic domain of multiple discursive practices. 
These practices can, at any point, allow for the reversal of dominant power relations and 
discourses (in Hanssen, 2004: 294).  This is the starting point for suggesting that media 
processes of contestation and confirmation of governmental discourse can have 
consequences for the ways in which the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity is 
understood. This contributes the primary argument of this thesis that a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between news 
media and governmental authorities. These processes will now be discussed through analysis 
of media representation of the introduction of the anti-terror laws. 
 
Themes of legitimation and newspaper reportage 
 
Despite the success with which themes of legitimation were used within governmental 
presentation of the laws to Parliament, media reportage provided an opportunity to expose 
the political strategies underlying governmental discourse. In this section, the varied 
responses to governmental discourse within media reportage will be discussed. Taking a 
Foucauldian perspective, this analysis must take into account much more complex and 
interconnected negotiations of meaning. This includes the possibilities of antagonistic 
relations between newspapers themselves in forwarding contestation and confirmation of 
governmental discourse. Where Habermas’ conceptualisation of communicative action 
suggests that the public sphere must be unified in its contestation of governmental discourse, 
a Foucauldian perspective suggests that competing discourses often exist in tandem, 
contributing to change as they battle for hegemony over the meaning of particular 
representations. 
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We see this competition illustrated in newspaper responses to the anti-terror laws, which 
have traditionally occurred in regard to their simultaneously competitive and dependent 
relationship with government. Within this relationship various complexities have ensued. 
Elements of contestation within newspaper reportage have often negotiated particular 
governmental representations of post-September 11 insecurity. Some newspaper reportage 
has also served to confirm governmental discourse. This has sometimes occurred as a 
conscious editorial recognition of the commercial and political advantages of analogous 
discourses. This confirmation has also occurred inadvertently, through reliance on 
governmental discourse to frame news reportage, creating institutional restraints on the 
representations that a newspaper can present.  
 
Nonetheless, Foucault’s suggestion of contingent and micro-economic relations of power is 
also illustrated in the competition between different newspapers’ reportage, which was 
politically divided on the legitimacy of the laws. These elements of confirmation and 
contestation could be traced through two Australian mainstream newspapers: The Australian 
and The Age. While both newspapers are considered ‘serious’ broadsheet organisations, their 
politically opposed responses to the introduction of the anti-terror laws illustrate divergent 
processes of contestation and confirmation of governmental discourse. The editorial politics 
of the newspaper has in each case corresponded to their response to the anti-terror laws. A 
determined editorial decision of either confirmation or contestation of frameworks of 
legitimation is illustrated in the overall tone of their reportage.  
 
Discursive processes of contestation were evident in the reportage of Victorian newspaper, 
The Age. Though the newspaper is not radical in its political views, The Age’s readership is 
traditionally considered a mainstream liberal demographic. The Age’s reportage contested the 
frameworks of legitimation underpinning governmental discourse by re-positioning 
representations of the need and logic for the laws. This representation implied blatant 
distrust of the Federal government and the Prime Minister through descriptions of their 
secretive and manipulative actions. For example, in the month before the COAG meeting, 
the newspaper suggested that the simultaneous timing of the introduction of the anti-terror 
and the Industrial Relations legislation was a suspiciously-timed politicised act that would 
block in-depth discussion of both proposed Acts in Parliament (See Editorial, 2005). 
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Referring to a poll that suggested 70 per cent of Australians thought that a terrorist attack in 
Australia was inevitable (Munro, 2005: 4), an Age editorial suggests that:  
 
National security is fertile political ground for the government (only one in four 
voters supports its industrial relations and Telstra policies) so it is always ready to 
come up with new counter-terrorism measures (Editorial, 2005: 16).  
 
The Age’s editorial suggests that the “indecent haste” of the introduction of the laws would 
curtail parliamentary discussion of the laws that, the editorial warns, experts have suggested 
could turn the nation into a “police state” (Editorial, 2005: 15).  This reportage implies that 
the governmental legitimation of the anti-terror laws has been in the best interests of their 
political power, rather than the interests of the nation. 
 
Utilising this representation of political manipulation, The Age attempted to re-negotiate the 
frameworks of legitimation inherent in governmental representation of the laws.  This 
reportage attempted to re-position frameworks of legitimation in governmental discourse, to 
see them as a means of procuring political power, rather than the actions of protecting the 
nation. This is an important discursive strategy utilised to contest governmental discourse 
because, as Habermas suggests, governmental forms of legitimation are redundant as soon as 
they are seen as the procurement of political power. This is evident in reportage of the 
outcomes of the COAG meeting that implies suspicion of the bipartisan approach to the 
laws. For example, The Age’s article “Are we really safer now?” suggests that the government 
forced the Opposition’s hand on the anti-terror laws:  
 
The Federal government’s command of formidable security information, combined 
with all leaders’ wishes to make sure no one can ever accuse them later of not doing 
enough, guaranteed a tough line all round (Grattan, 2005).  
 
The Age is providing their own definition of the need and logic of legislative responses to 
insecurity. This definition suggested that: “Politicians, not terrorists or trade unions, are the 
biggest threat to Australian democracy today” (Davidson, 2005: 17). To this end, the 
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reportage implies that the laws are not a logical response to post-September 11 insecurity, 
but a political ploy. This re-negotiation is important because it attempts to diffuse 
governmental hegemony over the understanding of legislation through its alternate 
representation. This relates to the processes of contestation within power relations that I 
have been arguing lead to changes in the understanding of discourses about post-September 
11 insecurity.  
 
The Age’s re-definition of the sources of post-September 11 insecurity also challenged the 
need for the laws by suggesting that they did not protect Australians against terrorist attack.  
For example, an Age editorial suggested: 
 
There is a real danger that ordinary Australians will feel less safe, made constantly 
aware of the fact that authorities believe the terrorist threat has grown, without being 
given any concrete evidence to support this view (Editorial, 2005: 14).  
 
This article led a tirade of angry criticism from columnists in The Age, who suggested that the 
laws would introduce racist attacks. One reporter (Grattan, 2005) argued that the new police 
powers encouraged authorities to stop and search based on a person’s ethnicity:  
 
If young Muslims are pushed to the fringe of society, not because they have done 
anything, but because a jittery community worries they might…by arming the 
authorities to ensure those people don’t pose a threat, we might just help turn them 
into one?  
 
The Age’s editorial argument is clear: the need and logic suggested through frameworks of 
legitimation in governmental discourse are contrary to their representation of the laws. The 
representation of the anti-terror laws in the newspaper suggested instead that they are simply 
part of the procurement of political power, to the detriment of the citizens they are meant to 
protect.  
 
Despite The Age’s criticism of frameworks of legitimation, not all media provided 
contestation of governmental discourse. In contrast, national broadsheet newspaper The 
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Australian was supportive of the government’s initial action to ‘toughen’ Australian laws in 
response to post-September 11 insecurity. The reportage on the anti-terror laws in The 
Australian confirmed governmental discourses and was quite antagonistic towards media and 
politicians who contested the laws. This was evidenced in reporting strategies that confirmed 
governmental discourse by suggesting the need and logic of the laws and positioning 
opposition to the laws as politicking to the detriment of the Australian citizenry. 
 
In a tone reminiscent of governmental discourse, The Australian suggested the need for the 
laws as a ‘new response’ to a ‘new threat’. This is reflected in The Australian’s editorial, 
which mimicked John Howard’s suggestion that: 
 
Circumstances since 9/11 have been anything but normal… we must take whatever 
measures are necessary to minimise the chances of waking to an even greater horror 
than on that morning four years ago (Four years after, 2005: 9).  
 
In the lead up to the COAG meeting, this new insecurity was underlined through analysis of 
the London bombings as a reminder of the ubiquitous terrorist threat to Australia. The 
newspaper claimed that the anti-terror laws “build on what London has taught us about the 
modus operandi of home grown Islamist terror cells in multicultural Western nations” (Four 
years after, 2005: 9). This statement is similar to the kinds of responses the Prime Minister 
was making to justify the introduction of the laws and in mimicking his responses, the 
newspaper signals its confirmation of governmental discourse. 
 
This confirmation of the need for the laws translated into the newspaper’s suggestion of the 
logic of the laws as a response to post-September 11 insecurity. To this end, The Australian’s 
reportage continually positioned governmental action in a positive light. For example, an 
article headlined “Fighting fires with faith and reason”, outlined the hurdles that Prime 
Minister Howard needed to overcome to implement the anti-terror and IR laws (Shanahan, 
2005: 14). The article uses militaristic allusions to suggest that Howard had been gallantly 
“taking hits” for his government to make sure the reforms were carried. The audience is 
positioned to admire Howard’s “dogged determination, commitment to achievable policy 
goals, a realistic political approach and a sense of the inner rhythms of the electoral term and 
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judgement of the Australian people” (Shanahan, 2005: 14). This sense of admiration for the 
Prime Minister is also suggested in reportage of the COAG meeting where the newspaper 
suggested that the way Howard negotiated the anti-terror law proposals with the state 
premiers was fair. This represents critics of the laws as unreasonable in light of the 
frameworks of legitimation forwarded by the government: 
 
Howard knows that despite concerns about civil liberties and public confusion 
surrounding the laws, there is overwhelming support for tougher laws to fight 
terrorism. Australians know they are targets and want to know what can be done is 
being done (Shanahan, 2005: 14).  
 
With this statement The Australian has framed its reportage in opposition to the contestation 
represented in other newspapers. They do this by suggesting that the need for the laws is 
‘above’ politics. Whereas The Age attempted to re-position strategies of legitimation as 
political ploys by governmental authorities, The Australian adopted frameworks of 
legitimation to confirm governmental discourse about the need and logic of the laws.  
 
This difference in representation manifested in competitiveness between the newspapers in 
attempting to situate understanding of the laws. The Australian was much more overt in this 
competitiveness, condemning the journalists and media institutions that did not share its 
political views. For example, an editorial on the anti-terror laws suggested journalists at The 
Age and ABC news were creating ‘hysteria’ about the laws as a political ploy: 
 
… [these] obsessive Howard haters have so lost sight of what the new draft 
legislation is all about that they will suggest…[that] the risk to Australians is from 
state and federal governments. Wrong. In reality, Australia faces the risk that 
terrorists, who believe Australia is an enemy of Islam, will kill as many of us as they 
can (Editorial, 2005: 15). 
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This statement’s abrasiveness is revealing both in its adherence to the governmental 
discourse about the ‘terrorist other’, as well as the frameworks of legitimation situating 
understanding the laws. The Australian’s reportage is part of power relations between the 
commercial newspapers battling for the dominant representation of the laws. The different 
approaches to newspaper reportage suggest the processes of confirmation and contestation 
that attempt to negotiate governmental discourse about sources and responses to insecurity. 
The competitiveness between institutions has ramifications for the ways in which 
governmental action is represented in the public sphere. This contributes to the major 
argument of this thesis that discourses about post-September 11 insecurity have continually 
evolved according to power relations between media and governmental authorities. This is 
because each institution provides representations that affect understanding of the legislation. 
The negotiation of these differing representations provides a foundation for evolutions of 
the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
This competitiveness between cultural actors is evidenced by each newspaper’s reaction to 
the circumstances surrounding the final acceptance of the anti-terror laws in Parliament. On 
November 2, 2005, John Howard announced that he had received information from security 
agencies pertaining to the ‘imminent’ risk of a terrorist attack on Australian soil. He called an 
emergency sitting of Parliament to change the wording of existing anti-terror legislation, to 
allow security authorities to arrest the terror suspects without needing proof of a specific 
terrorist act. Essentially, the amendment changed the wording of the legislation from 
needing proof of ‘a’ terrorist attack to ‘the’ terrorist attack. This meant that the onus of 
proof on security authorities in making arrests was less restrictive.  
 
The reaction of The Age and The Australian illustrated not only the particular political 
subjectivities with which they represented the anti-terror laws, but also the competitiveness 
between these responses in the public sphere. Relating this competitiveness to Foucault's 
conception of power, we see that consensus is not a requirement of the media’s negotiation 
of governmental discourse. Foucault (1972) suggested that critique could be exercised 
individually and collectively with both practices still having ‘positive’ or actionable 
consequences for the representation of meaning. Therefore, the newspapers’ responses to 
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the legislative changes reflect Foucault’s rejection of consensus in the public sphere, showing 
that even oppositional discourses still share a decisive will towards notions of democratic 
freedom.  
 
 The Age’s reportage on the announcement was imbued with much the same contestation of 
governmental discourses as initial reportage on the anti-terror laws.  Given that the 
announcement was made at the same time as debate about the IR laws was meant to take 
place in Parliament, The Age’s reportage again centred on its suspicion of the need for the 
amendment. Jason Koutsoukis based his reportage on his suspicions of the Howard 
government’s manipulation of insecurity for political gain. Koutsoukis mounted his 
argument with a particularly sceptical rendition of the day’s events: 
 
How very convenient. With just a smidgin of doubt lingering over the need for the 
Federal Government's new anti-terror laws, out comes Prime Minister John Howard 
with some dramatic news to scare us all half to death and help smooth passage 
through Parliament… “We have seen material. It is a cause of concern,” said the PM 
with furrowed brow yesterday. What material? He wouldn't say. From whom? Not 
telling. Where? Wouldn't tell us that either. What sort of threat? A shake of the head 
to that one also. All the PM would say was that he is “satisfied on what I have been 
told . . . but I do not intend and cannot and will not go into any of the operational 
details”. How reassuring (Koutsoukis, 2005: 4).  
 
This sense of governmental manipulation was a defining feature of The Age’s criticism of the 
need for the amendment. Several subsequent reports in the days after the announcement 
suggested firstly, that potential terrorists would have been tipped off by the Prime Minister’s 
announcement, and secondly, that the raid had been planned for months and an ‘emergency 
announcement’ had been timed (See Silvester, 2005: 1; Dodd, 2005: 4).  
 
The newspaper’s editorial also attempted to link the timing of the announcement of the 
emergency situation with the debate over the IR legislation. This suggested the newspaper’s 
suspicion of the action in comparison to the level of threat. For example, the newspaper 
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prioritised critical opinion on the timing of the announcement, quoting the views of 
politicians who “would not rule out political interference" (Senate recall justified, 2005). By 
the end of the week when no raids had occurred, the newspaper began to merge its criticism 
of the anti-terror laws and the IR laws into an indictment on the government’s manipulation 
of its parliamentary power:  
 
There’s something very odd about the Federal Government's approach to public 
debate. On the one hand it's spending $40 million of taxpayers' money to promote 
“public awareness” about its controversial industrial relations bill. On the other, it's 
enshrining provisions that close down discussion about its anti-terror laws (Dodd, 
2005: 4). 
 
The Age forwards this view in its representation of Federal government action as 
manipulating the context of post-September 11 insecurity for political gain. This form of 
contestation is reminiscent of Habermas’ suggestion that legitimation is negated at the 
moment that its procurement is seen as a political ploy. The Age provided alternate 
representations of the need and logic of the laws in order to negate the legitimation situating 
understanding of the laws. Contestation of the need and logic of the laws therefore not only 
negotiates understanding of legislative action, but the power of governmental authorities to 
utilise these particular actions. This is because these alternate representations have 
consequences for subsequent political action and how it is understood in the public sphere. 
 
Despite these forms of contestation, when police finally raided properties in Melbourne and 
Sydney and arrested 17 men, The Australian saw the opportunity to confirm governmental 
discourses about the sources and responses to insecurity. Their reportage of the anti-terror 
raids was published in a series called “Terror hits home”, in a similar manner to the “Rat in 
the Ranks” series representing the capture of David Hicks. Reportage of the extent of the 
actual terrorist acts committed by the individuals arrested was subsumed by potentially 
thwarting an ‘imminent’ terrorist attack. The editorial on the day of the arrests triumphantly 
announced “that the price of life and liberty is eternal vigilance was made crystal clear by the 
raids and subsequent arrests of nine men in Melbourne and eight in Sydney yesterday” 
(Domestic dangers, 2005). This statement sought to displace criticism of governmental 
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authorities, who are represented in The Australian’s editorial as acting for the nation, rather 
than a particular political discourse. 
 
The newspaper utilised frameworks of legitimation to contextualise the event within broader 
understandings of post-September 11 insecurity. This is evident in the editorial’s warning 
that: “We must face the possibility that some young Australians have turned against us all. 
And there is nothing we can do to assuage their irrational anger” (Domestic dangers, 2005).  
The sense of the ubiquitous and ‘irrational’ threat of the terrorist other is thus seen as the 
legitimation of the actions taken by the government. This sense of imminent threat is also 
suggested in the newspaper’s news reportage, with journalists reporting that: “A massive 
terrorist attack on Australian soil has been narrowly averted” (Leys et al, 2005). This was 
reported as fact despite the ‘terrorist attack’ only being an allegation that had yet to go to 
trial. The newspaper also confirmed this representation of the introduction of the anti-terror 
laws by continuing its attack on other media. The newspaper went so far as to re-publish an 
article from another media source, Crikey, which suggested that “News is simply miles ahead 
of Fairfax in reporting national security issues” (The doubting Thomas, 2005: 17). In this 
way the newspaper provides proof to its readers that its discourse is the most pertinent in 
the public sphere. In competing with other ‘voices’ in the public sphere, this method of 
suggesting a hierarchy of importance in opinion is one way that a commercial media 
organisation can have a defining claim in representing the news in a particular way. This is 
important because maintaining a dominant discourse in the public sphere also increases the 
dominant institution’s cultural power.  
 
This confirmation of the anti-terror laws in media like The Australian was taken up by the 
Federal government as vindication of their actions in introducing the legislation. As I have 
previously suggested through Habermas’ work, governmental authorities use ‘juridical 
incantations’ as well as other cultural events justify their actions. In responding to criticism 
of the timing of the ‘emergency announcement’, John Howard said in the aftermath of the 
arrests: 
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I have always tried on security issues to act in the national interest. I knew we had to 
make that amendment. I knew it would strengthen the capacity of the authorities to 
respond…I also knew that as the days went by people would make the accusations 
that they did. The important thing is that we made the amendment (Howard, 2005e).  
 
With this statement Howard suggests not only his personal vindication, but also the 
legitimation of the anti-terror laws themselves.  His comments suggest his actions as the 
apolitical work of protecting the nation. Within this context, the arrests provide an apparent 
vindication of the need for ‘tougher’ anti-terror laws. Though the individuals arrested were 
yet to face trial, the prevention of a terrorist act was a defining factor in the acceptance of 
the need for the laws.  This also seemed to be a defining factor in the passage of the 
legislation by Parliament in December 2005, despite continued criticism from The Age and 
other groups in the public sphere.  
 
We see here an altogether different situation than that discussed in the previous chapters 
regarding ‘otherness’. In those chapters, media criticism resulted in changes in governmental 
discourse and action. In the complex negotiations between cultural actors over the 
representation of certain meanings, it can be seen that discursive contestation does not 
necessarily equate to a change in governmental action.  Especially when reporting on 
particular political issues, the ability of the media to push for change does not often threaten 
structures of government. This is because the media are constrained by their need to define 
their cultural power within a particular status quo. Just as governmental discourse is limited 
by particular institutional restraints, media reportage is simultaneously limited by restraints 
on its role as the ‘fourth estate’ previously discussed in Chapter Four. These restraints are 
usually caused by the focus on governmental structures in media reportage. This often allows 
governmental authorities to frame debate on certain political issues. For example, the ability 
for newspapers to adequately critique the anti-terror laws was limited because of reliance on 
governmental agencies for information. This was an advantage to governmental authorities 
who used this reliance to repeatedly maintain frameworks of legitimation in responding to 
media inquiry. This implicitly perpetuated representations most favourable to the 
introduction of the anti-terror laws through media reportage.  
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Furthermore, this reliance can also prove to be a limitation in terms of governmental control 
of the timing of information released. Given the deadline constraints of contemporary 
newspapers, reliance on governmental sources of information often leaves little time for in-
depth or sustained analysis of complex governmental information. The cultivation of ‘expert’ 
or insider opinion also takes time beyond newspapers’ deadlines and thus, media 
organisations are often forced to analyse material according to the paradigms set by 
governmental authorities, or to release criticism after governmental authorities are given an 
opportunity to communicate their particular discourses. Given that the media responds to 
events, governmental authorities often set the possibilities for critical analysis. This was 
evident in media reportage of the anti-terror raids because the amount of information 
available was dictated by what governmental authorities chose to release. Thus the media is 
always placed in a reflective, ‘outsiders’ position when reporting on political issues. This 
serves to highlight that even the media’s role in criticising legislation does not necessarily 
mean a revocation of the discourse, let alone a challenge to the legitimacy of the state. Often 
the media’s role in reporting particular events like the anti-terror laws simply maintains the 
structures of power employed by governmental authorities to make legislation.  
 
This chapter does not forward an argument that the media has the sole power to change the 
societal structures in which it participates. Instead this chapter illustrates the processes of 
contestation and confirmation forwarded by newspaper reportage that have served to 
negotiate governmental discourses regarding the introduction of the anti-terror laws. This 
illustrates that the media’s power often comes from the challenge it poses to the 
government’s power to represent meaning in certain ways, rather than its actual ability to act. 
The power of the media is most often situated within contestation of governmental 
representations of meaning in the public sphere.  
 
At the intersection of governmental discourse, media reportage and alternate discourse in the 
public sphere, the power relations between these cultural actors continually serve to mediate 
dominant meanings. The authority to represent meaning is fought over in the public sphere, 
which in turn sets the terms for future action. Thus, losing the credibility of a certain 
discourse is often damaging to claims of dominance over meaning. It is here that the media 
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is able to compel changes in governmental discourse and less explicitly, political action. 
These processes are reflected in the major argument of my thesis that a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through power relations between the media 
and governmental authorities.  The discursive processes of confirmation and contestation 
forwarded by cultural actors like the media provide alternate representations that affect 
understanding of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. In the next section I will turn 
to discussion of the processes of contestation forwarded by media reportage and its effects 
on a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
Negotiation of governmental discourse in Australian newspapers 
 
In this section I will illustrate that united media contestation of governmental discourses had 
greater ramifications for understanding of the anti-terror laws. This was especially evident 
when Australian governmental authorities attempted to justify the introduction of sedition 
provisions within anti-terror legislation. Frameworks of legitimation within governmental 
discourse to justify sedition were met with an especially critical response in both The 
Australian and The Age. Newspaper contestation was united through the shared conception 
that the sedition laws might infringe on the media’s cultural power as the Fourth Estate. 
Two powerful frameworks for understanding—legitimation and the Fourth Estate—were 
used in the battle over the meaning of this legislation. As a result, several media 
organisations and governmental authorities engaged in a power play for the dominant 
representation of sedition as a response to post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
The Attorney General Philip Ruddock introduced the sedition provisions in the Australian 
anti-terror legislation as an update to defunct 1914 treason laws. The sedition provisions 
effectively amended the wording of the legislation to outlaw the promotion of violence to 
overthrow or ‘urge disaffection’ against the Australian constitution, government or 
Parliament (Ruddock, 2005). Specifically, the sedition provisions created five new offences in 
the Anti-Terrorism Act that carried a seven-year jail term (Sedition Law, 2007). These 
offences included: urging interference in Parliamentary elections, urging violence within the 
community [3], urging the overthrow of the Constitution or government, urging a person to 
assist an enemy, and urging a person to assist an enemy engaged in armed hostilities against 
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the Australian Defence Force (Sedition Law, 2007). The Federal Government argued in 
Parliament that revitalising the sedition offences would: prevent terrorism, protect the 
integrity of electoral processes, protect public order from violence, and prevent seditious 
speech (Sedition Law, 2007). In the media, Attorney General Philip Ruddock suggested that 
the laws were meant to deal with extreme Islamic preaching to potential ‘home-grown’ 
terrorists (Ruddock, 2005). 
 
Frameworks of legitimation underpinned the Attorney General’s suggestion that Australia 
needed to be in a “stronger position” to “prevent new and emerging threats and to stop 
terrorists carrying out their intended acts” (Hot topics, 2007). Though he did not identify a 
specific threat, Ruddock suggested the laws “were not something we would like to see 
postponed” (Nicholson, 2005). These comments implied a sense of immediacy in the need 
for the laws, given previous representations of the enigmatic and ubiquitous nature of the 
terrorist threat. Thus the sedition laws were situated within governmental discourses about 
legislative responses to post-September 11 insecurity to suggest the appropriateness of the 
tougher laws. Ruddock argued that the Australian government created the sedition 
provisions as a tough response to “protect the community from those who would abuse our 
democratic values and threaten our harmonious and tolerant society” (Ruddock, 2005). In 
this way, governmental action is seen as a logical component of its maintenance of the state. 
This helps to legitimate governmental power, because it suggests their submission to the 
public will.  
 
This newer discourse was nonetheless subject to contestation by mainstream newspaper 
reportage. Even newspaper reportage in traditionally politically conservative newspapers 
such as The Australian was vehemently opposed to the sedition. Indeed, opposition to the 
sedition laws was the one shared concern between Australian mainstream newspapers, 
regardless of particular political subjectivities. This unified contestation of the sedition laws 
thus created opportunities for newspaper reportage to subject governmental discourse to 
more intensive negotiation. While frameworks of legitimation were successful in situating 
understanding of the anti-terror laws, the sedition laws proved to be more conducive to 
competitive relations between the media and governmental authorities. Within this battle 
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over representation of the laws, governmental communication of legitimation competed 
against media suggestion of their role as the ‘Fourth Estate’.  
 
In forwarding contestation of the legitimation of sedition laws, the media perpetuated a 
discourse of itself as the protected and important Fourth Estate. This refers to their role as a 
‘protectorate’ of free speech (See Saul, 2005: 15). Discourses about the Fourth Estate suggest 
the power of the media to advocate for, and protect democratic principles through its 
freedom to report on political and social issues. As I have previously discussed in Chapter 
Four, it is a discourse that many journalists forward in purporting to report objectively ‘for 
the public interest’. Obviously, notions of the Fourth Estate obscure the reality of news-
making as a commercial enterprise limited by revenue, resources and public relations. The 
discourse of the mass media as a watchdog on behalf of the public sphere relates to the 
newspaper’s representation of its authority to represent meaning. The newspaper is able to 
make claims on behalf of the public sphere that are nonetheless favourable to the newspaper 
in their battle with governmental discourse to represent the laws. In this way, the newspaper 
can claim its representation of the sedition laws as a battle with governmental authorities on 
behalf of the public sphere. Similarly to governmental discourse, the media must battle other 
discursive actors to maintain dominance of their representation of meaning in the public 
sphere.  
 
Newspapers based their criticism of the sedition laws on the danger that the laws posed to a 
liberal press, using appeals to Australian public interest to support their arguments. For 
example, newspapers like The Age claimed that journalists would not be able to report on 
court trials of terror suspects if the information was deemed sensitive to national security, or 
may be forced to relinquish their sources to security authorities. The newspaper reported 
that the provisions give “no automatic protection or qualified privilege for journalists who 
report the views of terrorists or even those who sympathise with them” (Dodd, 2005: 4). 
Even though the government argued that these provisions were not actually part of the 
sedition laws, these points were often used in reportage as a suggestion of an overall 
governmental ploy to curb free speech. The Age framed their reportage to suggest that all 
Australians would feel the consequences of the laws because they “undermine our 
presumptions of individual freedom” (Dodd, 2005: 4).  
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The Australian also took up these notions of the liberal press acting for the greater good. This 
contestation was presented within an editorial scare campaign about the sedition provisions. 
The Australian’s rejection of the sedition laws was a stark editorial change to the usual 
conservative political confirmation of governmental discourse. Where the newspaper had 
supported the implementation of the anti-terror laws, the sedition provisions were criticised 
because they infringed on the power of the media. Nonetheless, the newspaper represented 
this contestation as a battle on behalf of the public sphere. For example, in presenting 
criticism of the sedition laws, The Australian’s front-page feature claimed that the sedition 
laws also meant that: “Voters have turned on the Coalition and John Howard, denting his 
campaign to sell the government’s industrial relations revolution and tougher anti-terror 
laws” (Lewis, 2005:1).  
 
While The Australian’s contestation was based on the possible interference the sedition laws 
posed to the newspaper’s power, it was represented as part of a broader protection of free 
speech in Australia. For example, reporter Chris Merritt wrote that the sedition laws were 
“the ultimate barbecue stopper” because they stifled the Australian right to criticism (Merritt, 
2005: 13).  In doing so, the newspaper appeals to the audience by confirming its place as a 
political watchdog in the public sphere, suggesting their contestation as part of the 
Australian public’s anger. In a similar way to governmental discourse, this discursive strategy 
situates the media’s actions within a broader framework of national interest. This attempts to 
garner public support for their contestation, which adds to their power to negotiate previous 
governmental hegemony over representation of the anti-terror laws. 
 
The media’s claim to authority in the public sphere is situated against governmental 
discourse in battles over the representation of meaning. In drawing the battle lines for the 
representation of the sedition laws, The Australian actually wrote itself into the news.  It 
reported that: 
 
John Hartigan, executive chairman of News Limited made it clear that the nation’s 
biggest newspaper company would target the proposed anti-terror laws as a part of a 
new campaign in the battle for freedom of speech (Merritt, 2005: 23).  
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A month later, the newspaper made good on this threat by printing a ‘nightmare scenario’ 
involving a man persecuted by ASIO as an alleged terrorist (Day, 2005: 18). The ‘nightmare’ 
unfolds as the newspaper finds it is unable to report on the story because of sedition 
provisions in the anti-terror laws. The hypothetical editor laments:  
 
We can’t say the kid was arrested; we can’t say he was held without charge for 14 
days; we can’t say he was tortured; we can’t say Sam’s [the journalist’s] notes were 
seized. We can’t say anything. If we do, I’m going to jail for seven years (Day, 2005: 
18).  
 
The conclusion to this ‘nightmare’ is most revealing in its contestation of governmental 
discourse. Having given up on the terrorist story, the editor asks what other stories are 
available. The news editor replies:  
 
There’s this single mum sacked because she couldn’t work on Boxing Day. It’s part 
of the new industrial relations laws. They exempted Christmas Day but still gave 
bosses the right to sack people on the spot any other day.  
 
This story, which is meant to be embarrassing for the Federal government, is given the go-
ahead by the editor. In the last paragraph he suggests that his consolation is that there are 
enough of those sorts of stories “to keep us going until the next election” (Day, 2005: 18). 
This is obviously the newspaper’s ‘last laugh’, but more broadly, it suggests the authority of 
their reportage in the public sphere. The inference is obvious; on the discursive battle 
ground, this is a warning to the government of the newspaper’s dominance of the public 
sphere and ability to damage governmental discourse. 
 
Having recognised media scrutiny of the sedition laws, governmental and media discourse 
competed to represent the ‘truth’ about the laws. These relations of power played out in 
ways that consequently negotiated how the sedition provisions were represented. For 
example, Philip Ruddock embarked on a media campaign to ‘correct’ the media’s 
representation of the laws (See Ruddock, 2005). Capitalising on his power in the media as a 
‘credible source’, Ruddock proceeded to publish several editorial features in mainstream 
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newspapers, suggesting that the dissenting voices in the media were presenting 
“misinformation and scare-mongering” (Ruddock, 2005). Ruddock went so far as to 
physically pursue dissenting voices in the media, calling the John Laws radio talkback 
program to personally respond to a previous guest’s criticism of the sedition laws (Ruddock, 
2005a). In doing so, Ruddock attempted to steer media representation of the sedition laws 
along familiar lines of legitimation suggesting that the laws were a “matter that the Australian 
community wants to see addressed” (Uncertainty and doubt, 2005).  
 
These acts to gain control of representation could be constructed in terms of Habermas’ 
description of legitimation crises, where governmental authorities use appeals to ‘cultural 
discourses’ to ensure that legitimation is not seen as the procurement of political power. 
Media organisations are well aware of governmental management of what Habermas 
suggests as ‘obfuscating’ discourses presented within the public sphere (Habermas, 1976: 
123).  Contrary to Habermas’ suggestion of the acceptance of this obfuscation by the media 
or the public, this thesis argues that these processes are part of larger power relations 
occurring between groups within the public sphere arguing for a particular representation of 
meaning. This relates to the primary thesis argument by suggesting that power relations 
between media and government contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. As soon as governmental authorities begin to use these appeals in 
public communication, their actions illustrate the instability of their hegemony over 
discourse. In attempting to re-direct representation of the sedition laws, media contestation 
has an effect on the way the meaning of the laws were understood in the public sphere.  
These power relations thus affect the way a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity is 
understood and constituted within the public sphere. 
 
We see the consequences of this discursive competitiveness in the subsequent application of 
the sedition provisions. Though the anti-terror laws were passed, the Federal government 
was forced into amending the wording of the sedition provisions. The effects of media and 
public contestation can be seen in the suggestion in Parliament that the provisions were too 
severe. Contestation of the provisions was also seen to spur Parliament to force the 
government to allow an investigation into the use of the sedition laws by the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (ALRC). In its discussion paper released in May 2006, the ALRC 
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suggested that the laws needed to provide a clear line between legitimate dissent and those 
who urged violence against the state or fellow citizens (Ross, 2006). In June 2006, the first 
government-appointed Security Legislation Review Committee found that there had been no 
“excessive or improper” use of Australia’s new anti-terror laws (Editorial, 2006). The 
committee, chaired by a former Supreme Court judge Simon Sheller, found that although no 
executive abuses of the laws could be found, there were concerns about the potential threat 
to civil liberties. In particular, the committee recommended that the crime of associating 
with a terrorist group be repealed. It described the offence as transgressing rights to familial, 
religious and legal freedom of association, suggesting that: “the interference with human 
rights is disproportionate to anything that could be achieved by way of protection of the 
community” (Editorial, 2006).  
 
Despite the contestation mounted by media discourse about the sedition laws, their approval 
in Parliament and investigation by the Review Committee remained relatively under-
reported. This lack of interest from the news media allowed Attorney General Philip 
Ruddock to subsequently re-present the Committee’s findings in public communication. 
Ruddock dismissed the Committee’s suggestion to repeal the crime of association saying that 
the government had given “detailed consideration to all the recommendations, but we do 
not believe there is any justification for removing the association offence” (Editorial, 2006). 
In this respect, the discontinuation of discursive processes of contestation allowed 
governmental discourse to maintain unopposed the legitimacy of its actions in response to 
post-September 11 insecurity. What can be suggested is that media contestation forces 
governmental authorities to justify their actions. Thus, when battles occur between 
governmental and media discourses, this leads to negotiation of the representation of 
meaning. When media reportage fails to provide an alternative to governmental discourse, it 
remains dominant in the public sphere. This demonstrates that processes of confirmation 
and contestation by media reportage have effects on the representation of meaning within 
governmental discourse.  
 
As this chapter has illustrated, various power plays have had heterogenous effects on 
understanding of themes of legitimation within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. 
Where different media outlets fought over representation of the anti-terror laws, the 
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subsequent sedition provisions saw a united media contestation of governmental discourse. 
This suggests that the previous chapter’s discussion of Habermas’ separation of the cultural 
and the political sphere is too reductive. The negotiation of discursive themes such as 
terrorism, legislation and war within the public sphere is individual, subjective and 
contingent. Both discursive processes of confirmation and contestation contribute to 
changes in understanding of post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter demonstrates that 
where some meanings are dominant within particular discourses, the representation of these 
meanings are available for negotiation by other cultural actors in the public sphere. This 
follows a Foucauldian perspective, suggesting that as a result of these complex and 
interconnected processes of meaning making, the meaning of insecurity is continually open 
to change within the public sphere. This relates to the primary argument that I have been 
pursuing throughout this thesis because it shows that power relations between media and 
government contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity. 
 
The next chapter, Exceptionalism in the military war on terror, will explore epistemological 
frameworks of exceptionalism that have situated understanding of the use of military force 
against sources of insecurity. This chapter will argue exceptionalism situates governmental 
action as the most pertinent to the war on terror. This differs from legitimation, which 
justifies the need and logic of governmental action. Exceptionalism situates understanding of 
military responses within the exceptional moral authority of governmental actors needed to 
justify the use of violent action against others.  
 
Endnotes: 
 
1. It also amends the forensic procedure provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 to facilitate 
effective disaster victim identification in the event of a terrorist attack within 
Australia.  
 
2. Among the more controversial of these proposed were: the use of preventative 
detention for terror suspects, sedition offences with seven year jail terms, the use of 
control orders to restrict travel and work, broader jurisdiction for police to use 
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shoot-to-kill rules, and the ability for security authorities to restrict access to 
information to the public, legal representatives and the accused in terrorism trials. 
 
3. Ruddock’s remarks prompted accusations by the Federal opposition that the 
Attorney General was drumming up fear of terrorism as a political issue before the 
2004 election (Wroe, 2003). The shadow Attorney general Rob McClelland argued 
that Labor had not argued to change evidentiary aspects of the bill before the Senate 
and that what Ruddock had argued as the ‘defective’ parts of the law, were in the 
Government’s original bill (Wroe, 2003a).  
 
4. This offence in the sedition laws included (a) the person urges a group or groups 
(whether distinguished by race, religion, nationality or political opinion) to use force 
or violence against another group or other groups, and (b) the use of the force or 
violence would threaten the peace, order and good government of the 
Commonwealth (Australian Sedition Laws, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
 
 
 
 
PART FIVE 
 
MILITARY RESPONSES TO INSECURITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 239 
 
Chapter Nine 
The use of Exceptionalism in the military war on terror 
 
 
While the anti-terror laws were initiated as a domestic response to post-September 11 
insecurity, Australian governmental authorities have also engaged in military action as part of 
a global response to terrorism. The Australian government continually justified its 
controversial decision to join the Coalition of the Willing by suggesting that military action 
would free the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan from the tyranny of terrorist ‘others’ and 
install a ‘new’ democracy (National Security, 2007). This discourse was framed by an 
understanding of the exceptional moral and political authority of the Coalition of the Willing 
to forcefully impose constructed national virtues onto those nations. Thus, we see that 
military responses to post-September 11 insecurity have not just asserted the logic of 
governmental action, but also the power of governmental authorities to act.  
 
Having discussed governmental legislative action, this chapter now turns to the 
representation of military responses to post-September 11 insecurity. This chapter argues 
that epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism have situated understanding of 
governmental discourse representing a military ‘war on terror’.  Exceptionalism justifies 
military action by referring to both the political and moral right of governmental authorities 
to respond to threats to the nation. This shifts the previous chapter’s focus from the actions 
implemented in response to post-September 11 insecurity, to the representation of those 
who act. Therefore the chapters discussing legitimation and exceptionalism should be seen 
as inter-connected, because the legitimation of specific responses to insecurity is also 
reflective of a broader justification of governmental authority.  
 
This chapter will proceed firstly by defining exceptionalism as the epistemological 
framework that situates understanding of military action as the ‘exceptional’ right of 
governmental authorities to use force against terrorist others. The moral and political 
superiority implied by exceptionalism is subsequently used to exempt governmental 
authorities and their actions from critical judgement. This definition of exceptionalism will 
be sourced primarily from Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of ‘states of exception’. Agamben 
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argues (2005: 1) that the context of an ‘exceptional’ circumstance creates opportunities for 
governmental authorities to expand political power beyond traditional legal and moral limits.  
Nonetheless, in the third section of the chapter, Agamben’s analysis will be considered 
critically. I will suggest that frameworks of exceptionalism are part of discursive techniques 
that are necessarily subject to relations of power.  
 
Where Agamben defines how concepts of exception are utilised within governmental 
discourse, I will utilise Foucault’s theorisation of governmentality to distinguish the strategies 
involved in asserting governmental hegemony over its meaning. In the last section of this 
chapter I will utilise the two theorists to illustrate this chapter’s argument that the state’s 
ability to exert violence is often centred on discursive understandings of governmental 
power to act (McNay, 1994: 86). This will be discussed as part of the discursive techniques 
employed by governmental authorities to maintain hegemonic representations within power 
relations between media and government. This discussion will be related to the broader 
thesis argument by illustrating that these power relations contribute to the continual 
evolution of a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
Defining exceptionalism 
 
In this section I wish to define the context for a military response and its situation within 
frameworks of exceptionalism. In contrast to the legislative responses discussed in the 
previous chapters, the military war on terror revolves around the trans-national deployment 
of military force. Therefore the effects of this response to insecurity are not just felt 
domestically, but also on an international political, economic and social scale. Nonetheless, 
the discursive strategies examined in the legitimation of legislative action—namely the 
context of post-September 11 insecurity and the logic of governmental action—can be seen 
to frame the further justification of military force.  
 
A military ‘war on terror’ is defined as the Coalition of the Willing’s imposition of military 
force to fight against their defined sources of post-September 11 insecurity. The stated 
purpose of the war on terror is to end trans-national terrorism networks by enforcing a 
Western liberal democratic political system within defined ‘rogue’ states (NSCT, 2006) [1]. 
After the events of September 11, 2001, the US government identified Afghanistan and Iraq 
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as rogue nations whose governmental policies encouraged ‘terrorist others’ to carry out 
attacks on Western interests. As such, the war on terror was forged with the aim of replacing 
both the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the late Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in 
Iraq [2] with a Western liberal democracy. Critics of the continuing military campaigns in 
both countries have suggested that the war on terror is part of an overall policy of US 
domination of political and economic affairs in the Middle East (See Ali, 2003). This 
discourse has not been legitimated by governmental authorities acting within the Coalition, 
particularly the USA, United Kingdom and Australia. Rather the war has been justified by 
the exceptional nature of the post-September 11 world, and the exceptional moral authority 
of the Coalition of the Willing to provide an end to Islamic fanaticism. Within this context, I 
will now turn to definition of the epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism deployed to 
perpetuate this understanding of a military war on terror. 
 
Epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism provide the platform for governmental 
discourse to perpetuate understanding of their authority to act. This occurs via two specific 
discursive strategies. The first provides a contextual framework, suggesting the exceptional 
circumstances to which governmental authorities must respond. For example, within a 
discourse of insecurity, the post-September 11 period has been continually positioned by 
governmental authorities as an ‘exceptional’ political context in which equally exceptional 
responses from governmental authorities are justified (Howard, 2003). The second strategy 
refers to the moral and political superiority of governmental authorities to engage these 
exceptional responses in fighting the ‘war on terror’. This authority is sourced through 
suggestions of identification between governmental authority and the citizenry in protecting 
the nation.  
 
These strategies relate to the individualising and totalising qualities that I have previously 
referred to through Foucault’s conception of governmentality. Citizens, acting within the 
‘body’ of governmental action and authority form a unity, and with that, a single will (Burke, 
2007: 5).  It is constituted as a repulsion of the ‘other’, which it must respond to by 
controlling, transforming or destroying (Burke, 2007: 5). Extending from my discussion of 
otherness in Chapters five and six, the threat and difference defined by governmental 
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representation of the ‘other’, also works to justify legislative and militaristic responses as 
constitutive of the unity and belief of the nation. I have illustrated that terrorism is defined 
through epistemological frameworks of otherness that contrast the threat of terror to the 
protection of national belief and identity. Linked to this definition, epistemological 
frameworks of exceptionalism justify military responses by referring to the political status 
quo of governmental authority as protector of national belief and identity. Military action is 
thus seen as the political exercise and moral right of a protectorate authority. 
 
Given this positioning of military action, exceptionalism therefore refers to Australian 
governmental authority as part of the protection of Western democratic national belief. 
These beliefs underpin constructions of national identity, which is defined against terrorist 
‘others’. By extension, governmental action as the protector of the nation is seen as morally 
and politically superior to those nations that harbour terrorist others. Similarly to discussion 
in chapter five, the definition of an enemy—as the Other—is specifically constitutive of the 
state itself. Without an other to define itself against, the state cannot exist. Therefore, “the 
opponent’s way of life… must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s form of 
existence” (Schmitt, 2006: 26). Sources of insecurity such as terrorism are constructed 
through the construction of the exceptional quality of one nation’s belief over ‘others’. This 
sense of identification also propels a sense of emergency as governmental authorities 
strategically deploy responses to the sources of insecurity defined by the other. These actions 
are justified by the exceptional circumstances of insecurity, as well as the exceptional 
authority of governmental action itself. 
 
Frameworks of exceptionalism can refer to the justifiability of military action by suggesting 
political and cultural superiority of the nation, giving ‘us’ the exceptional power to forcefully 
police ‘them’. For example, US governmental authorities have continually presented the 
nation’s role in military operations as a process of giving those nations the superior 
democratic principles that western nations enjoy. This draws focus away from the violent 
consequences of warfare and towards notions of the moral foundations of governmental 
action. In this regard, President George W. Bush could suggest that in beginning the Iraq 
war that: “when we talk about war, we are really talking about peace” (Bush, 2004). 
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President’s Bush’s comment demonstrates the deployment of exceptionalism, where the 
violent consequences of war could be obscured by the moral actions he suggests underpins 
governmental action. 
 
Exceptionalism was also evident within Australian governmental discourse justifying the 
decision to commit a military presence to Iraq in 2003. In his initial public announcement of 
the decision, Prime Minister John Howard firstly contextualised the exceptional nature of an 
era of post-September 11 insecurity, suggesting that: “there is something different about the 
world we now live in, which does require a different response” (Howard, 2003).  This 
response was the deployment of 2000 military personnel to Iraq to quell terrorism in the 
region by force. Though this was an immensely controversial decision [3], Prime Minister 
Howard (2004) suggested that a military response was in the national interest because it 
spread democratic principles throughout the world: 
 
We [the Coalition of the Willing] share the values of aspirational people … for a free 
and democratic Iraq…If the democratic future of Iraq can be achieved, that will have 
beneficial consequences not only in Iraq, but it will also be a wonderful 
demonstration in the Middle East and around the world that democracy is not 
something which is confined to countries that have historically enjoyed it. 
 
This comment suggests that Australia is not engaging in warfare, but assisting in the 
“reconstruction of Iraq” according to Western principles (Howard, 2003). In this context, 
Australian governmental authorities are seen to be acting within exceptional moral 
principles, bringing liberal democracy and freedom to Iraq. The importance implied by rogue 
nations gaining these principles thus eclipses the violent force through which they are 
spread. 
 
By associating military action with moral superiority, frameworks of exceptionalism can also 
be seen as an attempt to undermine criticism of governmental responses to insecurity. To do 
this, exceptionalism refers understanding of governmental actions to oppositional actions 
such as:  “good over evil, democracy over tyranny, freedom over anarchy, law over chaos, 
west over east” (Lewis, 2005: 206). The implied ‘logic’ of governmental actions over these 
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oppositions frames the notions of moral superiority used to exempt governmental actors 
from critical judgement. These oppositions suggest that governmental action can never be 
wrong, or at least is always ‘less wrong’ than those of their opposition. For example, while 
US authorities have used extreme ‘rendition’ interrogation techniques of terrorism suspects 
in other countries, they have systematically denied claims of torture. Instead, US President 
Bush situated practices of rendition in opposition to the filmed public execution of hostages 
by Middle Eastern militants (Bush, 2005). The gruesome actions of the militants confirmed 
previous governmental representations of terrorists who “kill innocent people…and kill 
children” (Bush, 2005). In comparison, practices of rendition were presented as a necessary 
action designed to stop the actions of those militants. Thus a moral distinction is made 
between the violence of the ‘other’ and the nation’s justified “violence of justice” within a 
war on terror—which has also killed innocent people and children (Lewis, 2005: 225).  
 
Representation of both the exceptional nature of the post-September 11 era and more 
implicitly, the exceptional superiority of Western democratic nations, justifies actions outside 
norms of law and democracy for the purpose of enforcing those attributes elsewhere. It also 
represents any damaging consequences as aberrational, in consideration of the overall logic 
of their actions. In the following case study this will be further illustrated by governmental 
communication regarding events of abuse of Iraqis by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib 
prison.  
 
In an ideologically driven debate—such as the justification for going to war—a government 
may utilise frameworks of exceptionalism to create an atmosphere permissive of violent 
action. This avoids discursive recognition of similarities between governmental violence and 
the violence of ‘others’ that would reduce the moral justification of their actions. This is 
important because it allows governmental authorities to secure ‘arguments’ for both the 
legitimacy of their actions and their political and cultural authority to initiate those actions. 
The existence of exceptionalism therefore suggests the threat that dissenting discourses pose 
to the actions of governmental authorities because of the discursive strategies that are 
initiated to attempt to quell that dissent. We can relate this to the broader thesis argument 
that power relations between governmental authorities and the media have contributed to 
the continual evolution of discourses of post-September 11 insecurity.  While the existence 
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of exceptionalism attempts to perpetuate governmental hegemony over the representation of 
meaning in discourse, these strategies are negotiated by discursive interaction with the media 
within the broader power relations that contribute to discursive change. In suggesting this 
definition of exceptionalism, it would now be pertinent to discuss the theoretical framework 
for this definition. In the next section the definition of exceptionalism will be discussed via 
Giorgio Agamben’s work on the ‘state of exception’. 
 
The State of Exception 
 
The definition of exceptionalism that I have described above is significantly influenced by 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.  His text, State of Exception (2005) argues that declared 
states of exception are part of particular political strategies to increase governmental power 
(Agamben, 2005: 1). To illustrate this, the text explores historical moments in Western 
democracy where juridical norms are suspended for the stated purpose of protecting 
democracy and law. Agamben takes this premise from political theorist Carl Schmitt, who 
suggested a ‘state of exception’ to define a political context which advocated the sovereign 
suspending normal legal order to respond to an immediate threat to the state (See Schmitt, 
1996). Theorists such as Judith Butler (1996) have also used Schmitt’s conceptualisation to 
discuss the relationship between war and human rights. 
 
Agamben defines a ‘state of exception’ as a juridical paradigm where an exceptional context 
allows forms of military authority into the civil sphere, while simultaneously suspending 
constitutional norms that protect civil rights (Agamben, 2005: 5). This paradigm is 
represented by governmental authorities as acceptable because it does not constitute a 
dictatorship, but rather “a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal 
determinations are deactivated” (Agamben, 2005: 50-51). Instead, the suspension of legal 
norms is justified by the articulation of exceptional political contexts, such as war or security 
threats. The expansion of governmental power is established through discourses that suggest 
“fundamental laws could be violated if the existence of the state and the juridical order were 
at stake” (Agamben, 2005: 20).   
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Though his analysis is grounded in exploration of political action within juridical systems, 
Agamben’s analysis is useful because he also illustrates that the state of exception is part of 
the discursive techniques of confirming governmental power. As I suggested previously, 
exceptionalism provides the contextual framework through which governments suggest the 
legitimacy of otherwise controversial actions. He identifies several key connections between 
political action to extend governmental power and their justification through discourses 
pertaining to post-September 11 insecurity. For example, US President Bush’s decision to 
refer to himself as the ‘Commander in Chief of the Army’ after September 11, 2001, can be 
considered a discursive claim to exceptional powers because it implies governmental 
authority to preside over a much broader range of political action (Agamben, 2005: 20). The 
President’s new title suggests that governmental authority can extend beyond legislative 
norms in exceptional circumstances. 
 
In times of crisis a democratic, constitutional government must temporarily be 
altered to whatever degree is necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal 
conditions. This alteration invariably involves government of a stronger character; 
that is, the government will have more power (Agamben, 2005: 8).  
 
Similarly, post-September 11 insecurity provides governmental authorities with a discursive 
context to justify their power to act. This power also includes the ‘strengthening’ of 
governmental legislative and military responses, justifying increasingly intrusive or violent 
measures as ‘exceptional responses’ to ‘exceptional circumstances’.  
 
By using these paradigms of exception, the conception of governance is transformed from 
purely legislative to be allowed intervention in all aspects of democratic life. For example, in 
the previous chapter governmental claims for extra police and regulatory controls in 
legislation shows how a context of insecurity can increase the perceived need for 
governmental powers. Similarly, governmental authorities suggest that warfare creates 
exceptional circumstances for political intrusion into traditional civil and legal rights for the 
‘good of the nation’. These frameworks continually create the political conditions for the 
acceptance of these exceptional actions through referral to their need in an exceptional 
context. 
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Exceptionalism therefore allows governmental authorities to claim to be applying moral 
principles of law and democracy to others, while simultaneously exempting their own actions 
from the grasp of those principles (Agamben, 2005: 86-87). As previously suggested, the 
state of exception creates a ‘framework of opposition’ where governmental actions are posed 
against defined ‘enemies’. In communicating this opposition within discourse, government is 
representative of democratic and juridical order while the ‘other’ is the collapse of that order, 
represented by actions not conducive to governmental authority. In maintaining a 
relationship of power with its ‘other’ the governmental authority who proclaims the state of 
exception remains anchored in the legal order and yet, able to act outside the law. Therefore, 
the state of exception introduces a zone of anomy into the law (Agamben, 2005: 50). 
Agamben argues that: 
 
This space devoid of law seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the juridical 
order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to 
ground itself, the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an 
anomie (Agamben, 2005: 50-51).  
 
Agamben suggests that this is a paradoxical discourse because those who represent the 
maintenance of juridical order also have the power to annul those juridical obligations for 
political benefit. Thus in a state of exception, juridical norms are annulled by governmental 
authority and are yet presented within a framework of juridical norms (Agamben, 2005: 34).  
 
Agamben’s definition of a space devoid of law is illustrated within governmental discourses 
regarding a military war on terror. Prior to initiating the war against Iraq, the US, United 
Kingdom and Spain proposed a resolution to give Iraq a deadline to comply with weapons 
inspections before a possible military intervention. This proposed resolution was 
subsequently withdrawn because not enough countries supported it. This would have made 
any military attack illegal within the both the UN and NATO charters. The Secretary 
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan reiterated this claim, indicating that military 
attack “was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view, from the 
charter point of view, it was illegal” (Iraq War illegal, 2004). Nonetheless, forcible 
disarmament was supported by a majority of the US Congress and this authorisation was 
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used by the Bush Administration as the legal basis for the Coalition to invade Iraq. Bush’s 
authority as protector of the US allowed his justification of the attack along discourses of 
national security. The exceptional circumstance of the September 11 attacks on the US also 
followed the suggestion of a moral and political right to respond to the threat Iraq posed as a 
‘rogue nation’. We can thus suggest that in initiating the war in Iraq, issues of legality became 
subjective arguments on the basis of what the Coalition of the Willing presented as an 
exceptional threat.  
 
As Agamben suggests, in maintaining a relationship of power with its ‘other’, a state of 
exception allows governmental authority to continue to suggest a legal order despite acting 
outside normal legal rules. Acts committed during a period of exceptional necessity cannot 
be criticised according to legal or democratic norms. This is because these actions escape 
legal definition: “they are neither transgressive, executive, nor legislative, they seem to be 
situated in an absolute non-place with respect to the law” (Agamben, 2005: 86). As they 
escape legal definition, these actions in response to exceptional necessity also have 
justifiability beyond the rule of law because of their “originary character”. This refers to the 
imperative that necessity is dealt with before anything else (Agamben, 2005: 28).  For 
example, though the existence of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba is seen to 
be divergent from the legal norms of detainment of prisoners of war, the state of exception 
fuelled by discourses of post- September 11 insecurity creates a ‘legal non-place’ in which the 
facility can exist (See Butler, 1997). The US government can cite the necessity of protecting 
the state within exceptional circumstances to exempt their practices from condemnation. 
 
Frameworks of exceptionalism can thus be seen to manifest within governmental discourses 
attempting to situate these acts as being in the best interests of the nation. In this way, 
exceptionalism can be viewed within discursive strategies that assist governmental actors to 
legitimise their actions. Agamben (2005: 25) suggests these strategies as ‘political fictions’. 
(2005: 25). These political fictions communicate a sense of necessity, which changes a 
particular context from the ‘norm’ into a state of exception. The repeated articulation of the 
necessity of governmental action creates an exceptional context where: 
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… he who acts beyond the letter of the law in a case of necessity does not judge by 
the law itself but judges by the particular case, in which he sees that the letter of the 
law is not to be observed (Agamben, 2005: 25). 
 
This discursive strategy was illustrated in the previous case studies such as the ‘Be Alert, Not 
Alarmed’ campaign and the introduction of the anti-terror legislation. Controversial 
governmental action was legitimised through the exceptional context of post-September 11 
insecurity, which allowed their actions to transgress traditional legal boundaries concerning 
civil liberties.  
 
Relating Agamben’s analysis back to the thesis, we can suggest these ‘political fictions’ of 
necessity, like all discourses, entail subjective framing. Governmental authorities relinquish 
legal boundaries according to their subjective understanding of necessity.  Thus Agamben 
suggests the necessity of exceptional governmental power can be critiqued because: 
 
The recourse to necessity entails a moral or political evaluation, by which the 
juridical order is judged and is held to be worthy of preservation or strengthening 
even at the price of its possible violation (Balladore-Pallieri cited in Agamben, 2005: 
30).  
 
Agamben suggests that this subjectivity of representation is the “central fiction” of 
governmental actors battling against counter-discursive actions (Agamben, 2005: 87). Thus 
governmental communication of necessity is a discursive argument for a particular 
understanding of their authority to act. The subjectivity of this representation reveals 
struggles to form a hegemonic structure of meaning. As I have suggested previously, the 
existence of epistemological frameworks such as exceptionalism reveal this struggle in 
discourses representing governmental action as the most pertinent in a war on terror. In 
doing so, exceptionalism reveals the power relations that contribute to the continual 
evolutions in meaning. This is suggested by the primary argument of this thesis that a 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity has continually evolved through the power 
relations between media and government. The struggle to form a hegemonic representation 
of post-September 11 insecurity contributes to changes in the understanding of its meaning. 
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Given this focus on the negotiation of meaning, I will now turn to discussion of how 
Agamben’s analysis can be reconciled with the Foucauldian conception of power relations 
utilised in this thesis. 
 
Exceptionalism and Governmentality 
 
This section will now critically discuss Agamben’s conception of the state of exception. 
Criticisms of Agamben’s work will be discussed within the broader Foucauldian perspective 
of this thesis. In describing the state of exception, Agamben’s analysis was influenced by 
Foucault’s conception of governmentality. Agamben suggested that the conception of 
governmentality preceded the theorisation of the state of exception by outlining the ways in 
which governmental power was presented as logical and therefore, indispensable (Agamben, 
2004). Where the state of exception focuses on the discourses perpetuated by governmental 
authorities to extend their powers, governmentality suggests the initial practices of justifying 
governmental power as a political status quo. Governmentality distinguishes the features of a 
‘governmental rationality’, which enabled Agamben to describe the state of exception as a 
strategy aimed at expanding and justifying governmental authority. 
 
Nonetheless, the possibility for contestation of governmental discourse remained 
unexplored by Agamben. His focus did not extend to the possibilities for change inherent in 
discursive representations of the state of exception. This section will thus expand on 
Agamben’s initial theorisation using Foucault’s conception of governmentality.  This will 
suggest that governmental authority is a complex form of power reliant on discursive 
acceptance of their actions to exert influence. This relates to the broader thesis argument 
because it demonstrates that governmental use of exceptionalism is not self-sustaining, but 
utilised within power relations that continually negotiate the meaning of post-September 11 
insecurity. 
 
Foucault’s analysis is useful at this point because Agamben does not suggest the ways in 
which the representation of exception could be contested or altered by other cultural actors. 
Though he does suggest that the state of exception is a subjective political fiction that can be 
criticised, the dominance of governmental authority over meaning seems to be fixed. This 
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becomes more apparent when Agamben uses his empirical data to suggest a “permanent 
state of exception” (Agamben, 2005: 9). For example, he refers to the contemporary Italian 
political system suggesting that: 
… the democratic principle of the separation of powers has today collapsed and that 
the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power. 
Parliament is no longer the sovereign legislative body that holds the exclusive power 
to bind the citizens by means of the law: it is limited to ratifying the decrees issued 
by the executive power…though this transformation of the constitutional order 
(which is today underway to varying degrees in all the Western democracies) is 
perfectly well known to jurists and politicians, it has remained entirely unnoticed by 
the citizens (Agamben, 2005: 17).  
 
Agamben suggests here that citizens have no knowledge of their apparent repression, but 
more importantly, that they are incapable of changing this state of affairs. This is made 
evident through his belief that the tendency of all Western democracies is “the declaration of 
the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalisation of the 
paradigm of security as the normal technique of government” (Agamben, 2005: 14). This 
conception undermines the value of Agamben’s work in suggesting the complex logic of 
relations between governmental sovereignty, democratic principle and citizenry. Given that 
the power of government in a state of exception is reliant on the suggestion of state of 
emergency, I would suggest along the broader thesis perspective that this reliance gives rise 
to contestation of those declarations. In Agamben’s analysis, the creation of a situation of 
emergency only creates an intensification of governmental power. 
 
The state of exception seems to be suggested as an imposition of power by a governmental 
discourse whose hegemony over meaning cannot be escaped. The absence of freedom to 
resist implies a state of absolute domination. This is not consistent with this thesis’ 
illustration of the negotiation of particular representations of insecurity. Even if we suggest 
that contemporary states of exception seem to have no clear end point (for example,  that 
Guantanamo detainees are to be held until the ‘war on terror’ is over), the exceptional 
practices themselves, and the victims of those actions are still understood in terms of an 
exceptional relation with the norm. In this respect, governmental authorities still require a 
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discursive ‘logic’ for the declaration and enactment of a contemporary state of exception. 
This chapter argues that the reliance on this discursive logic of exception exposes 
governmental authorities to processes of conteststaion, rather than simply creating a 
monolithic executive. Therefore, the more indirect techniques suggested by governmentality 
extend Agamben’s analysis by including the possibility for discursive change within more 
heterogenous conceptions of power. That is to say, power relations are possible because 
cultural actors have the potential to contest dominant representations of meaning.  
 
In his lectures on governmentality, Foucault did not simply refer to political and 
administrative structures, but also the ways in which the conduct of individuals could be 
influenced within a relation of power (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 81). Governmentality is 
referred to as the centralisation of this power, manifesting indirectly through ‘strategies of 
governance’. These discursive strategies produce particular understandings of the conduct of 
the self and the population for the prosperity of the state, to which one either conforms or 
resists (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 81). I have discussed this previously as the individualising 
and totalising practices of governmentality.  By analysing governmentality, Foucault wanted 
to suggest that while centralisations of power did exist within culture, the effects of this 
power were contingent and indirect, giving the possibility of effective contestation of 
governmental hegemony. Governmentality was thus conceptualised as an activity aiming to 
shape, guide or affect the conduct of individuals and populations through an ensemble of 
“institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections; the calculations and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific, albeit complex form of power” (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 
103).  These multiple activities could result in the efficient management of the population, 
though their effects would be mostly heterogenous and indirect (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 
119). 
 
In contrast to Agamben, Foucault conceptualised discursive strategies as part of an ‘art of 
government’. This is less about the imposition of power on populations and more about the 
range of multiform tactics applied by government to suggest the ‘truth’ of their authority. As 
Foucault (in Burchell, 1991: 81)suggests:  
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My problem is to see how men govern themselves and others by the production of 
truth…not the production of true utterances, but the establishment of domains in 
which the practice of true and false can be made ordered and pertinent.  
 
The establishment of these domains allows governmental authorities to that suggest their 
management and surveillance of the state is an acceptable model of political action. Within 
an ‘art’ of government this is a strategy deployed to combat discourses forwarded by other 
cultural actors in the public sphere.  
 
Foucault illustrates that the techniques of government are continually contested according to 
complex cultural interactions within certain historical and political contexts.  For example, 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality would suggest that governmental discourses about 
responses to post-September 11 insecurity illustrate a range of techniques to suggest the 
need and logic of their actions. The ‘art of government’ can thus be utilised to discuss the 
discursive strategies in place to legitimise governmental power to act. Nonetheless, these 
strategies are always posed against the representations of other cultural actors. The need to 
continually maintain governmental discourse suggests the effects that power relations with 
other cultural actors might have on their hegemony over these understandings. This allows 
the broader thesis to illustrate the ways discourses about post-September 11 insecurity might 
evolve in relation to power relations between government and media reportage. In 
strategically maintaining a discursive representation of the need and logic of their actions, 
governmental authorities are constantly acting in response to alternate representations of 
their actions in the public sphere.  
 
We can see these strategies illustrated in Foucault’s suggestion of the discourses of 
maintaining security as the main paradigm of modern governance. Within this discourse, 
regulation over possible threats justifies governmental authority. This method of ensuring 
the political, economic and social ‘common good’ creates paradigms of security that ensure 
governmental authority as part of the everyday management of the nation. 
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The ‘common good’ refers to a state of affairs where all the subjects without 
exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to 
which they are assigned and respect the established order so far as this order 
conforms to the laws imposed by God on nature and men. In other words, the 
common good means essentially obedience to the law either that of their earthly 
sovereign or that of God, the absolute sovereign (Foucault in Burchell, 1991:95).  
 
These representations of security, similarly to frameworks of exceptionalism, suggest the 
prioritisation of governmental authority in the management of the state. Thus, governmental 
power is not imposed directly on citizens but suggested as ‘acceptable’ through the 
discursive representation of the successful state. Foucault’s conception of security precedes 
discussion of exceptionalism by initially suggesting the ways in which governmental power is 
made to seem the most legitimate form of managing the nation. Stemming from this 
conception of a ‘governmental rationality’, exceptionalism extends this acceptability to 
actions that are outside governmental norms by suggesting the overall logic of governmental 
power to manage the state. 
 
Foucault regarded security similarly to Agamben’s notion of ‘necessity’, in that 
representations of security suggest the imperative of particular governmental action. This 
implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, the government must ensure the greatest 
possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means 
of subsistence, and that the population are secure from threat (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 
97). Whether or not these responsibilities are being adequately satisfied, practices of 
governmentality present strategies to continually suggest their effective management of the 
state. These are represented as methods of imparting security for the well-being of the nation 
in a variety of different ways: firstly, a discourse of security posits itself within a series of 
probable events, it evaluates the comparative costs of insecurity to the prosperity of the 
nation, and lastly, it prescribes action by demarcating the optimum result for the population 
(Foucault in Burchell, 1991:21). These processes of representation have been illustrated 
throughout this thesis, where governmental authorities present the sources of, and responses 
according to their threat to the nation. This relates to exceptionalism because effective 
management and protection of the nation has been forwarded as the justification for military 
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action. Even when these actions transgress traditional juridical norms, a governmental 
rationality suggests the logic of those actions in response to threats to security. 
 
In ensuring the nation’s security, the successful management of the state by governmental 
authority is seen as having an impact on the success of the individual. As I have suggested 
previously, the individualising and totalising qualities of governance suggest the protection 
and needs of individual citizens are met through the united ‘body’ of governmental rationale. 
This implies that the successful state is also dependent on the individual behaving within the 
best interests of successful governance. Thus, governmental authority presents forms of 
regulation of the individual that are represented as good government of the state. This 
regulatory technique equates the happiness of the individual with the state’s strength. In 
previous discussion of governmentality I suggested that this notion is paradoxical. On the 
one hand, governmental strategies seek to increase the happiness of citizens in terms of 
individual quality of life. On the other, this is achieved through intensification of regulatory 
controls over individual’s behaviour: “to develop these elements constitutive of individuals’ 
lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state” 
(Foucault in McNay, 1994: 122).  This can be related further to the paradoxical claims of 
governments to be acting within political and moral rights in responding to threat by 
transgressing juridical norms.  
 
It is the tension between these two aims that illustrate the complex power relations between 
cultural actors fighting for hegemony over meaning. As illustrated within this chapter, 
governmental discursive arguments for particular representations of meaning are presented 
in ways that are most conducive to governmental power. Foucault suggests that they are also 
resisted by counter-discursive movements attempting to contest their hegemony over 
meaning. Governmentality refers not only to regulation, but also to a process in which ‘free’ 
cultural actors attempt to govern others by influencing their actions. Indeed, Foucault 
defines the complex interconnectivity of power relations between government and other 
cultural actors as: “a mode of action which does not act immediately and directly on others. 
Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action” (Foucault in McNay, 1994: 126). 
In contrast to Agamben, governmentality illustrates that power is not simply imposed upon a 
person ‘from above’, but manifests as an agonistic struggle between different cultural actors 
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(McNay, 1994: 86). In the following case study, the paradoxical notions of governmentality 
will be further illustrated in the response of governmental authorities to events of abuse at 
Abu Ghraib. Epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism were evident in governmental 
discourses suggesting the moral authority of Western political intervention in Iraq to 
counteract media criticism of the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib. 
 
As Agamben and Foucault have suggested, the repeated use of exceptionalism is a political 
strategy, situating discourses that constantly assert the ‘logic’ of governmental authority. This 
is evidenced by the use of exceptionalism to situate representations of the military war on 
terror as the only response to post-September 11 insecurity. In providing the framework for 
exceptionalism as a discursive theme, Giorgio Agamben has suggested the political strategies 
that are employed by governmental actors to justify their actions. The declaration of an 
exceptional circumstance creates a ‘zone devoid of law’ through which governmental 
authorities can act outside of legal or moral norms. In this way Agamben’s state of exception 
relates to the chapter argument by showing the ways in which governmental discourses are 
deployed to legitimate the authority of what are essentially political discourses. Foucault has 
extended this argument in his conception of governmentality. Foucault suggested that a 
‘governmental rationality’ forwarded discursive claims to the logic of governmental 
structures to regulate individual behaviour ‘for the good of the state’. Governmental action is 
thus represented within discourse as the ‘logical’ method of managing the state, giving 
governmental action an inherent acceptability over other cultural actors. 
 
Foucault also emphasised the complexity of different power relations, suggesting that 
governmental influence within relations of power is more indirect and diffuse. This is 
opposed to Agamben, whose conception of the state of exception suggested that forms of 
governmental control could be resisted, but not the hegemony of governmental meaning 
making. Foucault extends the definition of exceptionalism by suggesting that hegemonic 
meaning is often realised indirectly through a convergence of different social practices 
(McNay, 1994: 125). This relates to the broader thesis argument because it suggest that ways 
in which power relations between media and government can contribute to evolutions in 
representations within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Foucault’s conception 
suggests the possibility of discursive interaction between cultural actors that contribute 
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differing representations of meaning within the public sphere. These differing meanings 
serve to continually negotiate what is understood as ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ over 
time. These continual evolutions lead to changes within cultural discourse, even when one 
representation is dominant within the public sphere. 
 
In exploring this negotiation of particular governmental discourses, Chapter ten will illustrate 
the manifestation of frameworks of exceptionalism within a case study of events at Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq. The case study will explore how Australian governmental authorities 
represented events of violence at the prison, and how these representations were negotiated 
by Australian newspaper reportage. The following chapter will suggest that frameworks of 
exceptionalism referred the meaning of governmental discourse to the moral superiority of 
the Coalition of the Willing. This was a way to exempt questionable actions from critical 
enquiry. This final chapter will also illustrate that the three discursive themes and their 
epistemological frameworks are linked within a governmental discourse representing post-
September 11 insecurity. Epistemological frameworks of ‘otherness’ representing sources of 
insecurity allow governmental authorities to suggest the legitimacy and authority of their 
actions in politically expedient discourses. Subsequent frameworks of legitimation and 
exceptionalism justified governmental responses to post-September 11 insecurity within 
representations of the moral and political authority of both governmental action and 
governmental actors themselves. All of these discursive themes are exist within interactions 
between media reportage that either confirmed or contested these representations are part of 
the ‘meaning’ of post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
Endnotes: 
 
1. President George W Bush first announced a ‘war on terror’ on September 20, 2001 
in the form of military action against the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the 
Al Qaeda network (Bush, 2001). The ‘war on terror’s’ ideological and physical goals 
were also extended within the US administration’s National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (NSCT) in February, 2003. The war on terror was declared against a 
“trans-national terrorist movement fuelled by a radical ideology of hatred, 
oppression, and murder” (NSCT, 2006). In the words of the US administration, the 
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strategy of the war on terror is to:  (1) Advance effective democracies as the long–
term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; (2) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks;  
(3) Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; (4) Deny terrorists 
control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and (5) 
Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures to carry the fight 
against terror into the future (NSCT, 2006). The ideological nature of the war on 
terror is explicitly expressed by the US administration claiming that the wars is 
involves both “a battle of arms and a battle of ideas” (National Security, 2007). Thus, 
the US administration has presented a particular discursive understanding of the war 
on terror, suggesting that “not only are we fighting our terrorist enemies on the 
battlefield, we are promoting freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the 
terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule” (National Security, 
2007). 
 
2. More recently, the Coalition of the Willing has committed its forces in Iraq to 
attempt to quell ‘sectarian tensions’ between Sunni and Shi’ite as part of nation-
building attempts in the region. With the war in Iraq fast becoming a political ‘poison 
chalice’, politicians recently arguing for the continuance of Coalition forces have 
attempted to steer representations of the war into discourses of nation-building and 
democracy (See Gawenda, 2007). 
 
3. In response to the 2003 inavison of Iraq, some of the biggest protests ever were held 
internationally. Australian protests saw almost 200,000 people take to the streets in 
Melbourne (Australia launches, 2003).  
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Chapter Ten 
A case study: Exceptionalism in the Australian governmental response to 
Abu Ghraib 
 
 
With the remains of the twin towers still smouldering in the background of global, broadcast 
media reports and the American public left reeling, the September 11 attacks seemingly left 
no space for President George Bush to contemplate anything other than retaliation (George 
Bush, 2001). A month later, the uncompromising ‘war on terror’ began, with US troops 
storming Afghanistan and Bush declaring there would be no distinction made between those 
who committed terrorist acts and those who supported them (George Bush, 2001). This 
military response to insecurity was legitimised by the exceptional moral authority of the 
Coalition of the Willing to forcefully impose democracy on ‘rogue nations’. On the 21st of 
April 2004, this clearly delineated discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was disrupted by a series of 
disturbing images. They showed US soldiers subjecting Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison 
to various abuses, from being photographed in sexualised poses, to vicious beatings. These 
images immediately showed the instability of discourses framed by the exceptional authority 
of the Coalition to enforce liberal values through warfare. This rift in governmental 
discourse allowed other cultural actors, specifically the media, to successfully contest broader 
understandings of war as an appropriate response to post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
This chapter will argue that frameworks of exceptionalism were subject to discursive 
processes of confirmation and contestation by newspaper reportage. This will be illustrated 
specifically through a case study of governmental response to events of abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. I will proceed firstly by illustrating the frameworks of exceptionalism that situated 
governmental response to claims of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. The second section of 
the chapter will illustrate that this response was subject to negotiation by media reportage.  
In particular, media reportage contested the conceptions of exceptional authority that had 
initially justified military action in Iraq. This contestation had two effects on governmental 
discourse. The first forced governmental authorities to respond to criticisms of their 
‘exceptional’ authority to utilise military force, and the second created negative 
representations of military action in Iraq that were often beyond governmental control.  
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The last section of this chapter will discuss governmental responses to negative media 
representations of the military war on terror. These illustrate the particular battles that were 
occurring between the two institutions to maintain dominance over a particular 
representation of meaning. Governmental authorities responded to alternate discourses 
presented within media reportage to stem any re-contextualisation of the way military 
responses to post-September 11 insecurity were understood. This discussion will be related 
to the broader thesis argument by showing that a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity 
has evolved through power relations between media and governmental authorities. This 
argument becomes evident in this chapter through the competition between the media and 
government to maintain particular understanding of exceptionalism in response to Abu 
Ghraib.  
 
Themes of exceptionalism and Abu Ghraib 
 
This chapter utilises the definition of exceptionalism suggested in the previous chapter to 
discuss governmental response to the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib.  Agamben’s ‘state 
of exception’ illustrated the strategies used by governmental authorities to suggest their 
exceptional right to use force against represented sources of insecurity. In this section I will 
illustrate that understanding of moral superiority was also used as an attempt to exempt 
governmental actors from critical judgement in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Where 
Agamben outlines the strategies of exceptionalism that suggest the legitimacy of 
governmental actions, Foucault’s notions of governmentality illustrate that this is a discursive 
technique that necessarily involves the exercise of power. This exercise of power is shown in 
the definition of the superior political actions of governmental authorities in opposition to 
their defined ‘others’. Any negative consequences of the war on terror are thus seen as 
aberrational in the context of the noble work of the Coalition building democratic principles 
within ‘rogue’ nations. 
 
While building democratic principles may well be the ambition for military personnel 
working in Iraq, this positive representation of military action is also an important discursive 
strategy to continually re-direct criticism from other cultural actors. These positive 
representations became increasingly important during the ongoing military operations and 
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conflicts in Iraq. Frameworks of exceptionalism situated an image of Coalition soldiers as 
noble fighters endowed with the responsibility of bringing democracy to the far regions of 
the globe. In opposition to the image of the terrorist ‘other’ described in Part Three of the 
thesis, the imagery of soldiers fighting for ‘our’ ideological principles is important because it 
suggests the notion of shared beliefs within constructs of nationhood. Anderson (1991: 143) 
has also suggested the image of the ‘noble soldier’ is historically linked to ideas of the 
nation’s unified ideology and spirit. For example, in Australian governmental discourses, 
Prime Minister Howard has been particularly enthusiastic about equating images of the 
Australian ‘digger’ with his representation of nationalistic values such as ‘mateship’ and a ‘fair 
go’ (See Das, 2005).  
 
In the previous chapter I suggested the terrorist threat defined by governmental authorities 
also works to justify legislative and militaristic responses as constitutive of national interest. 
It is the idea that these nationalistic constructions are worth dying for that makes soldiers 
seem the unassailable ambassadors of national identity. Therefore, discourses about military 
action often suggest the possibility of the soldier’s ‘ultimate sacrifice’ on behalf of the nation. 
This type of fatality is inscribed with moral purity.  As Anderson suggests, the soldier’s 
sacrifice is seen as the ultimate confirmation of the worth and importance of the nation 
(1991: 144). These somewhat nostalgic descriptions have afforded a faultless quality to the 
image of the soldier. For example, Douglas MacArthur’s description of the American soldier 
illustrates this idea of moral purity:  
 
I regarded him [the American man at arms] as one of the world’s noblest figures; not 
only as one of the finest military characters, but also as one of the most stainless. He 
belongs to posterity as the instructor of future generations in the principles of liberty 
and freedom (in Anderson, 1991: 10).  
 
This particular description shows that representations of the soldier are not just reflections 
of the people that serve in the military, but also particularly powerful conceptions of the 
constitution of national identity. 
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The powerful imagery of the noble soldier is often utilised within governmental discourses 
legitimating military action as part of the protection of nationalistic principles. Governmental 
action is presented in partnership with the soldier’s subsequent battle and sacrifice to protect 
national identity. Often this discourse will identify governmental actors through the imagery 
of soldiers, awarding them honorary medals of valour, or suggesting governmental 
authorities as the symbolic ‘leaders’ of armies. This representation ‘borrows’ from the 
symbolic moral authority of soldiers to present governmental action.  For example, in the 
lead up to the last presidential election, President Bush staged a media event where he was 
seen leaping from the cockpit of a fighter jet on a military carrier at sea in full fighter pilot 
uniform to promote his security policies (Goldstein, 2003). This image was aimed to reflect 
the noble machismo so historically revered in American military men. Furthermore, the 
image of a ‘triumphant’ Bush in election victory was meant to relate to leading the American 
military to victory in Iraq. Bush’s symbolic referral to the noble soldier invokes 
exceptionalism as justification for the Iraq War. 
 
But what happens to these grandiose images of moral superiority when alternative 
representations subject these traditional discourses to criticism? The photographs depicting 
abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib were disruptive to governmental representation of 
moral soldiers fighting a ‘moral’ war. This is because the photographs allowed criticism of 
established frameworks of exceptionalism within media reportage. The first images of Abu 
Ghraib were released by the New Yorker magazine in April 2004, showing evidence of abuse 
that had been occurring at the military prison since October 2003 [1] (See Hersh, 2004). The 
photos showed American soldiers involved in systematic physical and emotional abuse of 
numerous Iraqi detainees. Many of the photographs showed naked Iraqi detainees being 
humiliated in various ways, for example by being forced to wear women’s underwear . There 
were also disturbing depictions of guards using military dogs to intimidate detainees, 
positioning of naked detainees into simulated sexual poses, images of beatings, as well as 
images of grinning soldiers posing next to deceased Iraqis [2].  
Apart from the condemnation that the images of abuse warranted in the media, the Abu 
Ghraib scandal also presented an ideological schism for governmental discourses understood 
through the exceptional moral purity of Coalition soldiers liberating Iraq. This schism was 
further underlined by the location of the abuses. The pictures of abuse came from the same 
 263 
 
location that Coalition authorities claimed had been at the centre of Saddam Hussein’s 
atrocities against Iraqi citizens. In the face of deep-seated cultural belief, the photos of the 
noble American soldier revelling in the abuse of prisoners presented a sudden paradox in the 
governmental verbiage. Thus the ‘shocking’ aspect of the scandal was not just the abuse the 
photos contained, but also the sudden slippage in what seemed an unambiguous cultural 
conviction. As Thomas Friedman (2004) argues, with the discovery of the photos, 
Americans were: 
 
In danger of losing something much more important than just the war on Iraq. We 
[Americans] are in danger of losing America as an instrument of moral authority and 
inspiration in the world.  
 
The events of Abu Ghraib therefore created spaces for discourses about the war on terror 
that were not conducive to frameworks of exceptional governmental authority. This was 
problematic for governmental authorities because the conditions for acceptance of 
controversial actions are created through the continual maintenance of hegemonic 
discourses.  
 
The photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib created slippages in the epistemological framing of 
meaning according to exceptionalism. This created space for greater scrutiny not only of the 
images, but of governmental actions in the war on terror. For the Australian government 
trying to justify its involvement and alliance with the US on moral grounds, the photos were 
particularly damaging to the credibility of its actions. The representation of the Australian 
soldier’s (and the nation’s) ethos of mateship was mismatched with the representations of 
the unethical Abu Ghraib soldier. But more broadly, the images also created a schism in 
governmental representation of Australian soldiers helping ‘our mate’ build national 
principles of democracy in Iraq. This was problematic in that it contradicted the exceptional 
moral authority referred to by governmental authorities in justifying violent action in Iraq. In 
the face of international media condemnation, there were no guarantees that governmental 
struggles to re-establish dominance over particular discourses about the war on terror would 
succeed. Though the constant assertion of governmental authority through frameworks of 
exceptionalism is particularly powerful, it is evident that alternate discourses can negotiate 
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different understandings of these representations. This substantiates the argument that I 
have been establishing throughout the course of the thesis that power relations between the 
media and governmental authorities have contributed to the continual evolution of a 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. Representations of exceptional moral authority 
become unstable when exposed to alternate representations in the public sphere. Thus the 
positioning of military responses also becomes unstable as representative of the meaning of 
a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The next section will discuss how 
exceptionalism was utilised successfully by governmental authorities to respond to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal. 
 
The Abu Ghraib soldier versus the ‘true’ American soldier 
 
In responding to the events of Abu Ghraib, governmental authorities found that previous 
discourses representing the military war on terror were being increasingly scrutinised. 
Governmental authorities were forced to create new discursive responses to combat the 
effects of the derogatory images on the representation of the military war on terror. These 
responses were nonetheless hinged to epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism, given 
the need for governmental communication to seem consistent and united.  These new 
discursive responses had varying effects, given that they were now struggling against 
powerful alternative discourses in the media. This section will discuss one of the more 
successful discursive techniques used by governmental authorities to the Abu Ghraib 
scandal. This involved utilising exceptionalism to isolate the photographs and the acts they 
depict, from any interference that might have resulted to maintenance of governmental 
policy on the war on terror (Danner, 2005: 40). As I suggested in the previous chapter, 
governmental rationality consistently maintains a conception of the logic of governmental 
management of the state.  This was illustrated in governmental action to isolate discourses 
about the overall moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing from the actions of the 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib. This discursive strategy situated the Abu Ghraib scandal as an 
aberration within the overall logic of governmental action. 
 
Governmental actors thus distinguished the ‘true’ identity of the American soldier from the 
subversive ‘Abu Ghraib soldier’ in the media. The repetitive governmental message that ‘this 
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is not what American soldiers would do’ compared Abu Ghraib soldiers with the traditional, 
‘comfortable’ imagery of the ‘true’ American soldier (Abuse scandal terrible, 2004). This 
separation allowed the US government to communicate a repetitive but distinct message: 
while ‘we’ may have done the crime, the crime wasn’t ‘us’. To suggest that the abuses were 
‘American’ would be to discredit the frameworks of exceptionalism that situated the war on 
terror as part of the moral actions of Western nations. Indeed, the evidence of the abuses 
threatened the very foundations of the discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. This is 
because discourses about post-September 11 insecurity are structured according to the 
frameworks of exclusion and protection that constitute the nation in opposition to defined 
‘others’. Equating the protection of national identity with the abuses would imply the 
Coalition’s similarity to the themes of otherness used to describe the terrorist threat through 
which the war on terror was initially justified.  
 
To this end, governmental communication distanced the moral exceptionalism framing their 
discourses from the physical reality of the abuses. President Bush swiftly established this 
governmental position in press conferences saying: “Their [the prisoners] treatment does not 
reflect the nature of the American people” (US denies, 2004). His staff reinforced his views. 
The White House spokesperson went on to say, “It does not represent what we stand for” 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also said: “That is not how the American 
military acts” (Shock, outrage, 2004). Not surprisingly, when Prime Minister Howard was 
asked for his reaction to the images, he responded, “That is not the conduct that represents 
the attitude and the behaviour of the American military” (Howard, 2004a). Within this 
discursive response, the images of the  ‘Abu Ghraib soldiers’ were pitted against the well 
established and therefore, more ‘true’ representations of the American soldier. Separating the 
Abu Ghraib soldiers’ actions from the moral superiority symbolised by the American soldier 
allowed governmental authorities to isolate the politically unworkable images. 
 
Thus, the Abu Ghraib soldier was no longer an American within the governmental discourse 
responding to the Abu Ghraib scandal. The American soldier at Abu Ghraib also became 
‘Other’. The soldiers were described as uneducated and low-ranking officers whose 
individual characters, rather than the entrenched nature of their battalion or the orders of 
their superiors allowed them to revel in such inhumanity. These soldiers were ideologically 
 266 
 
separated from the exceptionalism inherent in the description of the culture of the American 
military and people. If discourses about the “true nature and heart of America” could not be 
morally wrong, then any behaviour that deviated from this discourse could not be publicly 
acknowledged as part of America (See Shock, outrage, 2004). While all the soldiers involved 
in the abuses at Abu Ghraib were American citizens trained to work in American armies, and 
were distinguished as American by their uniform and allegiances, their actions at Abu Ghraib 
denied them the moral superiority of being ‘American’.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, declared ‘states of exception’ create discursive systems 
of opposition where governmental authority is posed against its other (Agamben, 2005: 34). 
Communicating this opposition shows government as representative of democratic and 
juridical order while the ‘other’ is the collapse of that order represented by actions not 
conducive to governmental authority. In Part Three of this thesis, the ‘other’ was described 
as the terrorist responsible for post-September 11 insecurity. The Abu Ghraib scandal forced 
governmental discourse to create oppositions in discourse between the actions of the 
Coalition of the Willing and their own military. In a similar way, David Hicks was presented 
as a ‘terrorist other’ to justify the Australian government’s lack of response to his 
imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay. Creating a moral opposition between the ‘true’ American 
soldier and the Abu Ghraib soldier suggests that governmental discourse is presented as 
irrefutable even when their actions belie them. These oppositions frame a conception of the 
exceptionalism that governmental actors use to reject any of the damaging consequences of 
their actions.  
 
Creating media-saleable images and stories of aberrant Abu Ghraib soldiers as ‘other’ to the 
‘American way’ isolated the abuses from discourses about the overall moral authority of the 
Coalition of the Willing. As the ‘public faces’ of the scandal, Private Charles Graner and his 
girlfriend Private Lynndie England were deemed as ringleaders of the abuse. Details of their 
life were reported in the media—and used by governmental actors—to show the individual 
inhumanity of their actions. For example, Graner was described as a “sadistic” soldier who 
enjoyed the process of ‘softening’ the prisoners for interrogation (Serrano, 2005). He was 
said to have initiated much of the sexual abuse against the prisoners and disseminated the 
photos as “souvenirs of the fun” (Sontag, 2004). These descriptions of Graner—as well as 
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details of his affair with Private England—created images of a subversive individual rather 
than a culture of violence within his battalion. 
 
Out of the initial ‘gallery’ of 14 photos, five depicting Private Lynndie England were leaked 
to the media. The now infamous images of the diminutive 21-year-old Army reservist 
grinning while pointing to the genitals of a naked Iraqi man and another of her leading a 
crawling detainee with a dog lead have been pinpointed by the media as the most disturbing 
images of the scandal (Hersh, 2004). Similarly, during the court hearings before Private 
England’s trial, government prosecutors concentrated on showing England’s private life as 
the conduit for her adverse behaviour at Abu Ghraib. The details of her life were used as a 
response by government prosecutors to allegations that military investigators had sanctioned 
the abuses. She was allegedly repeatedly reprimanded for seeing her boyfriend when she 
should have been sleeping and apparently produced ‘sloppy’ work in her role as a desk clerk 
(Iraq abuse case, 2004). Media coverage of the trial subsequently concentrated on the 
salaciously newsworthy details of England’s private behaviour. During the trial, details of an 
alleged nude swim in her hometown and the exposure of her breasts near the face of a 
sleeping former colleague were often front-page news (Serrano, 2005). Finally, England’s 
pregnancy to her ‘partner-in-abuse’, Private Graner was shown as proof of her subversive 
sexual indiscretions and her new media title as “the trailer trash torturer who shamed the 
US” (Iraq abuse case, 2004; Riddell, 2004). 
 
Private Lynndie England’s actions at Abu Ghraib were represented as damaging not only to 
military operations in Iraq, but also to the nationalistic principles of the US. Simultaneously 
her actions excused the overall structures of military and government from scrutiny over the 
incident. As discussed in the last chapter, strategies of governance produce particular 
understandings of the conduct of the self and the subsequent prosperity of the state 
(Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 81). Foucault suggests that these individualising and totalising 
practices of governmentality present the ‘good’ behaviour of the individual as an imperative 
of a prosperous nation (Foucault in Burchell, 1991: 20). This good behaviour implies that to 
ensure the nation’s security, the successful state is dependent on the individual behaving 
within the best interests of successful governance. Private England’s ‘individual’ behaviour at 
Abu Ghraib was represented as betraying the well-being and prosperity of the nation’s 
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international ambitions. Her individualistic behaviour meant that the US government could 
lose control over the discourses perpetuating its moral superiority in the war on terror, and 
she was therefore rejected as un-American. 
 
Private England was presented as an aberrational soldier not only because of the abuses she 
participated in, but because she presented a schism in traditional descriptions of the military 
and government exceptionalism. Private England’s representation can be compared with 
media reportage of Private Jessica Lynch’s personal life to illustrate this point (The truth, 
2003).  Private Lynch was the subject of media scrutiny after a controversial, media-directed 
effort to rescue her in Iraq [3]. In the aftermath of the rescue, Private Lynch’s media persona 
incorporated a small-town upbringing and her proud family’s description of her noble 
reasoning in joining the military (The truth, 2003). This is the perfect extension of the Bush 
administration’s paradoxical prioritisation of non-violent, moralistic roles of American forces 
liberating Iraq. The careful management of Private Lynch’s rescue perpetuated of oft-
repeated images of male Coalition soldiers fighting for the freedom of the innocent or meek. 
The images of a grateful Private Lynch and victorious male colleagues could be used 
interchangeably with established discourses of the moral coalition forces using exceptional 
right to violence to liberate Iraq. 
 
In comparison, Private England’s representation illustrates governmental discourses about 
the aberrant behaviour of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib. The description of the ‘Other’ 
American soldier allowed their actions to be individualised to an extent that higher ranking 
military officers and indeed, the ideology of the Coalition of the Willing remained untouched 
in the wake of the scandal. This representation was seemingly confirmed by media reportage 
enamoured with the scandal of a barbaric woman. As long as the mainstream media 
focussed on the role England played at Abu Ghraib, less time was spent exploring the 
reports that the abuses were meted out on the orders of higher authorities. As Sheila Tarrant 
(2004) argues: 
 
In the end, the more attention the media gives to Lynndie England, the more it 
distracts from the fact that there were people in charge at Abu Ghraib with far more 
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training and responsibility than she had. Our outrage over England’s behaviour 
diverts our attention from the real issues at hand.  
 
This indicates that in reporting stories that are simply conducive to particular newsworthy 
qualities, the media confirm governmental discourses instead of subjecting them to further 
investigation.  
 
Referring back to the organisational constraints of the media discussed in Chapter Two, the 
tensions between the newspaper’s public role and its economic viability can often result in 
the confirmation of governmental discourse, rather than its investigation. Within media 
representation, the details of Private England’s life proved far more salient and accessible 
than investigation of knowledge of the abuses by higher ranking governmental officials. 
While this points to an impotency of media reportage of some issues, it also indicates the 
importance of the epistemological framing to governmental discourse battling against 
alternative representations in the public sphere.  This is because it shows that the framing of 
governmental discourse can sometimes be uncritically confirmed by media reportage, leading 
to the dominance of governmental representations of meaning in the public sphere. Cultural 
actors fight for dominance over the representation of meaning as it contributes to their 
authority in the public sphere. As the broader thesis has argued, these power relations 
between media and government contribute to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. These battles occur within power relations that have the potential 
to negotiate the meaning of particular discourses. As the next section of this chapter will 
illustrate, media contestation has effected the understanding of frameworks of 
exceptionalism underpinning military response to post-September 11 insecurity.  
 
 
 
Media response to the photos 
 
So far this chapter has suggested that governmental authorities were somewhat successful in 
representing the Coalition of the Willing in opposition to the aberrant Abu Ghraib soldier. 
Nonetheless, in the previous chapter I suggested that these discourses of exception are not 
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inviolable. In theorising exceptionalism Agamben’s work is useful in terms of illustrating the 
ways in which governmental power is situated as the political status quo. Foucault’s 
governmentality allows for a more complex and diffuse understanding of the ways in which 
governments maintain discursive power. Foucault’s conception of governmentality also 
allows for the contestations of other cultural actors to affect the ways in which governmental 
power is maintained. Response to Abu Ghraib illustrates the heterogenous ways in which 
governmental authorities attempted to retain discursive power, with some being more 
successful than others. Utilising Foucault’s notions of governmentality, we will now turn to 
discussion of exceptionalism as part of discursive techniques of governmental actors 
engaging in relations of power with the media.  
 
Though frameworks of exceptionalism necessarily involve the legitimation of governmental 
power, the representation of this power is not fixed. Governmental actors must continually 
‘argue’ for the dominance of their discourses in the public sphere, framing meaning through 
exceptionalism to represent their authority. The success of these discourses is often 
dependent on the contestation that other cultural actors forward. While the media confirmed 
the subversive representation of Lynndie England, not all governmental discourses were 
reported by the media. The dominance of governmental discourse regarding the otherness of 
the Abu Ghraib soldiers faltered when newspaper reportage critiqued the legitimacy of 
particular discursive claims of exceptionalism. This criticism began when Australian and 
American governments attempted to distinguish its own ‘violence of justice’ from the 
violence perpetrated by ‘terrorist others’ (Lewis, 2005: 225).  
 
Within this governmental discourse, the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib were distinguished 
from the atrocities that Saddam Hussein would have committed if the Coalition of the 
Willing had not liberated Iraq. As Prime Minister Howard (2004a) argued, the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib ‘paled in comparison’ to the treatment of prisoners under Saddam Hussein:  
 
People who did far worse than that under Saddam Hussein were promoted, they 
weren’t court marshalled. They were lauded, they were encouraged with an 
instrument of state policy to do far worse than to murder people and not just to 
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intimidate them, but to actually torture them and mutilate them and kill them. They 
weren’t court marshalled, they were applauded.  
 
With this statement, Howard refers to the systems of opposition that situate one nation’s 
actions as superior to their ‘others’. Despite indulging in the behaviour so derided in 
Hussein, these ‘exceptional actions in exceptional circumstances’ maintain the moral context 
of the Coalition’s presence in Iraq. In this way, American governmental responses could 
argue that the photos would upset “honourable, decent” Americans, while ignoring any 
discussion of the abuse of Iraqis (Best, 2004). This implies that the loss of the cultural belief 
of the Coalition of the Willing’s exceptional morality is a far greater problem than any of the 
abuses committed at Abu Ghraib. For example, Prime Minister Howard initially responded 
to the abuses by calling them a “body blow” to the Americans (Howard, 2004a) rather than 
reflecting on the suffering that the abuses would have caused.  
 
These governmental responses were largely critiqued by mainstream newspaper reportage. 
Though frameworks of exceptionalism were extremely powerful in referring meaning to the 
legitimacy of the war on terror, suggesting this moral authority to excuse the war’s negative 
consequences was not so easily justified in the public sphere. In the aftermath of the scandal, 
governmental authorities were forced to respond to unforeseen transformations of their 
discourses in the media. The images from Abu Ghraib presented a problem for 
governmental discourse because the ‘terrorist others’ could literally be seen as frightened, 
unarmed Iraqis being tortured and humiliated by a more powerful force. This was evident in 
newspaper reportage on the scandal that allowed former Iraqi detainees to share stories of 
the injustices meted out by their apparent liberators. For example, several media outlets 
prominently published interviews with former Abu Ghraib detainee Hayder Sabbar Abd, 
who said that he was beaten by investigators after he refused to masturbate in front of a 
female American soldier (GIs scoffed, 2004: 8; Fisher, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004). This 
particular story suggested that discourses about the Coalition’s exceptional authority over 
‘terrorist others’ was not justifiable. This is evident in the prominent publishing of Abd’s 
claim that “We were not insurgents. We were just ordinary people, and American intelligence 
knew this” (GIs scoffed, 2004: 8). 
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This re-presentation of governmental discourses in newspapers led to an evolution in the 
original representations of the war on terror. Power relations between governmental 
authorities and the media became increasingly competitive as each struggled to maintain a 
particular representation of the ‘meaning’ of the Abu Ghraib scandal.  This transformation 
in the representation of Abu Ghraib illustrates that alternate discourses presented by other 
cultural actors within the public sphere have consequences for the broader meaning of post-
September 11 insecurity.  This was evident in the widespread publication of alternate 
discourses about the legitimacy of the military war on terror in mainstream newspapers. 
Where governmental discourse had suggested that Coalition abuses would pale in 
comparison to Saddam Hussein’s atrocities, newspaper reportage transformed this discourse. 
Instead, one newspaper suggested that the photographs of American abuses “would do 
Saddam proud” (Mackay, 2004). Mainstream newspaper commentary could continually 
question the representations that had underpinned the legitimacy of governmental 
representation of the sources and responses to insecurity. In much of this newspaper 
reportage, governmental claims of exceptionalism were questioned. For example, The 
Australian critiqued the discourses that had previously legitimised the military war on terror:  
 
In George W. Bush’s speeches the evil-doers do the raping, the torturing, the beating 
and murdering while the US military does the noble thing and defends freedom. The 
reality is sometimes different (Eccleston, 2004: 7).  
 
This report suggested the physical realities of the photographs were mismatched with 
discourses originally about the exceptional moral authority of the Coalition of the Willing. It 
was this schism that allowed alternate discourses to become dominant in representing the 
war on terror. 
 
The dominance of alternate discourses became more evident through the changing tone of 
mainstream Australian newspapers. Whereas the media had previously pounced on the 
opportunity to demonise Private Lynndie England, one newspaper now proclaimed: “They 
want to put this [the scandal] on the reservist MPs and hope that this thing goes away. Well, 
it’s not going to go away” (Eccleston, 2004: 11). The dominance of critical newspaper 
reportage at this time suggests a change in power relations between governmental authorities 
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and the media. Media dominance of the representation of Abu Ghraib saw transformation 
of previous governmental discourse about the abuses as individual aberrations to the 
Coalition’s noble cause. To this end, finding ‘proof’ of systemic acceptance of the abuses 
within the military became a sole pre-occupation of mainstream newspapers.  
 
In a media story that already provided scandal and explosive imagery, the prospect of a high 
level conspiracy of violence created media interest that governmental authorities could not 
control. For example, interviews and court transcripts with the accused Abu Ghraib guards 
suggested that the soldiers had participated in approved methods of ‘softening’ the prisoners 
for interrogation by higher-ranking military intelligence officers. Private Ivan Frederick, a 
staff sergeant who was Private Graner’s superior at the prison said after pleading guilty to 
abuse at Abu Ghraib that “he had consulted six senior officers, ranging from captains to 
lieutenant-colonels, about the guards’ actions but was never told to stop” (Reid, 2005). Both 
American and Australian media outlets published Private Frederick’s testimony that senior 
officers had praised the guards’ ‘work’, and the defence’s claim that “Through all this [the 
accused] was following orders” (Reid, 2005). Media analysis was particularly interested in this 
theme of the soldiers following ‘higher’ orders, perhaps because of the highly saleable 
element of conspiracy. 
 
These claims were also valuable to media analysis attempting to frame the event within 
claims of a systematic culture of abuse at Abu Ghraib. This led to a re-presentation of the 
frameworks of exceptionalism that had situated governmental justification for military 
responses to post-September 11 insecurity. For example, Susan Sontag (2004: 27) suggested 
conversely to governmental discourse that the photographs were: 
 
… souvenirs of a collective action whose participants felt perfectly justified in what 
they had done because the structural allowance of violence in return for the greater 
good was an ideological standpoint of Bush and his coalition in justifying the war.  
These particular transformations of governmental discourse indicate the shifts that were 
occurring in their dominance over the representation of the military war on terror.  As the 
broader thesis has suggested, these alternate representations have consequences for how the 
broader meaning of post-September 11 insecurity evolves. This media negotiation of 
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governmental discourses demonstrates the broader thesis argument that power relations 
between the media and governmental authorities have contributed to continual evolutions in 
a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. As cultural actors battle for dominance over the 
representation of meaning, differing understandings of post-September 11 insecurity 
permeate the public sphere, causing the discourse to evolve over time.  
 
The changing power relations between governmental authorities and media outlets is 
similarly indicated by the lack of control that governments had in stemming public access to 
information about the extent of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. This was shown in the emergence 
of several leaked reports from high-level organisations, including the US defence force itself. 
This shows that the participation of different cultural actors in the public sphere can have 
damaging results for governmental hegemony over a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity. For example, a leaked 53-page US military report submitted by Major-General 
Antonio Taguba detailed widespread abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib, ranging from the forced simulation of sexual acts to sodomy. The report was 
submitted in February 2004, making several recommendations for the training and discipline 
of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Major-General Taguba also maintained that many of the 
systemic problems at Abu Ghraib were caused by lower level soldiers being tasked to set 
interrogation conditions for Military Intelligence Groups (Taguba, 2004). The legitimacy of 
these official reports, coupled with the explosive photographs of the abuse, allowed 
journalists to argue that the Abu Ghraib scandal was evidence of systemic violence within 
the US military. Journalists such as Seymour Hersh re-negotiated frameworks of 
exceptionalism within governmental discourses to argue that: 
 
The roots of the Abu Ghraib scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations of a few 
Army reservists, but in the reliance of George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld on secret 
operations and the use of coercion—and eye for an eye retribution—in fighting 
terrorism (Hersh, 2004).  
In this way, the meaning of governmental discourse is seen to be subject to the negotiations 
of alternate representations of meaning within the public sphere. These negotiations allowed 
previously dominant representations of responses to insecurity to become unstable and thus, 
open to the changes suggested by alternate representations in the public sphere. 
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As part of reporting this high-ranking knowledge of the Abu Ghraib abuses, media 
commentary turned on American defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Countless Australian 
and American media articles suggested that the “embattled” defence secretary had lost the 
confidence of the Bush administration and the American public [4] (Coorey, 2004: 37). 
Newspaper commentary also called for his resignation, suggesting his insensitivity had 
caused him to mismanage the war on terror. For example, newspapers reported Rumsfeld’s 
‘arrogant’ executive advice that the US government was not bound by international treaties 
or federal laws banning torture because President Bush, as ‘Commander in Chief’ could 
approve anything in the interests of national security (Coorey, 2004: 37). In the media, this 
manifestation of exceptionalism instead suggested the imperialistic arrogance and 
mismanagement of the war on terror. This was evident in the media re-conceptualisation of 
governmental suggestions of the noble soldier referred to by frameworks of exceptionalism. 
Newspapers reported on a string of public complaints from families of soldiers killed in Iraq 
that Rumsfeld had “not bothered” to personally sign the letters informing them of the 
deaths (Eccleston, 2004: 8). The machine-created signatures were condemned as 
“insensitive” by Congress after the White House confirmed that President Bush signed such 
letters himself (Eccleston, 2004: 8).  
 
Rumsfeld continued to refer to exceptionalism by suggesting that like ‘true’ American 
soldiers, he “is a survivor” (Eccleston, 2004: 13). Publicly dismissing calls for his resignation, 
Rumfeld situated himself as utilising the exceptional moral authority of the Coalition. He 
told US troops in Iraq: “Don’t let anyone tell you America is what’s wrong with the world. 
We’ll get through this tough period” (Coorey, 2004: 17).  Again suggesting that the abuses 
were perpetrated by a “few bad apples” in an otherwise glowing democracy, Rumsfeld 
denied any similarities with the ‘barbarism’ exhibited by their enemies (Howard, 2005). 
Though leaked media evidence suggested that some of the approved interrogation 
techniques did not meet Geneva Conventions, Rumsfeld essentially banned the use of 
torture to describe the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib because: “what has been 
charged thus far is abuse, which I believe is technically different from torture, and therefore 
I’m not going to address the ‘torture’ word” (in Sontag, 2004). This semantic challenge refers 
to traditional frameworks of exceptionalism. It situates understanding of the exceptional 
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moral authority of governmental action to work outside the norms of legality in order to 
bring these norms to the ‘inferior’ nation.  
 
As Agamben suggested in the previous chapter, governmental ‘unbounding’ of the legal 
limits for their actions must be continually justified in the public sphere. Similarly, Rumsfeld 
attempted to excuse the transgression of the rules of war by continually suggesting the 
exceptional circumstances and exceptional authority of the Coalition forces. Nonetheless, 
Rumsfeld seemed continually stifled by his inability to adapt frameworks of exceptionalism 
that were already contested by media reportage. Media criticism had cemented the damage 
done to the defense secretary’s representation as the manager of the war. When the 
Democrats wrested power from the Republicans in the 2006 mid-term elections, Donald 
Rumsfeld was forced to resign because of his association with the mis-management of the 
war in Iraq (Rumsfeld stepping down, 2006).  
 
We can further relate the media criticism of Rumsfeld to this chapter’s use of Foucauldian 
concepts of power. Within power relations between media and government, the authority to 
represent meaning can also equate to the authority of the cultural actor within the public 
sphere. As the broader thesis research has illustrated, the strategies to gain hegemony over 
meaning are heterogenous and indirect. The range of discursive tactics forwarded by 
governmental authorities such as Rumsfeld could also be negotiated in ways that are not 
always beneficial to governmental action. The media’s power is seen in the challenge its 
representation of discourses pose to governmental power to represent meaning in certain 
ways. As the Abu Ghraib scandal has illustrated, though governmental authorities often 
control the dissemination of political information, they cannot always control the way this 
information will be negotiated in the public sphere. The situation of discursive themes of 
terrorism, legislation and war according to particular epistemological frameworks attempts to 
create the political conditions that benefit governmental policy directives and actions. 
Nonetheless, they must struggle against alternate representations by other cultural actors.  
By suggesting new representations of Abu Ghraib, media reportage effectively negotiated the 
frameworks of exceptionalism that had assisted governmental authorities in justifying 
military responses to post-September 11 insecurity. Journalists like Susan Sontag suggested 
that the main issue of the Abu Ghraib scandal was not whether the torture was done by 
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individuals, but whether particular discourses have allowed the subjugation of those seen as 
Other to the ideal of western democracy.  In questioning assumptions of exceptionalism in 
the war on terror, journalists also critiqued governmental representations of the sources of 
insecurity. One journalist went so far as to ask: “Are we all torturers now?” (Wilkinson, 
2005). This particular article suggested that prior to Abu Ghraib, discourses of the Coalition 
of the Willing’s exceptionalism only showed terrorists as ‘torturers’ (Wilkinson, 2005). The 
question posed implies that the dominant cultural discourses can no longer be impervious to 
the psychological and physical violence so patronisingly condemned to the ‘Other’.  This 
enabled Susan Sontag (2004) to attribute the abuses to the discourses of insecurity that 
justified violent responses to demonised ‘others’. Within this understanding of governmental 
discourses, Sontag argues: “the photos are us” (Sontag, 2004: 42). They are representations 
of a discourse where frameworks of exceptionalism situated a cultural acceptance of violence 
against others. These alternate representations exist within the public sphere to struggle 
against governmental discourse in attempting to forward the this ‘meaning’ of the war on 
terror.  
 
As the violence continues in Iraq and governmental authorities become increasingly 
desperate to assure a sceptical public that war is the only acceptable response to terror, the 
affects of the Abu Ghraib scandal on discourses of insecurity are palpable. That the 
discursive tables could be so readily turned to expose the supposed liberators as also being 
the torturers demonstrates how important cultural processes of meaning making are to the 
understanding of material action. 
 
Governmental authorities have relied on epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism to 
justify a war on terror. This also links back to governmental use of otherness and 
legitimation to represent the sources of, and responses to post-September 11 insecurity. 
These frameworks situate understanding of discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and 
war. The framing of these discursive themes strategically situates and perpetuates 
governmental authority to represent meaning, and subsequently their authority to act. 
Nonetheless, these governmental strategies manifest as part of discursive struggles between 
cultural actors to maintain hegemony over meaning. These discursive struggles relate to the 
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power relations that this thesis has argued contribute to continual evolutions in a discourse 
of post-September 11 insecurity. 
 
The Abu Ghraib scandal has illustrated the ways in which discursive processes of 
confirmation and contestation by mainstream newspapers affects negotiation of 
governmental discourses. This is not to say that these forms of contestation necessarily 
equate to a change in governmental structures or actions. Instead this thesis has shown that 
the consequences of the simultaneously dependent and competitive power relations between 
the government and the media result in complex, contingent and individual evolutions in a 
discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The results of these relations can be seen in the 
challenge each cultural actor poses to the other’s power to represent meaning in certain 
ways, rather than their actual ability to act. The authority to represent meaning is fought over 
in the public sphere, which in turn sets the terms for future action. What this and the 
previous research chapters have thus established is that governmental discourse—no matter 
how dominant—is always subject to negotiation and contestation by cultural actors within 
the public sphere. 
 
As the final research chapter in this thesis, the Abu Ghraib scandal demonstrates the broader 
thesis argument regarding the representation of post-September 11 insecurity. This thesis has 
illustrated that particular discursive themes have been inherent in governmental discourse 
about the sources and responses to insecurity. The governmental narratives associated with 
Abu Ghraib have illustrated the inter-relation between the epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation, exceptionalism and otherness to situate understanding of the discursive themes 
of terrorism, legislation and war. We have seen through the various case studies presented in 
this thesis that these frameworks manifest within governmental discourses attempting to 
maintain a particular representation of the sources of, and responses to insecurity. While 
each case study has illustrated the heterogenous effects of these power relations, one 
outcome remains constant: the continual changes that these relations contribute to the 
understanding of discourse in the public sphere. Thus, this chapter illustrates the main 
contention of this thesis that power relations between the media and governmental 
authorities have contributed to evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity.  
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Endnotes: 
 
1. It has been suggested that US 60 Minutes were actually the first to receive the photos 
of the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib, but were concerned about the potential 
legal ramifications of airing the images. Governmental authorities had also asked for 
the program to be delayed, so that they could formulate a communications response 
to the scandal (See Hersh, 2004).  
 
2. Further digital photographs depicting British soldiers beating Iraqi civilians, and 
urinating on bleeding and unconscious Iraqis were subsequently uncovered (Mackay, 
2004). These proved to be a hoax. 
 
3. Private Jessica Lynch, then a 19-year-old supply clerk was injured after taking a 
wrong turn with her team in Basra and being captured by Iraqi forces. Eleven other 
soldiers in the company were killed in the attack. She was taken to an Iraqi hospital 
where US armed forces staged the first successful Prisoner of War rescue since 
World War Two. While her rescue was declared a triumph in the US media, 
subsequent investiagtion found that much of the detail of the capture and rescue 
could not be verified (The truth, 2003). In 2007, Lynch testified that she never fired 
her weapon at an enemy and was knocked unconscious when her vehicle crashed. 
She accused the US Government of fabricating her rescue to manipulate public 
opinion in favour of military operations in Iraq (Lynch, 2007). 
 
 
4. Rumsfeld subsequently faced calls to resign over the prisoner abuse scandal and 
claims that he allowed a ‘secret program’ of torture techniques on Iraqi detainees. 
Mainstream newspapers reported that Rumsfeld had approved the removal of 
clothing, forcing prisoners to stand for four hours, 20-hour interrogations, use of 
dogs to induce stress, 30-day isolations and the hooding of detainees (Eccleston, 
2004: 9). Newspapers also suggested Rumsfeld’s insensitivity by claiming that he had 
questioned why prisoners could not be made to stand for longer, given that he was 
on his feet for 8 hours during a workday (Ecclestone, 2004: 9). 
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Chapter Eleven 
Summary of major findings 
 
 
In the years that have passed since the events of September 11, 2001, numerous discursive 
shifts have led to evolutions of its meaning in the public sphere. Where it was once so 
powerful in justifying various governmental responses, the discourse of post-September 11 
insecurity seems to be the victim of changing political and cultural frameworks of 
understanding.  Most notable is the seismic shift against discourses of post-September 11 
insecurity in the US. As the political and cultural instigators of the global ‘war on terror’, US 
military operations in Iraq have now resulted in almost 4000 casualties. The war on terror 
has become immensely unpopular amongst the American public, with polling numbers 
consistently showing unwillingness to continue their acceptance of the war (Sevastopulos, 
2007). The self-proclaimed leader of the war on terror, George W. Bush seems destined to 
remain embattled and politically alienated for the remainder of his presidency. From 
recording the highest ever recorded approval rating of 90 per cent immediately after the 
September 11 attacks, Bush’s domestic approval rating has now slumped to a range between 
24-30 per cent, the lowest level for any sitting president. In the 2006 mid-term elections the 
Democrats won the House and gained a one-seat majority in the Senate. Media coverage of 
the lead up to next year’s presidential campaign has been dominated by Democrat hopefuls 
Hilary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, both publicly registering their opposition to 
continuing a war on terror. 
 
The US-led Coalition of the Willing also seems destined for an acrimonious divorce. British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair has been replaced by Gordon Brown, who has not continued 
Blair’s unreserved support for the war on terror. The Iraq war has also become deeply 
unpopular within the UK, and Brown has repeatedly distanced himself from ‘standing 
shoulder to shoulder’ with US policies on Iraq. British troops were pulled out of Basra in 
September, 2007, handing over control to Iraqi security forces in December. The 5,000-
strong British deployment in Iraq will be reduced to 2,500 from next year, with a timetable 
for full withdrawal being tabled in parliament.  
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In Australia, a new Prime Minister has been sworn in. After more than eleven years of 
Liberal party dominance, the political landscape seems set to change dramatically. Along 
with ratifying the Kyoto protocol and submitting a formal apology to Indigenous 
Australians, the new Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has stated that within his first 100 
days of government, he will draft a brand new defence and anti-terror White Paper. In the 
wake of an election won on issues of climate change, health and education issues and 
housing affordability, a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity, so politically expedient to 
the Howard government, seems to have lost its lustre. Four Australians have died fighting 
the war on terror. Given the increased contestation of the meaning of post-September 11 
insecurity, it seems only a matter of time before Rudd pulls Australian troops out of Iraq, 
having realised the final throes of its political acceptability. On December 21, 2007, Rudd 
and his Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon visited Australian troops in Iraq to tell them they 
will see out their rotation, but would not be replaced (Rudd’s diary, 2008). 
 
Summary of major findings 
  
If the introduction to this thesis asked how ‘post-September 11 insecurity’ became such an 
expansively accepted and legitimating political discourse, the conclusion must ask how and 
why this discourse has changed. The answer lies in the premise of this thesis that power 
relations between the media and governmental authorities has contributed to continual 
evolutions within a discourse of post-September 11 insecurity. The research in this thesis has 
illustrated this by discussing how governmental representations of terrorism, legislation and 
war have been negotiated by newspaper reportage. In focussing on the relations between 
governmental authorities and the media, this thesis is framed by the assumption that they are 
both critically implicated in influencing and producing meanings within particular cultural 
and historical contexts.  
 
This thesis focused on a discourse of insecurity underpinning overt governmental promises 
of security. It illustrated that the promise of security is never realised because it is forever 
constituted by the presence of threat. Security appears to be represented in governmental 
discourse through themes of exclusion and violence, justified by an exceptional authority to 
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perpetrate violence and transgress legal boundaries. In this respect, how can security be 
meaningful? Security, like insecurity is meaningful through its strategic deployment via 
discourse as a way of maintaining various forms and relations of power. Through the 
epistemological frameworks that situate understanding of sources and responses to 
insecurity, the authority of certain cultural actors is secured in the public sphere. The power 
to define security and insecurity is thus meaningful despite the abstract nature of the 
concepts. 
 
I have argued that Australian governmental authorities have attempted to perpetuate a 
particular discourse regarding post-September 11 insecurity. This has revolved mainly 
around discursive themes of terrorism, legislation and war. These discursive themes 
manifested as part of governmental attempts to create the conditions for a stable and 
politically expedient representation of the meaning of post-September 11 insecurity. I 
suggested that this occurs through the situation of these themes within particular 
epistemological frameworks of meaning.  
 
The research for this thesis was accomplished through the analysis of the epistemological 
frameworks through which governmental discourse is able to ascribe particular meaning to 
themes of terrorism, legislation and war. The research illustrated that these epistemological 
frameworks situated the ‘meaning’ of governmental discursive themes by continually 
referring to particular modes of understanding. In particular, frameworks of otherness, 
legitimation and exceptionalism were theorised as situating understandings of discursive 
themes. I suggested that epistemological frameworks situate understandings of sources of 
insecurity by referencing discursive constructs of the nation. This allows governmental 
discourse to suggest the threat that terrorist others pose to the ‘unity’ of the nation, in 
reference to the particular construction of a political status quo. This framework is also 
reinforced in representations of responses to insecurity, specifically through governmental 
action to protect the unity of the nation. To this end, terrorism, as a source of insecurity, was 
understood in terms of the threat to the unity of national identity and belief. Governmental 
responses to insecurity were understood in terms of their physical and political protection of 
these national values. 
 
 285 
 
Situating these arguments within the broader findings of the research, the thesis showed that 
each discursive theme forwarded by governmental authorities was subject to processes of 
confirmation and contestation by media reportage. Nonetheless these processes had 
heterogenous results on how the meaning of sources and responses to post-September 11 
insecurity were represented in the public sphere. For example, epistemological frameworks 
of otherness situated the representation of terrorism as the main source of post-September 
11 insecurity in Australia. In the case study focussing on the representation of David Hicks 
governmental discourse continually referred to understandings of nationhood and its 
protection against those who do not immediately fit within its description. Initial media 
reportage confirmed Hick’s representation as a terrorist other within suggestions of his 
betrayal of national interests and values. Subsequent reportage was much more dynamic in 
responding to changing attitudes towards Hicks and often led public contestation of Hicks’ 
incarceration at Guantanamo Bay. This case study showed that the relationship between 
government and media often functions on dependence, in that it is mutually beneficial to 
maintain a particular status quo that reinforces the institutionalisation of their roles in the 
public sphere. Nonetheless, both government and media engage in processes of meaning 
making in order to establish their own cultural power in the public sphere, and in this respect 
are also competitive with each other.  In this instance, the inability of governmental 
authorities to respond adequately to changing media opinion about Hicks has led to changes 
in his representation. 
 
With Hicks’ release from a South Australian prison, his representation as a terrorist, despite 
his conviction, sits unsteadily as the reason for his incarceration and trial at Guantanamo 
Bay. The politicisation of this discourse becomes evident when a suspect of terrorism, rather 
than a convicted criminal, is not afforded the rights of a civilian suspect but instead is 
assigned the illegitimacy of being an ‘unlawful combatant’. This contributes to evolutions in 
the understanding of terrorism as a source of insecurity. When the ‘others’ that 
governmental authorities represent as traitors to ‘our’ ideals are not dealt with according to 
those values, the ‘meaning’ of their representation becomes confused. This is because the 
inherent politicisation of terrorism becomes visible in the public sphere. Instead of being a 
discourse of protection, terrorism becomes blatantly ideological. The threat of terrorism 
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becomes much more difficult to imply when it accounts for the dissolution of the political 
and ethical values that governments suggest their actions uphold. 
 
Focussing on the representation of terrorism is also important because we can go on to 
suggest that responses to insecurity through the ‘war on terror’ are profoundly ‘discursive’ 
political acts. In moving to responses to insecurity, the thesis showed that legislative 
responses to insecurity have also been situated within epistemological frameworks of 
legitimation. Legitimation refers to the need and logic of governmental action. Therefore, in 
defining the threat to the Australian nation, governmental authorities subsequently 
attempted to situate their actions within understandings of their role as the protectors of the 
nation.  
 
Where the initial chapters showed effective contestation of governmental discourse, the case 
study on the introduction of the anti-terror laws illustrated that newspaper reportage often 
had heterogenous effects on the representation of meaning in the public sphere. This 
heterogeneity was analysed within a broader understanding of the relationship between 
government and media to represent themes of post-September 11 insecurity. In this case 
study, newspapers were bound by certain cultural, political and social understandings of their 
role within the public sphere. Different newspapers were somewhat stifled by the haphazard 
ways they could present meaning. Each newspaper was in competition with the other, with 
particular economic and political subjectivities affecting the way ‘the media’ was seen to 
represent meaning. This concluded in a somewhat weaker contestation of the need for anti-
terror laws, allowing their introduction into law relatively smoothly.  
 
Though the anti-terror laws were enacted successfully by the Howard government, they have 
only been used sparingly since the arrest of the ‘Barwon 13’, who were the first to be 
arrested with the new laws on suspicion of planning an imminent attack on Australia. Given 
that the Labor government supported the implementation of the legislation, there seems 
little reason for the incumbent government to now change the laws. The representation of 
legislation as an effective governmental response to post-September 11 insecurity has thus 
survived relatively unscathed. Nonetheless, the intensity and breadth of the laws continues to 
 287 
 
be open to negotiation by other cultural actors. To this end, activist groups such as Civil 
Rights Defence have highlighted seemingly excessive use of the laws in regard to the Barwon 
13, though this has not been reported in the mainstream media. Lawyers for the group have 
asked for a stay in proceedings, suggesting that the conditions on their imprisonment are 
having a detrimental effect on their psychological well-being. At the time of writing, Judge 
Bongiorno had asked prosecutors to explain the “oppressive” conditions of the group’s 
remand (Cowan, 2007). What this illustrates is that processes of confirmation and 
contestation have heterogenous effects on the evolution of discourse. While the political 
status quo of legislation as an appropriate governmental response to insecurity has continued 
in the public sphere, the representation of what this legislation should actually constitute 
continues to evolve. 
 
The chapters discussing legitimation focussed on governmental actions, though this was 
placed within larger understandings of the justification of governmental authority itself. In 
the final chapters the thesis illustrated that a broader understanding of governmental power 
and authority is important in situating the meaning of specific governmental actions in 
response to insecurity. To this end, frameworks of exceptionalism shifted the focus from the 
actions implemented in response to post-September 11 insecurity, to those who act.  
Epistemological frameworks of exceptionalism situated governmental authorities’ 
exceptional right to the use of force against represented sources of insecurity. A case study 
of governmental response to Abu Ghraib showed finally the intense competition between 
media and government in attempting to secure a hegemonic representation of insecurity. 
This exposed the representation of meaning as a highly politicised process with high stakes 
for the cultural authority of each institution. Indeed, the Abu Ghraib scandal did irreparable 
damage to governmental discourses justifying the war on terror on moral grounds. Even 
President Bush later admitted that the Abu Ghraib scandal was a turning point in 
maintaining acceptance of the military operations in Iraq (Bush, 2006a). The sustained 
negative coverage of the event merged with criticism of the military operations in Iraq to 
question the overall legitimacy of a military war in response to abstract notions of terror. 
This has led to the biggest evolution of all the discursive themes, to the extent that a military 
war on terror is no longer politically bankable as a discourse.  
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The findings of this thesis relate more broadly to arguments I made about power relations 
between governmental authorities and media reportage as two cultural actors fighting over 
the representation of meaning in the public sphere. The manifestation of epistemological 
frameworks as conducive to ‘meaning’ illustrates that representations of insecurity are not 
‘facts’. Rather, governmental authorities present discursive strategies alongside alternative 
discourses presented by other institutions, organisations and individuals. These 
representations (and their presented meanings) are open to challenge through both physical 
modes of resistance, and the discursive battles over meaning that occur in language when 
certain groups present differing representations of events. 
 
We see then that both institutions act according to various freedoms and constraints in 
attempting to represent dominant meaning in the public sphere. The appearance of media 
contestation can sometimes disguise a deeper confirmation of the political status quo. 
Similarly, governmental authority acts within an imperative to secure itself as the protector 
of forms of national identity. Mainstream newspaper reportage often operates within a much 
broader context of consensus about the sources and responses to insecurity and only 
contests the minute details of how governmental action should be constituted. When it is 
really the constitution of insecurity itself that must be debated, newspaper reportage is often 
limited to contesting its everyday manifestations. This was illustrated in this thesis in the 
successful initiation of governmental action such as the Iraq War and sedition provisions in 
the anti-terror laws despite broad media contestation. 
 
Nonetheless, governmental representation of discourse is not suggested as dominant in this 
thesis. The research has shown that both cultural actors have a stake in the representation of 
meaning as a way to secure power, and governmental authorities are not exempt from this 
need. Governmental authorities are constrained by their need for public acceptance of their 
discourses as a united stance against post-September 11 insecurity. Through the case studies 
we have seen that governmental mobilisation of discursive strategy is often an attempt to 
shield their discourse from contestation by other cultural actors. Governmental authorities 
recognise the damaging potential that alternate representation of meaning has to the 
authority of their actions. If audiences begin to understand meaning in ways that differ from 
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what is being suggested by government, or in ways that suggest their manipulation of power, 
scepticism or resistance may occur. As I have already suggested, this tension of 
governmental interests creates gaps in discourse where other representations can be 
presented as alternatives to dominant discourse. It is these processes that have allowed the 
thesis to illustrate its primary argument that power relations between the media and 
governmental authorities have contributed to the continual evolution of a discourse of post-
September 11 insecurity. I will now turn to discussion of how this argument could be 
implicated in future research. 
 
Implications for further research 
 
The initial justification in beginning this project was to further elucidate the contestability of 
seemingly dominant cultural discourses. In emphasising the possibilities for evolution in 
discourse, the premise of this thesis was to suggest the possibilities for other cultural actors 
to forward alternate representations of meaning within the public sphere. There are no 
monoliths within the discursive representation of culture.  There is no perfect representation 
of meaning, no cultural actors who do not work against certain cultural, economic and 
political constraints and no discourse that cannot be challenged. Therefore, the choice of the 
word ‘evolution’ in the primary argument of this thesis was deliberate, to suggest that these 
battles over meaning are ongoing. The analysis attempted to posit the ‘meaning’ of insecurity 
as a concept that is continually contested, subjective and reproduced according to the 
cultural specifications of a certain time and context.  
 
To do this, my starting point was to define the way we construct understandings of 
insecurity within culture. I wanted to do this in contrast to the realist viewpoints espoused by 
governmental authorities suggesting that insecurity was a “state of mind akin to fear”, or that 
humans are “conditioned to fight insecurity” (Richardson, 2005: pg 2). I did not want to 
suggest that insecurity is an unavoidable condition of living within the nation-state. Instead, 
the importance of the proposed research is that it places insecurity firmly within a politicised 
framework of discursive definition and negotiation. In this sense, security and insecurity exist 
within a network of practices and techniques that both influence understanding of certain 
 290 
 
behaviours, events and people. This highlights the importance of the relationships of power 
within culture and the discourses they deploy while advancing their contending claims for 
public consent and legitimacy.  
 
This thesis is part of a much larger intellectual discussion about how to understand security 
and insecurity in the post-September 11 era. In the thesis I discussed the various approaches 
to the analysis of security and insecurity, mostly focussing on political and media studies 
approaches. My own research has tried to navigate between political theory, media studies 
and cultural theory to find a mode of cultural criticism that may provide a method for 
increased political action. The theoretical frameworks pursued in this thesis would be 
beneficial to future research particularly in media studies. Such research could take from the 
processes of confirmation and contestation presented in this thesis as the starting point for 
discussion about sustaining more effective political and investigative media reportage. 
 
 While analytical work about the effectiveness of media reportage in the political arena is well 
established, I believe further work into journalistic process itself may yield more interest. In 
particular, the case studies in this thesis focussed on journalistic processes of reporting 
according to news values. The use of news values has long been forwarded as the journalistic 
approach to reportage.  Nonetheless, strict adherence to news values was shown in the case 
studies to stifle effective contestation of governmental discourse. For example, salacious 
reportage of Private Lynndie England’s personal life interrupted investigative work into the 
depth of knowledge of abuses at Abu Ghraib further up the US military hierarchy. Perhaps 
future research might turn a critical eye towards contemporary news values. Taking into 
consideration globalised, multimedia modes of contemporary news-making, questions might 
be asked about the nature and effectiveness of news values. 
 
As one particular relationship of power within culture, governmental discourse and its 
representation within the media is especially interesting. The interplay between the two 
cultural actors illustrates the instability and evolution of meaning and the inevitability of ‘a 
struggle for signification’ (See Hall, 1976). When ‘public’ opinion is included in this interplay, 
the inherent complexity of meaning making in culture is exposed. It also exposes the power 
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that public opinion has in negotiating the way governmental discourse is gradually 
understood. While governmental action is not necessarily deterred by public contestation, 
further research could discuss effective modes of counter-discursive action in the public 
sphere. This is already being anticipated by work in media studies on the effectiveness of 
trends towards citizen journalism, hyper-local journalism and the blogosphere in negotiating 
dominant cultural discourses.  
 
More research into media audiences seems warranted here, especially in defining the 
relationship audiences have with media in effecting particular political understanding and 
action.  Ien Ang’s seminal work on audiences defined the conceptual parameters for 
understanding how audiences make meaning utilising the media. Audience reception studies 
have proven to be difficult territory for academics and generalisations about how audiences 
understand meaning still abound. This thesis was very careful not to make assumptions 
about how audiences might be influenced by governmental or media communication. The 
implications of this research point to further discussion of how the relationship between 
media, government and audience might be defined in terms of affecting political action. The 
anticipated benefits to the community would be the contribution to understanding of the 
ways dominant social and cultural narratives are shaped by representation. This is the 
starting point for understanding how to effectively contest and dismantle the justification of 
exclusion and violence that have recently permeated discourses about the September 11 age. 
 
Conclusion 
Since September 11, 2001 the Coalition of the Willing has told us that we are at war. But this 
war, given the nature of the enemy, is a war with no foreseeable end. In this war, the 
terrorists are abstract and ubiquitous threats to our freedom. The ‘freedom fighters’ are 
represented by a political status quo, a governmental authority protecting our national 
identity through violence and surveillance. The war on terror is a war as metaphor, where 
depending on the threat, people are represented as ‘with us or against us’. The problem is 
that the effects of real wars are not metaphors. Real wars have a beginning and an end, as 
well as real losses, hurts and burdens. The other problem with a discursive war is that it 
cannot be won. Our representation of events as terrorism and people as ‘enemies’ will 
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continue for as long as we understand them in this way. Not even history will win a 
discursive war because its meaning is changeable. Those who were once called terrorists by 
those they opposed can be re-labelled by history.  
When the Coalition governments declared a war on terrorism they were attempting to give 
themselves permission to limitless power. The only brook to this flow of power is 
understanding of the cultural sphere in which it operates. To this end, constantly referring to 
insecurity is not a successful political tool in the long term because it normalises a sense of 
threat within culture, without providing a material assurance of safety. When the need for 
this constant awareness of insecurity does not seem justified, the public grows suspicious of 
governmental action. What a discursive war declares is that the enemy is only as you 
understand it. Over time, meaning evolves, and the ephemeral nature of insecurity will not 
seem like a good enough reason to rid ourselves of the very values we hope to protect.  
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